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My dissertation is a Feminist contribution to Environmental Political Theory focused on 
temporality. My research investigates the tension between the urgent need to act fast in a 
fast-changing world, and the necessity for time to pause and think through such radical 
and rapid changes. As it signals our nearing the planet’s limits, the emergence of the 
“anthropocene” crisis challenges growth-driven “progress.” 
 I begin this dissertation with a survey of Environmental Thought that helps situate 
my contribution to the ongoing debates in this field, underscoring that as ecosophers pose 
the question of the nonhuman, in so doing they also are confronted with problems related 
to temporality. Then, building on the concept of “utopia,” I critique a temporality that 
assumes infinite growth on a planet with finite resources, while constantly postponing its 
promises of abundance to an impossible future. The concept I propose is “uchronia”: 
growth-driven progress is a timeless (ou-chronos), dangerously idealized (eu-chronos) 
temporality, just like “utopia” refers to both a “nowhere” place and an “ideal” place (ou- 
and eu-topos). I draw from Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return to problematize 
teleologies of progress: the eternal return prompts us to live our lives as though we were 
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prepared to re-live them eternally.  
 
 In contrast with uchronia, alternative, queer eco-temporalities – I call these “anti-
uchronia,” “heterochronia,” and “synchrony” – build upon and radicalize sustainability. 
However, not all “eco-temporalities” – alternatives to the hegemonic, in-crisis 
temporalities – constitute themselves as non-linear or radical – i.e not all of them are 
queer: I have also coined the concept of “counter-uchronia” to describe certain 
understandings of “sustainable growth,” justifications of geoengineering and carbon 
markets creation, as well as primitivist (often virilist) environmentalist discourses which 
respectively advocate the “return” to a golden past of harmony with (often feminized) 
“Nature,” or technofixes and green capitalism to amend and resume growth-driven 
progress’ uchronian course.  
 To advance this conceptual framework, I offer close readings of environmental 
science fiction stories, activist manifestos, graffiti art, performing arts including 
contemporary dance and circus, as well as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
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JUST A MATTER OF TIME 
 
A seer, a purposer, a creator, a future itself, and a 
bridge to the future – and alas! Also as it were a 
cripple on this bridge. (…) To redeem what is past, 
and to transform every “It was” into “Thus would I 
have it!” (…) “It was” : thus is the Will's teeth-
gnashing and lonesomest tribulation called. 
Impotent toward what hath been done – it is a 
malicious spectator of all that is past. Not backward 
can the Will will; that it cannot break time and 
time's desire – that is the Will's lonesomest 
tribulation. (…) That time doth not run backward – 
that is its animosity; “That which was”: so is the 
stone which it cannot roll called.” 




Urgent Matters, Time and Again 
 
“It’s Not Too Late!” was Greenpeace’s slogan in one of its worldwide campaigns a 
couple of years ago, in a formulation symptomatic of the urgency often omnipresent in 
environmentalist discourse. Since 1992 when 12-year old Severn Suzuki spoke to the 
United Nations Earth Summit in Rio, many environmentalist images and events have 
relied upon children as the symbols of “future generations,” to the point that this phrase 
has practically become idiomatic in environmentalist talk. The slow movement’s ranks 
are growing, defending lifestyles that would break away from the fast speeds and paces 
of late modern life. Degrowth and conviviality-oriented environmentalists take clocking, 
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the work week, the work day as well as “free time” as their targets to argue in favor of 
“liberated time,” in what they denounce as a “speed society” (Illich, 2013). This comes 
with denunciation of consumerism and commodities’ planned obsolescence, critiques 
pointing out that the only good consumer is a never-satiated one, this state always 
postponing satisfaction to an abstract future which won’t and should not be reached, but 
always desired. Activists often also involved in the slow movement create “time banks” 
everywhere to turn away from the capitalist markets and to barter skills, activities, labor 
with hours as the bartering unit rather than money.  
 Geologist Paul Crutzen has offered the idea to invent a new “epoch” in geology’s 
periodization of Earth history, to designate the current one as distinct in that human-
caused markings will come to predominate the lithosphere: thus, we are told, the 
“anthropocene” may have begun, and a hypothetical deep future geologist would be able 
to read Earth’s history to see its anthropogenic scars – granted geology as a science 
produced by humans is as unlikely to exist as humans are, in this posthuman future 
(Colebrook, 2014). Thousands of researchers worldwide wonder and debate about when 
exactly to situate the start of such epoch, while some wonder about the meaning of the 
convergence of Gaia and the human calendars (Colebrook, 2014; Chakrabarty, 2010; 
Hache, 2010; Gibson-Graham, 2011). Both to dramatize the destruction associated with 
the “anthropocene,” and as an attempt to make sense of Earth’s deep time in relation to 
humans,’ geologists translate deep time by explaining that if the Earth’s old age was 
converted into an annual scale, humans would have made their appearance at the last 
minute before midnight on New Year’s Eve.  
 
 3 
 The world’s largest and most cited panel of scientists and the only one ever to 
have won a Nobel Peace Prize, a.k.a the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC), produces periodic reports synthesizing all climatological data available regarding 
past millenia of climate trends into computer-modelized futures, subsequently making 
recommendations for present world leaders. One of the most cited marking points for the 
origins of the contemporary environmental movements is 1962, the date of publication of 
Rachel Carson’s now world-famous Silent Spring, in which, to denounce the 
omnipresence of toxic pollutants in daily life in the United States, the author opens her 
essay with the description of a dystopian, imagined future Spring where no more birds 
will be able to sing.  
 
 Slowing down, before it’s too late, because it’s urgent, to take care of future 
generations, to avoid apocalyptic futures, to imagine other futures, given the new epoch 
and new calendars on Earth’s deep time, while humans have been Earth dwellers for a 
second, while capitalism took a split second to emerge, and while greenhouse gases 
destructive of the holocene atmosphere proliferated in about the same split second: these 
claims may all be coming from environmentalist voices, but they have something else in 
common as well. They are injunctions, invitations to rethink temporality, to conceptualize 
and experience time differently. 
 
 The other most cited date used to mark a starting point for contemporary 
environmentalist movements is 1972. Ten years after Carson imagined future Springs as 
gloomily silent, the now-famous Limits to Growth report used computer models designed 
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to imagine the future, a bit like the IPCC’s modelizations: in this case, the data treated 
was focusing on the (impossible) relationship between exponential growth of economic 
production and linear growth of access to natural resources. On the basis of this scientific 
evidence and many other symptoms of resource depletion, possible scarcity, current 
pollution and ecological damage of all sorts, environmentalists everywhere mobilize to 
denounce risks and consequences involved in “going beyond limits,” “passing critical 
tipping points,” beyond “thresholds,” sometimes accompanying their urgent warnings 
with dramatic end-times descriptions. Here acting in concert against climate change and 
ecological catastrophe takes the form of attempts at finding the right moment, again, 
before “it’s too late,” as long as “it’s not.” 
 In 1987, the United Nations’ World Commission on Environment and 
Development published its now famous “Brundtland Report,” which was titled Our 
Common Future, and which tied the already temporally-connoted term “sustainability” 
with the idea of “future generations” : “sustainable development” was defined here as 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and 
Development, 1987). Environmentalist activists keep calling for taking into account the 
long term as well as the short term (many refer to capitalist markets as characterized by 
“short-termism”), accusing capitalist growth of being blind to the former, and defending 
de-growth. The climate crisis forces distinctions to be made between the weather (short 
term) and climate (long term). It invites deep time into fast-paced lives, as it becomes 
ever more threatening when visible not only in climate trends, but also in weather events. 
But though global warming has long seemed ever too fast and vast to act upon, it turns 
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out to be simultaneously (paradoxically) so slow, gradual, non-linear as to be the target of 
(heavily right-wing funded) “skepticism.” Though Louisiana’s territory is sinking at a 
rate described as “the equivalent of one football field every hour,” and though dramatic 
weather events cause sudden accelerations in damage in specific locations, U.S 
politicians and international summits react ever so slowly, if at all. Just like the sixth 
extinction under way, the imperceptible, slow and erratic acceleration of climate change 
causes Gaia theory inventor James Lovelock to wish a sudden and catastrophic event 
would give it a sufficiently palpable, urgent nature, so as to provoke “blood, sweat and 
tears” emergency action. Urgency sometimes turns to despair, outcries and frustration, 
and the risk of a failure to think critically: in an album dedicated mostly to global 
warming, Radiohead singer Thom Yorke sings: “there is no time… to analyze… to think 
things through… to make sense.” Thus the singer underscores the tension between needs 
for rapid changes in the face of a rapidly yet to an extent imperceptibly developing event, 
and the need to take the time to “think things through.” On another end of the 
environmentalist spectrum, the Climate Reality Project, founded by Al Gore (who also 
offers “Earth Inc.” and such green capitalist ideas, thus the distinct positioning compared 
to a more radical environmentalist like Thom Yorke), has initiated the “24 hours of 
reality” event organized around “24 reasons to hope” and “24 reasons to believe.” 
Banners on the events’ website claim: “now is our time!” 
 Post-apocalyptic movies proliferate, most with ecological catastrophe as their 
moment of dramatic shift. Some (perhaps not enough of “us”) worry about how to signal 
to future generations of human and nonhuman beings that they should not dig up the 
nuclear waste that has been and still is being accumulated over the last half century, 
 
 6 
designing impossibly universally decipherable monuments and atemporal or allegedly 
deep temporal warning signs supposed to be understood by species and beings radically 
unknown to us, separated from us by 10, 000 years. Along with its desperate attempts at 
communication, this potential anthropogenic mass destruction into deep time inaugurates 
a new kind of unknown and a new kind of unimaginable.  
 To highlight urgency, new forms of clocks are called upon and performatively tell 
a new time (Bastian, 2012): the doomsday clock, created in 1947 by the Bulletin of the 
Atomic Scientists (BAS) as a way to quantify the likelihood of “the end of time” (mass 
destruction) approaching, has been coming closer to its symbolic midnight to incorporate 
not only risks related to nuclear catastrophes – the most pressing possibility of ecological 
destruction when this clock was initially invented, but also climate change and other 
ecological disasters. The “One Hundred Months project” is a similar instance: in August 
2008, the New Economics Foundation started its hundred-months’ countdown to the 
moment when action to prevent the Earth’s average surface temperature from increasing 
above the threshold of two centigrades would not be possible anymore. Granted, the 
hundred months project’s accuracy is already challenged as the calculations supporting 
our passing 2 centigrades one hundred months from August 1st, 2008, was based upon the 
estimate that the atmosphere’s concentration in CO2 would go beyond 400ppm (parts per 
million) at the end of December 2016,1 a threshold that was in fact passed in April 2014.2 
Though the clock is still ticking on the campaign’s website (“100 Months,” 2015), before 
                                                        
1 See more detail on the calculations that initially informed the hundred months’ project at 
http://www.neweconomics.org/page/-/files/100_Months_Technical_Note.pdf; retrieved July 13, 2015. 
2 Though the carbon dioxide concentration has never been so high in human history, and only reached such 
levels anywhere from 800,000 to 15 million years ago, this level remaining as high is subject to seasonal 
fluctuation: 2015 is suspected to become the first time when the 400 ppm threshold will have been passed 
on an annual average.  
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the 100 months countdown expired, the Hundred Months Project was already the 
obsolete marker of a beaten race against time.  
 Other resorts to time warning us about ecological disaster take a calendar rather 
than a clock form: each year, Earth Overshoot Day marks the approximate date when 
humanity’s resource consumption for that year exceeds Earth’s capacity to regenerate 
those resources that year (in 2014 this occurred on August 19th). Also designed by the 
New Economics Foundation and widely campaigned about by the Global Footprint 
Network, Earth Overshoot Day performatively simplifies and dramatizes the ecological 
debt to provide it with a temporal measurement, qua the following equation: the world 
biocapacity is divided by the world ecological footprint, and the result is multiplied by 
365 days. The result is an estimation of when “humanity” (here performative time-telling 
flattens unequal contributions and effects of this situation across different humans and 
nonhumans) starts living off the Earth on a credit which future generations will allegedly 
have to refund one day. Time will tell when.  
 Some argue in favor of a “return” to a supposed past when humans allegedly lived 
in harmony with nature. Many denounce the paces and speeds of the digital age, the car 
culture, globalization and its fast flows. Progress, this arrow that – once upon a time – 
used to provide the direction of modernity, is everywhere questioned by planetary limits 
and what some refer to as “the eruption of Gaia” (Hache, 2010; Stengers, 2009) in a 
volcanic metaphor which rhetorically impresses the reader or interlocutor as signifying a 
sudden emergence, an event, a surprise, and again, urgency, a state of emergency. This is 
so to the point that philosophers now studying ecology and politics have resorted to 
provocations – demonstrations – formulated in the past perfect: “we have never been 
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modern” (Latour, 1991). Not only ‘sustainability’ but also ‘renewability,’‘recycling,’ 
evoke ideals of perennity, of taking the long term, or at least, future generations into 
account, making new from the old and from the present without damage to the future, 
maintaining and supporting resources so as to promote their endurance, transforming 
trash so that it can cycle back and again, repeating use and privileging the perennial and 
the enduring rather than a consumerist and destructive ephemeral. 
‘Conservation,’‘preservation,’‘restoration’ are terms often used by yet other strands of 
environmentalisms, and which posit a pristine wilderness, a “nature before man” both in 
the sense of chronological preceding and prioritization in terms of importance. 
Conserving and preserving, a bit like sustainability, connote endurance, longevity, and 
restoration emphasizes a return, a reconstruction of the alleged past health of a lost 
wilderness. Times of ecological crises are times when time becomes an urgent matter. 
 
 This dissertation is titled Time to Leave Uchronia. “Uchronia” is a concept I have 
coined3 to synthesize a number of notions and arguments in ecosophy, and add to these 
debates as I argue that capitalist temporalities rely upon a timeless time, one that 
presumes, values and desires (and values the desire for) infinite growth on a finite planet, 
and one which promises abundance for all who deserve, satiety in an impossible, 
unattainable and untenable future that subjects the present. As I will further explain 
                                                        
3 Though I have indeed coined this concept, I am not the first to deploy this neologistic term. The word 
“uchronia” has sometimes been used to designate a micro-literature, a sub-genre within science fiction that 
imagines different past worlds based on a re-writing of history. My conceptual ruminations have lead me to 
build the term “uchronia” as a mirror to “utopia” stressing temporality instead of spatiality, without my 
initially being aware of this neologism’s preexistence. The previous use is obviously very distinct than the 
meanings I ascribed to my own concept here. 
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below, while utopia is built on “eu-topos” (the “good place” in ancient Greek) and “ou-
topos” (a place that is no-where), uchronia is the ideal(ized) time which has no time.  
 But uchronia, capitalism’s ideal and idealized time, has recently encountered a 
new crisis. For the most part, capitalism’s temporal horizon has been clouded with 
stormy clouds since inception, in spite and because of some blind and blinding discourses 
that imagined a sun that in fact never shone there. The promises and limitlessness carried 
have notoriously not been kept or upheld, as the poor, many women, many minorities, 
and capitalism’s myriad “others” could easily see. Today, another dimension of this 
world bears witness to this reality, a dimension which some have named Gaia, Nature, 
the environment, the mesh, climate, the biosphere, the planet. This takes the form of 
lithospheric scars that will testify of an age some have called the anthropocene, all the 
way into a deep future very different from uchronia’s bright and shiny growth future, 
though deep future could indeed be bright and shiny for quite a moment – again, quite 
differently so. With this event, I argue it is about time to leave uchronia, that we need to 
take the time to leave uchronia, and that this is the right time to leave uchronia. This 
requires the (ongoing) emergence or eruption of alternative temporalities, ones that would 
make human and nonhuman lives livable.  
 My argument is a Feminist intervention in Environmental Political Theory (thus 
the subtitle of this dissertation, Queer Eco-Temporalities for a Livable World). In the last 
couple of decades, Feminist and Queer theory have become animated by a number of 
debates directly pertinent to my reflection here. Firstly, over the last couple of decades, 
“New Materialist” Feminist theory has revisited central problems regarding matter, the 
body, the environment, nature, often in light of the ecological crises. Feminist theory has 
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long been engaged in challenging, contesting, rethinking both the human and nature as 
problematic categories that supported the contradictory and violent exclusion of certain 
“others,” as well as violence, inequalities, etc: either these “others” were excluded 
because these were associated with nature as opposed to “fully human,” in modern 
ontologies that held the one as strictly separate from the other, or on the contrary, some 
were judged “unnatural,” a judgment that, paradoxically depending also on modern 
understandings of nature, implied abnormality, deviance, abjection, etc.  
 But if these challenges to what and who counts as human and what and who 
counts as natural have long been central to feminist and queer theory, new materialist 
feminisms and queer ecologies have posed these problems anew. As Stacy Alaimo (2008) 
has pointed out, in order to offer critiques of these human/nature exclusions and 
separations (Plumwood, 1993) insofar as they acted as the foundation for gender 
inequalities, feminists often would abandon nature altogether, casting it as an 
unredeemably normative concept and endeavoring to critique and rethink the human 
instead. With the ecological crises, the digital and technological age and its proliferation 
of cyborgs (Haraway, 1989; 1991), and late modernity at large, questions related to 
biology, nature, the environment, humans’ intimate relationships to nonhumans, and what 
French science philosopher Isabelle Stengers has called “the eruption of Gaia” have 
caused new materialist feminist and queer theory to engage in queering nature (Hird, 
2004), queering ecologies. 
  Meanwhile, and with little overlap so far between these debates, queer theory has 
engaged in debates over questions of temporality which will be helpful to think with in 
what follows. Straight time, linear time, progress, the relationship between normativity 
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and time, utopia v. the present, are all concepts and questions that have attracted the 
attention of queer theory. Finally, I turn to Queer and Feminist theory for support in my 
intervention in Environmental Political Thought because the latter has important 
shortcomings in terms of its thinking about and deploying temporalities in relation to the 
nonhuman. This relation manifests itself in often gendered forms, as I will demonstrate in 
the first chapter below. Indeed, while the new materialist turn in Feminist Theory has 
sometimes been rightly cast as a need for internal critique on feminism’s part (Alaimo, 
2008), it is also the case that feminist critique is highly necessary as an intervention in 
ecosophy.  
The Eternal Return of Temporality and 
the Temporality of the Eternal Return 
 
 
One thread running through this dissertation is the Nietzschean notion of eternal return, 
according to which time has no origin or end, and of all the infinite pasts and infinite 
futures are with us at each moment. This notion rejects any possible reading of time as 
linear, progressive or teleological. I am not the first to turn to Nietzsche for purposes of 
queering temporality: queer theorists McCallum and Tuhkanen have already done so in 
their “Becoming Unbecoming: Untimely Meditations,” opening a co-edited volume on 
queer temporalities. Neither am I first to draw from Nietzsche within ecosophy, 
especially with respect to temporality and becoming, as William Connolly’s last couple 
of books attest (2011; 2013). However, what distinguishes the argument I present here 
from these examples is that I draw more specifically from Nietzsche’s concept of eternal 




The Eruption of Gaia: Intensity and Possibilities for Improbable Joy 
 
As we have seen, thinking at a planetary scale and in deep time is forced upon us in a 
context named the Anthropocene, the sixth extinction, the climate crisis. The markings 
referred to by the concept of Anthropocene, which allegedly engrave “human” presence 
in the lithosphere all the way to a hardly imaginable future lacking a human geologist to 
decipher them, remind us of how short the Holocene has been (Colebrook, 2014). It was 
but an ephemeral period of hospitality on the part of an Earth now damaged by some of 
its self-extinguishing guests. Meanwhile, in the midst of these ecological crises, desires to 
alternately slow down or rapidly make changes with respect to even quotidian and larger 
scales temporalities so as to match our world of becoming, along with challenges to 
historical time as progress or decay or neither, all emerge as increasingly salient and 
intense because of the eruption of Gaia, and her deep time. In the end of the nineteenth 
century, a few years before a 1908 earthquake devastated the area and as the famous 
volcano Etna was erupting as usual, threatening erasure of fragile lives and things, 
Nietzsche wrote a series of Idylls while in Messina, Sicily, which would subsequently 
serve as an appendix to his Gay Science. He proposed them to the Internationale 
Monatschrift claiming that “even the most serious publication need something cheerful.” 
In the Idylls, Nietzsche indeed entertained a conversation with a woodpecker, who made 
him laugh by calling him a poet, and admired an albatross who “felt sorry for envy.” How 
could such joyful thoughts and affects emerge under volcanic and seismic threats? Could 
it be that we similarly may laugh and encounter joy, in our anthropocene and sixth 
extinction context? I will argue, throughout the pages that follow, that it is in fact due to 
this very context that we may experience a vast array of affects with a special intensity, 
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and that this intensity is further heightened also, by the notion of eternal return – which is 
linked, as we will see, to extinction and necessary to a philosophy of becoming. If every 
moment passes, everything becomes, every time difference returns, then how do we face 
and perhaps embrace this becoming, especially in moments when the ephemeral and the 
long term are simultaneously so salient, and when tensions arise between needs for rapid 
change in a fast-changing world and for pauses allowing philosophical ruminations to 
think such change. Could our “sixth extinction” or “Anthropocene” (or “Capitalocene” – 
Haraway, 2015) be or become ripe with an intensity that may highlight life in all its thick 
layers and striating scars, while we are pushed to envision, down to best-sellers, “the 
world without us” (Weisman, 2008)?  Could joy also be part of these moments where the 
short and long term, deep time and the speed society, needs for slowness and quick 
change, tear our temporalities apart? The eruption of Gaia threatens to sweep the world as 
we know it… now shall we join Zarathustra’s dance?  
Eternal Return: a Critique, an Ontology, an Ethics 
 
The Nietzschean concept of eternal return is a very complex one that suffers or perhaps 
enjoys multiple interpretations. If I were to simplify it to the point of risking doing 
violence to it, I would say that for Nietzsche (or at least for a Deleuzean Nietzsche) the 
idea is to denounce any teleological understanding of time according to which the origin 
of time absurdly already containing its ends, to instead see the universe as made up of 
finite forces which constantly re-organize from one instant to the next. This has a number 
of ontological and ethical consequences which I find highly pertinent to a context of 
extinction, as the eternal return intensifies each instant, prompting a transvaluation of all 
values (in other words it requires to question the value of values). The eternal return 
 
 14 
entails that the entire infinity of the past as well as the infinity of the future, are present in 
each present moment, such that the oft-cited notion of “interconnectedness of all things,” 
often stressed in a spatial sense in environmentalist discourses, takes on a temporal 
dimension as well. This last aspect will feed into my concept of synchrony, in contrast 
with the atemporal time of uchronia.  
 One of the eternal return’s recurring characteristics as a concept has to do with the 
fact that it was repeatedly dismissed as the incoherent thought of a soon-to-become mad 
man. Milan Kundera dismissively referred to it as “Nietzsche’s half-mad idea.”4 Yet, 
Nietzsche’s notion offers a critique of linear, teleological visions of time (thus 
Zarathustra exclaims: “I have liberated them of goals!”), allows to celebrate chance and 
the unpredictable, unexpected, random (thus Zarathustra’s reign is called “the reign of 
great randomness”). Such a critique is vital, as we will see, to efforts to carve queer eco-
temporalities against straight time, to challenge growth-driven progress. The eternal 
return also provides a philosophy of becoming, helping to think how all pasts can flow 
into all futures through present moments. Finally, it entails a radical, ethical challenge: if 
we were to weigh each of our actions against the possibility (or quasi-certainty) that the 
moment in which they arise would repeat itself forever, would we drive an SUV up to 
mount Etna for a “once-in-a-lifetime” tourist experience, without feeling the presence of 
future generations on the passengers’ seat along with Nietzsche’s poetry writing moments 
in nearby Messina? We may still opt for the SUV, yet the intensity of each moment, 
                                                        
4 Though he extensively draws from Nietzsche throughout his inspiring work on temporality and becoming, 
in the Fragility of Things (2013), William Connolly dismisses this notion, read in one specific way, as 
“incompatible with a philosophy of becoming” (p. 217). Throughout this dissertation, one of the 
implications of my main argument will be about advancing a different reading: to me the eternal return is 
not only highly pertinent to our contemporary ecological context, it is the very condition for a philosophy 
of becoming. See especially chapter 6 (see for instance ibid., p. 349), for more engagement with Connolly’s 
dismissal and a more detailed my (partial) disagreement with this reading.  
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including all joyful, or mediocre, or terrible ones, would have to be confronted 
differently, inviting indeed, a trans-valuation of all values.  
Uchronia, Anti-Uchronia, Counter-Uchronia, Heterochronia 
 
My effort to queer temporalities in times of ecological crisis will thus draw from 
Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return and, as we will soon see, strive to argue against 
visions of ecological thought as utopian. As I will further explain (chapter 2), one of my 
goals is to turn the tables, to shift the burden of proof, to turn accusations around, against 
common suspicions: radical queer ecological thought and praxis are by no means utopian. 
In fact, it may offer pragmatic antidotes to decenter capitalocentric temporalities. By 
contrast, the latter temporalities, as they forever postpone the satisfaction of capitalist 
promises to an ever-receding impossible horizon of consumerist and productivist 
abundance, purporting to offer limitless growth on a limited planet, are what I call 
“uchronian.” 
Time and Ecosophy 
 
In the first chapter, I will show that temporality is a central theme threading 
Environmental Political Thought and interlaced with the central ecosophical question of 
the human/nonhuman relationship emerging in varied gendered forms. This will enable 
me to further situate my argument as an intervention in EPT from a Feminist and Queer 
Theory perspective. In the chapters that follow, I will develop four concepts that together 
provide tools for queering capitalocentric temporalities. Their goal is to detect the 
possibility for other temporalities to emerge, and ways to distinguish between various 





In chapter 2, I overview some key concepts in environmentalist discourses and ecosophy, 
again bringing out the temporal thread which runs across these, to advance my own 
concept of “uchronia,” and elaborate upon the critical lens it offers. “Uchronia” aims to 
underscore how capitalocentric temporality teleologically postpones promises of inifinite 
economic growth to an abstract and impossible future (ou-chronos, no-time) of also 
infinite accumulation, where all those who “deserve” (“worked hard for”) it, would 
allegedly revel in consumerist and productivist abundance (eu-chronos, good time). This 
future is impossible as it assumes infinite growth on a finite planet (ou-chronos). The 
environmentalist concept of limits to growth underlines the impossibility of infinite, 
exponential growth in a world with finite resources. Thus the idea of limits to growth 
makes it possible to see capitalocentric temporality for what it is: uchronian. I open the 
chapter with the environmentalist theme of urgency, specifically with a close-text reading 
of some slogans and videos Greenpeace released a couple of years ago, in the context of 
its “It’s Not Too Late!” campaign. I also start drawing from the Nietzschean concept of 
the eternal return’s critical dimension, to question the teleological character of 
capitalocentric temporality, or “uchronia.” Through this lens, I explore what exactly is so 
new and unprecedented in making future generations and nonhumans a matter of 
concern: I distinguish this concern from the self-proclaimed future-oriented (or “futurist”) 
character of modern, capitalocentric progress. As Bruno Latour has claimed, moderns 
have always “run to the future… with their backs turned.” In my formulation, the 
fundamental distinction between uchronian futurism and the futurity at stake in the 
concept of responsibility toward future generations, is revealed by my concept of 
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uchronia: uchronia is inherently reliant upon the abstraction of consumerist and 
productivist horizons (the point is to accumulate and grow, with more or less regard and 
fetishization for the objects of such growth). In contrast, future generations offer concrete 
and vitalist, material matters of concern (the point is to affirm life and/or the livability of 
life). Finally, I discuss “end-times” themes in some environmental discourses, i.e to 
underscore the limits of limits’ discourse. For instance, I challenge a certain kind of – 
capitalocentric – Marxist despair-ridden sigh which has been resonating too often in the 
last decade (e.g., Zizek’s or Harvey’s work), according to which with the current 
ecological crises, “we” (late modern humans) have less difficulty imagining the end of 
times than the end of capitalism, or the radical (non-capitalist) means by which we would 
avoid end-times. I argue that this type of colonization of the imaginary (Castoriadis) by 
capitalocentric temporalities is one of the powerful and problematic effects of uchronia.  
Anti-Uchronia 
 
In chapter 3, I advance a second moment in my reflection on uchronia, one that asks: how 
can we cultivate an ability to see uchronia differently, how can we develop a perspective 
from which to start seeing that there may be other possibilities, i.e to see uchronia as a 
contingent, fragile and not so self-evident temporality which cannot but imagine the 
future as capitalist (and it is indeed in this sense that it is a “capitalocentric” temporality), 
and which (inaccurately) presents itself as the only possible and desirable reality.  
“Anti-uchronia” is not a symmetrically oppositional perspective, supposed to 
confront uchronia, as anti-capitalism may be for “Capitalism.” It is, however, a moment 
of my argument which may be described as “critical” (crucial and critically-minded). I 
conceptualize anti-uchronia as a pause to take the time to think, in creative tension with 
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fast-paced, rapidly changing worlds and with urgent needs for radical change. Though 
anti-uchronia is not yet an alternative temporality, it is a breech opened in the self-
naturalizing character of uchronia, into and against the capitalist pretension to the 
colonization of the temporal imaginary: anti-uchronia “makes other possible (temporal) 
order of things glitter,” to use Foucault’s formula regarding what he calls, in the Order of 
Things (2014), heterotopias (although the “temporal” in parentheses is my addition here). 
Anti-uchronia thus refers to the opening up of the possibility for other temporal 
possibilities. 
Anti-uchronian art, science, thought, events, would be those which allow to see 
the essential contingency in a temporal order that attempts to naturalize itself, in spite of 
all odds – as it is, in fact, timeless, disconnected, absurdly teleological, unsustainable and 
unbearable, as it always already postpones the promise it carries, running after sand 
castles in clouds so destructive to our Earth presents. Anti-uchronian moments are 
moments of “idiocy” in the Deleuzian and Stengersian sense, where we allow ourselves 
to ask interruptive, disruptive questions that “slow others down”: “wait! Why do we/I 
need/desire capitalist growth again? But… do we indeed need it?” They are moments of 
suspension of a rushed, supposed common sense (a frenetic race to a capitalocentric 
temporal horizon), moments when we are invited to look at temporalities differently.  
In this third chapter I draw from world-renowned graffiti artist Blu’s works, 
arguing that some of his frescos can be interpreted as “anti-uchronian.” I juxtapose these 
with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports, suggesting that the famous 
panel of climatologists provides evidence that capitalocentric temporalities “lead us into a 
wall” (Stengers, 2009). I also offer a close reading of a science fiction short story where 
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artificially intelligent self-renewable houses become cannibal, and of a contemporary 
circus piece and its work on suspension, a choreographic movement I associate with anti-
uchronia. Through the examination of these various forms, genres and discourses which I 
read as anti-uchronian, I discuss the need for a conceptualization of interruptive time that 
would include kairos (time in the sense of the moment, the event, the right or wrong time, 
etc) and chronos (series and duration, successions, etc). I also weave the anti-teleological 
moment of the Nietzschean concept of eternal return into my interpretation of these 
various examples. 
Counter-Uchronia and Hyper-Uchronia: Regression and Progression 
 
The fourth chapter starts to develop a third concept to think with in times of ecological 
crises, when uchronia comes apart as such. “Counter-uchronia” refers to alternative 
temporalities emerging in this context, but which still take on the form of a 
capitalocentric temporality, either because they merely modify or amend growth-driven 
progress (sustainable growth, and most mainstream understandings of the concept of 
sustainability), or because they attempt to diametrically oppose this temporality by way 
of a primitivist narrative of “return,” often reifying pre-modern, pre-industrial, pre-
capitalist economies as well as non-Western ones. The attempt, in both of these cases, is 
to propose a “counter-uchronia,” (i.e uchronia under a slightly different guise), a reactive, 
symmetrically oppositional temporality created so as to counter uchronia. I underscore 
that this is insufficient, as counter-uchronias remain caught in a temporal 
capitalocentrism (it fails to challenge, go beyond, circumvent or de-center uchronia, 





Anarcho-primitivist works, a de-growth manifesto, Viennese environmentalist artist 
Hundertwasser’s “five skins” and “tree tenant” theory serve as some of the examples with 
which to think the extent to which different environmentalist discourse may be called 
“counter-uchronian,” when they rely upon a “return” to a supposed golden age when 
humans and nonhumans lived happily-ever-before, when harmony between “Man” and 
“Nature” allegedly prevailed. If Bruno Latour has described moderns as running to the 
future with their backs turned to it, “primitivist” moments in environmental discourse and 
thought would have us run to the past in the same uchronian manner. Chances of falling 
are just as high. Often, the “return” proposed is also one that reifies diverse (often 
indigenous) economies and worlds that are in fact coeval (Fabian, 2014) with capitalist 
economies, thus taking on a colonizing form.  
Furthermore, with chapter 4’s focus on regressive counter-uchronias, we will see 
that the problem with nature does not reside in the nature of nature, as much as it does in 
its temporalities: if “Nature” is imagined as mere background, stable, static, or moved by 
eternal cycles (in contrast with the eternal return of becoming), then it becomes an object 
of reification and a counter-uchronian, teleological end or goal. However, the examples I 
use can be read for difference, i.e as not counter-uchronian all the way. Indeed, after 
problematizing their counter-uchronian aspects, in chapter 6 I will also offer to read some 







The second form of counter-uchronia, which I call “progressive” counter-uchronia, is the 
focus of chapter 5. In this chapter I turn again to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change reports, this time to underscore their counter-uchronian rather than anti-
uchronian character. While in chapter 3, I underscored that the IPCC made it possible for 
welcome and needed “idiotic” questions to be asked (such as, “but is endless growth even 
possible in a finite world?),” in this chapter I stress that these reports do not sufficiently 
part ways from capitalocentric temporalities and remain (counter) uchronian in their 
proposal of creating carbon markets, their relative blindness to gender, class, race and 
other inequalities in climate change impacts (supposedly affecting all of “humanity”), 
their understanding of sustainability’s object as… capitalist economies. Indeed, these 
reports are the perfect examples of a counter-uchronian understanding of sustainability, 
as needing to sustain capitalist growth. Yet, for sustainability to become synchronic 
rather than counter-uchronian, its object should shift from capitalist economies to a form 
of nonhuman/human (hybrid) ethics. Sustaining capitalist futurism with windmills and 
other technofixes as well as carbon markets thus differs from sustaining an ethical 
perspective taking present and future generations of human, nonhuman and hybrid lives 
into account: the former sustainability is counter-uchronian, the latter would be 
synchronic. 
I then ask “idiotic” or anti-uchronian questions (ones that intend to create pause). 
The IPCC’s counter-uchronian perspective deploys what Isabelle Stengers would call 
“stupidity,” i.e it places demands on a situation which demands completely otherwise, 
aggravating it rather than taking into account the current demands (made by the 
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ecological crises, by the situation). Thus the IPCC indeed proposes to address a crisis it 
has demonstrated was caused by capitalist economies… with more “Capitalism.” In 
doing so, and in spite of its own anti-uchronian moment, the IPCC is traversed by what 
may be called stupidity. The world-renowned panel compares millenia of climate data 
with data over a period of high levels of carbon dioxide causing unprecedented global 
heating: that of 1750 and on. The IPCC reports then proceed to argue that global warming 
is “anthropogenic.” Problematizing the undifferentiated “anthropos” once again, I ask the 
following idiotic questions: have “we” become “human” only in 1750? Should climate 
change be called “capitalogenic” instead of “anthropogenic” (Donna Haraway has 
recently proposed to the term “capitalocene” to describe what some have been calling the 
“anthropocene” – 2015)? What does this correspondence tell (or confirm to) us about the 
emergence of humanism and the concept of the universal “human” in relation to carbon-
emitting capitalist economies? 
I conclude chapter 5 with examples of the potentially hubristic consequences of 
anthropocentrism in a context of climate crisis, advancing a critique of geoengineering 
measures that have been defended by the IPCC, Gaia theorist James Lovelock, and 
millionaire Russ George.  
Heterochronia and Synchrony 
 
Chapter 6 closes the argument with a couple of additional concepts to think with, in the 
hope of better seeing and creating alternative temporalities. It asks, how do we go from 
an anti-uchronian moment, taking pause to consider the possibility for other possible 
temporalities, to experimenting with alternative temporalities that may decenter uchronia, 
without finding ourselves trapped by a counter-uchronian logics?  
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One term I propose is “heterochronia,” to refer to other times, other temporalities: 
to Foucault, heterotopias were spaces which juxtaposed otherwise incompatible spaces 
(2009), just like in medical language, heterotopia referred to the growth of an organ in an 
anomalous place on the body. In Foucault’s view, heterotopias made it possible for 
“another order of things to glitter” (2002, p. vii). “Heterochronia,” in my 
conceptualization,5 refers to moments of surprise when otherwise distinct and separate 
temporalities coexist simultaneously, when they converge in a synchronic moment. One 
way of nurturing heterochronia would be to ask ‘what is being done?,’ as Gibson-Graham 
invites us to do (2010). Here for instance, I offer an alternative reading of 
Hundertwasser’s five skins and tree-tenants theories, which I had read as partly counter-
uchronian in chapter 4. I argue that this artwork also offers a heterochronian dimension, if 
one reads Hundertwasser’s art in the form of three dimensional spirals. Imagining and 
creating a different oikos enables decolonizing the imaginary, and while this could be 
called a utopia, I argue that we can also read it as offering ecochronian antidotes resisting 
the pull of uchronia. 
In discussing synchrony, I bring in Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal return again. 
According to this latter idea, all the infinity of the past (pasts) and all of the infinity of the 
future (futures) are contained in each passing moment, and the universe is but a constant 
re-distribution of forces which do not know any maximal or optimal point, do not suffer 
any diminution or increase, as teleological time is an impossibility. For moments to pass, 
for time and for being to exist, all must be becoming. If this is the case, Nietzsche invites 
us to an ethical attitude resulting from this ontological condition: were we to relive our 
                                                        
5 Foucault had proposed the term as well, but only mentioning it in passing as the temporal dimension of 
heterotopia (see Foucault, 2009). 
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lives eternally, would we cry enthusiastically, joyfully, “da capo”? Temporalities that 
have been cultivated in the performing arts, certain community economies, science 
fiction, etc foster a sense that many times, paces, rhythms and speeds, many temporal 
orders, can be experienced at once: this is what I call synchrony. I discuss this concept of 
synchrony in relation to a couple of contemporary dance choreographer Pina Bausch’s 
pieces as well as a choreographic moment in a recent “Flood Wall Street!” protest, to 




CHAPTER I  





The deployment of time and temporality within what has come to be called 
Environmental Political Thought and ecosophy is both new and old, central and often 
insufficiently foregrounded. Early in the XIXth century, Henry David Thoreau, who is 
often read as a precursor of environmental thought,6 already pointed to the acceleration of 
paces and speeds in the quotidian as one of the symptoms for the lack of simplicity 
characteristic of his industrializing times. In Walden, he poetically describes the rhythms 
and cycles of “nature” and opposes them with the acceleration produced by the railway 
system then in the making:  
the soul of man, or its organs rather, are reinvigorated each day... All memorable 
events, I should say, transpire in morning time and in a morning atmosphere… To 
him whose elastic and vigorous thought keeps pace with the sun, the day is a 
perpetual morning. It matters not what the clocks say or the attitudes and labors of 
men. Morning is when I am awake and there is a dawn in me… In any weather, at 
any hour of the day or night, I have been anxious to improve the nick of time, and 
notch it on my stick too; to stand on the meeting of two eternities, the past and 
future, which is precisely the present moment; to toe that line (2008). 
 
                                                        




The valuation of the present moment and of the moment of morning, of awakening, are 
associated with the regularity of nature’s cycles. “Nature,” understood as granting access 
to transcendance, is seen as self-coherent, predictable, and immutable in its cyclical 
character. It is associated with a double eternity, into both the past and the future. It is 
also situated beyond, outside, apart from conventions and the socius: clock time does not 
affect the morning state Thoreau claims to be capable of whatever the hour. But morning, 
like Nature as granting access to transcendence, is a state of mind disconnected from the 
concrete moment (be it “social” or “natural”), and thus it is not only abstracted from 
social conventional time, but also from day and night. This abstract understanding of 
nature as made of immutable cycles is now becoming ever more clearly problematic – 
many environmentalists altogether reject the concept of Nature, contrary to the cliché 
portraying them as Nature-lovers. Thus Tim Morton denounces “Nature” as a form of 
“crystallized history.” As Dipesh Chrakrabarty has claimed, the emerging geological 
concept of anthropocene prompts the human and the Earth calendar to converge – I 
would rather say they may be – problematically – read together, as whatever is referred to 
as “the human” was always indeed a period of so-called “natural” history and as our 
months, seasons and years, like other calendars in various cultures, attempt to pace 
themselves imperfectly along the Earth’s rotation in relation to the sun and the moon’s in 
relation to the Earth. The anthropocene event incites zooming out in “deep time” and 
understanding the ryhthms and cycles Thoreau took to be the key to some eternal 
transcendance as ever more fragile, as passing, with all other moments. The (Western and 
relatively temperate,7 cyclical) milieu described in Walden, the Holocene “man” – now 
                                                        
7 Note that the term temperate has time for its root, just like Thoreau’s Nature relies upon a certain, 




allegedly transformed into an “anthropocene” one – was but the product of a fleeting 
exception of hospitality on the part of an Earth that would have been and will most likely 
go back to being inhabitable for human forms. This vision was as ethnocentric as it was 
anthropocentric. Thoreau’s time and Thoreau’s Nature are problematic, even while and 
perhaps precisely because it opposes “human” fast-paced “modernity” to a supposed 
stillness or predictability found in “Nature.” Thoreau’s temporal dualism is ultimately 
quite similar to that which has founded the possibility of understanding a “Nature” 
passively awaiting humans so as to be mystified, reified, festishized, conserved, and, also, 
colonized, “mastered,” destroyed (Grosz, 2004; Bennett, 2002). Thoreau invoked what I 
read as a triple return: at the scale of a life, he praised infancy associated with purity and 
innocence (2008, p. 63).  At the smaller scale of the day, we have seen that mornings and 
awakenings were to be returned to so as to constantly begin again (p. 64). Finally, at the 
scale of history, Thoreau associated cardinal points, and his fetishized visions of both 
“the Orient” and “the West,” with an allegedly different kind of progress, a westward 
movement following both the direction of the sun each day and manifest destiny, 
celebrating a wilderness whose human inhabitants he erased (at most Thoreau would 
abstractly praise Native Americans as “savages,” while most of the time he would refer to 
Native American land as empty – p. 268), and which Americans were inevitably drawn to 
(p. 269). The reactionary and colonial dimension of this thought was accompanied by the 
projection of purity and transcendance into an abstract, constant and cyclical Nature 
which ultimately was the precursor of ways in which what is now called biocentrism 
meets anthropocentrism: “[Thoreau] took a walk in the woods and came back taller than 
                                                                                                                                                                     




the trees” (2008, p. 265 ). Today’s deep ecologists and conservationists have continued 
on this particular trend of thought, as we will see below. 
 I will also come back to the problematic utopian nature of Thoreau’s transcendent 
Nature below, but for now I want to stress that these glimpses into Thoreau’s works show 
the important place of temporality in relation to the Man/Nature relationship here, an 
importance that carries on beyond Thoreau. The disobedient transcendentalist’s insistence 
that Americans “live too fast,” that the division of labor and productivism, the 
construction of railtracks, the exclusions and destructions associated to the fast and 
speeding-up rise of industry (“if some have the pleasure of riding on a rail, others have 
the misfortune of being ridden on” – 2008, p. 66), which he opposed to the eternal cycles 
of Nature, indicate the importance of temporality for environmental thought all the way 
down to its precursors. Thoreau makes it possible to begin my reading of this barely 
visible yet central thread, this importance of temporality (whether explicit or not) which I 
see as one of the few commonalities between otherwise disparate visions, throughout 
Environmental Thought.  
Humans/Nonhumans, Temporality, Gender 
 
Beyond a critical speed, no one can 




Environmental Political Thought (EPT), or “ecosophy” as it is often called (more often 
by European thinkers), is now an increasingly established field in political theory, 
philosophy and ethics, though of relatively recent emergence. Right before the twenty 
first century, J. Baird Callicott pointed out that “during the decade that has elapsed since 




developed explosively.” However, this conservationist ethicist, who strove to continue 
the works of Aldo Leopold’s “land ethics,” claims that: “nevertheless, environmental 
philosophy remains something of a pariah in the mainstream academic philosophical 
community” (1999, p. 2). What in 1999 Callicott considered a marginal place held by 
EPT within philosophy has for sure changed significantly since, to the point that even 
beyond the confines of this field, many authors who previously did not address ecological 
issues now feel compelled to do so.8 However the canon of Environmental Political 
Theory remains contested, as well as the exact boundaries that could help define what 
may count as “ecosophy.” Thus environmental theorist Matthew Humphrey claims: “we 
lack an all-encompassing concept for green/environmental, political thought” (2010, p. 
182). Searching for the lowest denominator that may bring together sometimes disparate 
traditions of environmental thought, Green theorist and politician Andrew Dobson quotes 
Andrew Vincent who claims that  
most [political ecologists] assert the systematic interdependence of species and the 
environment … and there is a tendency to be minimally skeptical about the 
supreme position of human beings on the planet. Furthermore there is a general 
anxiety about what industrial civilization is actually doing to the planet (2007, p.14) 
 
                                                        
8 Examples could include Latour, whose work Actor Network Theory going from the French Conseil d’Etat 
to the production of scientific knowledge and truth contributing to shape Science and Technology Studies, 
has taken a resolutely clearer focus on political questions regarding the Earth, the ecological crisis, the 
concept of humans, hybridity, and nonhumans etc over the last decade or so (e.g. The Politics of Nature, 
2004). J.K. Gibson-Graham and community economies scholars are also increasingly focusing on 
ecological dimensions, hybridity and nonhumans in their work. Many among the Left(s) especially have 
dedicated at least significant portions of their latest works on ecology when critiquing capitalist economies. 
Writers beyond academia also exemplify this change. Naomi Klein’s latest book’s title is quite telling: This 
Changes Everything marks her shift from her latest study on the “shock doctrine” where she appeared 
much more as a keynesian, to more radical critiques of capitalism provoked by her investigation of the 




Environmental thought is eclectic, disparate, and many schools of thought, many visions 
and positions are incompatible with one another within this vast movement or these 
movements. One common denominator nonetheless stands out and ultimately brings 
these together, sketching the contested contours of the field so that it may indeed be 
considered one, so that it may be called ecosophy or environmental thought. Namely, 
environmental thought engages with the human/nature dualism, also known as 
human/nonhumans, modernity/Nature, Man/Nature, humans/more-than-humans, 
humans/environment, human/Earth. Various traditions within environmental thought 
indeed conceptualize this problem or relationship using slightly different terms, and the 
relationship itself may be called or critiqued as a dualism, a binary, a separation, a divide, 
a dichotomy, depending on the tradition. Various schools of thought and authors also 
offer differing responses or insight with respect to this question, thus resulting in 
differences and disagreements between not only the formulation of the problem, but also 
what should be done or thought through to address it: as we will see some may wish to 
reverse the hierarchy binding the two terms, celebrating “Nature” and denouncing its 
modern subjection to “the human.” This biocentrism denouncing anthropocentrism is 
found in deep ecology and conservation, as well as some social ecologists. It is probably 
the most known image of environmentalism, though not by any means unambiguously 
majoritarian. In contrast, some environmentalists (e.g. political ecologists, critical 
ecologists, post-structuralist and new materialist ecological perspectives) sometimes call 
for our abandoning the very concept of nature and altogether challenging the concept of 
human, to emphasize the blurriness of lines separating the human and its environment as 




words, reversing the hierarchy in the human/nonhuman binary may not be enough, and 
the ecological crises call for carefully examining both terms critically, potentially even to 
subsequently reject either or both of them. In this chapter, as one point of entry to situate 
my own contribution to the field of environmental thought, I discuss some of the most 
important schools of thought and authors involved in this work, showing that, to each 
respective understanding and critique of the human/nonhuman relationship, corresponds a 
specific understanding and mobilization of temporality.  
 We have just seen that Thoreau’s rendering of the human/nonhuman dualism was 
one whereby he praised the regular (supposedly “eternal”) rhythms, patterns and cycles 
of “Nature” (daily, seasonal…), contrasting those with the paces and speeds of the fast-
industrializing America of his times. The former have an ability to invigorate the self 
against conventional time (mornings as awakening, despite “what the clocks say”), while 
the latter function as a means of exclusion (some ride on trains and others are “ridden 
on”). Now if we leap in time from this nineteenth century transcendentalist (alleged)9 
                                                        
9 Henry David Thoreau’s status as a precursor of EPT or ecosophy is open to debate, though I lack the 
space and time to discuss it and take a more substantiated position on the subject here. First, Thoreau is far 
from being the only candidate for early modern thinkers that have inspired the environmentalist movement 
as we know it today. Darwin could of course be cited, as well as Thoreau’s friend Emerson, but also the 
romantics, and the precursor of romanticism Rousseau. We could also consider the Lockean imperative to 
save only what one can consume to be a premise which some environmental thought is based on, and this 
one has obvious roots in a long tradition within Christian thought. The eternal regression to many 
philosophers throughout the Western canon can go on to any thinker having thought (with) the concept of 
Nature… i.e virtually all (virtually all of the canon has reflected upon “nature,” as a central concept even – 
Thoreau’s innovation may be said to be about the opposition between industrialization and this concept, 
announcing the ecological crises to come more than he founded a current of thought including “ecosophy” 
in general). This regression also tends to obscure female or feminist, and nonwestern nature writers to 
foreground white, male, upper middle class Westerners. In my view, Thoreau is just such a nature writer 
primarily, and rather than a precursor anticipating the themes developed by contemporary ecosophy, he has 
inspired some (very specific) authors within Environmental Political Theory. I am using this latter phrase, 
distinguishing here between ecosophy and EPT in the sense that the former is more often used as the term 
to describe this field in North American literature, while the latter is more often used in European 
philosophy. Indeed, Thoreau is more often cited as a precursor of environmental thought on the former side 
of the Atlantic. He also is claimed as legacy by specific currents of the broad field of environmental 
thought. Namely, (self-proclaimed) “deep” ecologists and conservationists rarely hesitate to consider him 




precursor of environmental thought to the beginnings of the contemporary movement, a 
couple of important founding figures stand out (e.g Ivan Illich, Hans Jonas, Aldo 
Leopold10), and a number of different schools of thought subsequently developed (deep 
ecology, social ecology, political ecology, ecofeminism, critical ecology, post-
structuralist and new materialist ecology). Qua a few (inevitably non-exhaustive) 
examples from these various currents, I will argue that while each propose their specific 
formulation of the human/nonhuman problem, these formulations respectively have 
idiosyncratic consequences for their mobilization of temporality. The goal of this 
overview is two-fold: it will underscore a less obvious thread within Environmental 
Theory, and its importance, i.e temporality. It will also allow me to further to situate my 
own contribution concerning the new temporalities emerging in a context of sixth 
extinction, anthropocene, climate change, in short, in times of ecological crises. Thirdly, 
as we meander through a number of ecosophers’ works, my examination of the 
connection between temporality on the one hand, and the human/nonhuman on the other, 
as threads of ecosophy, will prove to be more or less explicitly gendered in each instance, 
for better or worse.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
problematic understanding of “Nature” he mobilized, his response to the problem of the Man/Nature 
relationship in the form of a reversal of the dualism’s hierarchy in favor or “Nature” or the wilderness, and 
the gendered characters of these two ontologico-ethical positions: Nature is often a “she,” either calm and 
motherly (as for instance in his essay “Walking”) or erratic and hysterical (in many instance both in 
“Walking” and Walden), and part of the true ecologist’s attitude has to do with facing, embracing it in ways 
quite… masculine or virile (famously killing animals with one’s own hands is described in such terms in 
Walden – a reminder to the reader than meanwhile Thoreau was regularly taking cookie-collecting trips at 
his mother’s would perhaps excessively specifying the kind of masculinity – boyhood? – indeed at play 
here.  
10 I will be discussing Illich, Jonas and Leopold here so as to provide a couple of major examples of 
inspirations for contemporary ecosophical work. However, by no means do these offer an exhaustive 
genealogy situating environmental thought: the survey of EPT literature I offer here is selective: the goal of 
this selection is to highlight, through enough important figures and schools of thought within the 
movement, the relation I wish to underscore here, between EPT’s common thread, i.e its reflection on 




Anti-Elitist Feminist Conviviality 
 
Ivan Illich’s considerations on the energy crisis strikingly resonate with Thoreau’s 
denunciation of the speed of railtracks, though Illich was no transcendentalist. In a 1973 
essay first published in Le Monde (2013), the late 20th century philosopher who inspired 
the de-growth and political ecology movements (conversely, Thoreau inspired more 
thinkers and groups among the deep ecology and conservation movements) laments the 
“speed-stunned imagination” of cultures dominated by motorcars, where the “habitual 
passenger” of such vehicles suffers from “inherited perceptions of space and time and of 
personal pace” which “have been industrially deformed.” The concept of “net transfer of 
lifetime” (2013, p. 83) is crucial to his critique of the energy crisis: Illich points out that 
with motor vehicles and high speed transportation in general, “the exchange-value of 
time becomes dominant, and this is reflected in language: time is spent, saved, invested, 
wasted, and employed” (2013, p. 84). By “net transfer of time,” Ivan Illich simply means 
that once transportation’s acceleration reaches a critical threshold, equity and the quality 
of social relations cannot but be greatly damaged:  
Beyond a critical speed, no one can save time without forcing another to lose it. 
The man who claims a seat in a faster vehicle insists that his time is worth more 
than that of the passenger in a slower one. Beyond a certain velocity, passengers 
become consumers of other people’s time, and accelerating vehicles become the 
means for effecting a net transfer of life-time (2013, p. 85). 
Illich goes so far as to insist that neither the specific technological make-up of a 
particular technology nor the specific persons owning these technologies of transportation 




technologies’ speed. The speed society is damaging of sociability, damaging of the 
“conviviality” (1973) which Illich stressed and advocated (very simply put, Illich 
understood the concept of conviviality as corresponding to societal arrangements where 
tools allow people to express themselves, as opposed to machines subjecting their users). 
Speed matters in matters of motion, more than the matter moving. Temporality here is 
foregrounded, as central to conviviality and the socius:   
The effect of speed on the autonomy of people is only marginally affected by the 
technological characteristics of the motorized vehicles employed or by the persons 
or entities who hold the legal titles to airlines, buses, railroads, or cars. High speed 
is the critical factor which makes transportation socially destructive. A true choice 
among practical policies and of desirable social relations is possible only where 
speed is restrained. (2013, p. 55) 
 
Illich, a bit like Thoreau in his denunciation of speeds and paces of modernity as opposed 
to rhythms and cycles of nature, underscores the ways in which beyond a certain 
threshold, the speed and acceleration certain technologies bring about becomes 
poisonous, insofar as they participate crucially not only in production, but also in the 
production of new inequalities and exclusions as well as their reproduction. He thus calls 
for a slowing down, a restraint on speed and a re-valuation of slow, more “natural” 
modes of transport, insisting upon embodied practices not involving high-speed 
machines: motion by way of walking on one’s feet procures more autonomy. Speed has 
become a nuisance to both autonomy (in an almost Castoriadian11 sense) and 
conviviality, and empoverishes those whose quotidian lives it purports to make more 
                                                        




efficient. Of note here is the emphasis on sociability, autonomy, equality, conviviality. 
Surely Illich also discussed thresholds and technological innovation in relation to natural 
resources. Yet, inaugurating the political ecology tradition (and to an extent offering 
some inspiration to social ecology as well), Illich is not focused on “Nature,” but rather 
on the livability of (human) life. In fact, deep ecology’s “biocentrism” clashes quite 
explicitly with Illich, Gorz, Bookchin, in other words with political and social ecology’s 
relative “anthropocentrism.” Furthermore, Illich’s stance contrasts with Thoreau, deep 
ecology, and conservationism’s, also in the sense that then the time in question and under 
scrutiny is about a concrete, social temporality, rather than an abstract mental state 
whereby one would always be invigorated by an eternal morning, away from social time. 
 Illich’s critique of the speed society also importantly integrates temporality, 
gender/sex, and his critique of industrialism/growth. In his book Gender, Illich contrasts 
preindustrial societies’ “reign of vernacular gender” to industrialism’s “regime of 
economic sex.” Insisting on “lost time,” which disappearance he bemoans, he carves the 
concept of “ghost work.” In the “apparent economy,” i.e that characterized by salaried 
work, sexual discrimination is made clear by wage disparities which Illich sees as 
inherently present in the growth society. Thus he reads the (sexually) “neutral” (growth-
oriented) economy as a liberal feminist illusory promise of emancipation in fact further 
alienating women and other minoritized groups. Illich emphasizes that, in industrial 
societies that abolish “vernacular gender” (i.e, the differentiated quotidian roles shared by 
women on the one hand, and men on the other), “sexism” becomes prevalent not only due 
to wage discrimination in the apparent economy but also because of the unpaid time spent 




performing salaried work is considered to have any sort of value: Illich mentions car rides 
to and from vast grocery stores, use of laundry machines abolishing possible moments of 
social gatherings of women when they previously all washed clothes together, etc. Thus 
he defines “ghost work” as follows:  
any labor by which the consumer transforms the purchased commodity in a usable 
good, … the time, toil and effort spent which must be expended in order to add to 
any purchased commodity value without which it is unfit for us… The 
transformation of household labors is by no means superficial, but indeed very 
profound. The increase of standard of living makes these labors ever more 
dependent upon capital by having multiples machines and gadgets penetrate 
households… New domestic chores have also become more solitary, monotonous, 
impersonal, and considerably more polluting. Among other palliatives to this 
silent stress, we note the consumption of Valium and mind-numbing in front of a 
TV screen … If economic growth is intrinsically and irreparably … sexist, then 
sexism will not decrease unless it does at the ‘price’ of  contraction of the 
economy. (1983, p. 47) 
One of the most important aspects of such subordination in a society that inaugurates 
vernacular genderlessness yet so profoundly relies upon sex-based discrimination has to 
do with both the quality and the quantity of quotidian time spent by women 
accomplishing tasks which used to take place in common with other women and which 
collective dimension is now supplanted by machinic alienation. This critique should not 
be confused with an advocacy in favor of a return to medieval times and the “reign of 




denunciations (2010) of all environmentalists as necessarily anti-feminist, or even sexist, 
because they dare critique the allegedly wonderful progress laundry machines have 
represented for women, would be quite inapt at accounting for what Illich is pointing to 
here. Rather than advocating a return to different and allegedly purer forms of subjection, 
Illich uses past arrangements to contrast them with the “modern” “West,” showing that 
the latter’s is a story of “progress” understood as the proliferation of new, machinic form 
of sexist subordination eating up autonomous moments and “liberated” time. He refrains 
from speculating on the future, but calls for “contraction,” in the de-growth sense I will 
clarify a bit below. In sum, Illich brings together environmental degradation with an 
astute attention to quotidian temporalities, showing the gendered and sexed dimensions of 
both. 
Patriarchs and Technocrats 
 
While Illich’s reflection on technology and modernity’s speeding up paces focuses on 
temporality as it is transformed at the (sexed) quotidian scale, Hans Jonas, another major 
influence who inspired contemporary ecosophy, offered a multi-dimentional and multi-
pace, complex deployment of temporality in relation to his critical reflection on 
ecological crises. Jonas’ work indeed engages not only the paces at which we live on a 
daily basis, but also, at a larger scale, the ways in which our “technological age” forces a 
rethinking of ethics to incorporate nature and future generations as objects and subjects of 
present generations’ ethical obligations. Here the scale is thus not the quotidian, but a 
larger temporal scale, a historical perspective, inclusive of future generations’ capacity to 
exist, to live. Jonas’ ethics is also “multi-pace,” in the sense that he called for the 




of prediction, which he called “futurology,” to inform what he called an “ethics of the 
future.”  
 As a student of Heidegger, Hans Jonas read the current “technological age” as one 
where technology had radically altered the scope of ethics. Namely, to him responsibility 
was commensurate to powers, to what a thing can do: granted that the technological age 
had provided humanity with unprecedented powers for self- and nature’s destruction, 
human responsibility knew totally new scales which forced taking into account 
nonhuman nature and a duty toward future generations’ non-extinction. In short, progress 
had turned into threat with the advent of the technological age. Writing in 1979, as 
nuclear threats were highly tangible and global warming and such planetary ecological 
crises were barely starting to emerge in ecological knowledge, Jonas wrote: 
Modern technology, informed by an ever-deeper penetration of nature and 
propelled by the forces of the market and politics, has enhanced human power 
beyond anything known or even dreamed of before. It is a power over matter, 
over life on earth, and over man himself; and it keeps growing at an ever 
accelerating pace. … But lately, the other side of the triumphal advance has 
begun to show its face, disturbing the euphoria of success with threats that are as 
novel as its welcomed fruits. Not counting the insanity of a sudden, suicidal 
atomic holocaust, which sane fear can avoid with relative ease, it is the slow, 
long-term, cumulative – the peaceful and constructive use of worldwide 
technological power, a production, consumption, sheer population growth – that 
poses threats much harder to counter. The net total of these threats is the 




may be reached in one direction or another, points of no return, where processes 
initiated by us will run away from us on their own momentum – and toward 
disaster. (1985, p. ix) 
According to Jonas, before the technological age, the human polis was comparatively 
separate from nature, in the sense that human powers could only impact nature in 
restricted ways: in his view the polis coexisted with nature with little effect on the latter, 
thus nature was primarily moved by “immutable” laws, untouched by human artefact. 
This separation of nature and the human sphere of action (and therefore of responsibility) 
collapsed with modern technology’s new powers: “the raping of nature and the civilizing 
man go hand in hand” (1985, p. 2). Or, as he puts it in the quote above, “modern 
technology [is] informed by an ever-deeper penetration of nature.” Formulated in yet 
another way, Jonas claimed that “the nature of human action has de facto changed, and an 
object of an entirely new order – no less than the world biosphere of the planet – has been 
added to what we must be responsible for because of our power over it” (1985, p.7). The 
threatening acceleration of technological development is thus directly linked, in Jonas’ 
rendition, to the collapse of an allegedly previously separate and intact sphere of 
“Nature:” 
The boundary between ‘city’ [here Jonas is referring to the polis] and nature has 
been obliterated: the city of men, once an enclave in the nonhuman world, spreads 
over the whole terrestrial nature and usurps its place. The difference between the 
artificial and the natural has vanished, the natural is swallowed up in the sphere of 
the artificial, and at the same time the total artifact generates a nature of its own. 





With this comes an unprecedented need to rethink ethics. The new “ethics for the future” 
takes on various radical, temporal changes: for Jonas, a new science of predictability is 
necessary: this is what he called a “futurology.” Differentiated changes of pace follow in 
various domains: futurology’s development must be accelerated, and meanwhile, 
technology’s development must be slowed down, as there is a “gap between the ability to 
foretell and the power to act,” a gap which has created this novel ethical problem. Armed 
with the lessons drawn by futurology, the decision-maker or statesman must espouse “an 
ethics for the future” taking on a form which Jonas compares to the patriarch’s protective 
attitude toward his family (!): futurological experts will examine the future, in terms of 
risks, probabilities, predictions and uncertainties, and on this basis, with nature and future 
generations in mind, statesmen may make sound, protective decisions (for now fragile 
Nature and for children – including those who do not yet exist). Jonas places nature and 
future generations on the same footing, in that neither have the ability to represent 
themselves – this is also part of the novelty of the technological age’s human condition. 
One major imperative falls on the statesman’s shoulders, that of preserving the capacity 
for future generations to exist, which is also what links them to nature, as nature is a 
condition for the livability of future human life.  
 With the case of this major precursor of contemporary ecosophy, we see quite 
clearly how there is a striking connection between needs for paces of scientific, 
technological and ethical developments to be radically altered in a differentiated manner, 
on the one hand, and the eruption of Gaia, on the other. According to Jonas science and 
ethics must take on a future-oriented form – “futurology” and the “ethics of the future” ; 




incorporating the ethics for the future. And all these modifications of temporality must 
take place due to the greater and greater dissolution of separation between nature and the 
human, as well as the eruption of awareness that future generations’ living conditions are 
highly altered by the technological present. Temporality and the relationship between the 
human and the nonhuman are at the center of Jonas’ philosophy.  
 However compelling and helpful the case of Jonas may be so as to see the 
human/nature dualism in relation to temporality, his diagnosis, prognosis and program 
are highly problematic in a number of respects. For one, his claim that nature and the 
polis used to be relatively separate, that nature was “immutable,” is dubious at best. We 
know that with the very beginnings of human history and the settling of human societies 
throughout the planet, whole species have constantly disappeared, and that this took place 
much before what Jonas calls the “technological age.” Of course his association of human 
modernity with natural devastation has some truth to it, as the rate of these extinctions 
has notoriously accelerated with the industrial revolution and on, such that we currently 
are confronted with what scientists call the sixth great extinction. Nonetheless, the 
portrayal of pre-modern nature as animated by “immutable” laws in contrast to a period 
where “the natural is swallowed up in the sphere of the artificial” is rather unconvincing: 
environmental historians like Mike Davis (2002) have demonstrated how an ahistorical 
reading of nature as changing ever so slowly, or moved stably by cycles, is mostly the 
result of ethnocentric perceptions of “Nature” in relatively (and relatively recently) 
temperate climates. And as mentioned above, the eruption of the concept of 
“anthropocene” reminds us of how short the hospitable Holocene has been relative to 




Another problematic dimension of Jonas’ critique and program has to do with the 
specific gendered terms of both: Jonas depicts human civilization as “raping” and 
“penetrating” nature ever more deeply, in a move that many ecofeminists have 
denounced where nature is feminized, women are “reduced” to biology and nature, and 
both are depicted as passive, or in this case as victims of penetration. Conversely, the 
human is more or less implicitly equated with a certain masculinity, risking women’s 
exclusion from a category that is (problematically) traditionally centered and privileged. 
Further, Jonas’ recommendation that decision-makers espouse the “patriarch’s” ethical 
attitude may raise more than one queer and/or feminist eyebrow. The technocratic, 
potentially anti-democratic dimension of Jonas’ programmatic moment is quite clear: 
Jonas encourages us to rethink the role of technology in late modernity, only to affirm the 
celebration of the scientific expert and his capacity to inform (and arrest) debate, to 
curtail civil society’s potential interference – the latter is not even mentioned in Jonas’ 
Imperative of Responsibility, besides as a passive feminized force in need of patriarchal 
protection. As Latour would say, scientists come in and out of the cave, exercising a 
monopoly over the kind of truth capable of eliminating any participatory democracy dear 
to others in the political ecology tradition (above-discussed Illich’s anti-elitism contrasts 
with these views, for instance).  
Yet Jonas’ insight into the technological age, the centrality of both temporality 
and the human-nonhuman relationship to his thought, and the gendered terms of such 
insight, are helpful insofar as they further confirm my claim that while ecosophy has 




question, it has done so in ways that foreground the temporal, or at least considerably 
affect temporality – being especially critical of temporalities of progress.  
Conserving Virility 
 
The conservation movement, as yet another specific tradition within ecosophy, similarly 
deploys discussions of the “Nature”/human relationship in temporal and gendered terms. 
Environmental feminist Karen Warren has praised one of the founders of conservation 
ethics, Aldo Leopold, claiming that:  
Many feminist environmental philosophers adopt key aspects of Leopold's land 
ethic. For example, many defend a notion of the self as a relational, ecological 
being who is a member of the larger biotic (living, organic, ecological) 
community. (Warren, 2015) 
Warren also goes on to quote Leopold’s praise of both cultural diversity and biodiversity: 
“Leopold claimed that an ecological interpretation of history shows that ‘the rich 
diversity of the world's cultures reflects a corresponding diversity in the wilds that gave 
them birth’” (Warren, 2015). Yet, if Aldo Leopold’s famous land ethic does indeed 
resonate in part with some environmental feminist ideas regarding the diverse 
interconnectedness between humans and nonhumans, we may also remember that in 
1925, Leopold wrote that “public wilderness areas are essentially a means for allowing 
the more virile and primitive forms of outdoor recreation to survive the receding 
economic fact of pioneering” (Leopold, 1992, p. 138). This sentence captures a number 
of dimensions of conservationist thought’s complex and at least partly problematic 
positioning with respect to the correlated questions of temporality, human/nonhuman 




The adjectives “virile” and “primitive,” along with the phrase “outdoor 
recreation” are symptomatic of some of the conceptual grounds that have conservation 
ethics is rooted in. Leopold saw “wilderness” as calling for “conservation” so as to 
preserve possibilities for certain manly men to fully experience their manhood by 
accessing land with no roads or “civilization” (also a commonly used term in Leopold’s 
writings) as “playgrounds” (this word appears extremely often in Leopold’s essays). 
Though the land ethic that Leopold crafted repeatedly asserts that “Nature” must be 
“protected” for its own sake, because of its intrinsic rather than instrumental value, 
underneath this distinction lays an opposition between Nature for leisure and Nature for 
labor. “Using” “Nature” as a playground for purposes of serving upper-middle class 
men’s feeling of wild exploration of “primitive” ways is deemed of higher moral value 
than exploitation of Nature as a resource for one’s livelihood. The term “primitive” 
signals a narrative imbued by a temporality of “return” that permeates conservation 
ethicists through and through, whereby certain nonwestern ways of life are symbolic of 
the past while the West stands for the present and future (themselves read in a 
declentionist perspective). Denying any coevalness to so-called “primitive” economic 
ways of life, these are subsequently exoticized for purpose of play. At the same time, and 
this is not by any means a contradiction but rather more proof of the erasure committed 
here, when Leopold contributes to imagining the national parks system in the United 
States, he rejoices: “any system of wilderness areas would have to be owned and held for 
public use by the Government. The fortunate thing is that the Government already owns 
enough of them” (Leopold, 1992, p. 125) Let’s all clap at the completed U.S. occupation 




Though it is true that Leopold inaugurated an ecological tradition of questioning 
economic logics as sole drivers of land policy, his was a project, not of contesting ideas 
of manifest destiny and economic growth, but of merely tempering, reforming or limiting 
it. Therefore, although he is often read as related to the deep ecology tradition and to 
what Dobson will call ecologism as opposed to environmentalism (see my next section 
below), his legacy must be complicated as also constituting a precursor of green 
capitalism, informed by certain colonial and patriarchal undertones. Leopold did critique 
industrialization’s overtaking all American land, with some provocatively critical 
formulas such as “there is no God but Gasoline and Motor is its Prophet!” (Leopold, 
1992, p. 127) Yet, the “father” of land ethic also repeatedly asserts that economic 
expansion is desirable, as long as it is limited in pace: thus he denounces “the tragic 
absurdity of trying to whip the March of Empire into a gallop.” Though the image is 
again beautifully provocative, here it is the pace, the speed of Empire’s march that is 
denounced, and not so much Empire per se. Let’s note here that Leopold’s critique of 
paces and speeds at which modernity travels, echoing Thoreau’s, and his vision of the 
“primitive,” his partly declentionist objections to progress, enable him to attack only part 
of the imperial logics he seems to denounce: rather than the logics themselves, it is their 
rapidity that is at stake. The emphasis is on “loss” of “the Unknown,” on a “return” to 
pristine (“virgin”) wilderness, i.e the deceleration of a process which in itself is not 
contested. Although Leopold may inspire more radical agendas, he also preached for 
what would now stand as “green consumerism”: “would not many people pay an extra 
penny for a ‘clean’ newspaper?” (Leopold, 1992, p. 192) And although as Warren 




nonhuman world, he relies upon clear distinctions between “Man” and an – often 
feminized – “wilderness” that should be preserved from mass tourism so that the upper-
middle class man may use it as his “playground.”12 “Man” is hubristically defined as “the 
first creature in all the immensities of time and space whose evolution is self-directed,” 
while wilderness is evoked in the following terms: “the most pleasing [road] is the one 
that ‘opens up’ some last little vestige of virgin wilderness.” (Leopold, 1992, p. 184). 
Again, we see a narrative of loss, of return, to a “Mother Nature” that calls for protection 
and for recreational exploration on the part of a privileged manly man. This agenda also 
relies upon a strong nationalistic rhetoric: part of the justification Leopold provides for 
his conservation advocacy taps into a supposed idiosyncratically American spirit, and the 
stakes emphasized have to do with preserving a rugged individualism at the core of 
“Americanness” : “there is little question that many of the attributes most distinctive of 
America and Americans are the impress of the wilderness and the life that accompanied it 
… its distinguishing marks are a certain vigorous individualism” (Leopold, 1992, p. 138). 
Formulations of the human-nonhuman relationship and what exactly may be 
problematic or helpful with them changes with almost each author, or at least each school 
of thought within ecosophy. So do their implications for temporality, and in each case the 
terms of these two facets of the ecosophical question are gendered in different ways. It 
remains that ecosophy is marked by: an engagement with the human-nonhuman 
relationship which is often the most obvious common denominator between 
environmentalists; a subsequent or rather simultaneous engagement with temporality; we 
                                                        
12 In her Primate Visions (1989), Donna Haraway has offered another striking example of the ways in 
which racialized, gendered and classed narratives about “adventurers” and “explorers” so fond of 
“wilderness” (like, for instance, Teddy Roosevelt’s) indeed contributed to constitute the white, male, 




should now add, an often gendered language to defend these two endeavors – whether 
authors advance feminist critiques or, as in Jonas’ or Leopold’s case, explicitly 
patriarchal positions. This has become apparent through four precursors of ecosophy 
(XIXth century transcendentalist Thoreau, conservation ethicist Leopold in the first half 
of the XXth century, Illich and Jonas in the second half). In the remainder of this section 
I will survey some of the more recent schools of thought which have emerged in 
Environmental Political Theory (from the 1980s and 1990s, on), underscoring how each 
of these both critique and understand the human-nonhuman relationship, and what 
consequences this has on the way they may mobilize temporality. I will first focus on 
what Andrew Dobson has called ecologism and distinguished from environmentalism. 
Yet contrary to his defense and amalgamation of ecologism as one singular “ideology in 
its own right,” I read ecologist thought as importantly traversed by disagreements which 
matter tremendously, and this importance will be particularly apparent in discussing 
temporality in these respective currents. These include deep ecology, social ecology, 
political ecology (and de-growth), and finally (more recently) critical, post-structuralist 
and new materialist ecologists (note that many of these categories of course overlap, as 
we will see). 
Ecologism as Ideology 
The green movement has spent years trying to get the environment on to the 
political agenda, and the major political parties have so artfully stitched a green 
stripe into their respective flags that there seems to be no need for a specifically 





This apparent lack of need for a specifically ecologist agenda, for what he called 
“ecologism,” understood as “an ideology in its own right,” is what Andrew Dobson tried 
to refute in Green Political Thought, which presented a survey of debates within 
Environmental Political Thought and a synthetic overview of ecologism still often cited 
as a reference in the field, even twenty years after its first publication, and many new 
editions. For this reason I will devote a substantial amount of attention to it: not that it 
represents the field exhaustively by any means, but it is a great entry point to discern 
some of the connections mobilized, sometimes in spite of the authors’ intentions, between 
temporality, human/nonhuman relations, and gender. Dobson’s argument distinguishing 
ecologism from environmentalism was indeed a needed one, and helps situate some of 
the following reflection, as my own intention is to intervene in ecologist rather than 
environmentalist debates. However, I contend that Dobson’s battle being to defend 
ecologism as “an ideology in its own right,” his attention to the flags within the (British) 
party system13 and their stripes (see the above quote), sometimes prevent Dobson from 
distinguishing with nuance the complex spirals intertwined, the intersections and parallel 
                                                        
13 The term “ecologism” is relatively absent of American Environmental Political Thought. The 
terms“ecosophy” or “ecophilosophy”are equally rare. This is not the place for me to specify these nuances, 
but a passing clarification may interest readers wishing to further refine their understanding of the field and 
the contexts in which it has been developing. While in the United States, “political ecology” often refers to 
an academic field of scientific scholarship (which should however be understood as having political 
implications and going beyond disciplinary boundaries, including between so-called “hard” and social 
sciences - citations), in France “l’écologie politique” is a false cognate referring to what could perhaps be 
loosely translated as a movement sharing many similarities with the American “Environmental Justice” 
movement (citations). Thus when Bruno Latour opens his Politics of Nature with a provocative “What is to 
be done with political ecology?,” to which he answers: “more political ecology!,” he is calling for a 
furthering of a movement that has grown out of associative (non-profit) life, left-libertarian greens, and the 
Green Party there, problematizing the human/nonhuman relationship in relation to social, economic, 
geographic, gender and racial inequalities and participatory democracy. When Dobson refers to ecologism, 
he is speaking within his British context, where he has run for elections within the British Green party (and 
he has held a position of advisor to the British government’s Sustainable Development Commission, among 
other such institutional responsibilities). The two movements (British “ecologism” and “écologie 
politique”) do not exactly overlap, as what Dobson describes does not stress social inequalities as much as 
his continental counterparts, and as the latter ones are influenced by Ivan Illich, Hans Jonas, Andre Gorz 
more than deep ecologists like Arne Naess, and overlaps with the mostly Franco-Italian de-growth 




lines within the fabric of ecologism, the nuances among dark greens (I will try to offer a 
glimpse at some of these in the following sections on deep, social, political ecology). 
Though Dobson insists upon the distinction between light or shallow, and dark or deep 
greens, he is color-blind to some dimensions of the debates. I will start with the 
nonetheless very helpful definition he provides of ecologism (dark or deep greens) as 
opposed to environmentalism (light or shallow greens) to grasp this, and examine how it 
is directly connected to his treatment of the nature/human dualism, in relation to 
temporality and gender. Dobson explains, as do many in the field,14 that ecologism refers 
to a movement which advocates for fundamental societal and institutional change as 
necessary to address the ecological crises, while environmentalism would include, for 
instance, ecological modernization, technological fixes, so-called green capitalism, 
sectorial reforms in the use of very specific sorts of pollutants and ecological damages, 
etc.  
More specifically substantiating his definition of ecologism, Dobson provides a 
synthetic and clear formulation. In his view and others,’ “it is the limits to growth thesis, 
together with the ethical conclusions to be drawn from ecocentrism and hybridity … that 
divides light-green from dark-green politics” (2007, p. 53). And Dobson also emphasizes 
the human/nonhuman relationship more explicitly elsewhere, as a distinctive trait of 
ecologism: “what sets ecologism apart from other political ideologies is its focus on the 
relationship between human beings and the non-human natural world” (p. 28). These 
quotes are indeed quite rich in terms of helping one grasp the meaning of ecologism. I 
                                                        
14 See for instance Humphrey’s review article, “Green Political Thought” where he writes: “We will use 
‘green’ political theory as a broad category encompassing all forms of political thought that have as a high 
priority the conservation or preservation of the natural environment. ‘Ecological’ will refer to those forms 
of green thought that seek the dissolution of contemporary political and economic institutions, and 




would rephrase this analysis as follows: ecologism or dark green politics comprises a 
critique, an ontology, and an ethics. The ontological moment in Green Political 
Philosophy has to do with posing the problem of the relationship between the human and 
the nonhuman. The ethics unfolds from this moment, while the critical moment, which 
can either be read as an implication of the first two or as the premise engaging an 
ontologico-ethical proposal, attacks the idea of progress, its direction being set by growth 
– thus the attack also targets growth itself. In Dobson’s depiction, what I read as his 
programmatic moment would consist of building the “sustainable society.” As I will 
discuss (and critique) later on in this chapter, the British thinker characterizes the 
sustainable society as a “utopia” – under his pen an appraisive term.  
Dobson’s identification of the ontology and ethics, the limits to growth critique, 
and the sustainable society program, all constitute the distinguishing elements that allows 
ecologism to be “an ideology in its own right.” Of note here is that this statement 
contains both the question of the human/nonhuman relationship, along with a critique and 
program which temporal dimension is fundamental, though the author does not 
underscore this. Throughout his works, Dobson (and in this he is quite representative of 
many green thinkers) discusses the limits to growth not only in terms of material 
resources being exhaustible, but also with the implication of a deadline, thresholds, 
temporal limits: the critique is, after all, that growth is unsustainable, i.e that it cannot go 
on forever, in a (temporally, substantially) unlimited manner. In fact, Dobson points out 
(synthesizing the views of many ecologists, as is the goal of his book here) that the limits 
to growth not only impose a deadline, a moment when growth will inevitably collapse on 




rapid rates of growth aimed for by industrialized and industrializing societies have an 
exponential character, which means that dangers stored up over a relatively long period 
of time can very suddenly have a catastrophic effect” (2007, p. 54). The emphasis on 
sustainability is quite clearly a way in which temporality meets imperatives to care about 
the nonhuman: the idea is to sustain conditions for present and future life to continue (or 
begin again) to thrive, thus imagining a present and future of contraction rather than 
expansion. Like a number of other Green thinkers, Dobson deploys a battery of temporal 
concepts, yet does not thematize temporality or underscore that these concepts have more 
in common than addressing the relationship between humans and nonhumans – and of 
course, this means that the connection between this relationship and temporality is left 
unexplored as well.  
This characterization is very helpful on our journey to start seeing the link 
between temporality and the question of the human/nonhuman dualism, and the gendered 
ways in which these questions are formulated by various green theorists. Yet as I have 
mentioned above Dobson is so focused on drawing the line separating ecologism from 
environmentalism, that he amalgamates a number of currents within the former under a 
single rallying umbrella many may have qualms with (myself included). Firstly, Dobson 
grants deep ecology a virtual monopoly over what he calls the “philosophical” 
foundations of ecologism (what I would instead call, more specifically, the ontologico-
ethical moment in this thought). Yet as we will see below, social and political ecology, 
understood as distinct from deep ecology, have nothing to envy the latter current in terms 
of ontological and ethical insight. Dobson sees de-growth as the pragmatic implication of 




political ecologists but not by all (in any of these three currents). Deep ecology asserts 
that all natural things have an intrinsic value, and this justifies sustaining them beyond 
the instrumental fact that human society could not do without natural resources. This is 
indeed a helpful way to read ecologism to an extent, yet the kind of biocentrism defended 
by deep ecology is not shared across the whole movement: in fact, deep ecology’s 
concept of “intrinsic value” has been critiqued by ecofeminists in particular, along with 
social and political ecologists, which disagreement Dobson somehow avoids even when 
discussing ecofeminism (as for new materialist feminist or queer theory, Dobson seems 
to ignore the very existence of this critical development in feminist thought). According 
to a number of social ecologists (e.g. Murray Bookchin, discussed below), political 
ecologists (e.g. Bruno Latour, who as we will see proposes to further deploy political 
ecology beyond itself), ecological feminist theorist Val Plumwood (1993), Tim Morton’s 
(2010) “dark ecology,” as well as queer ecology, the response proposed by deep ecology 
to the problem of the human/nonhuman relationship merely consists of re-valuing the de- 
or under-valued term in this dualism. Simply reversing the hierarchy that organizes this 
dualism insufficiently problematizes both terms: it fails to deconstruct the binary under 
scrutiny – in other words, what is needed is rather to dehumanize and denaturalize 
ecology.  
This is directly linked to the temporal dimension of Dobson’s version of 
ecologism: he thus claims that, to the question aiming at specifying the object of 
sustainability, “what is to be sustained?,” ecologists answer: “natural value.” Yet instead 
of flipping values around, instead of mere reversal, I argue that strands of ecologism 




(I will further discuss this idea below and to some extent throughout this dissertation). 
Thus it is not so self-evident to all ecologists that “natural value” is to be sustained, and 
in fact many (myself included) would argue that this mere reversal is likely to result in a 
further fetishization, reification and mystification of nature, thus perpetuating and 
reinforcing the human/nature separation, however much deep ecologists claim that 
humans are also part of nature, however much they stress the interconnectedness of all 
things. Yet, of interest here is the fact that Dobson is quite symptomatic of an interesting 
assumption that all ecological thought has to be about “nature” : put differently, while the 
most mainstream and least “deep” – in spite of their self-proclamations – critiques that 
have erupted from the ecological movement15 regarding the relationships between 
“nature” and “the humans” fail to de-naturalize and de-humanize politics, in doing so 
they further strengthen the very dualism that produced the current ecological crisis, solely 
striving to either reverse or flatten its hierarchy by way of a simplistic “mise en 
equivalence” (Stengers, 2009) or altogether a praise of “pure” “wilderness.” As we will 
start seeing below in discussing Dobson’s treatment of utopia and in chapter 4, this 
results in a highly problematic envisioning of the future in ways that reproduce patterns 
having created the “anthropocene”’s sixth extinction. For the time being, let’s just point 
out that Dobson sometimes reduces green envisionings of the future and warnings in the 
present, to terms of pessimism/optimism. This is motivated principally by a desire, as the 
ideologue, to fend off accusations made against greens of pessimism. Doom and gloom 
                                                        
15 Note that here I am calling Dobson’s ecologism “mainstream” in the double sense that it seeks to 
amalgamate disparate and complexly distinct movements within ecologism, and in that it thus leans toward 
what I see as the least profound and radical questioning of the human/nature dualism, in relation to 
temporality and gender. I do not mean to refer to environmentalism by way of the adjective “mainstream,” 
as I agree with Dobson regarding his distinction between environmentalism and ecologism (up until he 
claims that adherence to deep ecology’s ontological and ethical vision is one of the distinguishing element 




warnings used as mobilizing tools, fear as anticipation of dire times are indeed central, as 
we have seen above, to a precursor of ecosophy like Hans Jonas: this has earned 
ecologism a reputation for party-poopers Dobson wants to counter with a life-of-the-party 
identity. Dobson thus “defends” ecologism as follows : “greens are generally unerringly 
optimistic with respect to our chances of dealing with the crisis” (2007, p. 20). I would 
not only disagree with such a statement (as we will see, many ecosophers fully expect 
and reflect upon mass extinction, not a particularly or necessarily optimistic vision), but I 
would also argue that the pessimism/optimism dyad is at best unhelpful, at most 
detrimental to both thought and praxis. In fact, overcoming, side-tracking, marginalizing 
such incentives to self-description as either optimistic or pessimistic – and, similarly, 
self-proclaimed utopianism relying upon threats of dystopia – is part of the point of the 
conceptual apparatus I propose, so as to think and experience temporality differently in 
times of ecological disaster. Hopefully the project of circumventing utopia/dystopia, 
optimism/pessimism, human/nonhuman visions will become more and more clear 
throughout, as well as the connection between needs to denaturalize and dehumanize 
ecologism, on the one hand, and needs to create new temporalities on the other.  
Dobson’s ecologism is also resolutely universalist, and in this respect very much 
part of a liberal kind of ecologism, in spite of its claims to radicality (or, as he, Naess and 
the likes enjoy calling it, “depth”). To underline the unique nature of ecologism, Dobson 
writes that it is a “function of the green movement’s argument that environmental 
degradation and the social dislocation that goes with it are everybody’s problem therefore 
ought to be everybody’s concern” (2007, p. 21). Yet even the most moderate and liberal 




environmental crises. Demonstrating that gender, class, race, ability, geographic location 
inequalities are not only reflected but also exacerbated by, say, the climate crisis is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. However one could quote, for instance, this report 
published by UN WomenWatch, to underscore the gendered character of the crisis: 
“women are more vulnerable to the effects of climate change than men—primarily as 
they constitute the majority of the world’s poor and are more dependent for their 
livelihood on natural resources that are threatened by climate change.” The report goes on 
to emphasize that  
women are not only vulnerable to climate change but they are also effective actors 
or agents of change in relation to both mitigation and adaptation. Women often 
have a strong body of knowledge and expertise that can be used in climate change 
mitigation, disaster reduction and adaptation strategies. Furthermore, women’s 
responsibilities in households and communities, as stewards of natural and 
household resources, positions them well to contribute to livelihood strategies 
adapted to changing environmental realities. (“Women, Gender Equality and 
Climate Change,” 2015)16 
 
Reciprocally, uneven contributors to climate change challenge the idea that it is 
simplistically “everyone’s concern and everyone’s problem,” as Dobson calls it without 
much further qualification (the average carbon footprint of an American is about 10 times 
that of a Brazilian, more than 13 times that of an Indian, and 40 times that of a 
Senegalese, and one could also observe similar gaps within each of these countries, along 
with gaps in impacts of climate change unevenly distributed across class, race, gender, 
ability lines). Thus we may remind gender, class, race-neutral advocates of carbon-
neutral politics that, for instance, three times as many women as men died in each of the 
                                                        
16 Note the language of “vulnerability” deployed here, as is the case also with the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change reports: this language poses a number of problems as it risks reifying certain 
populations to a relatively passive role, while also obscuring the interdependencies, power dynamics and 
inequalities which produce the so-called “vulnerability.” I will return to this point in my critique of the 




last Asian tsunamis in the 2000s, and that age and income level also contributed to this 
disparity. This is never evoked by Dobson even when he discusses women’s alleged 
“greater proximity to nature,” which he makes the only, vague and essentialist reason to 
acknowledge ecofeminism in the last couple of pages of his book. Dobson then 
recognizes that ecofeminism, contrary to other “ideologies” he distinguishes (socialism, 
liberalism, conservatism) from ecologism, is quite close to the latter and apt at providing 
robust concepts with which to think ecologist themes and advocate an ecologist program. 
Though he does approvingly discuss Val Plumwood’s deconstructive efforts (Dobson, 
2007, pp. 176 – 188) with respect to human/Nature and the man/woman, male/female, 
master/slave dualisms, Dobson fails to truly integrate any of these anti-essentialist 
environmental feminist insights in his own writings. When he refers to feminists’ anti-
essentialist skepticism with regards to “Nature” being read as having a “feminine 
character” (allegedly inspiring “care” and nurturing qualities), Dobson describes such 
skepticism as “balking.” He not only fails to fully recognize the essentialism in this 
feminization of nature, but also proceeds to espouse such “nature as female” as a 
“normative model,” claiming that “ecologists” at large do so.  
Getting Deep 
 
Up until the third edition of Dobson’s Green Political Thought, the British advocate of 
“ecologism” indeed offered “principal features of the natural world” which were 
supposed to act as a normative model: each of these ontological features “translated” in 
programmatic principles for ecologist politics. Though he has retired this passage with 
the latest edition of the volume without further ado, these normative “lessons from 




1980s under the pen, for instance, of ecosopher Arne Naess. Dobson then characterized 
“Nature” as coterminous with “diversity,” “interdependence,” “longevity,” and, last but 
not least, “nature as ‘female.’’ These characteristics respectively translated into the (thus 
separated) political world as “toleration, stability and democracy,” “equality,” “tradition,” 
and finally “a particular conception of feminism.” I must note here the interlaced features 
of ecologist thought I have been underscoring throughout: longevity, stability and 
tradition again signal an at least implicit importance of the temporal – in this case a 
specific temporality imbued here with an account of “Nature” and femininity as constant 
if not altogether static, unchanging, perennial, an account which we could already make 
out in both Jonas and Thoreau’s depictions including transcendence, cycles, reproduction 
and even eternity. We may also note that within these lineages of environmental thought, 
feminized Nature and naturalized femininity have also been alternately associated with 
portrayals as “temperamental” – both the angelic, pristine, pure and eternal Virgin and 
the hysterical, unpredictable woman have been invoked. 
 From a deep ecology perspective, the human/nonhuman dualism has been 
addressed as a problem which solution resided in the re-valuation of Nature. Arne Naess, 
who originally coined the term “deep ecology,” distinguished this current from what he 
called “shallow ecology” by stressing that all natural things had “intrinsic value.” This 
included individual animals and plants, but also ecosystems, the Earth, etc. Thus Arne 
Naess and others (e.g. Naess, Drengson, Devall, 2008; Devall & Sessions, 1985) 
denounced anthropocentrism and advocated for biocentrism, advancing various 
fundamental principles to ground this biocentric worldview. In his essay on “the Basics 




platform” comprising eight essential points (Naess, 2008, pp. 105-120). The very first 
point declared that “the flourishing of human and nonhuman life on earth has inherent 
value. The value of nonhuman life-forms is independent of the usefulness of the 
nonhuman world for human purposes” (p. 111). By “inherent” or “intrinsic” value, deep 
ecologists meant to refer to a value beyond any instrumental use found in natural things. 
Nature is not only to be “preserved,” “conserved,” or “protected” (note the past-oriented, 
paternalistic language often used by deep ecologists and conservationists) as a resource 
upon which humans depend, but also for its own sake. The “inherent” value is part of 
why Naess claimed deep ecology went “deeper” into the problem of the relationship 
between humans and “Nature” than did “shallow” ecologists and their anthropocentric, 
instrumental views. Point 5 of Naess’ platform echoed this proposition, and also gave 
away the extent to which this valuation of nature came with a reproduction of the 
separation between humans and nonhumans: “present human interference with the 
nonhuman world is excessive, and the situation is rapidly worsening” (p. 111). Note the 
stress on the urgency, the pace of the crisis included in this point. Arne Naess called for a 
“more joyful experience of the connectedness of all things,” yet his deep ecology 
urgently demanded that humans cease to “interfere” with the nonhuman world so much – 
having declared, at the same time, that humans were indeed part of nature. Point 1 of 
Naess’ deep ecology platform proposed the ontologico-ethical claim that all human and 
nonhuman life had inherent value, while point 5 advanced a critical moment in deep 
ecologist thinking, whereby human “interference” must become more limited. Though 
deep ecology did celebrate a re-valuation of nature, it not only failed to challenge the 




from the nonhuman, as it called for a retreat of humans from the nonhuman world. 
“Deep” ecology’s biocentrism is trapped in contradictions that ultimately tend to have it 
fall back onto anthropocentrism.17 
 Naess’ deep ecology also advanced a slightly different version of the concept of 
sustainability than that outlined by the Brundtland report, though this institutional source 
provided the model to amend: to Arne Naess, “there is sustainable development if, and 
only if, it meets the vital needs of the present-day human population without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own vital needs” (p. 194). 
Here the amendment of mainstream “sustainability” concerned the idea of “vital” needs: 
Naess claimed that deep ecology went deeper than environmentalists among the United 
Nations World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED)’s injunction to 
make present needs’ satisfaction compatible with future ones, as contrary to the 
Brundtland report, he stressed that the needs to be satisfied must be restricted to those 
which are deemed “vital.” According to Naess’ own admission, the term is “ambiguous, 
[yet it] is a good starting point for a critical approach to the term ‘need’ in its relation to 
demand in the marketplace of the world’s rich countries” (p. 194). However, deep 
ecology has been critiqued by many social and political ecology advocates as well as de-
growth and environmental justice ones, for failing to altogether reject the notion of 
development as it is, in their views, too deeply entangled with colonial legacies and 
universalizing, linear visions of progress – a sort of depth to which deep ecology did not 
                                                        
17 On this point and for a more extensive critique of deep ecology’s ultimately anthropocentric biocentrism, 




seem as sensitive. Further, deep ecology has also been denounced for the often 
reactionary priorities set by its idiosyncratic defense of biocentrism.18 
On this point we may turn to the strategic and programmatic moment of Naess’ 
deep ecology. As he discussed some of the programmatic claims defended by deep 
ecology, Arne Naess declared: “people in the materially richest countries cannot be 
expected to reduce their excessive interference with the nonhuman world to a moderate 
level overnight” (p. 283). This concession to an expectation of incremental change in the 
Global North contrasts with Naess’ recommendations with regards to “global actions … 
across every border:” “local communities or areas with scattered population are 
uncritically in favor of so-called development and must be forced to a more ecologically 
responsible policy by central authorities” (p. 113). This is an interesting limit to Naess’ 
call for decentralization and participatory democracy. In other words, Naess’ deep 
ecology was open to concessions and negotiation with regards to changes of lifestyles for 
Global North inhabitants, allowing these to transition smoothly to “less interference.” 
Meanwhile, Naess claimed that people in “developing” countries may be coerced into a 
deep ecologist orientation to their politics. On the one hand, changes must “realistically” 
be incremental and transitions relatively slow (rich people “cannot be expected to” 
“change overnight”), and on the other, urgency allegedly justifies coercion (poorer areas 
shall “be forced” into ecological responsibility “by central authorities”).Though Naess’ 
occasionally critical view of the concept of development had sensible reasons and in fact 
could afford to be significantly more radical (without requiring coercion), Naess did not 
provide much explanation as to why exceptions to democratic, decentralizing imperatives 
                                                        
18 See for instance, for a critique of deep ecology from the perspective of social ecology, Bookchin, 2007 




usually defended by radical environmentalists should be made when it comes to the 
Global South or “developing” countries.  
This is just one among many examples of Naess’ envisioning transitions and 
futures, or conceptualizing “sustainability,” in such a way as to barely take global, class 
or gender inequalities into account, even potentially aggravating these. When examining 
his deep ecology’s strategic moment, we similarly find an apology of tree-spiking direct 
action tactics in spite of the fact that this means of protest has notoriously killed more 
logging workers than it has dissuaded logging companies to curtail or stop their 
deforestation efforts (p. 105). Naess also praised the displacement of indigenous 
populations in Australia so as to extend the boundaries of conservation land (p. 279). 
These are justified by Naess with a rhetoric of “return” to an allegedly pristine natural 
state ecosystems enjoyed “before” human “interference,” as well as urgency, along with a 
selective understanding of present and future “vital needs.” Thus the specific ways in 
which deep ecology critiques the human/nonhuman dualism, in a specific gendered and 
ethnocentric form, informed by certain temporal assumptions including themes of return, 
urgency and sustainability, together result in a mere reversal of the human/nonhuman 
dualism’s hierarchy, while tending to exclude already minoritized humans.  
Some deep ecology advocates have also been problematically selective regarding 
the question of what sacrifices shall be made by whom among humans, so as to ensure 
“less interference” into “Nature”: thus in 1988, the journal Earth First! infamously 
published a deep ecology-inspired piece where the author (who signed as “Ann 
Throphy”) suggested violently homophobic means for addressing overpopulation: “if 




would probably be something like AIDS, [which] has the potential to end industrialism” 
(cited by Dobson, p. 52). Co-founder of Earth First! Dave Foreman also has been known 
to make xenophobic claims regarding restrictions on Mexican immigration in the U.S as 
somehow enabling better land conservation. When some self-proclaimed “deep” 
ecologists may rejoice at the mass deaths of queers and AIDS-infected people, fantasize 
about the coercion of developing countries, imagine “Nature” as “female,” or not shy 
away from displacing indigenous populations so as to “conserve” “wilderness,” the 
“depth” of these advocates of “biocentrism” is seriously questioned, in spite of its still 
popular perception among the ranks of some in the environmentalist movement.  
One, Two, Nature! 
 
Bookchin’s social ecology stands in stark contrast with many of the theories’ discussed 
above, and though it shares the same central threads (temporality and the 
human/nonhuman relation) I have been emphasizing and drawing out in the above survey 
of the field so far. His theories conflict with the lineage described above from Thoreau, 
Leopold, deep ecology and conservation, within environmental thought, while they find 
more affinities with (and are nonetheless distinct from) political ecology (discussed in the 
next section) and its precursors (e.g Ivan Illich, Hans Jonas to an extent, and Jacques 
Ellul). For instance, Bookchin opened an essay titled “What Is Ecology?” with a 
statement in clear disagreement with deep ecology’s biocentric perspectives: “ecological 
problems originate in deep-seated social problems” (Bookchin, 2007, p. 19). Indeed, 
when he wrote this Bookchin was quite aware of the incompatibility of this assertion with 
deep ecologists and conservationists’ views, whom he refered to negatively, in the 




as being the preservation of the wildlife and wilderness, or more broadly as attending to 
‘Gaia’ to achieve planetary ‘oneness.’”  
 Bookchin opposed this characterization to his own “dialectical materialism,” 
which has the merit of explicitly stressing the processual nature of “Nature,” rather than 
portraying it, as we have seen in some of the above cases, as static or at best constant in 
its allegedly regular cycles, and calling for a ‘return,’ a ‘conservation,’ or any such past-
privileging accounts. In contrast, Bookchin critiques  
the beautiful vistas we see from a mountaintop or images fixed on the backs of 
picture postcards. Such vistas and images of nonhuman nature are basically static 
and immobile. …Such static images deceive us into believing in the ‘eternality’ of 
single moments in nature. (Bookchin, 2007, p. 23) 
In Bookchin’s ecology, the processual nature of “Nature” emphasizes that both the 
nonhuman and the human world profoundly change over time: they are granted a History 
rather than transcendance. Yet Bookchin does see order in “Nature:” he describes nature 
as a teleological process. To him nonhuman nature is a “developmental” and “enduring” 
process which, qua a simplified reading of Darwin, goes from less adaptable, flexible 
organisms with lesser intelligence, and capacities for subjectivity and self-reflectivity, 
to… humans, who are more of all these things than any other species, creatures or 
organisms. What sets “first nature,” i.e nonhuman nature, apart from “second nature,” i.e 
human, or social nature, is indeed the “fact” that “humans are highly intelligent, … very 
self-conscious primates” who can alter their environment. Thus “human beings belong to 
a natural continuum,” they emerge from nature and are natural creatures, yet contrary to 




Bookchin does concede, throughout a pseudo-Rousseauist narrative of progress mixed 
with degeneration (toward more dominance, more hierarchy, more inequalities), that 
humans are not alone in being able to alter their environs.  
 Yet when he is forced to such a concession he quickly escapes from further 
investigating the rather arbitrary and contestable criteria distinguishing first and second 
nature, by claiming that what he is describing is a spectrum, a continuum, and therefore if 
nonhumans also may affect their surroundings and/or exercise intelligence or demonstrate 
some degrees of consciousness, they are not equipped with these capacities “to the same 
extent” as humans. Difference between first and second nature becomes a mere matter of 
degree. What he first establishes as qualitative criteria for distinction becomes 
quantitative, with the quantities measured being identifiable on “developmental,” 
“evolutionary,” “organic” teleological line. This continuum emphasizes a human 
“superior” intelligence. Besides the fact that the meaning of the concept “intelligence” is 
(inaccurately) assumed to be sufficiently agreed upon to remain unqualified, this 
emphasis on human superiority is interesting for a “dialectical naturalism” that also relies 
upon a “libertarian municipalism” rejecting hierarchization. There remains (unexamined) 
tension between the Hegelian ontology advanced, and the anti-hierarchy anarchist project 
defended. Though Bookchin’s emphasis on human self-reflexivity, consciousness and 
capacity to alter one’s environment allows him to ground an argument according to 
which humans would have all the more responsibility toward nonhuman nature, as a 
“supportive” rather than “dominant” species, and qua an “ethics of complementarity” that 
social ecology aims to develop, the reasons for human nature to have degenerated into 




offered is a mix of progressivism and declentionism) are left to the wonders and 
mysteries of dialectics. The progress of this teleological nature is also described thusly:  
Nature is the history of nature. … [This] require[s] a way of thinking that 
recognizes that ‘what is,’ as it seems to lie before our eyes, is always developing 
into ‘what is not,’ that it is engaged in a continual self-organizing process in 
which past and present, along a richly differentiated but shared continuum, give 
rise to a new potentiality for an ever-richer degree of wholeness. (p. 28)  
Yet if the teleological movement guiding natural evolution is one that makes for more 
“wholeness,” and if the development of human capacities for reflexivity etc is praised as 
coterminous with such progress, Bookchin also claims that second nature is not currently 
fulfilling human potentialities (among others, as a “supportive” species). Thus the 
founder of social ecology describes the negative moment of his “dialectical naturalism” 
as follows: 
Second nature as it exists today, far from marking the fulfillment of human 
potentialities, is riddled by contradictions, antagonisms, and conflicting interests 
that have distorted humanity’s unique capacities for development. Its future 
prospects encompass … the danger of tearing down the biosphere. (p. 31) 
Bookchin thus sees social nature as having failed the achievement of its teleological ends, 
and as currently taking a “distorted” and destructive form whereby a teleology of 
progress turns into a declentionist one. Extracting both humans and nonhumans from this 
path is possible if a “true” second nature, one that actually fulfills human “potentialities” 
is restored, qua “libertarian municipalism,” or the ecological society: small communes 




in broader bioregional sets. To Bookchin, capitalist societies distort second nature, 
organizing structurally around an imperative to growth that intrinsically is incompatible 
with ecological well-being, and instead promotes devastation. The regeneration that 
would occur in the ecological society would not reject technology per se, but would be 
capable of creating different technology. In a quasi-Illichean way, Bookchin claims that 
technology in a capitalist society is necessarily thought through the prism of the growth 
imperative, but that technique is not in and of itself noxious. I will return to the 
programmatic moment of Bookchin’s social ecology in the section below on utopia and 
ecosophy. For the time being, we may underscore that for Bookchin, temporality and the 
human/nonhuman dualism are inseparable, insofar the processual, historicizable and 
developmental character of nature makes the two terms parts of a single continuum rather 
than completely separate spheres. However, Bookchin does not try to part ways with the 
dualistic nature of this process, and instead he further reinforces a normative ordering 
privileging the human. He does so qua a reading of the process as a teleological one – as 
we will see, this teleology will clash with the temporality of becoming that I will defend 
here.  
What Is To Be Done With Political Ecology? 
 
“What is to be done with political ecology? Nothing. What is to be done? Political 
ecology!” (Latour, 2004, p. 1) This provocative and enthusiastic exclamation is Bruno 
Latour’s, and it opens his book Politics of Nature. Though in the United States, it is 
sometimes misread as referring strictly to the field of scholarship called “political 
ecology” and calling for further politicization of this academic field, in the French 




movement of this name that the first chapter of the text stresses (though the STS scholar 
also includes ecology as a scientific subfield).19 I will suggest below that Latour, along 
with an eclectic crowd made of science studies, philosophy of science, environmental and 
feminist theorists that could very loosely and imperfectly be described as “post-
structuralist” for some, “new materialist” for others, “object-oriented ontologists” for 
many (these three currents also overlap and clash, to various extents) have together 
radicalized and complicated some of the insight that proliferated in part out of the 
political ecology tradition.20 We will see that this double elan of complication and 
radicalization is particularly visible if we read these various texts and currents from the 
perspective of temporality in relation to the nonhuman. For now, and to clarify some of 
what Latour is inviting to “be done,” I turn to one of the founding thinkers who 
influenced “l’écologie politique,” understood as a political movement and a current of 
ecosophy.21 
 Andre Gorz, a prominent figure of the New Left in the 1960s and 1970s, focused 
on and developed what he and many in continental Europe called “political ecology” 
starting in the aftermath of May 68. Influenced by the Frankfurt school (he was a friend 
of Marcuse’s) and also by Ivan Illich, Gorz advocated for an “ecological, social and 
cultural revolution which would abolish the constraints of Capitalism” (1980, p. 40). In 
his Ecology as Politics, Gorz denounced both “monopolistic capitalism” and  
                                                        
19 See my and Elizabeth Barron’s upcoming paper: “Political Ecology, Ecologie Politique: Interdisciplinary 
Losses in Translation.” 
20 See the introduction to this dissertation for more on queer and feminist ecologies. 
21 Granted that, as I have mentioned above in other authors’ cases, a number of other important figures 
could have provided a general idea of where political ecology originated, and the survey in this chapter is 
by no means exhaustive. It rather offers prominent examples, for each current examined, of authors’ insight 
regarding the human/nonhuman dualism in relation to temporality. In the case of political ecology, I could 
have turned for instance to Michel Serres (1995), or co-founder of Generation Ecologie, activist and 




“bureaucratic socialism” as the two facets of an industrialism incompatible with the 
limited resources of this planet. He thus participated in inaugurating the tradition now 
lead by thinkers like Serge Latouche and called “de-growth,” formulating its ideals of 
economic contraction by claiming that the only way compatible with limited planetary 
resources would require to “produce less, to consume less, to work less, to live 
differently.” Gorz proposed a polemical reading of productivism and consumerism that 
resolutely aimed at thinking social and economic inequalities alongside ecological 
devastation, bringing class-oriented left themes together with environmental justice. He 
insisted that “nature is not a garden planted for our benefit,” while also repeatedly 
asserting that nature was not sacred either. In this perspective, the relationship between 
the human and the nonhuman cannot be animated by a deep ecologist reversal of the 
dualism’s hierarchy celebrating “Nature” now placed on a pedestal. Neither did Gorz part 
ways from humanism. A generous reading of his works could conclude that he pushes 
aside both biocentrism and anthropocentrism, yet Gorz did remain focused on a relatively 
unapologetic anthropocentric viewpoint which argued for economic contraction mainly 
because natural resources’ depletion and exhaustion create increased inequalities among 
humans and risk serving as justifications for anti-democratic measures in the emergent 
event of ecological catastrophe. Three axes could thus be identified in Gorz’ works: 
social and economic inequalities, democratic participation, and ecological damage were 
his principal inter-related concerns. Though visibly close to Bookchin’s social ecology, 
with regards to temporality (at the historical level) Gorz’s political ecology contrasted 
with Bookchin’s critique, in that it did not propose a reading of natural or social evolution 




progressive vision. Instead, Gorz proposed an astute critique of productivism and 
consumerism grounded in a largely revised Marxist analysis, along with a resolute 
conviction that lifestyles could indeed be re-invented to adjust to natural limits and 
radical democratic imperatives, slowing down the relentlessly sped-up paces of late 
modernity (thus Gorz follows his friend Illich at the level of quotidian temporalities). He 
offered such a horizon of change away from capitalist growth as one possibility which 
may or may not prevail, depending on collective mobilization, just as he tended to 
explain the current ecological crisis in ways suggestive of over-determined contingency 
rather than progress or decay. Yet I will suggest that the role of temporality in Gorz’s 
works remained problematic, when I discuss his description of “a possible utopia” in the 
section below (II). 
More Political Ecology: OOO Subjectivity, and Matter Matters 
 
But for the time being, let’s return to Bruno Latour’s invitation: as I mentioned, in his 
Politics of Nature, he asks provocatively “what is to be done with political ecology?,” 
answering this provocation with a simple “nothing,” itself followed immediately by a 
second question: “what is to be done?” The answer offered then: “political ecology!” 
Latour’s invitation to “do” political ecology is interestingly quite inseparable from an 
insistence both on temporality, and on human/nonhuman subjectivities. However in his 
case, the agency at works is one lacking agents, and including instead actants, hybrids, 
involved in a “parliament of things,” nonhumans being allotted “spokespersons” found in 
part in the sciences, and a new constitution bringing together or assembling “Nature” and 
culture, the sciences and politics, running counter to modernity’s efforts of separation and 




partly – an environmental philosopher, though more significantly his works are the result 
of a general trend in some segments of (overlapping) Science and Technology Studies, 
(so-called) post-structuralist theory, philosophy of science and what has now been named 
“new materialisms.”22 These have recently turned to new “matters of concern” due to the 
“eruption of Gaia” (2009). The events and changes mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter, including various sorts of ecological crises and urgencies, have indeed prompted 
many to address themes that so far had mostly interested Environmental Political Theory 
or ecosophy per se. So rather than reading Latour as such an ecosopher, which would risk 
being reductive (though not entirely inaccurate anymore), it is interesting to note that he 
and others, though not originally or exclusively environmental theorists, have felt 
compelled to focus their attention to ecology in this context. In the case of Latour, 
temporality also seemed an inevitable problem related to the nonhuman turn. I would 
contend that this is not only caused by the importance granted to time and temporality in 
Latour’s previous works, though it helped: if a meeting took place between on the one 
hand, a Latour who had previously asserted that “we have never been modern,” critiquing 
the unidirectionality and unidimentionality of time in modern discourse, and on the other, 
the nonhuman turn, it was because this problematic linearity of modern time is also 
problematic when nonhumans invite us to rethink the world and the separations 
“moderns” have attempted (ultimately with limited results) to create. To Latour, hybridity 
proliferates particularly in our contemporary context, a hybridity that requires to rethink 
democracy as well as the passing of time. In fact, the futurism at work in modernity 
                                                        
22 Exhaustive discussion of the work done over the last couple of decades in this booming field is beyond 
the scope of my argument, but just as an indication of this development, we may cite a couple of 
anthologies, which to an extent are the start of a good indicator for how prolific this area has been lately: 
Grusin et al., 2015; Van der Tuin & Dolphijn, 2012; Braun, Whatmore, Stengers et al., 2010; Afeissa, 




(which I will further discuss in much of this dissertation), is described by Latour in the 
following terms: moderns have always been running toward the future, only their backs 
were turning backwards the whole time. This metaphor will come back a number of times 
in what follows, but already we may point out that, simply put (for now), the uni-
directionality and uni-dimentionality of modern progress poses serious threats to both 
human and nonhuman life. Understandably, while hybridity (between humans and 
nonhumans and technological things and creatures) becomes ever so salient when hitting 
planetary limits, challenging a “modern constitution” that desperately attempted to 
separate for a more efficient reign, so does the need for critique of modern temporality 
become inevitable. In times of ecological crisis, times of progress are especially put in 
doubt. 
 Similarly and before Latour (already in 1989), Felix Guattari had reflected on 
what Stengers has called “the eruption of Gaia”: he opened a short essay titled Les trois 
écologies with an expression of urgency and threat:  
Planet Earth is going through a period of intense technico-scientific 
transformations and phenomena of ecological unbalances are being engendered as 
a result, which threaten, in the long run and if they are not remedied, the 
implantation of life on Earth’s surface. (1989, p. 11)23 
In this essay Guattari called for an ecosophy operating in three registers or ecologies, 
namely that of the environment, that of social relations, and last but not least, the domain 
of human subjectivity. He argues that “there will only be a truthful response to the 
ecological crisis at the planetary scale if an authentic political, social and cultural 
revolution occurs, that would reorient the goals of the production of material and 
                                                        




immaterial goods” (p. 14). If Guattari’s call, which he further explored in the concluding 
chapter of his later book Chaosmose (1995), was strikingly urgent and related to the 
livability of human and nonhuman life, he mentioned that the necessary re-invention of 
subjectivity needed to match these circumstances would have to also “re-invent … the 
relationship of the subject to the body, fantasy, time that passes, and the ‘mysteries’ of 
life and death” (1989, p. 19). Guattari adds that “what is now in order is the release of 
fields of ‘futurist’ … virtualities,” as “the unconscious only remains attached to archaic 
fixations only insofar as no engagement has it reach out to the future. This existential 
tension will operate qua human and nonhuman temporalities” (p. 28). 
 We are again invited to think the human and the nonhuman in relation to 
temporality, and though these are dispersed and omnipresent yet passing mentions, 
spread throughout Guattari’s text, the importance of temporality to a number of authors 
who turned to the nonhuman from post-structuralism has become increasingly even 
clearer since. Perhaps this is also in part due to the proliferation of “new materialist” and 
“object-oriented ontology” literatures that occurred since the beginning of the 21st 
century, with some among these publications addressing temporality: in so many texts, it 
seems relatively sensible that temporality would erupt from time to time. Yet something 
more fundamental seems at play, perhaps more fundamental even than some passing 
references to temporality might seem to indicate in some of these works: if authors in 
these emerging fields do not all substantially develop new conceptualizations of 
temporality, it is omnipresent at least as a frequently recurring mention, almost taken for 




undeveloped given. This may require that the question of time be foregrounded and 
accorded the time and attention it needs. 
 Though not alone (we have already started to see how feminist and queer theory 
has contributed here), William Connolly’s works have advanced such a project to great 
extents. Connolly situates his own work on the fragility of things and thinking a new 
philosophy of becoming for this age thusly:  
The ‘new materialism’ is the most common name given to a series of movements 
in several fields that criticize anthropocentrism, rethink subjectivity by playing up 
the role of inhuman forces within the human, emphasize the self-organizing 
powers of several nonhuman processes, explore dissonant relations between those 
processes and cultural practice, rethink the sources of ethics, and commend the 
need to fold a planetary dimension more actively and regularly into studies of 
global, interstate and state politics. (2013, p. 399) 
Connolly situates this new materialism in a different manner than I am here, as he sees it 
(rightly) as a number of convergent movements coming from philosophy, biology and the 
humanities. This further confirms what I was starting to suggest above: the eruption of 
Gaia is forcing a rethinking of subjectivities and matter, nature and culture, the human 
and the nonhuman, such that the latter two relationships are not taken on just by scholars 
exclusively or originally engaged in ecosophy or EPT. 
In continuation of Deleuze’s Nietzschean exhortation to take the difficult task of 
making chance an object of affirmation, Connolly affirms becoming as he re-thinks the 
world and the human condition, as well as humans’ relationship to the world. He 




slower experience of the past flowing into the present and both flowing toward the 
future” (p. 305). Underscoring the limits both of linear causality and providential design, 
he points to the “bumpiness,” randomness, surprise and contingency of time, marking the 
movement of the past into the future. A recognition of the limits of human powers, a 
world of becoming is made up of force fields always already engaged in motion and 
transformation, which would not be possible without the passing of time (and 
reciprocally, time could not possibly pass if it weren’t for such force fields in motion). 
Thus once we know that matter indeed matters, that the nonhuman and the human are 
always already entangled, we cannot but also think the world in terms of motion, speeds, 
bumps, shifts, constant re-distributions. Temporality needs to be radically re-
conceptualized as characterized by contingency and becoming. 
Drawing not only from Deleuze but also from complexity theory and with an 
open sense of accommodation for a plurality of creeds, Connolly’s philosophy of 
becoming could result in a groundlessness that may be frightening to some. Yet it is 
above all an occasion to affirm agency without subjects, a needed project in a context 
where the nonhuman emerges as omnipresent and entangled with the human. In 
conjunction to this philosophy of becoming, Connolly offers possible antidotes, ways to 
live that may creatively address some of the forces that have either fueled the climate and 
other ecological crises, or denied it to defend instead a specific – and volatile – version of 
capitalism. One way is to affirm a tragic temporality (2008), which instead of relying 
upon vengeance, resentment and eschatological visions, would turn to awareness and 
affirmation of conflict and of finitude – here William Connolly is clearly re-asserting his 








With the above survey of the recent history of Ecosophy and Environmental Political 
Theory I have shown that, in posing the problem of the relationship between the 
nonhuman and the human in response to the current ecological crises, temporality has 
also become a central thread to key authors and schools of thought within this field. 
However we see from the readings I offer here that this connection between temporality 
and the question of the nonhuman has often taken on problematic gendered forms. For 
this reason I now turn to feminist and queer theory’s dealings with both temporality and 
ecology. A number of pertinent debates within queer and feminist theory have erupted in 
the last few decades: firstly, feminist and queer theory have gone through what some 
have called a “new materialist” turn (Alaimo, 2008) that has discussed nature, ecology 
and the nonhuman in innovative ways. Related to this shift is the emergence of “queer 
ecologies” (Mortimer-Sandilands & Erickson, eds., 2010), i.e efforts to rethink nature as 
queer, confounding our cultural gendered categories rather than caught in essentialist, 
static sex binaries. Finally, queer theorists have engaged in rich debates over temporality, 
contesting “straight time” (Halberstam, 2005) and reflecting on what alternate 
temporalities queers inhabit. However, feminist and queer debates over queer ecologies, 
nature matters, and time, have not or very rarely crossed paths. Rather, they have been 
pursued as parallel realms of inquiry. In other words, while the former two (new 
materialist feminisms and queer ecologies) greatly overlap, queer times and queer natures 




queer eco-temporalities would bring these debates in conversation with one another and 
enable a much needed feminist intervention into ecosophy. 
In Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Val Plumwood (2002) has offered 
feminist insight into what she reads as the human/nonhuman ‘dualism’ which organizes 
much of Western discourses, and which operates not only similarly to but also 
interdependently with other dualisms opposing Man/women, culture/nature, master/slave, 
mind/body, etc. Plumwood’s deconstructive approach helpfully strives to distinguish 
these dualisms from simple binaries or dichotomy, arguing that they rely upon radical 
exclusion (or hyperseparation), backgrounding or denial (the supposed dominating term 
in each dualism is seen as independent from the dominated one, negating the essential 
work the “Other” does to sustain the “self”); incorporation (or relational definition: the 
subjugated term is defined in relation to the upperside, as a lack or negativity); 
instrumentalization (or objectification, e.g nature is man’s garden); homogenization or 
stereotyping (the lower side of the dualism is caricatured, which implies that a simple 
reversal of the relation of power at stake with both terms unchanged is insufficient at 
best, dangerous at worst, as occurs when deep ecology celebrates the “intrinsic value” of 
nature and failing to sufficiently re-conceptualize it). Plumwood’s deconstruction exposes 
this logic of colonization and re-conceptualize both terms for a new ethics. She thus has 
opened the possibility to see how valuable feminism may be to environmentalism, and 
vice versa. Further even, she has demonstrated that one cannot do without the other: the 
implication of demonstrating that various dualisms like human/nonhuman and 
male/female are interdependent is that the resistances against the orders organized by 




 The work of Donna Haraway has also enabled a feminist or queer ecology to 
come into existence. For instance, she read primatology (1989) as a discourse that 
constituted white, male, Western, upper class subjects and cast non-human, non-white, 
non-western and female subjectivities as “Others” against whom the norm may establish 
itself as such. Her famous cyborgs and companion species manifestoes (1987; 2003) have 
challenged readers to think of the hybridities that make up all situated subjects and 
situated knowledge, as discursively constituted – while reminding us that these discursive 
constitutions have a materiality also requiring problematization. As Stacy Alaimo has 
written, “Nature, as a philosophical concept, a potent ideological mode, and a cultural 
repository of norms and moralism, has long been waged against feminists, people of 
color, indigenous people, queers, and the lower class. Paradoxically, feminists, the 
working class, tribal peoples, and people of color have been denigrated because of their 
supposed ‘proximity’ to nature, even as queers have been castigated for being ‘unnatural” 
(Alaimo, 2008, p. 239).  
 Environmental feminist theory has simultaneously engaged these 
interconnections, these complex and contradictory uses of “Nature” against women and 
“Others,” while also pursuing an internal critique of feminist theories. The latter have 
indeed often been so intent on parting from essentialism to demonstrate the social 
construction of gender that they have sometimes paradoxically failed to properly address 
ontological and epistemological questions of matter, the material, “Nature,” the 
environment, the biological body. In contrast, Alaimo’s approach conceptualizes the 
fundamental hybridity of our makeup, by way of her notion of “transcorporeality,” 




boundaries of human and nonhuman life, including at the skin’s scale. Transcorporeality 
provides substance to re-imagine nature as queer, as processual, agentic rather than 
serving as passive background, fragmented, traversed by historical/herstorical change, 
having porous boundaries or hardly discernable ones, entangled with human bodies. The 
nonhuman is thus invested with feminist stakes, and reciprocally, feminist critique and 
struggles have nonhuman stakes.  
 Similarly, Myra Hird’s work on animal biology (2008) shows that “we may no 
longer be certain that it is nature that remains static and culture that evinces limitless 
malleability.” Indeed, she provides a profusion of examples from the so-called natural 
world which queer it to the point that heterosexism may seem, in this perspective, quite 
“unnatural.” Supposedly female and male characteristics shift and change rapidly among 
animals and living beings, “the vast majority of cells in our bodies are intersex,” etc. This 
re-reading of “Nature” and biology from a queer perspective suggests open possibilities 
that, instead of avoiding or casting aside biology and nature as threatening to feminist 
positioning, may indeed nourish the latter. Claire Colebrook advances yet another kind of 
queering, proposing an alternative reading of the genealogies of vitalism where certain 
vitalisms have historically served normatively dominant valuations of life, while a 
vitalism emphasizing the virtual rather than the actual (from Nietzsche and Bergson to 
Deleuze, etc), may be thought of as queer (2014, pp. 100 – 126). Queer Deleuzian 
Feminist Rosi Braidotti invites new materialist feminism to rethink subjectivities in terms 
of nomadic subjects, and emphasizes becoming-nomad and becoming-animal as ways to 
experience a groundless world of precarious becoming (2011; 2013). Object-Oriented 




phrase “queer ecology,” in his case to advocate for the abandoning of the concept of 
Nature, which he deems a crystallization of history, and asserting our constant partaking 
into a mesh or interdependent, complex beings simultaneously uncanny and familiar 
whom he calls “strange strangers.” Strange strangers require us to “think big,” and 
“hyperobjects” such as the planet, climate change, deep time do so as well. There have 
been significant tensions which I cannot elaborate on here, between object-oriented 
ontology and speculative realisms, on the one hand, and new materialist feminist theory 
on the other, yet they converge to an extent in calling for queer ecologies.24  
 This whole literature indeed stresses contingency, the unexpected, and becoming 
as central to the feminist intervention into matter and the nonhuman and to the new 
materialist turn within feminism. However, few spend as much time on time as Elizabeth 
Grosz does (1999; 2004; 2005). Re-reading Darwin, Bergson and Deleuze from a 
feminist perspective and stressing temporality, she affirms randomness, chance, surprise, 
unexpectedness in stories of evolution, in art, and in a context of ecological damage. 
Indeed, queering both the human and the nonhuman calls for queering temporalities and 
challenging straight time. 
 But parallel to these debates among new materialist feminists and regarding queer 
ecologies, queer theory has also sought to question visions and experiences of time, so as 
to “queer” it. This has taken place without necessarily or often being connected to the 
ecological debates, so that bringing the two literatures together may enrich a queer 
perspective on eco-temporalities. I will now turn to a couple of authors in this vast array 
of work (Halberstam, 2005; Freeman, 2010; McCallum & Tuhkanen, 2011), as the goal 
                                                        
24 For feminist responses to some OOO and speculative realist critiques that also sum up the stakes and 




here is not to exhaustively review this literature, but rather to extract pertinent insights 
which can feed into my own contribution. Specifically, I choose the central debate 
between Edelman and Munoz, as it also staged a familiar character whom Munoz 
introduces against Edelman’s presentism and which I will discuss further in the pages to 
come: utopia. Lee Edelman’s No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (2004) 
played a crucial role in launching the debates within queer theory regarding temporalities. 
In his book, Edelman argues that the reigning, heteronormative temporality rests upon 
what he denounces as “reproductive futurism.” In his view, heteronormativity powerfully 
subjects the present to an always already postponed future qua the fetishized figure of the 
Child. Because of a constant obsession with the Child as representing innocence and 
calling for protection, queerness becomes the incarnation of the negation of futurity, the 
embodiement of a dangerous death drive. All sexuality, when not redeemed by the 
imperative to reproduce, is indeed dangerous, both in itself and with respect to the status 
quo. Edelman calls for queerness’ espousal of this dangerousness. He asks that queerness 
embrace the refusal of the – futurist – social and political order. Queerness must, in 
Edelman’s account, further mobilize and deploy the negativity of which reproductive 
futurism accuses it. Fuck the future! Fuck the Child! (p. 29) thus becomes a queer outcry 
meant to contest and resist the heteronormative subjection to the future. To a great extent, 
this critique of reproductive futurism could also be extended to ecological questions of 
limits on growth: what I call uchronia is in part defined by a subjection of the present to a 
future of always more. This ever-postponed tomorrow of impossible illimited abundance 
in a limited planet purports to justify ecological damage and destruction today, just like 




reproductive sex today. Thus Edelman’s attack on reproductive futurism can be 
transposed to the questions pursued in queer ecologies and offer insight.  
 However, while the sort of anti-relational presentism Edelman then calls for, and 
the eloquence with which Edelman portrays it, can be highly seductive, his critique of 
reproductive futurism also contains – or so I wish to object – a potentially nihilistic 
hyper-individualism incompatible with the stance of an environmentalism that also would 
invite an uprise against futurism (understood as the subjection of the present to an 
abstract singular future), without abandoning futurity. Instead, queer eco-temporalities 
could endeavor to re-think the future with respect to virtualities and possibilities beyond 
heteronormativity, beyond capitalist growth. In the next chapter I will further discuss the 
figure of the Child, which Edelman rightly underscores as heteronormative and in need of 
challenging in its abstracted, fetishized form, versus children, queer kinships (Haraway, 
2015) and “future generations” involved in eco-politics. Helped with Claire Colebrook’s 
queer vitalism (2014), I defend futurity against futurism, a distinction which Edelman 
fails to make: rejecting the futurist ways in which an abstract future (in this case a 
heteronormative future where the figure of the Child dominates) subjects the present, 
Edelman rejects futurity in general. Edelman’s critique is highly valuable, insofar as it 
gestures at destabilizing the subjection of concrete present and future realities under the 
yoke of abstract futurism. Yet the critique of “reproductive futurism” should focus more 
specifically to futurism, rather than rejecting all vitalism and interdependency in favor of 
a presentist nihilism. Presentism can indeed be a form of abstracted time, separated from 
both futures and pasts, thus equally problematic compared to remote utopias of growth. 




of the present to a singular normative future qua a merely reactive stress on the present is 
itself a form of utopianism. Such reaction simplistically re-locates the “good time” (eu-
chronos, uchronia) in an isolating and hyper-individualist present instead of the future or 
futures.  
 Jose Munoz pointed out, in his Cruising Utopia: the Then and There of Queer 
Futurity (2009), that Edelman’s anti-relational account posed problems not only as it may 
indeed result in a solitude or hyper-individualism not all queers may enjoy, but also 
because the present may not be such a pleasurable or desirable place for queerness to 
occupy. Instead, qua Ernst Bloch’s conceptualization of utopia, Munoz defends the “not 
yet here” character queerness affords. While I find that Munoz is right to critique 
Edelman’s anti-sociality and his presentism, I also find the former author’s turn to utopia 
highly problematic. Both authors take issue with ‘straight time,’ as Halberstam has put it 
(2005), and Edelman in particular underscores one of its fundamental problems, namely 
the subjection of the present to an abstract futurism. Yet Edelman falls into the rejection 
of the future and futurity which he fails to distinguish from abstract futurism, while 
Munoz, seeing the trap of Edelman’s presentism, falls into another: he ultimately situates 
possibility and change in an ever-receding horizon line once again, armed with Bloch’s 
concept of utopia. I argue that the needed queer eco-temporalities that the current eco-
crises call for cannot afford to project desires, hopes and concrete actions for change on a 
time disconnected from time (uchronia), whether it be an anti-relational, hyper-







Utopia and Ecosophy: 
Gazing Through Concrete Landscapes To an Ever-Receding Horizon Line? 
 
 
Without concluding that narratives which recount an 
elsewhere and an otherwise be solely a nuisance, I declare 
it brutally: utopia is death, as we would like to live it. … It 
congeals time, submitting existence to rituals that are often 
obsessive; it neutralizes space, situating its narratives in the 
improbable and the “placeless” … Yet, desirable, it does so 
while rendering this death attractive and pain-free. … [It 
evokes a] fascination for an immersion in an 
undistinguishable fetal and lethal state. 
J.M. Besnier 
 
Utopian Voices v. the Voice of Reason 
 
Utopia, a bit like temporality, is a recurring theme in ecosophy that is often obscured by 
the more obvious human/nonhuman thread, yet is directly connected to both the latter, 
and to temporality, in their various gendered manifestations. As this section aims to 
illustrate, a number of the authors discussed above either praise or reject utopia, or they 
may include a utopian moment in their reasoning. However, few actually explain what 
they may mean even when they use these terms, or what function this category serves in 
their thinking. In this section I will describe and analyze this, and though what follows is 
by no means an exhaustive portrayal of the ways in which ecosophical literature so often 
incorporates the theme of utopia, I will provide a couple of examples I find particularly 
pertinent so as to further situate my own position with respect to ecology, utopia and 
temporality, laying the ground for my own contribution. From these, the need for 




 Utopia, a term famously coined by Thomas More’s eponymous novel depicting 
the visit of a (Western) traveler into a Platonic ideal Republic in a remote location, is 
etymologically built on a double meaning: “eu-topos” refers to the good-place, while 
“ou-topos” means no-place or placeless place, the place that is no-where. More’s 
dropping the vowels leaves an ambiguity, a tension and/or a conflation which the modern 
meanings of utopia often comprises. The good place is also the place outside of all actual 
places, the unattainable one, perhaps to strive for, or perhaps to melancholically regret as 
a desirable and desired impossibility. Consequently, characterizing a political project or 
strategy as utopian may be appraisive, as we will see in the instances of ecological 
thinkers who proudly assert their utopianism. It may also be discrediting, accusatory: 
what is utopian is deemed unrealistic, unrealizable, impossible and naïve, idealistic.  
These appraisive and accusatory or discrediting meanings are also informed by 
the either internal or external perspective which the qualification comes from: some 
within a particular current of environmentalism may adamantly refuse to be called 
utopian, as they may see this mostly as a discredit shed upon proposals they intend as 
realistic as well as demands they deem to belong to non-negotiable necessities. A 
description of ecofeminists as “utopian” by some eco-modernization, non-feminist 
currents of environmentalism would, for instance, be greeted with uproar and counter-
accusations that it is the latter perspectives which aren’t as realistic as the ecofeminist 
ones, and that, for instance, the project of re-conceptualizing women and men’s roles as 
well as humans’ relationship to nature is not an idealist but a necessary one, one which 
ecofeminists have every intention to turn into reality. Perhaps a more specific and telling 




movements like ecofeminism as such, let’s think of one of the many women Vandana 
Shiva (among others) has written about as involved in leading the Chipko movement in 
India. Now let’s imagine her reaction if told that this movement’s efforts to protect 
Himalayan villagers’ livelihoods, their access to water, land, and forest shall be described 
as “utopian.” The violence committed by characterizations of certain radical 
environmentalist claims, projects and views as “utopian” is especially clear when 
ecological devastation becomes a more and more explicitly vital matter. Insisting to 
depict such vital matters in terms of utopianism is a claim to the probability of death: it 
would be so beautiful (eu-topos) if you could keep living livable lives, and at the same 
time this idea is outside of any realistic imaginings (ou-topos). We may also imagine the 
reactions of a person belonging to a generation a couple of decades into the future, whose 
life has been directly affected by runaway climate change (this is not to imply, far from it, 
that climate change only affects remote future generations). Knowing this change which 
has damaged her life (or perhaps rendered it impossible) has been caused to a great, 
crucial extent, by the globalized carbon-emitting economies of today, should we even 
bother asking this person whether the contraction and radical re-invention of such present 
economies is utopian or whether it is needed, worth a shot, whether it should be granted 
possibility no matter how probable? We may finally imagine a conversation with one of 
the hundreds of nonhuman species currently endangered by the anthropogenic sixth mass 
extinction under way: if we were able to hold such a conversation, would such a species 
agree that ideas of radical change formulated so as to contain further destruction are 
“utopian”? Of course these examples are hardly comparable beyond this thought 




violence to the unique subject positions at stake. Nonetheless, this question of who and 
what can afford to concede a “utopian” character to certain radical ecological critiques, 
claims and agendas seems especially salient and concerning, given how widespread the 
use of this term is.25 It has become quite commonplace, both for appraisive purposes 
within the ranks of – mostly Western, mostly white, mostly non-feminist – ecosophers 
and/or environmentalists, and, at the same time, to serve the discrediting and dismissive 
purposes of environmentalism’s detractors (whose “voice of reason” may utter things like 
“come on, we know you’re cute and utopian and idealist, but let’s be realistic, remember 
growth and the market really dictate what reality demands: in fact your ‘reality’ is 
unreasonable and their reality is the only one that counts as such”). As will start to 
become apparent by the end of this section, I wish to debunk both uses (appraisive and 
dismissive: their effects are equally noxious), and to reverse the charges (making room 
for snapping back: “the voice of reason is wrong, the market is the utopia, its demands 
are unrealistic”).  
For instance, ecologist Andrew Dobson proudly praises his own depiction of 
ecologism’s program for a sustainable society as ‘utopian,’ in the hope of connoting how 
closely related to the good life and how radical the Green project is. At times, his use also 
signals that the project is a rather unconceding whole, while in other instances Dobson 
calls the Green program a “utopia” in order to connote the admission that ‘realistic’ room 
for negotiation exists when it comes to building a sustainable society, and that 
                                                        
25 We may mention, for instance, that French ecosophy includes a whole set of works published as a series 
in the independent presses “Editions Utopia,” including a Manifeste Utopia (2008) postfaced by French 
political ecology precursor Andre Gorz. I will further comment on this text in chapter 4 below. Many books 




ecologism’s platform of claims and vision for a green society is but an ideal to strive for26 
(“dear voice of reason, don’t worry, we hear you: we radical ecologists and de-growth 
advocates realize how crazy we sound, and really we’re reasonable enough to readily 
accept your reality, with all subsequent concessions amending what we first saw as 
realistically needed”). Ultimately, as I will try to suggest in what follows, these 
contradictory deployments point to the insufficient attention paid to the meanings and 
effects conveyed by a term that has become commonplace enough for at least a 
significant contingent of ecosophers to use. (Appraisive) meanings of ‘Utopia’ are often 
taken for granted even though this term does no less than indicate the situation of a 
political project and strategy with respect to the real. As such, the notion in fact calls for 
further scrutiny. 
My defense of and critique with regards to ecologism addresses precisely these 
tensions: I wish to show that though many greens have or have been identified as 
‘utopians,’ sometimes espousing this term as appraisive, sometimes fending off 
accusations of a utopianism they rejected, they (we) would benefit from turning the tables 
around, and accusing the productivist, growth society of being utopian. Shifting the 
emphasis from topos to chronos (and kairos), I have coined the term “uchronian” to 
characterize capitalist growth-oriented temporalities. Thus I agree and defend a lot of 
elements in the respective ontological, ethical, political visions, strategies and projects 
                                                        
26 “[The planet’s] finitude provides the fundamental framework within which any putative picture of a 
green society must be drawn. The guiding principle of such a society is that of ‘sustainability,’ and the 
stress on finitude and the careful negotiation of Utopia that it seems to demand forces political ecologists to 
call into question green consumerist-type for environmental responsibility” (Dobson, 2013, p. 64). This 
quote is quite revealing of the tension here: finitude in planetary resources, requiring economic contraction, 
is depicted as the identifying criterion which define “dark greens.” But however fundamental of a 
framework this provides for the sustainable society, Dobson grants this a negotiability expressed qua the 
term “Utopia.” Utopia is the ultimate goal, that which will never be attained, and which one is willing to 




developed in certain strands of ecological thought (as should already be clear based on 
the overview of debates over temporality and the human/nonhuman dualism, above). Yet, 
I intervene in this field by calling for a non-utopian claim to ecological ways of living 
and seeing the world, considering many of these as radically pragmatic, and capable of 
displacing the impossible temporal horizon which capitalist growth offers and which has 
brought us to an ecologically catastrophic situation.  
A Utopia of One 
 
From Thoreau to William Connolly, many of the authors mentioned above have felt 
compelled to envision worlds, societies, futures, projects more or less concrete or remote 
from their actual present as a form of thought experimentation. These have aimed to 
describe the alternative lifestyles and societal models ecosophers consider to be needed 
so as to confront environmental damage. Thoreau’s famous novel Walden (2008), 
allegedly describing his experience living for a year in “the wilderness” and in autarky, 
has sometimes been described as a “utopia of one.” Indeed, though Thoreau’s narrative 
told a story of autarky in the wild, where he killed an animal with his bare hands, his self-
made wooden barrack on Walden Pond was just a couple miles away from his mother’s 
house, where he would regularly go get a cookie. The “reality” behind Walden was closer 
to a kid’s backyard’s tree house than to the concrete realization of an alternative way to 
live. Yet children’s tree houses are important to imagination, and imagination is in turn 
crucial to creating new ways, and to apprehending the real (critically): thus as a tree 
house narrative imagining a possible alternative lifestyle, as fiction, therefore, Thoreau’s 
book remains tremendously inspiring. Walden describes an ideal for a solitary way of 




“Simplify, simplify, simplify!” (p. 62) More than an accurate depiction of a ‘real’ 
experiment, Thoreau offered a valuable description of what could be, what worlds could 
emerge at the individual level, if only the ever so busy moderns that then surrounded him 
were to scale (and slow) down. Thoreau even provides a budget and a list of necessities 
(p. 37), such that this thought experiment in a place abstractly called ‘the wild’ which 
existed more in his imagination than by Walden Pond, could act as a form of concrete 
proposition. He reminds his readers that neither those who came before any given 
generation nor himself as a writer should dictate young ones how to live, and that each 
individual must devise their own ways (p. 219). Thus Walden describes Thoreau’s 
version of the good life (‘eu’ –‘topos’), in a non-place (‘ou’ – ‘topos’) named 
‘wilderness’ or ‘Nature,’ loosely imagined based on actual woods next to Concord, 
Massachusetts. Like many utopias previously and subsequently written, Walden projects 
some possibilities and criticisms from the here and now, to imagine them as realities of a 
distorted future or distanced place, then bringing certain lessons about the good life, to 
our the concrete present and its needs for change.  
A Possible Utopia 
 
What Thoreau devised at the individual level, in his “utopia of one,” a number of 
ecosophers have since developed at a collective level. I have mentioned Andrew 
Dobson’s appraisive use of the term ‘utopia’ so as to recognize the negotiability of 
Greens’ project for a sustainable society. Andre Gorz, whose works I discussed above, 
and Serge Latouche, one of the main theorists of the de-growth movement, also resort to 
utopia, inserting it in oxymoronic phrases like “a possible utopia” (1980, pp. 42 – 50) or 




to is the outline of a program, which in itself may pose a number of problems with 
respect to imperatives to collectively and democratically decide upon common societal 
and lifestyle paths, yet if presented as such, could constitute interesting proposals that 
would undoubtedly have their place within the kinds of semi-manifesto genres espoused 
by both thinkers, and for purposes of “de-colonizing imaginaries” (as Latouche puts it, 
following Cornelius Castoriadis), a.k.a tree house building. After all, many branches may 
indeed burgeon from such trees and their oikos.  
Specifically, Andre Gorz closes his famous essay, “Ecology and Freedom” 
(1980), with a whole section titled “a possible utopia,” narrated from the uncanny point 
of view of the citizens of a revolutionized France that transitions to a sustainable society. 
The narrative opens with the sentence “when they woke up that morning, the citizens 
asked themselves what new turmoil awaited them.” The citizens’ viewpoint comes back 
up a number of times, each formulated in reference to various moments throughout the 
day, thus situating Gorz’s “possible utopia” in a quotidian temporality: the third 
paragraph opens with “at noon, …” ; the next starts with “that evening, …” The 
description of this revolutionized moment of transition is to an extent programmatic and 
indeed quite quotidian, mundane, concrete: “on this morning, no tickets were being sold 
or required on the buses or suburban trains … At noon, the government announced [its] 
decision to institute free public transportation throughout the country.” The pace of the 
sustainable transition is fast, yet the goals have to do with slowing down, reducing work 
time, liberating time for leisure. Temporality is at least quadruply essential to this 
narrative: Gorz projects his readers into a potentially relatively close future to imagine 




compared to the very dry economic critique of the present which preceded in the essay. 
Secondly, the formal contrast between the latter critical moment of the essay (the 
economic analysis) and the “possible utopian” narrative part is abrupt, sudden, stark. 
Thirdly, the transition to a revolutionized green society is fast, opening on an awakening 
in all senses (the morning plays an important role in conveying this) with important 
governmental measures being taken each couple of hours. Finally, however clumsily 
Gorz leaps into this thought experiment after his dry economic analysis, Gorz rhetorically 
stresses the temporal dimensions of the revolutionary society: to a great extent the 
changes implemented are depicted in terms of quotidian paces, rhythms and speeds of 
life.  
Slogans attributed to the revolutionary government also punctuate the narrative, 
such as “we shall work less,” “we must consume better,” “we must re-integrate culture 
into the everyday life of all,” all four being quotes from a hypothetical Green president’s 
speech. By consuming “better,” Gorz means that the value of objects will not be dictated 
by capitalist markets’ exchange anymore, but rather by their use, this contrast between 
use-value and exchange-value being measured in temporal terms, as what would then 
matter would be the durability of objects. While free and public transport, along with bike 
lanes, would be greatly enhanced, private cars would be gradually phased out of urban 
centers. Factories would be self-managed by the workers such that surplus value created 
collectively would be self-appropriated, and schools would be organized around the “self-
reliance” of students, who, “with or without the collaboration of the teachers,” would 
raise rabbits and fish, learn crafts so longed neglected in conventional modern schools 




these changes are described, not by resorting to the conditional mode I am using to sum 
them up, but qua the indicative mode, a mode made possible by the political fiction 
narrative form which invites the readers to extend their imagination into a possible near 
future, however probable. 
 If the depiction of this utopia may seem naïve to some, my point is not by any 
means to portray them as such: in fact I would contend that these are concrete, sensible 
and desirable propositions for a context of ecological crisis. Furthermore, they are open 
to debate rather than an authoritarian program or strictly prescriptive outline. As Gorz 
specifies upon introducing his utopian narrative, that this is “one of several possible 
utopias,” and that his critical analysis could “be given a different expression from the one 
suggested here: its only function is to liberate the imagination as to the possibilities for 
change” (p. 42). In other words the utopia Gorz proposes is neither unsensible, absurd, 
nor supposed to outline some kind of iron law or rigid societal plan. My qualm is not by 
any means with the proposals themselves, but with the disconnect between, on the one 
hand, the concrete, open, even pragmatic and simple (albeit ambitious) propositions 
made, and on the other, the act of naming this political project “utopian,” conceding some 
alleged disconnect with reality instead of defending such changes as both as already 
happening in places here and now, as desirable and possible, without subjecting them to 
assessment in terms of probability. 
A Concrete Utopia 
 
De-growth economist Serge Latouche, who is widely read in the ranks of the movement 
of the same name, also mobilizes an oxymoronic phrase to advance his and de-growthers 




Truong as “a breviary of the de-growth [décroissance] movement.” Gorz and Latouche’s 
utopias share at least three traits in common: the expression of a tension between 
possibility and reality conveyed by their respective “possible utopia” and “concrete 
utopia” is one commonality. Another is the fact that both of these are included in texts 
that propose strong economic critiques accompanied with programmatic moments. 
Finally, these are indeed written, to an extent, as “breviaries,” or perhaps “manifestoes” 
for the rising movements the authors belong to. Though this indicates how appealing the 
term ‘utopia’ may be for a certain left in contexts of collective mobilization that require 
stressing “imagination at work” or “l’imagination au pouvoir,” and though the tensions 
contained in “concrete utopias” may be productive ones, I contend that these depictions 
are not sufficient in facing claims to the reality of the growth imperative at odds with 
political ecology’s proposals. Rather than assert possibility, these calls to utopia risk to 
(at the very least rhetorically) further confirm the alleged unfeasibility of de-growth and 
ultimately strengthen the colonization of the imaginary denounced by Gorz, Latouche, 
etc. I wish to provoke a search for how we may foster dreams, new imaginaries, 
capacious strategies and project for sustainable change, without depicting these as 
radically outside the real, as unfeasible, and instead showing that those ridiculing such 
dreams, those usually called realists (true believers in the marvels of capitalist markets 
and growth) are offering nothing but utopian dreams and imaginaries legitimizing 
destruction. 
Latouche writes: “The de-growth project is therefore a utopia, or in other words a 
source of hope and dreams. Far from representing a flight to fantasy, it is an attempt to 




fictional president’s slogans, Latouche offers “eight Rs”: “re-evaluate, reconceptualize, 
restructure, redistribute, relocalize, reduce, re-use and recycle” (p. 33). The “Rs” in all 
these are stressed as implicitly sharing another: that of “Resist.” In contrast, Latouche 
opposes the present “over-speeding thermo-industrial system” as one with “a growing list 
of words beginning with the prefix ‘de’: industrial delocalization, monetary deflation, 
political disenchantment (desenchantement), cultural demotivation and religious 
demystification” (p. 43). To potential accusations that his list of “Rs” may be read as 
past-oriented (passeiste or primitivist), retrograde or reactionary, Latouche retorts:  
Let me simply say that … the actions in question are as much part of a revolution 
as a backward move, and are at once innovative and repetitive. If there is an 
element of reaction, it is a reaction to the system’s excesses and hubris – which 
finds expression in many ‘overs’… ‘over-development, over-production, over-
abundance, over-extraction, over-fishing, over-grazing, over-consumption, over-
packaging, over-communications, over-medicalization, over-indebtedness, too 
much traffic (surcirculation). (p. 43) 
 
Like Gorz’s, Latouche’s utopia is highly charged with importantly temporal dimensions. 
The de-growth program he outlines does not only require “slowing down, and therefore 
resisting both the empire of speed and current trends” (p. 55). Neither does Latouche’s 
‘concrete utopia’ solely project the readers to a close future imagined as veering off the 
growth path. It also stresses a resistance against the “speed society” (as Ivan Illich put it), 
excesses that have thrown it beyond unsustainable thresholds. Latouche consequently 




living, the latter being adamantly defended as non-retrograde. However, Latouche’s 
insistance on the importance of place stands at odds with the non-placeness or ou-topos 
of utopia, again reiterating the tension between desirability (eu-topos) and feasibility. 
Furthermore, utopia risks obscuring some of the concrete elements in fact constitute the 
make-up of Latouche’s very proposals: he mentions Bookchin’s eco-municipalism, ideas 
of ecopolis, and the ‘slow city’ movements. Yet, perhaps inevitably, and to an extent self-
admittedly, Latouche ultimately describes de-growth in negative terms, by way of what it 
is not or should not be – thus the oppositions between his eight ‘R’s and the list of ‘de’s 
and ‘overs.’ This latter part is not discrediting by any means, as to make oneself clear one 
often needs to primarily explain what one is opposing or objecting to. But the question 
arises of why de-growth should be described as a pseudo-pristine utopia outlined in 
advance (with the anti-democratic risks this comprises) rather than being affirmed as 
innovative, concrete and ongoing, convivial resistance to the speed society. I contend 
that, was Latouche not characterizing the positive moment of his argument as “utopian,” 
perhaps the place of this negative would be reduced, and the proposals advanced would 
not risk to sound like a (potentially limitedly democratic) program. 
Futurological Anti-Utopianism 
 
We have seen27 that Heidegger’s student Hans Jonas proposes a very different kind of 
program, one where the development of a science of prediction or ‘futurology’ would be 
accelerated, where the production of risky technology would be slowed down, where an 
‘ethics for the future’ fueled by futurological, expert recommendations would inform 
policy makers, who would model their actions with regards to political subjects 
                                                        




(including present and future generations of human and nonhuman beings) on the 
patriarch’s allegedly benevolent protective stance with respect to his family. Though 
there are so many disagreeable aspects to this technocratic and patriarchal program, Jonas 
interestingly uses the term “utopian” as a form or dimension of human hubris particularly 
characteristic of ecologically devastating modernity. Thus he denounces 
the inherently ‘utopian’ drift of our actions under the conditions of modern 
technology, whether it works on nonhuman or on human nature, and whether the 
‘utopia’ at the end of the road be planned or unplanned. By the kind and size of its 
snowballing effects, technological power propels us into goals of a type that was 
formerly the preserve of Utopias. (1985, p. 21) 
 
Though I side with de-growth regarding a number of insights, I part ways from a certain 
political ecology which risks associating itself with such hubris in the form of a praise of 
utopia. On this subject, although I have made clear that a feminist and convivial (thus 
anti-elitist) political ecologist reading of Hans Jonas reveals many limits to his work on 
the ecological crises, I side with this precursor of ecosophy’s anti-utopianism. Here Jonas 
reverses the roles (though he would probably not phrase it this way), and accuses 
industrialist modernity of utopia, which is in part what I intend to propose we continue 
(or, for some of us, start) doing. Utopia has many undesirable traits, in spite of an 
association to dreaming and hoping and with “the good place,” and even, to an extent, 
related to this depiction as ‘the good place’ (starting with the problematic singular, and 
the apparent smoothness of prescriptions which could afford room for complexity, 
unpredictability and bumpiness, potentially lacking in this regard to the detriment of a 




“good place”) which, for instance, prompts critical ecology theorist Andrew Biro to 
depict Theodore Adorno’s works as including a utopian moment supposed to redeem him 
from portrayals as a doom-and-gloom pessimist (Biro, 2005). 
One limit of utopia which Jonas underscores above has to do with the totalizing, 
all-encompassing and potentially hubristically smooth character of the societal projects it 
stages. Another crucial problem is that of the relationships between possibility, 
impossibility, feasibility, reality and placelessness. Questions arise, for instance, as to 
what is obscured by green projects depicted as utopian. Utopia comes with the potential 
implication of erasing ongoing changes and resistances very similar to, and in fact often 
inspiring, the supposedly more general utopian societies defended within a remote sphere 
or future. In the following chapters, we will see for instance how political eco-fiction 
imagining green worlds or ‘ecotopias’ draws from ongoing practices, movements, 
collectives and communities to generalize them. But it is one thing for works explicitly 
situated in literary eco-fiction to stimulate our imagination and spread or magnify 
existing realities, and quite another for environmental theorists to outline what the perfect 
world shall look like resorting to the term ‘utopia’ with a strong ‘ou-topos’ connotation, 
in other words risking to negate the existence and/or possibility of alternatives in the 
present. This is what seems to occur with the presence of ‘Utopia’ (often wearing a proud 
capital ‘U’) as described in Latouche for instance, where the fact that already existing 
cooperatives, practices, groups that are already pushing alternatives into existence is 
being relegated in footnotes instead of advanced as evidence that, well, ecological 




place and the placeless place meanings in the term utopia, and each meaning separately, 
become highly problematic and operate as so many erasures of possibilities. 
If utopias have the explicit status of fiction aimed to inspire present efforts not 
implicitly denied, as a literary genre therefore, they are fascinating thought experiments. 
And it remains that Thoreau, Gorz, Latouche and others have contributed to envisioning 
different lifestyles as potentially rich sources for alternatives to growth, speed, 
consumerism and productivism. Yet the tension within the term, the framing of the good 
place as a placeless place, of ecological thinking as unrealistic dreaming encourages to 
ask what today may serve as exemplars for different modes of living, what credit one 
may grant to ecological thought, visions, proposals. In other words, caution is in order 
with respect to grand attempts to gaze through concrete landscapes in the hope of walking 
toward a line which by definition, being erected as horizon, will forever recede (Brault & 
Morrow, 2015). One may wonder what could happen if we start thinking about 
concreteness, not as lying at the utopian horizon line, but as part of the landscapes we 
may risk leaping or stomping over: perhaps we could find alternatives to growth growing 
within the concrete’s surprising and unpredictable bumps, cracks and pot-holes. The 
following two examples of ecosophical envisioning could be read as opening such cracks 
to see what is or could be growing under the pavement (“sous les pavés, la plage”?). 
Interim Futures and Now-Topians 
 
As I mentioned above, William Connolly’s dealings with the ecological crises advance a 
philosophy of becoming and tragic temporality to face the volatility of late capitalism as 
well as the fragility of things. Connolly also advocates for an “eco-egalitarianism” he 




“interim futures.” These futures do echo, to an extent, the utopian visions attempting to 
foster optimism which I discussed above. However, Connolly’s “optimism” (deserving as 
it is of quotation marks) situates itself within a tragic temporality that greatly differs from 
utopia, which in turn justifies the preference for the phrase “interim future.” Connolly 
proposes to fuel a “counter-resonance machine” opposing apocalyptic visions coming 
from the cowboy-capitalist evangelical Christian “assemblage” by way of “positive 
political energies” depicting eco-egalitarianism. This is made possible by a “philosophy 
of time, emerging from the lived experience of the unexpected and from theoretical 
study, [and suggesting] that time is punctuated by surprise, not only because of 
limitations in our ability to know the world but also because the world itself contains an 
element of volatility” (Connolly, 2008, p. x). Capitalist economies are far from exempt 
from this: “complexity, interactivity, and an uncertain degree of temporal openness 
compose [capitalism’s] mode of being” (p. 11). Here we are quite far removed from 
smooth utopian horizons, resolutely committing to the asperities and volatility of 
unpredictable concrete landscapes instead. Yet this non-utopian portrayal of a volatile 
world is not left as dry and arid land deprived of hydrating imagination and visions. The 
task is then to underscore the contingency of late capitalist economies (without 
underestimating their powerful assemblages and resonance machines), in a move echoing 
J.K. Gibson-Graham, whose work Connolly turns to when mentioning her use of current 
examples of “non-capitalist spaces” (Gibson-Graham, 2006). Thus we may “visualize an 
interim future that departs significantly from the shape of the present” (Connolly, 2008, 
p. 14). This future is not remote or abstracted from the present, as utopia risks being. 




But temporal proximity is not the only difference between utopia and such interim future 
(in fact, some of the problematic utopias discussed above may be envisioned as relatively 
near us). It also includes a defiance to linear or unidirectional (Latour) time much more 
explicit and concrete than potentially static and disconnected utopian visions. Upon 
envisioning an interim future, Connolly proposes to 
then work back from that point to specific reforms that could actualize the image.  
But why participate in visualization at all? You do so because imaging is 
ubiquitous and unavoidable in thought, and if negative images are not countered 
by positive visualizations the creative potential of thought and action is stifled. (p.  
94). 
The necessity for positive envisioning which, in spite of their shortcomings, utopian 
narratives discussed above attempt to meet, and which I have referred to as tree-house 
making, thus compel us to project ourselves into positive imaging of possible (though not 
necessarily probable) futures which depend upon imagination among other complex 
conditions. Without imaging and imagination, “the creative potential of thought and 
action is stifled.” Again, one of the stakes is the envisioning and location of asperities in 
our present landscape “by coming to terms with the periodic volatility and messiness of 
capitalism you can better discern both how tragic binds could unfold to capture it and 
identify experimental actions that might help to move it in more positive directions” (p. 
10). Connolly’s interim future may not be probable, yet the attachment is rather one of 
possibility, and “the shifts may be more radical and arrive sooner than earlier anticipated” 
(p. 102). With this nuanced distinction between the probable and the possible, as well as 




back onto the hubristic dimension of utopia denounced by Jonas as in fact being 
intimately connected with modernity (and modernity’s temporality of growth-driven 
progress). Though Connolly’s depiction of the interim future included, at the time of his 
writing Christianity and Capitalism, an equally impossible and improbable “reversal” of 
climate change, it is quite close in content to the de-growth program. We are invited to 
envision an “ecologically sound economy” where “soil, air, and water pollution are 
curtailed; the food system promotes health; waste disposal systems are organized around 
recycling; and nonrenewable sources of energy are increasingly replaced by renewable 
modes” (p. 93). Thus the affinity between de-growth and other political ecologies is quite 
apparent, with the important nuance of avoiding risk that discredit be cast upon these 
project due to the impossibility contained in the term utopia.  
 If we were to combine this multi-directional temporality with an attention to 
present experiments, we would not land very far from what I will call “synchrony,” in 
contrast to “uchronia.” Chris Carlsson (2008) has called attention to current resistances 
against what Ivan Illich denounced as the speed society and its standardized knowledge. 
Proposing the term “now-topia,” Carlsson offers a glimpse into what he considers a “self-
emancipatory class politics.” The “now” of “now-topia” thus replaces the privative prefix 
“ou” and the appraisive one “eu” to stress, as Gibson-Graham (2010) puts it, the question 
of “what is being done?” instead of that of “what is to be done?” Carlsson describes this 
move as follows:  
Tinkerers, inventors, and improvisational spirits who bring an artistic approach to 
important tasks that are ignored or undervalued by market society are what I call 
Nowtopians… [Now-topia includes] urban gardening/farming, do-it-yourself 
bicycle repair co-operatives often called ‘bike kitchens,’ hacker collectives 




communications, recycled clothing makers, biofuels co-ops, and more. (2008, p. 
47) 
 
Through these experiments, “people are taking their time and technological know-how 
out of the market” in surprising and unanticipated ways which disrupt existing 
productivist logics. In recycling, innovating, organizing qua mutual aid, care and 
solidarity within people’s free time rather than salaried work, now-topians not only 
demonstrate that other worlds are possible, but enact them in the here and now. Contrary 
to utopian versions of de-growth, the emphasis is on creating “post-capitalist forms of 
life” in clear locations and time re-valuing what Ivan Illich would call the vernacular, and 
granted renewed conviviality to tools having erupted so far from the waste of capitalist 
economies. In this anti-elitist perspective, ecological change is neither left to 
technology’s recognized experts nor contained in an image that risks being accused of a 
lack of pragmatism. There is, however, a tangible overlap with de-growth politics, which 
Carlsson himself underscores in a piece published in a recent degrowth glossary: 
Degrowth, a Vocabulary for a New Era: “[Nowtopians] are ‘exiting the economy,’ which 
is the slogan of degrowth. Their tinkering and inventive practices turn waste into 
productive matter yet operate outside the market and against the current of relentless 
growth.” To Carlsson the two major components of such efforts are “time and the 
technosphere.” Most activities pursued by urban gardeners and farmers, hackers, bicycle 
cooperative repair workers and others are indeed quite time consuming, but carve into the 
speed society for a quotidian liberated time of conviviality today. While a combination of 
Connolly’s interim futures and these now-topian practices would land quite close to the 
synchronic landscapes I am interested in (see chapter 6), the term “now-topia” is a partial 




multidirectional movement occurs between projecting ourselves into future positive 
images and making our way back to the present so as to promote change there. A mere 
presentism, as we will see, is insufficient, and so would be an imagined future lacking 
bridges to the present.  
Turning the Tables Around 
 
These two examples of envisioning alternatives to the growth-driven progress of 
capitalist economies contrast with utopias insofar as they protect imaginaries of a risk to 
erase, or at least obscure, current, ongoing, or possible (though not always probable) 
alternatives presents, and immediate or long-term futures. They emphasize contingency 
and surprise, unpredictability and randomness or chance, becoming rather than linearity, 
instead of proposing a potentially static plan or smooth program. The double meaning of 
utopia as the good place and the placeless place, along with each meaning separately, 
expose self-identifying utopian Greens to discredit, situating their worlds away from the 
real and their strategies away from pragmatism, while having them admit to 
impossibility. The deployment of utopia in green thought prevents ecosophy to concede 
some improbabilities while still affirming a will to create possible and perhaps even 
necessary innovative ways of living. The singular “good place” also risks forcing 
concessions and sacrifices on democratic agonism, erasures of complexity and conflict. 
The good place dimension in utopia smooths ecological programs, getting rid of 
asperities in complicated and ecologically damaged landscapes in need of reconstruction, 
improvisation and inventiveness. Though “now-topia” and “interim futures” offer 
capacious beginnings, I will argue that these should be combined into a synchronic vision 




can be invented, the tables must be turned on who is calling whom ‘utopian,’ who is 
being unrealistic, what the “voice of reason” proposes to accomplish, what demands are 
being made upon a situation which demands otherwise. Modern hubris has long been 
utopian, and it is about time that improvisational, playful, seemingly mad or anomalous, 
queer times be pushed to the foreground instead. In order to do so, new temporalities 
required by contexts of ecological crisis must be invented. Ecosophy has long had time in 








IT’S NOT TOO LATE! 




Uchronia as a Synthesizing Concept, and More 
 
This country was conquered by those who move forward. And so will space. 
John F. Kennedy 
 
On September 12th 1962, U.S. President John F. Kennedy gave a speech at Rice 
University, where he celebrated the ever-accelerating progress made by “human history” 
that would reach new, lunar heights seven years later, with the “giant leap for mankind” 
committed by proud U.S. citizen Neil Armstrong. In this speech, Kennedy translated 
“50,000 years of man’s recorded history” into the shorter time-scale of 50 years: 
No man can fully grasp how far and how fast we have come, but condense, if you 
will, the 50,000 years of man’s recorded history in a time span of but a half 
century. Stated in these terms, we know very little about the first 40 years, except 
at the end of them advanced man had learned to use the skins of animals to cover 
them. Then about 10 years ago, under this standard, man emerged from his caves 
to construct other kinds of shelter. Only five years ago man learned to write and 
use a cart with wheels. Christianity began less than two years ago. The printing 
press came this year, and then less than two months ago, during this whole 50-
year span of human history, the steam engine provided a new source of power. 
Newton explored the meaning of gravity. Last month electric lights and 




we develop penicillin and television and nuclear power, and now if America's 
new spacecraft succeeds in reaching Venus, we will have literally reached the 
stars before midnight tonight. (2015) 
 
The opening sentence gorgeously captures the paradoxical nature of the hubris expressed 
in this text. Here “man” is used to refer to the individual watching, mesmerized, the 
history of “His” species (the latter is referred to, later on, as “advanced man” or simply 
“man,” in the sense of humankind, “emerging from his caves”), an individual whose 
comprehension powers are challenged (“no man can fully grasp”) by the spatial and 
temporal scales (“how far and how fast”) of the history “he/we” belongs to (“we have 
come”). The humbling experience of this challenge to understanding apparently requires 
a reduction to more palpable, more relatable scales, ones that may fit in a lifetime or 
generation. However Kennedy’s leap from 50, 000 years to a 50 years fast-motion 
summary is not only meant to serve clarification or pedagogical purposes, translating the 
deep time of history into generation-scaled time and the fates of myriad humans 
(nonhumans are apparently left out of the picture) into gendered, technology-propelled 
space-traveling “man.” Evidently the acceleration also dramatizes the recent nature of 
what is read as tremendous human progress. To an extent, this dramatization could also 
seem to confirm the initial sentiment of humility first evoked by the individual difficulty 
grasp these time-scales: we moderns are so recent compared to a mostly primitive, 
“caveman” history: we’ve only just come out of our dark caves! But with this cohabits a 
sentiment of omnipotence created by the acceleration: we moderns have finally made this 
tremendous leap, just now, after our ancestors dragged their (bare) feet in their dark cave 




“advancement” of “man” to the next. The selection of such markers are telling: the use of 
animal skin, i.e the use of nature (here are the useful, resource-full nonhumans) to make 
clothes, precedes the construction of shelter as opposed to dwelling in caves, i.e the 
erection of “man”-made roofs to extract “man” from nature, etc. In a swift ethnocentric 
gesture, Kennedy later skips over all kinds of spiritualities to mention Christianity only. 
Though this has the merit of underscoring its recent character, (perhaps inadvertently) 
suggesting its contingency, this leap centers Christianity as among the most relevant 
markers for progress, among a list of technological innovations. A playful counter-
reading could of course underscore that Christianity is indeed, rather than the anomalous 
presence of the spiritual amidst technological bumps, itself a technology, one that 
required human invention and contributed to enabling a certain mode of production. But 
one may legitimately doubt that such implication is exactly what Kennedy wished to 
convey here. Then the printing press, the steam engine, physics, have us jump right into 
the industrial revolution, and it takes but two short sentences for JFK to introduce the 
essence of contemporary times, from electric lights to nuclear power and spacecrafts. 
Note that each of the last phases presented here (three periods include primitive self-
extraction from the cave, the industrial revolution, late modernity) correspond to some 
forms of new communication (the printing press, telephone, television), power and 
energy (steam, electricity, nuclear), mobility (the cart with wheels, the automobile, the 
spacecraft). These provide a ternary rhythm which accelerates at the end of the 
paragraph, when Kennedy enumerates (and… and…) while in contrast, events 
symbolizing the slow beginnings of history had each been narrated with their own, longer 




who move forward. And so will space.” The accelerating march of progress, 
accomplished by inventive Christians and Americans as they colonize greater and greater 
spaces all the way to the outer space, barely has limits. The very form of the text echoes 
this colonizing hubris, and rhetorically ties this history with a movement “forward” that 
assumes a linear and teleological foray into limitless “advances.” History is envisioned 
here as linear, teleological movement in a “forward” motion to greater and greater 
expansion, a motion moved by ever-accelerating paces. In short, both the expansion and 
the acceleration seem limitless.  
 However, ten years later the Limits to Growth report would be published, perhaps 
another marker in human understanding, one that challenged the idea of progress as 
endless expansion. This is just one example among many critiques of hegemonic 
temporalities of progress emerging with the ecological crises. I have mentioned a 
constellation of these in the introduction to this dissertation. In this chapter, I will 
examine a couple more closely (I): the question of limits, that of urgency, the image of 
future generations, and finally, pressures on every second in the quotidian to solely be 
dedicated to consumerism and productivism, with no interruption. My own concept of 
“uchronia” synthesizes these critiques and contributes further critical work. Considering 
them closely will therefore allow me to develop the concept: by calling capitalist 
temporalities “uchronian,” I underscore that these idealize a promised abstract future of 
abundance (good time, “eu-chronos”) that is always postponed, thus relying upon and 
generating insatiability, while they assume illimited growth in a limited world 




 Because the critique I present qua this notion of uchronia builds upon existing 
critiques in environmental discourses to then contribute further contestation of capitalist 
temporalities, to an extent this concept is a synthesizer (one could argue all concepts may 
be mostly this). For this reason, the notes and sounds will sound familiar, though I’ll 
compose my own tune to add to the concert of voices denouncing the ever-accelerating 
progress depicted here by JFK. More precisely, the goal of this chapter is not to 
demonstrate empirically that growth is overwhelmingly, hegemonically taken to be one 
of the principal measurements of a healthy economy, and yet is impossible. Ecologists, 
many economists,28 and myriad environmentalists have already accomplished this work. 
These give plenty of material to think with, and to go beyond. My goal here is to draw 
out the threads that run through many key environmentalist notions and arguments, and to 
more fully realize and conceptualize the implications of these arguments as well as how 
they impact the nature of the temporalities at work.  
 I will draw from critiques of capitalist temporalities to assert that it is high time to 
turn the tables, i.e to affirm that radical environmentalist proposals do not offer a 
beautiful, bright and shiny utopian horizon (contrary to what some even within these 
ranks have claimed, as we have seen in the previous chapter), a horizon that could easily 
be dismissed because as “utopian,” it would be unrealistic, situated outside reality and 
pragmatic demands. The ecosophical thought I defend sheds light on capitalist economies 
and capitalist temporalities’ own utopian and (especially) uchronian nature, as these are 
disconnected from concrete needs and conditions for sustaining the livability of human 
and nonhuman lives. In other words, I am not going to demonstrate the impossibility of 
exponential growth on a planet where human access to natural resources grows linearly, 
                                                        




and may in all likelihood decrease (for some resources especially). But I will work on the 
conceptual implications of this insight concerning capitalocentric temporalities reliant 
upon growth-driven progress, consumerism and productivism. I will not either 
demonstrate that the desire for growth is hegemonic or inherent to capitalist economies. 
Not only has this been done by myriad authors before, but a simple 30 minutes spent 
watching the news and counting how many times the term “growth” or the acronym 
“GDP”29  are uttered would suffice to anyone paying attention, without even 
necessitating a consultation of the vast literatures showing the omnipresence of this desire 
and its predominance in modern imaginaries. Surely one may object that growth is not 
always driving economies, and refer to periodic crises as moments of non-growth or even 
“de-growth.” But it is the desire for growth, the ideal temporality constituting 
capitalocentric imaginaries, and by no means its achievement, that uchronia designates. 
Reciprocally, de-growth is not only the absence of growth or the presence of negative 
growth, but most importantly the de-colonization of our imaginaries from the imperative 
to growth (e.g. D’Allisa, Demaria, Kallis, 2014). In fact, in periods of crisis, mass-media 
eyes are riveted on GDP movement in the hope of its increase, and this indicator is taken 
as the crucial one, which sustained presence, authorizes to claim that the crisis has 
passed. As Serge Latouche and other de-growth theorists and economists have argued, 
when growth is there, we are supposed to desire for it to last, and when it is lacking that 
its prompts return becomes all we shall want. This in fact is quite important: uchronia 
does not literally describe how time passes under capitalist regimes, but rather how 
capitalocentric discourses represent an ideal and idealized version of historical time (as 
                                                        
29 Granted this prevalence is a relatively recent phenomenon, datable after World War II. See for instance 




characterized by progress, expansion, growth). This concept also highlights the ways in 
which such idealization obscures, abstracts time from, and/or seeks (fails) to justify 
ecological and other damages, harms, destructions caused in the mean time. Uchronia 
always fails: that is its point, as it is a teleological temporality, one that assume a singular 
direction toward a certain goal always postponed, never actually achieved, always 
contested and contradicted in spite of its claims to reality.30 
The Eruption of Gaia: Critiques of Capitalist Temporalities Emerging 
 
Thus uchronia refers to capitalocentric temporalities which, as such, only envision the 
future (in the singular – only one is possible, plausible and probable in uchronia) oriented 
toward one direction: that of progress, which is itself measured by growth. The satiation 
of productivist-consumerist economies, practices, and desires is impossible, and must 
remain impossible so as to keep going, allegedly “forward,” that is to say on a 
teleological line. But uchronia is also impossible because it pretends to defy the laws of 
thermodynamism, as well as planetary limits. It projects desires and imaginaries to a 
singular, timeless (ever-postponed) future time, and subjects the present and possible 
                                                        
30 One may perhaps object that growth-oriented progress is not as desired anymore, or even that it is being 
rendered obsolete by “sustainable” growth. While I will address sustainable growth in chapter 5 (I read it as 
an oxymoron, and a form of “counter-uchronia”), I would respond that if this adjectival modification is 
indeed contesting and modifying the face of growth-driven progress in some arenas, sustainable growth is 
far from having supplanted growth “tout court.” The latter one’s omnipresence is again very obvious, as 
soon as one turns on CNN, Fox News, and even NPR or such left-of-center, mainstream media sources, and 
when one has a look at or listens to almost any of U.S president Obama’s speeches, etc. For instance, a 
quick survey of the new year’s wishes speeches pronounced by Western European heads of state in 2015 
would suffice to see that growth (tout court) is absolutely central, especially in a period of economic crisis, 
as a supposedly desired and desirable goal and one of the principal indicator of economic health, 
unqualified by any adjective supposed to moderate it. The adjective surely erupts in specialized occasions 
like international environmental summits, but when “the economy” at large is discussed, convenient 
forgetfulness drops it. It is true that sustainable growth can be seen as one of the innumerable internal 
contradictions and contestations within growth true believers’ circles, but it is far from having won the 
battle, or posing a threat of obsolescence to the pertinence of uchronia as a concept to think critically about 
teleological, linear, futurist, expansionist progress-oriented temporalities that assume a limitless world. In 
this chapter I discuss growth at large, as critiqued for the last couple of decades and until now by countless 
of environmentalists, and will return in chapter 5 to the ways in which sustainable growth is partly 




futures to it (this component of uchronia, the subjection of the present to an abstract 
future, is what I would call futurism). Concrete present and future generations of humans, 
hybrids and nonhumans are expected to concede most of anything to the imperative of 
growth (thus futurity and the future or futures are distinct from futurism: futurism 
obliterates different possible futures, and reduces futurity to uchronian futures, deemed 
the only ones possible). More, more, more is what we cannot not want, “naturally”: that 
is to say, this desire is naturalized in the sense that it is envisioned as going without 
saying, it is assumed, erected as a norm, perhaps even the only normal.31 As we will see, 
uchronian temporalities operate at the scale of history, national discourse, international 
economies, but also at the quotidian level: the norm is to always want more, and all 
temporal interstices of life, including at the level of the everyday, shall be all about 
producing, consuming, 24/7 (Crary, 2013). The good consumer is a never satiated 
consumer, running after the next iPhone, which most of the time runs too fast – in fact, 
devices themselves are constantly trying to catch up the futurism of uchronia, in their 
planned obsolescence which condemns them to be running too slow for the latest 
application or operating system. 
                                                        
31 We will see in chapter 4 that “nature” and “naturalization” is in fact only problematic if one understands 
“nature” in a uchronian or counter-uchronian sense, as reduced to a teleological end, and that therefore the 
problem with nature and naturalizing is not nature but its often teleological temporality, from which flows a 
normative and normalizing purchase. If nature is reconceptualized as contingent, unstable, surprising, 
unpredictable, with some agentic aspects, etc, or as William Connolly may put it, as made up of “bumpy 
temporalities,” rather than as teleological goal, it would not have these same normative implications. But 
for the time being, when I refer to uchronia as (abusively) presenting itself as “natural,” self-naturalizing, it 
is with this problematic teleological nature in mind. Indeed, uchronia presupposes an understanding of 





Growth, Its Limits, and the Limits of Limits, or Endism’s Dead End 
 
For us, it’s easier to imagine the end of the 
world than serious social change. Witness 
the numerous blockbusters about global 
catastrophe and the conspicuous absence of 




The rise of environmental crises and environmentalist movements have corresponded to 
the emergence of the problem of limits, specifically of capitalism’s limits, which as I will 
now discuss, should not be confused with all economies and all worlds’ limits. Some of 
these emphases on limits are very tangible, while others flirt with millenarist, alarmist 
fears. Worries about limits thus have varying levels and degree of evidence, though many 
limits are quite certainly going to create and/or already creating threats to human and 
nonhuman lives and species: for instance, the sciences have demonstrated that a “sixth 
extinction” is now under way, that climate change is occurring and overwhelmingly 
anthropogenic, that bees’ extinction is threatening entire ecosystems – which exact 
causes, while most likely linked to mass uses of pesticides, are the object of ongoing 
debate. Oil spills, biocides, risks of nuclear catastrophes and realized nuclear catastrophes 
(Fukushima), but also the specter of oil scarcity to come, all threaten the livability of life 
for an overwhelming proportion, perhaps virtually all humans and nonhumans. The 
proximity of various threats are not always in proportion to what is already ongoing or to 
future risks: for example, climate change is often presented exaggeratedly as being 
mostly a future issue, when myriad effects are already very palpable in the third world or 
in certain poor or less visible areas of the first world (Louisiana is apparently losing the 




continue to talk of climate change as a remote problem both in time and space, an effect 
also of environmental racism – Cole, Foster et al., 2001). The images associated with 
limits are consequently distorted: we know that capitalist expansion and growth has very 
serious limits, but the lines drawn depend upon many factors. Thus some seemingly 
alarmist discourses are in fact in very close proximity to many people’s realities, while 
others may indeed be the results of disproportioned end-times narratives. In this section I 
will examine limits as one of the features uchronian temporalities tend to obscure, as well 
as some of the limits of certain discourses of limits, specifically the problematic equation 
of the possible and possibly necessary end of capitalist economies with the end of the 
world. Building upon yet revisiting critically environmental limits’ discourse, I hope to so 
further specify the way limits may highlight capitalocentric progress as uchronian in the 
sense of impossible, unsustainable. The eruption of ecological conceptualizations of 
limits are indeed shedding light on the “ou” of uchronia’s “ou-chronos,” non-time. 
 If the question of limits gradually and complexly arose in multiple forms and 
from various perspectives, I have already mentioned that one famous marking point 
stands out: the Limits to Growth report, written in 1972 by Meadows et al. at the request 
of the Club of Rome, demonstrated that exponential economic growth could not be met 
by linear growth of available planetary resources. The report did not include global 
warming as one of the disruptions of linear growth of resources, among other stakes that 
emerged later on and added to skepticism and to the critique of capitalist growth. It 
nonetheless marks one of the cornerstones of the global environmentalist movement’s 
worldwide history, on par with Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring (2002). Thirty years later, 




doomsday prophecies have continued to find confirmations (Turner & CSIRO, 2008). 
Yet, although the computer models deployed have so far been credited with accuracy, the 
equally computerized arguments that a gradual decrease of the growth rate – or “de-
growth” – would curtail this problem of limits (adjusting to equilibrium below 
environmental limits) was far from translating into concrete implementation. Marx, and 
after him Rosa Luxemburg, had already pointed out that capitalism would eventually hit 
at least the world’s limits. But the current environmental crises have given this prediction 
a new acuteness. Let’s note, on this point, that Luxemburg’s reading of this may be 
problematic to our purpose here: it equates capitalism’s limits to the world’s, assuming 
that capitalism is unstoppable besides such limits. Narratives continuing to equate 
capitalism’s limits with the world’s dangerously depict the former as an all-powerful, all 
invasive monster always already about to penetrate every noncapitalist space (J.K. 
Gibson-Graham has shaken such accounts – 2006), these being reciprocally thought of as 
empty and passive and about to be raped. Such narratives evidently foreclose non-
capitalist possibility, and differing or dissident economies. In what follows I will discuss 
how some still equate the end of capitalism with the end of the world, more or less 
intentionally, willingly or consciously. This hinders possibilities and imagination which 
may foster non-capitalist presents and futures. This is one of the constitutive elements of 
uchronian temporalities: capitalist temporalities are uchronian in part because they 
conceive the temporal horizon from the perspective of a capitalocentric tunnel vision: if 
capitalism collapses, all the world will follow suit, as the only organizing principle of this 
world is assumed to be capitalism. But if critiques of limits run the risk of reproducing 




latter critical notion from capitalocentric gestures equating the end of capitalism to the 
end of times? 
 In his preface to a 2012 colloquium titled “Already Beyond? 40 Years of Limits 
to Growth,” William Krull, secretary general of the Volkswagen Foundation (who partly 
funded the initial report) asked: “was the shock that the Limits to Growth caused not 
strong enough?” Would the apparent lack of concrete change following the report have to 
do with a need for greater fear and trauma, a need for more “scaremongering” or 
“doomsday prophecies”? This raises the question of the mobilizing value of discourses of 
fear and the rhetorical effectiveness of urging outcries, considering the limited time we 
have to act (the urgency of recognizing limits and of radically changing existing growth-
driven modes of production) and the long-term impossibility of growth (the limits 
themselves). An easy critique of environmentalist warnings would consist of brushing 
these off as more panic-causing, pessimistic, or depressing, than they can be mobilizing. 
What, then, is the value of anticipation, or warnings concerned with upcoming 
limits? Andrew Dobson thus describes William Ophuls’ warnings (among others) as 
“dystopian ecologism” (2003) which potentially and dangerously implies (even in spite 
of Dobson’s conscious intentions) that these scenarios are improbable, remote, 
impossible and exaggerated threats. This characterization risks the quick dismissal of 
environmentalist critiques as not only inaccurate, but also insufficiently constructive, 
incapable of providing the nice happy end which the emotionally fragile, infantilized 
American(ized) public is allegedly counting on, the only scenario that will not reek havoc 




Yet, these critiques and warnings are arguably not so much “dystopias” as they 
are environmentalist demonstrations that capitalism’s temporality – illimited progress 
lead and defined by growth as its engine – is uchronian. In other words, it is not 
necessarily the environmentalist apocalyptic scenarios that are dystopian, science 
fictionesque, excessively alarmist, gratuitously resorting to scaremongering with no 
productive mobilization in sight. Instead, here again we may need to reverse the charges: 
it is the world we are heading into if action is not taken that is indeed dystopian. Just like 
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring can be credited for having brought about significant – 
albeit limited – changes regarding the omnipresence of carcinogenic pollutants in our 
everyday lives, The Limits to Growth report, along with Paul Ehrlich’s famous 
Population Bomb (1968), can hardly be denied a value in having acknowledged what 
Isabelle Stengers – another supposed scaremongerer – calls “the eruption of Gaia” 
(2009). These warnings have caused some, however insufficient in numbers, to carve 
useful concepts like “de-growth” or “sustainability”  (which I will further discuss in 
chapter 4 and 5 below), however insufficient these temporal theoretical weapons may still 
be. Because these mobilizations are insufficient does not mean that no alarms should be 
sounded. Hans Jonas infamously emphasized fear as a mobilizing tool for what he called 
an “ethics for the future” (as I have explained in the previous chapter). Granted the 
legitimate critiques he and others like Ophuls faced for the anti-democratic risk involved 
in their use of fear, the value of Jonas’ attempts to reconceptualize responsibility through 
the lens of environmental crises can hardly be denied. 
Emphasizing the threat presented by technological innovations’ increase of the 




have seen the light of day without the existential fear of mass destruction that drove Jonas 
to write. One could speculate that without his and the above-mentioned “alarmists’” 
anticipation of destructive futures, i.e without their anticipation and their fears, without 
their pointing out the problem of limits and proposing critiques of growth-driven 
progress, the “precautionary principle,” now commonly mobilized in European law, 
would not have been born. Thus the high stakes at play in these concepts, which converge 
in inciting us to inscribe the temporal in the political and in economies: fear, anticipation, 
limits, are all the more concepts and affects grounded in present threats, which resolutely 
future-oriented character incites one to rethink the present world and its hegemonic 
temporalities. 
The invention of “overshoot day,” mentioned in this dissertation’s introduction, is 
yet another striking example of how the temporality of limits, manifests itself as so 
central to environmental discourse, often in the form of a deadline clashing with and 
highlighting the assumptions of infinity that relentless consumerist paces rely upon. The 
following is provided by the Global Footprint Network, a nonprofit organization created 
in 2003 to defend sustainability and produce science and data in support of it: 
August 20 is Earth Overshoot Day 2013, marking the date when humanity 
exhausted nature’s budget for the year. We are now operating in overdraft. For the 
rest of the year, we will maintain our ecological deficit by drawing down local 
resource stocks and  accumulating carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. Just as a 
bank statement tracks income against expenditures, Global Footprint Network 
measures humanity’s demand for and supply of natural resources and ecological 




approximately eight months, we demand more renewable resources and C02 
sequestration than what the planet can provide for an entire year. (2013) 
Providing a date to mark the ecological debt, and bringing the concept of unsustainability 
to an annual scale, Overshoot Day makes limits palpable by resorting to time as a 
tangible measurement of environmental exhaustion. However, two limits should be noted 
regarding the language of limits deployed here: the use of the first person plural pronoun 
“we” and the word “humanity” fails to differentiate between groups and places in terms 
of the exhaustion of planetary resources, erasing inequalities and differentiated levels of 
demands, limits, and urgency (the demands placed on the planet by Americans is on 
average much higher than that of, say, many Camerounese women – who are also more 
likely to experience more urgent needs for climate change mitigation). This language 
relies upon an opposition between what “we” humans, indistinctively, demand of 
“nature,” which category implies in an equally undifferentiated manner “everything non-
human,” assuming a homogeneity and self-coherent whole to be alternately mastered or 
protected.  Further, one sentence stands out: “the data is sobering.” 
Humanity is inebriated, drunk on its frenetic consumerism, and expected to be 
arrested in its track thanks to… data and notions of credit or debt. The drunken metaphor 
is powerful, as it too, within the discourse produced by “overshoot day,” has temporal 
dimensions: consumerist and productivist inebriation corresponds to the fast pace of 
capitalist modes of living and economies, and like addiction, this drunkenness prevents 
humans (again, some more or less than others) to see further than their next drink. Yet the 
consideration of the relationship between a year’s worth of consumption and a year’s 




annual and calendar terms, allows for the addict to consider “sobering up.” But what 
would this sobering, this slowing down look like, and is there a risk of paralysis, coming 
to a complete and destructive halt rather than a slow yet urgent reconsideration? What 
will the shaking inherent in the detoxification transition feel like? Are all these efforts for 
warning and for conveying limits in all their temporal dimensions potentially so sobering 
that “we” may either die of thirst or keep drinking to forget that “we” are drinking (in an 
accelerationist move), and to continue seeing exclusively the short term, denying the 
possibility for a long term to even come into being (or rather, becoming)? 
It is indeed important to underscore a different risk involved in alarms to the 
limits of growth. We do need to take limits, fear, and anticipation seriously, yet we have 
to also consider the limits of the concept of limits. Joining a concert of other voices, 
philosopher Slavoj Zizek (2010) has characterized the environmental crises as a situation 
in which we are more capable of imagining the end of the world than imagining the 
radical change that could curtail such end. In a similar yet distinct vein, some have 
claimed that our imaginations were keener on envisioning the end of the world than 
capable of considering the possibility that capitalism may (need to) end. “We” allegedly 
may prove incapable of conceiving that such end of capitalism, although an incredibly 
significant historic event, would not necessarily entail the end of the world. Yet, radical 
alternatives beyond the equation of capitalism’s and the world’s collapses do not always 
lack or fail “our” imaginations, nor do they lack everywhere. The concepts of “anti-
uchronias,” “heterochronias,” and “synchrony” I advance in the following chapters 
should help fuel the envisioning and recognition of such radical alternatives.32 Paying 
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attention to ways in which some discourses may stage alternative visions for the present 
and future is at least as crucial as the critiques pointing to or symptomatic of the 
prevalence of end-times visions. 
Again, this is not to say that the latter “endist” critiques are not important and to 
dismiss their ability to stage a sense of urgency needed for mobilization around 
environmental issues, making the uchronian character of late capitalist temporality 
clearer. Neither does this amount to dismissing these critiques’ capacity to pertinently 
portray the dilemmas facing environmental thought – or the world. Both as rhetorical, 
mobilizational tools and as critical observations of the situation late capitalism has 
created, or even as truth claims, warnings about the finite nature of our world are highly 
useful, even critical – in the sense of “crucial.” Avoidance of facile dismissals of these 
warnings as “dystopian” is necessary given the high stakes they make clear to us. And the 
reversal of such accusations, to assert that it is capitalist times that are dystopian, is 
necessary. It is indeed one of the goals of naming “uchronia.” Yet, I wish to nurture a 
relative skepticism with respect to the equally facile slippage from the problem of limits 
to a problem of end-times equating doubts on the viability of capitalism to certainties 
about the end of the world, including when this equation is put in the form of a critique of 
our alleged lack of imagination. Depending on the form granted to the denunciation of 
such lack, we may foreclose possibilities for the envisioning and making of any present 
or future alternative (Gibson-Graham, 2006; 2011; Connolly, 2008, 2013). The 
consequence of this equation between the end of capitalism and the end of the world, is 
that it syllogistically implies another: the equation between the world and capitalism. And 




understood not as becoming, but as the necessary, given environment we have (rather 
than make) in common, then the equation becomes one that amalgamates capitalism and 
the very constitutive fabric of the real: capitalism is taken to be the only possible reality. 
This equation is grounded on the temporal: capitalist futures are taken to be the only 
possible futures, and if these were compromised, so would the future tout court. This 
futurist, capitalocentric tunnel vision is one of the principal constituents of what I call 
uchronia: a capitalocentric temporal horizon purporting to erase any other possible 
futures.  
When taking act of modern progress’ limits and the resulting crisis, no 
inevitability forces us to leap into conclusions such as: “modern progress has become 
impossible, it is rapidly throwing us into a wall, … but we cannot imagine anything else.” 
“We” may even have a moral obligation toward future generations to force ourselves to 
imagine “something else” as in fact possible, even if this “something else” first may seem 
improbable, otherwise the logical next step of this reasoning would lead to nihilism or at 
least fatalistic resignation, in the form of a: “… thus we are doomed.” This resignation 
quickly turns into a “so let’s just continue to do what we are so busy doing in exactly the 
same way as we are doing it now, for lack of imagination, even while we know it is 
ultimately destructive.” In short, end-times warnings and alarmist cries regarding the 
limits of resources and of bearable planetary heating can risk resulting in a certain 
fatalism, in the paralysis evoked above. Although pertinent and important, observing the 
current situation as one where we may be more susceptible to imagine our end than 
capitalism’s, or where we may equate the two, can overshadow alternative visions. By 




reproducing the very lack we are denouncing. Given these risks, but granted the strategic 
and truth value of the problem of limits, foregrounding this problem remains useful and 
needed, along with underscoring it as one of the multiple instances in which temporality 
makes itself present to environmentalist thinking (theory and discourse). The “eruption of 
Gaia,” this sudden realization that what was taken to be illimited resource is in fact finite, 
indeed takes on a temporal form: it presents itself as end-times narratives, anticipation of 
possible dangerous futures that call for drastic questioning of our destructive presents. A 
new light is thus shed on the ways in which these presents rely upon a progress 
temporality, and how this temporality is driven by a teleological movement of capitalist 
growth. Such warnings express the imminence of our encounter with scarcity and limits, 
an urgency worth taking into account. 
 
Urgency 
It’s Not Too Late! 
Greenpeace 
 
Greenpeace’s “It’s Not Too Late” campaign was one example of environmentalist calls 
for mobilization based on such a sense of urgency, drawing upon notions of tipping 
points and accelerations, the problem of the present’s responsibility toward future 
generations, and questions of limits. In 2007, with the alleged beginning of a climate 
change “tipping point” period according to many climate scientists and the publication of 
the penultimate IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) report (I will discuss 
the latest, 2014 reports, in the next chapters), the famous environmentalist organization 
posted small stickers simply marked with this short phrase on street signs, walls, and car 




website address. “It’s Not Too Late”: this sentence intrigued its interlocutors, an urgent 
yet anxiously hopeful phrase seen in passing, in the corner of one’s eyes, yet acting in 
part like a flash, almost subliminal presence, and in part as a provocation to arrest one’s 
gaze. This campaign also included videos evoking responsibility toward future 
generations along urgency – I will return to these in the section below. But on the stickers 
themselves, no explicit mention of climate change was needed. Neither did this utterance, 
“it’s not too late,” need any reference to one of the many current environmental perils 
“we” face: no explicit litany regarding environmental destructions was required, as these 
lists were (assumed to be) on everyone’s minds, sufficiently associated with urgency and 
limits to resonate in public spaces, even when the mere idea of urgency was evoked on its 
own. In other words, the reference was not one directed at the content of the crisis per se, 
but, following a metonymic form, to its temporal dimension only, which temporal 
dimension implied all the rest. That this is possible is further proof of the importance of 
temporality within environmentalist discourse. For those whose curiosity stopped them 
long enough, for those with whom this quick and urging call resonated, the reference to a 
time sensitivity sufficed, along with, perhaps, if viewers noticed the signature, the name 
of the famous environmentalist group. The slogan and its signature on the green 
background were enough to cause the mental connection with climate change, perhaps 
arousing curiosity regarding Greenpeace’s proposals, perhaps even enrolling a few more 
recruits in the pressing struggle. Interpellated by both the anxiety, the dramatic charge, 
and the hope which this short phrase evoked, one may pause. Greenpeace public 




the campaign message worth spreading like street art ornating each corner of countless 
cities. 
These mixed feelings of apprehension, fear, and desire or hope, the affective 
charges attributed to uncertain futures, this urgency, these pauses, these interruptions, and 
these quick glimpses in an ever accelerating world which assumes growth as its necessary 
engine, the eruption of this call for rapid change, are all central to environmentalist 
rhetoric. The temporal dimensions of our shared environmental context have become so 
crucial that a major environmentalist organization like Greenpeace can rhetorically rely 
solely on a temporally charged phrase, “It’s Not Too Late,” for said context at large to 
come to mind. While so many environmentalist texts (including the present chapter) have 
repeated and will repeat lists of environmental dangers and damage, from 
mass extinctions to pesticide pollution, from water and air pollution to genetically 
modified organisms (once upon a time advertised as capable of “solving” the problem of 
world hunger and actually resulting in an array of lawsuits and monopolies lead by 
infamous Montsanto), with Greenpeace’s slogan nothing but urgency stands as a 
signifier, and the need to enumerate matters of concern is circumvented. We are simply 
offered a glimpse at urgency and limits, which suffices to signify current perils. This is of 
course due precisely to the omnipresence of these enumerations and warnings, to the 
context. But these warnings’ temporal nature also makes them susceptible to be referred 
to solely by way of a mobilization of hope, fear, excessive lateness and desperation, the 
absence thereof, urgency, limits, rapid change. If their temporal dimension wasn’t as 
omnipresent as and in association with themselves, these perils would not come to mind 




Now what effects does urgency have and what exactly does it entail? In the 
context of ecological crises, the urgency is caused by the ever so accelerating approach of 
limits, the approach of the moment when it may in fact be too late. This growing 
proximity and increased presence of limits requires rapid change in a world that already 
changes rapidly, and often does not change in the same direction as that which would 
allow us to confront the problem of limits, to avoid or to limit further ecological 
destruction. Urgency entails a call for quick mobilization, for action, yet runs the risk of 
resulting in rushed, insufficiently thought-through, or insufficiently democratic, or, on the 
contrary, it risks resulting in complete paralysis given the fear invoked, the scale of 
urgency, the tension caused by ecological destruction’s proximity (and current presence). 
As a result of the limits of urgency regarding the risk for rushed, frenetic action on the 
one hand, and paralysis on the other, a tension emerges: this is a situation where urgency 
simultaneously creates a need to act rapidly in a fast-growing world with fast-growing 
environmental damage, and an opposite need for extensive time to think through the 
changes urgency demands, which changes in turn take on a tremendous scale and scope 
characteristic of urgent circumstances.  
In spite and maybe because of this tension between a need to act quickly and 
another to take the time to pause and think, Greenpeace claims that “it is not too late.” 
The slogan does not limit itself to expressing urgency, but also carries a form of desperate 
hope. It metonymically suggests, evokes and provokes, the notion that things could 
change: it’s not too late… to change directions, to slow down, to quiet growth down, in 
other words… the idea that it may be time to leave uchronia. I will discuss this kind of 




being, we may simply underscore that this campaign highlights yet another characteristic 
or trait of uchronia: that capitalist temporalities throwing us against the wall are 
contingent. They can (still) be side-tracked. There is still time, we must make the time, 
we have to take the time, so as to imagine other futures. This implied contingency clashes 
against the first characteristic I underscored above, as denounced by limits discourses: we 
saw then that uchronian temporality is defined by a capitalocentric tunnel vision, 
reducing the future or futures in general, to the allegedly one and only possible future: a 
capitalist one. Greenpeace’s “It’s Not Too Late!” provocatively suggests that underneath 
this reduction, this teleological movement of time, lies contingency: it can (still) 
be(come) otherwise. The organization links this resolute hope and determination, to a call 
for mobilization carried through by videos projected on monuments’ walls in big cities’ 
public spaces. The call came from an 8 year-old boy, who prompted adult viewers to take 
their responsibility with respect to his generation’s survival and the livability of his 








Climate risks are not identical with climate catastrophes. 
Climate risks are the anticipation in the present of future 
catastrophes in order to prevent them. This ‘present future’ 
of climate risks is real; the ‘future future’ of climate 
catastrophes, on the other hand, is (still) unreal. Yet even 
the anticipation of climate change sets a fundamental 
transformation in motion in the here and now.   
     Ulrich Beck 
 
 
Since the beginnnings of the environmentalist movement, and culminating with the 
climate crisis, the concept of “future generations” has been a central thread of 
environmental discourse, including in Environmental Political Theory, or ecosophy. 
These have often ascribed a novelty to “future generations” which this section attempts to 
further discuss, adding to the above considerations on limits, end-times, which critical 
notions I will synthesize to inform my conceptualization of capitalist temporalities as 
uchronian. Continuing on the analysis of Greenpeace’s campaign and then providing a 
few examples of environmental theorists’ conceptualizations of the future and future 
generations, in what follows I reflect on what exactly is so new about “future 
generations.”  
Through Greenpeace’s “It’s Not Too Late” campaign, thousands of people were 
provoked to pause and think of climate change while walking by major cities’ 
monuments. In Paris, Greenpeace hanged an immense banner shouting the slogan at 
tourists and Parisians coming to see the Eiffel tower. The banner covered most the middle 
section of the tower, with a giant picture of a thermometer accompanying the slogan, and 
the indication: “> 2°” in reference to the IPCC’s assessment that the average temperature 




(celcius) increase. The two degrees’ increase has been the maximum “agreed” upon (and 
highly contested) as a result of the Rio, Kyoto and Cancun conferences. This maximal 
target is highly criticized as a tolerable threshold, as many have pointed out that such 
increase would sacrifice many small island-states and poorer coastal areas of the world, 
whose populations did not obtain sufficient voice at international summits. Thus this 
cairological threshold, which has been (mis)read as an “objective” scientific estimation 
and consequently reified as the objective, is also loaded with political contestation. 
Greenpeace however was responding here to the then recent publication of the third IPCC 
report, taking up the opportune (cairological) moment of its release as an occasion for 
visible mobilization.  
 The French word “temps” has two meanings: time and weather. In Paris, on the 
Eiffel tower, both meanings were presented in association with one another, and the 
banner dramatically staged this urgent preoccupation upon one of the symbols of the 
Industrial Revolution’s culmination, the iron lady. As part of the same campaign, 
Greenpeace screened a video clip on a large screen placed on the façade of the French 
Parliament, among many other monuments of capital cities worldwide. This clip showed 
a young, probably 10 year-old boy staring for one single fixed shot at the camera, 
wearing a grey hoodie and with his traits somber, tense, the tension on his face 
accentuated by the absence of any TV make-up, and delivering the following speech 
solemnly and with great determination: 
The scientific community released a report that proves beyond a doubt that the 
Earth is getting warmer. This global warming is caused by things you grown-ups 




I grow up there won’t be any fish left in the sea. Rainforests and clean air will be 
a thing of the past. The polar icecaps will be gone. Oceans will rise. Entire 
countries will disappear. Life will change in ways you can’t even imagine. There 
could be famine, worldwide epidemics, life expectancy will be lower. We’re not 
just talking about the future. We’re talking about my future. But this is no 
surprise. You adults have known about this for years. Now you could’ve done 
something about it. You haven’t. You can say, it’s not my problem. You can say, 
‘I won’t be around in fifty years. But from now on, you can’t say ‘I didn’t know.’ 
Starting today, the lines are drawn. You have to choose sides. Either you’re for 
my future, or you’re against it. You’re a friend, or you’re an enemy. I may just be 
a kid today, but tomorrow will be different. This is the last time I’ll be talking to 
you adults. You’ve had your chance to fix this problem, now we have ours. We 
won’t be cute. We won’t be patronized. We will not be denied our future. [cut to a 
screen with the banner ‘It’s Not Too Late’, followed by another screen]: ‘Join the 
energy revolution. Greenpeace.’ (2015) 
Pronouncing this speech, because of the sobriety of his makeup, the aggressive lighting 
on his face, and the tense, serious, accusatory and focused look, the young boy looks his 
age yet older. One could almost mistake this tense expression for wrinkles, and the 
specter of the adult who will experience the most catastrophic effects of climate change is 
looming through him. The tone here is not so much one of hope, but one of assertive 
determination, accusation, authority and call to responsibility. It is intentionally radical: 
the call is for “drastic measures (…) now,” and the grey hoodie is evocative of many 




hop cultures, black blocks and anarchist groups in many places throughout the world. 
Subjects of the present world are interpellated directly and concretely as contributors of 
the collective problem at stake: “you adults,” “you grown-ups.” The question of 
the future is posed equally concretely, thanks to the very vehicle of this speech, a ten 
year-old standing up as one voice among his generation that of course evokes so many 
others. This 2007 resort to a child as the spokesperson of a whole generation for a 
concrete embodiment of the present responsibilities and concerns emanating from the 
climate crisis was notably not a first. 12 year-old Canadian activist Severn Cullis-Suzuki 
(Environmental Children’s Organization) famously gave a speech at the 1992 at the Earth 
Summit in Rio de Janeiro, also representing her and her future children’s generation. By 
the time the Greenpeace video clip came out, the actor pronouncing the above-quoted 
speech could have been Cullis-Suzurki’s son. In 1992 already, the goal had been to 
embody concretely the lives that would directly be affected by global warming, to make 
the future (not in the abstract, but rather specific people, many people’s future lives) 
concretely and not only conceptually present, in the present.  
The tone of the young Greenpeace activist in 2007 is resolutely dramatic. The 
speech opens on a dramatizing apocalyptic picture, similar to many of the dire end-times 
warnings discussed above. But this picture is depicted by a ten-year old whose speech 
illustrates very strikingly the novelty of the concept of future generations, compared to 
previous understandings of and questions about the future: “we’re not just talking about 
the future. We’re talking about my future. (…) We won’t be denied our future” 
(emphases mine). The most drastic effects of the climate crisis have now approached us 




loses its abstraction. We must also note the shift from the pronouns “I” to “we” in the 
text. The speech is organized in three moments: an apocalyptic, end-of-times scenario is 
first challenging our imaginations (“life will change in ways you can’t even imagine”). 
The concretization from “the” future to “my” future then signs the second moment, 
calling for a recognition of everyone’s responsibility and interpellating “adults” today 
(“You adults have known about this for years. Now you could’ve done something about 
it. You haven’t (…) from now on, you can’t say ‘I didn’t know.’”). The third moment in 
the text is marked by a polarization of the struggle into two distinct camps (Starting 
today, the lines are drawn. (…) Either you’re for my future, or you’re against it), one of 
which including the child’s entire generation in the form of this shift to his use of “we”. 
The speech indeed ends on three sentences rhythmically opened with the first person 
plural pronoun, and which closing one enables the dramatization to culminate: “we won’t 
be denied our future.” The modal “will” is present throughout the speech in reference 
both to the apocalyptic scenario thus described, and to children’s resistance. In this last 
sentence, it conveys the full array of possible meanings “will” can include (in its negative 
form): a refusal (“I will not”, i.e will as determination) and a future fact (will be, i.e a 
future indicative form). 
This close reading sheds light on the uniqueness and the newness of the problem 
of responsibility toward future generations: this newness resides in a shift from 
considering the future in abstract ways, to concrete, incarnated, embodied, personal ones. 
This is done in two crucial ways: firstly, the new sense of responsibility toward future 
generations shifts the affective charge associated to the future from hope, promises and 




determination. Secondly, the object of the future also shifts, from consumption, 
production and accumulation or profit, i.e growth, to concrete human and nonhuman 
lives’ livability. Finally, and as a result of these two shifts, the arrow of time is shattered, 
the specter haunting us is not that of past generations or of a millenarist (utopian) promise 
(like communism), but that of children and their own children’s future adult selves, and 
the damaged non-humans who will cohabit interdependently with them. This is what the 
above incipit for this section points to. There, Ulrich Beck underscores this movement 
from the future, back, making future catastrophes present to the present. In sum, the 
concept of future generations distinguishes itself by its affective charge (concern and care 
rather than hope), its object (making agentic future subjects concrete in the present), and 
its direction (from the future back to the present rather than the opposite). 
French philosopher Emilie Hache has partly cleared the ground in underscoring 
the newness and endemic character of “future generations” in ecosophy. In Ce à quoi 
nous tenons, she links “future generations’” emergence in politics to Hans Jonas’ “ethics 
for the future,” focused as it was on critiquing both liberal and Marxist ethics. In Jonas’ 
view, these lacked a concrete concern for the survival and well-being of humans and 
nonhumans to come.33 Hache’s reading is helpful because it further contributes to outline 
a crucial distinction between the future-oriented character of progress and the ecosophical 
concept of future generations : 
Although moderns have always turned toward the future, it was in the sense that 
they used to place their hopes in it. They did not care about it… Think about 
liberal and Marxist ethics, which Jonas explicitly crafted his ethics of 
responsibility against, precisely because they were both founded upon the notion 
                                                        




of progress… It is not certain that trusting the future – trusting class struggle or 
economic growth – or, even less, as has been heard multiple times, justifying the 
casualties and miseries of yesterday and today in the name of a hypothetical better 
tomorrow, is all that moral. (Hache, 2010, p. 146. Translation mine, author’s 
emphasis) 
Here Hache stresses that if modern temporality is characterized by progress and if 
progress is fundamentally about the future, that future consisted of abstract hopes rather 
than concern or care. Hache confirms that this is where the novel character of « future 
generations » lies : the affective stance regarding the future has shifted. I’ve added that 
the objects and subjects of these affective stances also differ from those associated with 
previous representations of the future. The hopes placed in the future by temporalities of 
progress focused on the expansion of consumption and production and an increase in 
accumulation or profit, i.e growth, as their object (however uneven its distribution may 
be, which poses the question of which subjects were to benefit for this orientation to the 
future : the abstraction operated as a mask silencing such unevenness). This ever-growing 
abundance was assumed to indicate comfort, the capitalist promise in the process of 
realization. In other words, the teleological movement here was one pointing toward 
more of a consumerist and productivist horizon (« horizon » needing to be understood in 
the very specific sense of the term, as a line which eternally recedes as one approaches 
it). As is made evident by examples like that of the above-cited Greenpeace video clip, 
the concept of future generations’ object, rather than production, consumption, profit, and 
accumulation, includes concretely incarnated, humans and nonhumans’ survival and 




concrete, material concern or care, rather than abstract capitalist hopes and dreams – with 
their share of terribly destructive present, material consequences. 
 This difference between the specific future-oriented character of capitalocentric 
progress, and the environmental notion of “future generations” is interesting to juxtapose 
to Lee Edelman’s denunciation of reproductive futurism and his critique of 
heteronormative temporality. I have already briefly discussed the pertinence of queer 
temporalities and the need to queer eco-temporalities in the introduction to this 
dissertation, and pursued a feminist overview of temporality and the nonhuman in 
ecosophy in the previous chapter. In the rest of this section I return to queer temporalities, 
to argue that Greenpeace’s revolutionary progeny highlights the need for queer eco-
temporalities for livable present and future worlds, a need that would include making 
room and time for queer kinships (Haraway, 2015).  
 This may seem surprising at first. Indeed, we may remember that Lee Edelman 
opposes queer sexualities to the figure of the fetishized, heteronormative Child. How 
then, could Greenpeace’s resort to one child supposedly emblematic or speaking in the 
name of at least some among future generations, be read as form of performative 
queering of eco-temporalities, or perhaps an ecologizing of queer temporalities, or both? 
Let us backtrack: Lee Edelman has argued, in substance, that heteronormative 
temporality relies upon reproductive futurism: any sexualities or sexual comportments 
that cannot or will not be redeemed, guilty pleasures as they are, by the at least spectral 
presence of the Child who will and must be bred as a result of the sex act, is dangerous, 
anomalous, queer. To Edelman queers and queerness should espouse this dangerous 




Consequently, Edelman advances an exhortation to “fuck the future!” and “fuck the 
Child!” 
 Yet, the child in Greenpeace’s video is distinct from the fetishized Child evoked 
and denounced by Edelman, and so are all kinds of present and possible future human 
children, adults and nonhumans, just like one must also distinguish between the future, 
futures, futurity, and futurism. The latter is a constitutive element of what I call uchronia, 
while the three first notions may be conceived, envisioned and experienced in a number 
of ways, including some that, as Haraway has recently put it would help us proliferate all 
sorts of “queer kinships” (Haraway, 2015). The concrete actual and virtual children, and 
their virtual children, are not the issue per se, and Edelman is very clear on this 
distinction between them and the fetishized Child of heteronormative reproductive 
futurism. However, as I have started to suggest before (introduction) he confuses the 
future, futures, futurities and futurism. I would define these various notions as follows. 
The future is made up of all the actual and virtual possibilities, events, people, living 
beings, things and many more “to come” (the French for future is also the term avenir, or 
a venir, as Derrida has reminded us, though I won’t turn to his understanding here). The 
future may be understood a plural, and in the present there exist all sorts of conditions for 
multiple potential or virtual futures. Thus the second distinction is between “the future” 
and “futures,” where the former is not problematic in itself as long as it is understood as 
plural, as admitting the possibilities of several “futures.” Futurity is the characteristic of a 
given time, past, present or future, that has a future, that has futures, and the virtual 
presence of these in the time in question. In a sense (and I will discuss this in chapter 6 




existence to pass, to become, to change at every moment: the conditions of the future are 
constantly present in the present, so is often its imagination or envisioning, and our 
(multiple) virtual future selves. But if futurity is only imagined as having one possible 
course, one single direction, and if this direction or course is erected as an end, a goal, in 
a teleological manner, if futurity and the future begin to subject the present as well as 
other possible and/or virtual futures to its dictate, then, and only then, we have futurism. 
It is indeed futurism that Edelman means to say “fuck” to. And if this is the case, there is 
still time and space, it is not too late for a queer vitalism34 and for queer kinships that 
values the Greenpeace child without Child fetishism, that wishes to value futurity as 
multiple, plural, perhaps even multidirectional (it is through a projection to future 
generations that we imagine different presents, etc). And queer kinships are especially 
needed, insofar as these are imagined solidarities and care for concretely virtual, future 
living human and nonhuman beings and things, which do not necessarily require 
conventional kinship: as Donna Haraway has recently underscored, the development of 
more heteronormative kinships is dangerous in a world over-populated with humans (and, 
we may add, their nonhuman companions, cattle, etc). Queer kinships, Greenpeace’s 
child activist, futures, futurity are valuable and helpful ways to resist, contest, challenge, 
perhaps supplant uchronia. And reciprocally, the problem with futurism is not futurity, 
but the subjection at play, the fact that the future in the abstract is permitted to play a 
                                                        
34 In Vibrant Matter (2009), Jane Bennett has argued that one can and should distinguish between the 
vitalism of, say, pro-life advocates, and a critical vitalism concerned with human, hybrid and nonhuman 
lives in contexts of ecological crises. As I also mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, Claire 
Colebrook (2014) has identified two different traditions of vitalism throughout the history of Western 
philosophy: one relying upon the actual, and the other, which she calls queer vitalism and unites Spinoza, 
Nietzsche, Bergson, Deleuze and others (similar to Bennett’s vitalism to an extent), proposes to turn to the 
virtual. In a way this was the (failed) attempt of Jose Munoz (2009) who proposed to oppose Edelman’s 
(2004) presentism and hyper-separation with a “not yet here,” though Munoz sadly falls back onto utopia 




subordinating role with respect to the present, justifying ecological and other kinds of 
damage. As such, futurism is an essential component of uchronia. 
Put differently, one could object to the newness of the concept of “future 
generations” and the central place of the future in environmental discourse, pointing out 
the already future-oriented character of the very progress temporality environmentalists 
denounce. Yet I argue that the concept of “future generations” as I read it inaugurates an 
original way to envision the future, and futures, to experience futurity, not in terms of 
hope but in terms of concern, not with ever expanding futurist production, consumption 
and accumulation as its abstract and fetishized objects subjecting the present and concrete 
futures, but focusing instead on human and nonhuman lives’ livability qua a multiplicity 
of futures. This critique contributes to denounce and challenge the disincarnated, abstract, 
non-time of growth temporality’s specific, problematic futurity, one made of futurism. 
Growth-driven progress has so far been nothing but (and no less than) uchronian, an 
empty promise where more always calls for even more, and this desire for growth, taken 
for granted in a capitalocentric vision of time, is being shattered along with the futurism it 
contains. Futurism appears for what it is, a means of subjection, and a constitutive 
element of uchronia, because of the realization and denunciation of the impossibility of 
sustaining indefinitely a productivism and consumerism running against the planet’s 




Quotidian Temporalities: Insatiable Speed, 24/7 
 
24/7 is a time of indifference … characterized as a generalized 
inscription of human life into duration without breaks, defined by a 
principle of continuous functioning. It is a time that no longer 
passes, beyond clock time … There are now very few significant 
interludes of human existence … that have not been penetrated and 
taken over as work time, consumption time, or marketing time … 
hence the ceaselessness of needs and their incitement, but also 
their perpetual non-fulfillment. 
Jonathan Crary  
 
 
Critiques of late modern temporalities which relate to the ecological crises, the question 
of the human, nonhuman and posthuman, and the technological and digital age do not 
limit themselves to inviting Earth’s deep time into human calendars and history, or to 
contesting imperatives to growth born in the second half of the twentieth century, or to 
challenging progress as it has been conceptualized since the industrial revolution and 
with the rise of productivism and consumerism. At more micro-scales of quotidian life, 
many have denounced the paces, speeds and rhythms of late modernity. Examples of 
resistances abound, like the slow movement, of which slow food is most famous, or the 
notion of “liberated time” circulating in de-growth discourses. As for critiques, I 
discussed in chapter 1 how Ivan Illich, one of political ecology and ecosophy’s early 
figures, characterized our times as symptomatic of a “speed society” (2013). He 
underscored the ways in which the fast paces of some becomes the extended hours of 
others because of the emerging velocity of transport (by motor vehicle) creating, once it 
occurs en masse, slow and excruciating traffic, versus the apparently slow yet efficient 
and convivial pace of transit (on foot and bicycle). Illich also crafted new concepts to 
describe the time consumed by “ghost work” (i.e, what is necessary to consume 




home, work on domestic machines like dishwashers, etc). To Illich, the speed society’s 
compulsory paces generate profound inequalities and a form of colonization of times of 
autonomy. Autonomy, along with what Illich called conviviality depends on the social 
relation to time, and time has everything to do with the distribution of power and 
arrangement of social relations. Michel Foucault’s depictions of the disciplinary society 
famously contrast an old regime power that harms the body in retaliation for certain 
crimes, with modern power, which “invests the body in depth” (1977, p. 72) emprisoning 
it into the soul as this form of power produces docile subjects. Disciplinary power 
calibrates each gesture for an efficient economy of power, in great part qua temporalities 
rhythmically punctuating the days and weeks of prisoners, school students, soldiers, 
hospital patients and staff. Thus Discipline and Punish famously opens with a gruesome 
description regicide’s quartering, juxtaposed with a timetable (p. 3 – 7). Discipline relies 
upon temporality, which is present throughout the book. 
 Jonathan Crary (2013) has recently argued that the digital age, the fast flows of 
the late twentieth century and beginning of the twenty-first century, are increasingly 
imposing a temporality he calls “24/7,” where “everyday life,” once a refuge from market 
exchanges, salaried work, commodification, is now invaded by the relentlessness of 
stimulation, image, frenetic information and communication, various commodities, 
devices and technologies. To Crary, “24/7 announces a time without time, a time 
extracted from any material or identifiable demarcations, a time without sequence or 
recurrence” (p. 29) Crary opens and closes his book with an analysis of how sleep 
becomes one of the last remnants of sequential pauses, vulnerable moments of social time 




recent book have reduced the argument to one where, qua sleep, Crary draws from Guy 
Debord’s denunciations of the society of spectacle or Gilles Deleuze’s critique of the 
society of control, so as to critique capitalist temporalities. Yet the argument goes much 
beyond sleep. Surely, many metaphors (and literal descriptions) regarding brightness, 
continuous lighting, restlessness populate his argument even when Crary doesn’t directly 
discuss sleep or dreams. But more generally, the author paints the picture of a timeless 
time that purports to replace the quotidian and commodify, control, subject all life in 
depth, in an age of digitalized and globalized consumerism and productivism. This is 
particularly relevant to my own argument here, insofar as this critique adds to the concert 
of voices showing that capitalist temporalities are not only unsustainable in the long run, 
in ecological terms, at the historical level, or in terms of the planet’s deep time, but they 
are also unbearable on a smaller time scale, at the level of micro-ecologies, and at 
individual or smaller groups’ levels, all of which are related in various ways to the larger 
time-scale examined so far. In an echo to Illich’s critique of the speed society as 
detrimental to personal autonomy and collective conviviality, Crary explains that due to 
this 24/7 temporality, which involves “temporalities of networked systems” operating 
constantly, accelerations and relentlessness produce a situation where “long-standing 
notions of shared experience atrophy” (p. 31). Crary thus denounces the “relentless 
incursion of the non-time of 24/7 into every aspect of social and personal life” (p. 30). In 
the fabric of quotidian lives, indistinction and homogeneity, flattening and constant 
stimulation, strive to stifle rest, social time, sleep, dreams, non-productive or useless 
activity, passivity, tasks and occupations pursued for their own sake and devoid of 




temporality Crary (among others) describes is the quotidian dimension of what I call 
uchronia: the timeless time of late capitalism, of the speed society. 
 However, Crary tends to insist on the presentism, the ephemerity, the moment 
obscuring any future, which result from 24/7 temporality. This analysis goes so far as 
erasing futurism from the 24/7 equation. I differ here, in that I argue that uchronia 
entangles two seemingly contradictory aspects of control at the level of quotidian 
temporalities, one that is indeed characterized by a timeless presentism, both forgetful of 
the past and future-less, as Crary aptly describes, and another facet of this temporality of 
speed that constantly subjects all to a never satiated state of desire for more (information, 
technological devices, newer commodities, etc). As a result, late moderns are indeed 
constantly running toward an abstract immediate future well-being and non-time, which 
is always postponed to better fuel the present non-time, made of consumerist impulses 
and frenetic paces.  
Crary, in contrast, asserts that:  
For much of the twentieth century, novelty production, in spite of its 
repetitiveness and nullity, was often marketed to coincide with a social 
imagination of a future more advanced than, or at least unlike, the present. Within 
the framework of a mid-twentieth century futurism, … there was at least the 
misplaced belief in technological solutions to intractable social problems. Now 
the accelerated tempo of apparent change deletes any sense of an extended time 
frame that is shared collectively, which might sustain even a nebulous anticipation 
of a future distinct from contemporary reality. 24/7 is shaped around individual 




comfort at the expense of others. The future is so close at hand that it is 
imaginable only by its continuity with the striving for individual gain or survival 
in the shallowest of presents. (p. 41) 
In this analysis, the futurism prevalent in the mid-twentieth century has given way to 
accelerated tempos that now tend to erase futurity tout court, or to reduce it to “the 
continuation … of the shallowest of presents.” Yet this futurism which Crary describes as 
made up of “misplaced belief in technological solutions to intractable social problems” 
still seems quite resilient when one thinks, for instance, of geoengineering and such 
technofixes to the climate crisis (I will discuss these counter-uchronias in chapter 5). At 
the quotidian and the individual or micro-levels, the next device, the new social network 
or app, the hippest commodities continue to provide ways for consumerism to never 
reach yet always pursue the satiation of a continuously increasing or at least open-ended 
appetite. More than “the shallowest of presents,” this could be described as a constantly 
receding horizon where the sun barely ever sets, or if it does, neons and touch screens 
have taken over so drastically one fails to notice. With 24/7 temporality, the future still 
subjects the present, including at quotidian levels.  
Crary does note that this is the case in the sense that 24/7 frenesy results in a 
tunnel vision detrimental to imagining futures different from the present, different from 
present monotonous agitation. And in the incipit that opens this section, he also concedes 
that the takeover of almost all “interludes of human existence” by “work time, 
consumption time, or marketing time” results in a “perpetual non-fulfillment” (p.10). 
Though Crary mostly insists on the erasure of the past and the future by 24/7 




futurity there, I contend that this permanent insatiability is precisely the futurism at play 
for this non-time. The ideal consumer is an eternally dissatisfied consumer, and the 
devices and commodities of today, ever so quickly outdated and obsolete, procure but 
split second pleasures that, as they are so fleeting, let desire take over and project oneself 
into the nontime of another similar split second in one immediate future disguised as the 
only future. This futurism is what Jean-Michel Besnier (2013) has described as a post-
human utopia. In his view the digital age and globalization, combined and entangled, 
offer the promise of an eu- and ou-topos where technical and scientific means would fully 
“accomplish humankind,” that is to say, they would allow “the suppression of all 
imperfections that bar humanity from access to happiness” (p. 94, my translation). Thus 
the utopian transhumanist and/or certain posthumanist fantasies: with these, “utopia is 
indeed present as such, in the perspective of a happiness which would put an end to the 
wanderings of history” (p. 96). This happiness is one where time stops, where one is 
finally liberated from time, entering into a stillness symptomatic of humanity’s ends 
having been realized. This speaks to the seduction also exercized on the left, to a Slavoj 
Zizek (2011) who understandably questions that there has ever been such a thing as 
Nature, but then concludes that we need to throw ourselves forward even more deeply 
into an artificialism that would allegedly provide the way to confront the eco-crises. A 
similar appeal of the paces and speeds of the technological and digital age also manifests 
itself in accelerationist aesthetics, according to which capitalism’s acceleration should be 
deepened, pushed to its utmost possibilities, promising radical change. Though Besnier 




once attracted to a utopianism defended by a certain kind of leftism, convinced then that 
“life rimes with utopia.” However, he explains that 
Today [he is] ready to recognize [his] mistake, without concluding however that 
narratives which recount an elsewhere and an otherwise be solely a nuisance. [But 
he] declare[s] it brutally: utopia is death, as we would like to live it. … It congeals 
time, submitting existence to rituals that are often obsessive; it neutralizes space, 
situating its narratives in the improbable and the “placeless;” it asepticizes 
humanity by exempting it of its flaws. … Yet, desirable, it does so while 
rendering this death attractive and pain-free. … [It evokes a] fascination for an 
immersion in an undistinguishable fetal and lethal state. (p. 98) 
We may remember that in Plato’s Republic, which could arguably be back-read as one of 
the first utopias (a city of words in a historical time where, however, Thomas More had 
not yet coined the term utopia), time, first incarnated by muses who announced that 
everything will ineluctably decay, is what ultimately breaks the harmony of Callipolis. 
The goal, the end of utopia is fixity, and is fundamentally at odds with becoming. In other 
words, utopia’s temporal dimension, or uchronia, is a timeless time, and we may 
currently be swimming in images of uchronia that claim to truth35. The paradox of 24/7 
temporality is that the way in which this self-identical, monotonous or still time, this non-
time is attained is by throwing production and consumption into a faster and faster 
supposedly ‘forward’ race.  
 
                                                        





Queering Times: Capitalocentric Temporalities as Uchronia 
 
This does not mean, of course, that we shall throw future generations and their babies 
with the acidifying oceans’ waters. For instance, Jean-Michel Besnier denounces utopia 
as the supposedly good non-place, because we now realize it would end time if fully 
realized (and, I would add, because we realize that its full realization will always fail: in 
fact that is one of its conditions of reproduction). Yet he also underscores that this does 
not mean that we should judge “all narratives that recount an elsewhere and an 
otherwise” to be noxious. In fact, I would argue that critiquing utopia reminds us that not 
all elsewheres are or have to be utopian. This is indeed one of the reasons to further 
reflect on what timeless time (uchronia) and its dictates are made of, so that different 
ways of imagining, different futurities, non-uchronian ones, may emerge. In other words, 
queering eco-temporalities so as to leave uchronia and live livable lives, requires more 
critical work to identify what we wish to leave behind, and so as to not conclude that all 
imaginations of other possible worlds and times are utopian and uchronian, conserving, 
or restoring, or creating, their beauty and helpfulness. Asking what uchronia is would 
thus amount to asking how we can imagine and make time, in spite of the dominant 
saturation of non-time. One of the goals of my conceptualization of uchronia is to call a 
time out on the time outside of time, to make time for invention and for sustaining life. In 
this section I will draw out the major traits that constitute what it is I call uchronia, 
building upon the critiques discussed above so as to better grasp how a capitalocentric, 
teleological time where the abstract futurism of productivism and consumerism 
constantly postpones its promise of satiation to a better tomorrow, justifying destructive 




spite of its apparent immateriality, this naturecultural time has a myriad of material 
effects, and celebrates a timeless time which I will conclude is incompatible with a 
philosophy of becoming needed in times of dramatic ecological transformation – thus my 
eventual turn to Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return.   
 
Uchronia: a Capitalocentric, Teleological and Timeless Futurism 
 
[L’utopie, c’est] le lieu hors de tous les lieux … le pays ou 
on peut tomber d’une montagne et se relever vivant, c’est le 




Uchronia is, in part, the temporal manifestation of capitalocentrism: all temporalities that 
offer to imagine the future (in the singular) as solely, or predominantly capitalist, 
obscuring non-capitalist (possible and more or less probable) futures, are uchronian. 
Uchronian temporalities reduce the future to capitalist (impossible) growth. Or, put 
differently, they reciprocally deem multitude and plurality, diversity in directions and 
forms of the future/futures, to be the only futurity present in the present, whether these 
may be probable or not, or less.  
 Furthermore, uchronian temporalities have reduced the measurement of progress 
to supposedly endless growth. At a larger historical scale including the industrial 
revolution or perhaps the beginnings of capitalism, progress has been the uchronian 
signifier for a linear time moved by a teleological end. The end of history, under the reign 
or temporal order of uchronia, tends to be equated to capitalist progress, not only in the 
sense of a goal of history, but also as its finish or closing line, its horizon. Teleology, 




possible, but in the sense of a reduction to homogeneity, and as opposed to plurality and 
multitude) are all components of uchronia. 
 Uchronias are a temporalities which essentialize or naturalize capitalist ends, 
capitalocentric teleological temporality as the only possible one. They take for granted, as 
going without saying, as natural, the logic or dynamic of wanting more and more: 
naturally, growth is desirable, it is what we cannot help but want, the non-negotiable 
logic moving our economies,  homo economicus cannot help it because it is in His nature, 
etc. We will see further that naturalizing can be understood as reducing, reductive and 
essentializing or essentialist, in the sense and as long as nature is imagined as static:36 for 
the moment this is how I am using the term. However what is at fault here is not so much 
nature per se, but that what is deemed natural is taken to indicate a teleological goal and 
form to attain and strive for, justifying all kinds of damage here and now. In other words, 
the problem with nature is not nature but its temporality, when it is conceptualized in a 
teleological manner. One consequence of this is that uchronia functions such that inherent 
to it is its denial of its own contingency. This is linked to my first point about uchronia 
rendering other possible futures unimaginable: if the natural end of time is capitalist 
growth, then it could not be otherwise, then capitalist temporality is not contingent. 
 One additional and crucial defining trait of uchronia is that it refers to the 
assumption of an impossible infinite growth in a finite world, which impossibility, 
similarly to its contingency, it keeps denying. Indeed, this denial is also an inherent 
constituent of uchronia. Here we see that the question of limits directly feeds into the 
critical purchase of my concept of uchronia: naming uchronia means naming a 
                                                        
36 See chapter 4, where I will argue that uchronia and also what I call counter-uchronias (such as 
environmentalist primitivisms and certain environmentalism’s claims to “return” or “restore” nature, etc) 




temporality which imagines no limits and relies on this impossibility taken to be the only 
possible, to then disguise itself as a forward movement (uchronia is also the assumption 
that “forward” equals “good,” that there is such a thing as a line, with two directions, an 
arrow to time). Impossibility and limits is the “ou” (not, none) of “ou-chronos” (non-
time)  in the etymology of uchronia. The denial of impossibility, and valuation of growth 
in spite of its impossible infinity, is the “eu” (good, ideal) combining with the “ou.” 
 Yet another feature of uchronia is related to this latter one: uchronia requires and 
entails, as a condition of its existence and reproduction, the eternal postponement of an 
end, a satisfaction, an achievement or satiety that will never come. Both this 
postponement, and its impossibility, its unattainable character, the fictive nature of the 
non-time, the outside timeliness of uchronian time, are crucially important: these are 
visible at the quotidian and micro-level, and on a larger scale. Uchronia is the running 
after sand castles perched in clouds. It is a matter which affects subjectivities and their 
production: the good consumer is that who is never satiated and whose pleasures merely 
feed into more desire, and the healthy economy of a given nation-state is that which 
strives for growth. Economies must grow, but to what end? Well the end has become 
growth, or growth has become the end itself (which one could have thought should 
perhaps have been a means… but then again what is capitalism besides the fetishization 
of means, their transformation into ends, e.g means of exchange like money? And, then 
again, the point would not be to simply reverse the hierarchy here, or separate ends and 
means, but to question this binary which is indubitably part of the teleological structure 
here). Inherent to the end of capitalocentric temporalities, as a constituent and a vector of 




their resilience, is the promise of an impossibility at which we will never arrive, a 
timeless, disembodied time which the notion of future generations, for instance, 
challenges. 
 Futurism is another component of uchronia, another aspect or dimension of its 
mode of operating. As I have discussed above when outlining the distinction between 
uchronian futurity and my reading of the environmentalist notion of future generations, 
futurism refers to something more precise than just futurity or the future (I have argued 
this in response to Lee Edelman’s “fuck the future!” which confuses the future, futures, 
futurity and futurism. By futurism I mean to refer to the subjection of the concrete actual 
and virtual presents, present futurity, and possible futures, to one future. In the case of 
uchronia, the future is inevitably made of capitalist growth, and this future purports to 
dominate and rule over any claims for other possibilities and other possible temporal 
orders.  The subjection of the present and futures, of temporality, to a capitalocentric 
teleological future evidently is highly normative, in this sense, this is how uchronia 
arbiters what counts as normal, the normal time, expectations, the expectable, probable 
and possible future, the real, etc. Because uchronia is a normative temporality and 
because it contributes to the conditions of production and reproduction of the normative, 
because, as Cornelius Castoriadis and de-growth theorists like Serge Latouche put it, it 
colonizes our imaginaries, any critique of uchronia entails queering temporality. Jose 
Munoz has argued that queer time is a “not yet here,” and indeed a critique of uchronia 
would require de-colonizing growth imaginaries to imagine (and continue to live, enact 
and embody) other possible queer temporalities and times. Yet this cannot take on the 




uchronias of substitution, what I would call counter-uchronias. This critique has to 
perform queer futurities, as Munoz underscores, yet these must not take the form of 
futurisms. As Foucault has put it, speaking of queerness and frienship, no less:  
The idea of a program of proposals is dangerous. As soon as a program is 
invented, it becomes law, and there is a prohibition against inventing… The 
program must be wide open. We have to dig deeply to show how things have been 
historically contingent, for such and such reason intelligible but not necessary. 
We must make the intelligible appear against the background of emptiness and 
deny its necessity. We must think that what exists is far from filling all possible 
spaces. To make a truly unavoidable challenge of the question: what can be 
played? (1997)  
What kind of eco-queer kinships are made possible by naming uchronia, and striving to 
not fall back into counter-uchronia, to avoid a program of proposals that would become 
law and prevent inventiveness, so that “what exists” is not only “far from filling all 
possible spaces,” but also far from filling all possible times? My concept of uchronia is 
meant to describe, to make intelligible, the appeal capitalocentric temporality has had, 
and its contingency in spite of its claim to necessity, to being what we naturally cannot 
not want.  
 One way uchronia can act as an apt descriptor of a normative temporality that 
calls for queering time, is that it also describes how capitalocentric constantly relies on its 
own failure to meet the ideal, non-time it purports to incarnate. Uchronian temporalities 
idealize growth as the right direction, they claim their status as the “good time” by 




deserve it. The lives of queers, nonhumans, and the many who have been denied human 
subjectivity are evidence that this ideal is never met. This is especially salient in periods 
of capitalist crisis (and to an extent, capitalism is precisely always in crisis), when, as 
Isabelle Stengers (2009) has emphasized in her Temps des catastrophes: resister a la 
barbarie qui vient,  “we are asked to tighten our belts” and sacrifices nonhuman life, the 
conditions of human and more nonhuman life, on the altar of desire to return to growth, 
in an exhortation to concede, “realistically” that Gaia (humans included) is not the 
priority. The hysterical Earth is throwing a tantrum? Shut her down, we have not caused 
her fever. Uchronia by no means describes actual times of capitalist hegemony, but 
rather, the ideal temporality of capitalism. Periods of crises and periods of growth both 
come with their respective lot of injustices, aggravation of many people’s and 
nonhumans’ conditions, exacerbations of inequalities, precarizations, ecological disasters 
and destructions, which all drastically contrast with the promises made. For instance, 
crises, far from resulting in de-growth (which would de-colonize our imaginaries from 
the imperative to growth), is supposed to strengthen the desire for growth, to make it 
even more incontestable and silence even further any concurrent desire, any proposal for 
different futures. Uchronia refers to the alleged imperative to desire growth, as the ideal 
temporality moving capitalism (taken as encompassing all reality) “forward.”   
 I should make one final precision with regards to the concept of uchronia: I have  
used the expression “uchronian temporalities” in the plural, and uchronia to designate all 
these, simply because uchronia is multi-faceted, and uchronian temporalities are multiple: 
they extend to quotidian, historical scales, they now impact deep time scales (thus the 




speeds and rhythms depending on these scales, etc. Uchronia is not a monolith, though it 
is difficult to describe and critique without risking to sound as though it was one.37 This 
also means that I have left many of these various facets and temporalities outside the 
scope of my examples. Though my concept of uchronia comes out of a specific, 
contingent context of ecological crisis and does not propose to be infinitely applicable, 
we could imagine many other aspects of capitalist times and temporalities which could be 
read as uchronian, thus the importance of the plural.38 
 
The Immaterial Dimension of the Material, or Temporalities’ High Stakes 
 
There is a certain part of all of us that lives outside 
of time. Perhaps we become aware of our age only 





If Foucault asked the provocative question of “what can be played?,” and if my critique 
of capitalocentric temporalities as uchronian entails queering temporalities, the task is 
nonetheless quite tall and the stakes quite high. It becomes apparent, from the effects of 
uchronia, some of which I have described above, that conceptions of time affect what 
counts as the real, or what is deemed realistic, realistically desirable. Uchronia’s modus 
operandi is to claim realism, “we cannot but want growth, let’s be realistic,” even in the 
face of planetary limits, and in an attempt to erase these limits. Temporalities shape 
                                                        
37 J.K. Gibson-Graham (2006) have discussed a similar problem in their introduction to the tenth edition of 
The End of Capitalism (As We Knew It), where they explain that, just like the feminist second wave had to 
risk caricaturing its sexist targets in the process of denouncing them, they have been accused to 
constructing a strawman version of capitalism so as to proceed in their attempt at burning capitalocentrism 
(p. 10).  
38 For example, Ivan Ascher (forthcoming) has argued that while Marx’s critique of industrial capitalism’s 
mode of production is still pertinent to this day, financial capitalism now relies upon a “mode of 
prediction,” depending on future risks, securities, and speculation on these. This new form of futurism 




modes of living, producing, consuming. Yet in spite of these concrete high stakes and 
effects, time desperately seems to remain impalpable, ungraspable.   
A number of environmentalism’s and environmental sciences’ key concepts are 
symptomatic of both this difficulty and this need to tell, see, feel and think time, 
including some that I have described above. The concept of “overshoot day,” as it strives 
to quantify the exhaustion of planetary resources over the course of a year, is an attempt 
at bringing this exhaustion, the ecological debt, the question of limits, to a graspable 
scale, in the form of a calendar, a date, a portion of the year spent spending resources that 
will not have time to replenish. As such, it is seemingly able to provide concrete, 
temporal terms in which to sense the excess, the rapid pace of an (unevenly) productivist 
and consumerist world. But this translation into an annual scale also makes the idea of 
ecological debt all the more abstract, and may be paralyzing to think about. Similarly, I 
have mentioned how some within the geosciences have now famously been proposing the 
term “anthropocene” to name our contemporary “epoch” (the smaller unit of geology’s 
periodization of Earth history). The attempt here is to manifest the fact that roughly since 
the Industrial Revolution (the moment for a marker is still highly contested) human 
activity has been so predominant in traces and changes affecting the Earth’s surface 
durably. In order to explain such debate over periodization and to allow the layperson to 
understand human time compared to Earth time, geologists often resort to a procedure 
similar to the reasoning at work with the concept of overshoot day, yet showing the 
complex, multi-dimentional nature of time and the barely graspable character of nature’s 
time. Geologists indeed tell us that if Earth history was brought onto a scale of a one year 




reminiscent of JFK’s, which opened this chapter). So at times, time is used to help 
visualize or better grasp what Tim Morton would call “hyperobjects.” This is telling 
insofar as it seemingly may make things palpable, showing how much temporality 
contributes to and constitutes our realities and imaginaries. Yet these scalings in calendar 
year terms are also symptomatic of the abstraction of time: first, what is mobilized is not 
time so much as a way in which time is measured, made sense of, socially regulated and 
– rhythmically – organized, and how a particular temporality then accounts for some of 
the fabric of reality. A distinction thus needs to be made between temporalities, as 
variously capable of showing or trying to show concreteness, and time, as ungraspable, in 
need of measurement or linearization (qua temporalities). This resort to temporality 
operates as a translation of the incommensurable into an abstraction, paradoxically 
designed to allow concrete grasp. 
After Bergson, environmental feminist thinker Elizabeth Grosz (2004) points out 
that time can be seen as the immaterial dimension of the material. If this is the case, then 
it can in fact hardly be “seen,” or only retrospectively: time, or the causalities we take to 
be symptomatic of time, works backwards. While the effects of time can be observed in a 
concrete way, and the causes of these effects traced back, retroactively, such 
reconstitution after the fact, after the passing of time, is the only means available to 
account for time’s fundamentally processual nature. This throws us into the impossibly 
retroactive reconstitution performed when doer and deed (2006, p. 26) are separated 
instead of holding everything as overdetermined effects (Althusser, 1985). One can see a 
wrinkle in the corner of one’s eye, or a strand of grey hair, and think back to the last time 




producing a tryadic line distinguishing between past, present and future – Bergson’s 
concept of duration is helpful here – to account for this change. Yet one cannot grab the 
carving of the wrinkle, or touch the de-pigmentation process of the hair, or even less, the 
duration in which these took place. These causes and effects are but points on that 
chronos’ line, leaving us with no choice but to imagine the liminal spaces, or rather, all of 
it as perpetual becoming, all of reality as open-ended, unpredictable process. My resort to 
the terms “line” and “space” are telling in this respect: as Henri Bergson remarked, time 
requires spatialization to make sense to us. Where does the present fit in this 
spatialization? How can we make sense of processes by which the planet becomes ever 
more endangered, especially granted the extreme rapid paces so characteristic of global 
capitalism, in spite of temporalities of progress that assume capitalist growth’s infinity? 
Climate science has developed accounts of time in the form of “tipping points,” 
“mitigation,” and then “adaptation,” to give concreteness to the urgency of the climate 
crisis. It has crafted new scientific ways to produce truths about the future qua 
anticipation and computer models and multiple future scenarios. As discussed above, 
Greenpeace’s campaigns have resorted to stickers simply stating a provocative, pressing, 
and urgent “it’s not too late”… which slogan has – tellingly? – disappeared. Greenpeace 
and other organization resort also, to enormous hourglass images on banners and as 
balloons, to convey urgency. But some dates about specific “tipping points” have 
vanished from the new IPCC report released in 2013 and 2014, compared to the 2007 
Third Assessment report, while this more recent report has shown that many effects of 
climate change had been previously under, and not overestimated… Does this mean that 




hope and urgency then expressed becoming obsolete? What meaning is such a question 
allowed when survival of species, and life itself, are at stake? As a process so crucial in 
our understanding and experience of the real, time is undeniably material, yet attempts at 
contesting its hegemonic modern conceptualization as linear, unidirectional and 
unidimentional (Latour, 1993; 2004), seem discouragingly insufficient in accounting for 
the fullness of what is at stake in a critical reflection on temporality within the context of 
the current environmental crises. I hope that the concept of uchronia can convey some of 
these stakes.  
The very idea of time ending, when it is difficult to imagine it as anything but 
open-ended process, seems an impossibility. The above critique of endism, along with the 
critique of teleological time performed by the concept of uchronia underscores the 
impossibility of a correspondence between the end of capitalism and an alleged end of 
time. This may seem paradoxical, as the point of naming uchronia is to underscore limits, 
the particular limits uchronia is running into yet denying, while I still affirm the open-
endedness of time. Yet the endlessness of time is not at all incompatible with the notion 
of limits: in fact these are interdependent. Time’s infinity points to the contingent 
naturecultural character of uchronian temporalities: as the above discussion of limits v. 
endism suggests, it is not time, as a constant process of becoming, that ends when 
capitalist production hits limits. That uchronian temporalities, capitalocentric times and 
capitalist futures have an end, that this end may be approaching – in the sense that they 
will at one point be washed away by the sea like marks in the sand, just like man will, in 





Uchronia v. Eternal Return: Fuck Futurism! Fuck Endism! 
 




In the following and concluding section, I finish (although the task is as endless as time 
is) substantiating and specifying the meaning of my concept of uchronia by bringing 
Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return in conversation with the considerations above. This 
concept also enables to transition from a negative to a positive moment of this critique. 
Although the concept of uchronia is distinct from the doctrine of eternal return’s rejection 
of teleological envisionings of time insofar as the former stems from the specific impetus 
provided by the anthropocene’s context, Nietzche’s critique of progress deeply resonates 
with my critique of capitalocentric temporality. Further exploring this resonance will 
enable a more precise delineation of the problem that the term uchronia foregrounds. This 
section, in weaving the critique made possible by describing capitalocentric temporality 
as “uchronia” with Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return, brings Nietzsche’s attacks 
against the teleofinalism of progress characteristic of modernity into dialog with 
ecological matters of our times. I argue that Nietzsche’s conceptualization of the eternal 
recurrence is a welcome support to an environmentalist critique of temporality: in fact, it 
was about time such conversations were staged.39  
                                                        
39 A number of attempts have been made to bring Nietzsche into conversation with environmentalist theory, 
including ones that have claimed Nietzsche as a pre-deep ecologist. I do not find these compelling, as deep 
ecology postulates a stable, eternal nature to return to (see chapter 4) whereas Nietzsche’s nature is made of 
becoming, neither unreason or reason, constant erratic flows, bursts of creation, will to power. Thus I will 
not address these readings in depth, also because Nietzsche as a deep ecologist arguments have been 
refuted convincingly since. For an overview of this debate, see Acampora, 1994; Drenthen, 2005; Hallman, 




In the current context of ecological crises, where urgency, the critique of growth 
and progress, limits, end-times, future generations make up central concepts in 
environmental thought to the point of posing fundamental questions regarding the 
reigning temporality, Nietzsche’s attacks against teleofinalist time acquire astute salience. 
The eternal return not only feeds into the critical purchase of my concept of uchronia, it 
also begins to suggest how other temporal orders are possible (Foucault, 2002), and what 
forms they may take. What follows by no means purports to be the result of any sort of 
exhaustive mastery over this incredibly rich concept. Yet the eternal return turns out 
extremely helpful for purposes of temporality queering.40 For now, I extract some of its 
critical dimensions. I will continue discussing this critical aspect in the next chapter, and 
subsequent chapters will weave other ontological and positive ethical aspects to 
discussions of alternative eco-temporalities.  
This extraction first comes with the need of explaining part of the concept. With 
it, Nietzsche was proposing a radical refusal to align himself to Christian, modern, 
Enlightenment – or all three at once, as these overlap – teleological visions of History, to 
show instead the fundamental contingency and the total absence of pre-set meaning to the 
course of time. This is one first point that the eternal return helps specify regarding the 
critique made possible by naming uchronia. So far, for simplicity’s sake, I have claimed 
that uchronia describes a teleological temporality. Yet we may now be more precise: after 
Connolly’s reading of Nietzsche, it becomes clear that the target here is not the presence 
of direction (telos) per se, but the singular direction that absorbs or claims erase all other 
possible ones, with ends, goals, as justifying or redeeming the process. Teleodynamic 
                                                        
40 Here again we are reminded of Colebrook’s identification (2014) of Nietzsche’s vitalism as relevant to 
times of ecological crisis, and as she has more specifically underscored, as part of a queer vitalist tradition 




temporalities (Connolly, 2015), which may include directions in movement and more 
plural, are not as problematic – though Connolly ultimately settles for what he calls 
“bumpy temporalities” instead. 
In Nietzsche’s view, if the universe had been able or designed to attain an 
ultimate goal, a unique and predetermined end, and if it were animated by reason, then it 
would already have reached such a goal or end. The fact that we have not yet arrived at 
such an end state, that the forces of the universe have not developed to reach their 
original objective, shows that there is in fact no such origin or objective. Thus Nietzsche 
reiterates this thesis many times in his notebooks, has his famous character Zarathustra 
claim it, exposes it in his Gay Science. If the course of history had always already been 
unfolding toward an end it contained at its point of origin, as a teleological vision of time 
would have it, there would be nothing rather than something, or some kind of impossible 
stasis: we would still be in this state, lost in time, out of time. If everything passes, then 
there is nothing but the eternity of the instant, containing the infinity of the past and the 
infinity of the future at each moment, rather than a meaning, a unified goal, a determined 
course. 
Let us beware [hüten wir uns] to assign an aspiration, a goal of any kind to this 
cyclical motion, or to regard it according to our needs as boring, stupid, etc. 
Undoubtedly, the supreme degree of unreason manifests iself within it just as 
much as the contrary: but we could not judge it according to this fact, neither the 
reasonable nor the unreasonable are predicates that could be attributed to the 





I will discuss in subsequent chapters the ethical implications of the doctrine of the eternal 
return, but for the time being what matters is this impossibility for any teleology to hold 
water – as water runs. Yet, with the notion that though there is no linear, unidirectional 
and unidimentional, single course for history, no predetermined goal, Nietzsche does not 
either claim that no meaning exists. Rather, the only meaning we humans may encounter 
in the world is the result of our own contingent creation – we may add that this takes 
place in hybrid collaboration with nonhumans, though this addition is deductable based 
on Nietzsche’s depiction of the universe as moved by the eternal return and will to power, 
far from limited to humans.  
Concretely and for our purposes here, Nietzche’s doctrine of the eternal return 
provides further ammunition to attack uchronia, i.e to demonstrate the absurdity and 
impossibility the direction given to time by a capitalocentric temporality – that is, growth 
as the direction that measure progress, progress’ goal as infinite abundance in a finite 
world. Or, more specifically, Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence shows that such an objective 
is nothing but or no less than, contingently created and always re-created anew 
(differently at each moment). In other words, in spite of its self-representation as the only 
possible reality, in spite of its naturalization (capitalism being presented as the end of 
History, growth as the engine of progress and capitalocentric progress as our inevitable, 
ultimate end toward which we ineluctably tend), the idea of growth as our end is indeed a 
contingent creation of meaning (and uchronia is undeniably highly meaningful to many), 
one that we can get out of or leave, rather than the meaning. Furthermore, time is 
consequently infinite: no end preexists at the origin, because there is neither origin nor 




of the world’s story, the end in sight, and the end understood as a ultimate goal, a 
direction or purpose. Nietzsche affirms that the universe of forces never attains 
equilibrium, never gets a moment of calm: its force, its agitation are always of the same 
intensity. Whatever the state of the world of forces may attain, it must of necessity 
already have reached it. And this state must have been reached an incommensurable 
number of times. Reason and unreason are off topic, and all meaning is creatively 
contingent, contingently created. If this is the case, then capitalism is but one assemblage 
of the forces in the incalculable possible assemblages of forces which will repeat 
themselves over and over, ad infinitum. The end of the world cannot correspond or be 
equated to or suspected of resulting from the end of capitalism: capitalism will end, 
growth and progress cannot, of necessity, be linear. 
And this is where things become interesting, as in this doctrine converge 
necessity, contingency, and creation – thus freedom. The consequent possibility to get out 
of uchronia is what I will examine in the subsequent chapters. In the mean time, we may 
think back on the problems of urgency, limits, growth, linear progress, future generations 
qua the lens made available by the eternal return. I have synthesized these critiques 
thanks to the critical concept of uchronia: we urgently need to extract ourselves from 
logics of growth because they fail to acknowledge the limited resources for this planet. 
Uchronia describes an assumption of infinite forces in a finite world and ever-postponed 
end of abundance we allegedly cannot but pursue, as one would chase the horizon 
imagining one can touch it until one exhausts oneself, not before having (re)produced, 
meanwhile, (Earth-)exhausting modes of living. Uchronia denounces the naturalization of 




light on the abstraction characteristic of the futurism at play in such teleology: ecological 
destruction (life-denying forces, nihilism, or reactive forces in Nietzschean language) is 
justified today, as today is subjected to an ever-postponed, abstract tomorrow of total 
abundance that will never come. This (re)productive futurism bypasses the concrete 
presence of all of future’s infinity in the present moment, our concrete interdependence 
upon future generations of life forms which incalculable configurations repeat themselves 
eternally (a vitalism quite different from the vitalism which subsumes the present under 
abstract future life). Uchronia refers to this nihilist abstraction, to life-denying forces that 





ANTI-UCHRONIAS: TIME TO PAUSE AND THINK
 
Figure 1 : Blu, Untitled.  
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My Hands Are Tied, Time Is Money 
 
In November 2008, Italian graffiti artist Blu spent three nights and three days covering an 
immense wall in downtown Berlin with a mostly black and white picture representing the 
white shirt-wearing torso and arms of a person tightening their tie. Probably about 30 
meters high, the black and white of the painting did allow one major exception: the gold-
colored watches ornating the person’s wrists. These were connected together by a heavy 
golden chain, as though the person was in fact wearing a strange kind of handcuffs. Thus 
the tie and gigantic hands, the stiff neck, stage a businessman with his “hands tied” … by 
time – of course: “time is money.” Yet, more than a tie constraining his hands, time 
literally emprisons, arrestingthe very powerful figure who uneasily tightens the knot 
around his neck. For urban spectators also, the image is arresting, inviting to at least 
glimpse, if not pause and contemplate. The gigantic painting almost has the viewer hear 
the gulping sound produced as the giant character swallows his saliva reaching for the 
reassuring symbol of his power. He ordersthis tie so as to grant himself better composure, 
as though he did not quite believe his own formulas: “you understand, my hands are 
tied… time is money,” echoes unconvincingly, with a broken voice from a giant chest. 
My hands are tied indeed, my tie tightening, time is money, and qua the symbol of these 
golden watches chained together, time and money intertwine to tie the hands which 
desperately tie the tie. The shape is that of a watch, the material is gold, the function, 
multiple: that of handcuffs, to tie. That of watches, to tick. But the tying around the neck 
is self-imposed, initiated directly by the hands, though spectators may imagine it as 
nervous. And the watches must have been desired, and then bought: the rational choice of 
a rational consumer and powerful producer, decision-maker, business owner?  
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We know that Blu took three nights and three days to create this graffiti, as he 
provides “time-lapse” videos attesting of the process. Watchers, eyes wide open and 
mouth agape, discover the projector-equipped crane going up and down with the 
painting’s progression, as they re-live the graffiti artist’s insomnia in an anxious, 
titillating, compressed version. We’ve all seen time-lapse videos of flowers blooming, of 
suns rising and setting, of all kinds of otherwise slow nonhumans’ movement and change, 
compressed so as to be made visible to the human eye. Here, we watch an urban 
landscape in the making. The result of these three nights and three days points at the 
prison of a certain temporality and its inextricable relationship to capitalist economies. It 
exposes the attentive interpreter to ready-made statements referring to a realism rendered 
absurd by the art which caricatures such realism: “time is money”; “my hands are tied.” 
This is a pristine example of what I read as “anti-uchronian” art. 
 On December 11th 2014, this fresco was erased, most likely by the artist himself. 
The ephemerity of street art is also what grants it power and impact. Headlines 
concerning this event – as the erasure is also an event – read: “the most famous fresco of 
Berlin committed suicide last night.” The erasure took place in the context of planning in 
this section of Berlin, that were including high-end luxury residences, whose inhabitants 
will surely wear ties and gold watches similar to the giant character that vanished 
overnight. Appearing and disappearing in ephemeral ways makes the life of a graffiti 
painting meaningful beyond the actual duration of its existence, which makes graffiti art 
indeed quite a great candidate for producing anti-uchronian moments or glimpses. Blu 
has created explicitly environmentalist art. The first section of this chapter includes a 
close reading of a couple of his frescos, supporting my clarification of the meaning I 
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create for the concept of anti-uchronia. For the time being (or becoming), suffice is to say 
that “anti-uchronia” is not the opposite of “uchronia,” a symmetrically oppositional, other 
temporality that would replace it. Instead, anti-uchronia is about arresting the eye and 
making us see uchronia for what it is. For instance, it is “anti-uchronian” to call uchronia, 
“uchronia.” So is my elan to and the process of creatingthe concept of “uchronia,”i.e to 
describe capitalocentric temporality as “uchronian,” reversing charges usually directed at 
radical politics, so as to call capitalist economies “utopian” and “uchronian.” Anti-
uchronia is a critical glimpse and/or gaze at uchroniaas the contingent temporality that 
denies its contingency, presenting itself as neutral. It makes clear that this temporal order 
of things is not a given, that it is not self-evident and could have been otherwise – while it 
is true, at the same time, that so many factors explain it, that it is highly overdetermined. 
This in fact is the essence of contingency: that which, though over-determined, or 
perhaps because it is over-determined, could also have been otherwise. Anti-uchronian 
art, science, thought, events, would be those which allow to see the essential contingency 
in a temporal order that attempts to naturalize itself, in spite of all odds, as it is, in fact, 
timeless, disconnected, absurdly teleological, unsustainable and unbearable, as it always 
already postpones the promise it carries, running after sand castles in clouds so 
destructive to our Earth presents. So “uchronia” is itself an anti-uchronian concept. The 
reality that anti-uchronia refers to is uchronian, but daring to call it that when it claims so 
loudlyan exclusive access to realism or pragmatism, is anti-uchronian. Consequently, the 
entirety of the argument in the preceding chapter – and in this dissertation – strives to be 
anti-uchronian. Anti-uchronia allows to expose capitalocentric temporality as contingent: 
it starts the process of de-centering it, of denaturalizing it – in an understanding of nature 
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as static and devoid of change, which as Tim Morton (2010) has suggested, is precisely 
the problem with the concept of nature, naturalizing something would be coterminous 
with making it immutable, true at all times and in all places, for all beings. An anti-
uchronian argument, anti-uchronian art, moments where the sciences lean toward anti-
uchronia, all propose a vision that allows to see that capitalist consumerism and 
productivism are not naturally the ineluctable direction history necessarily takes, the hope 
for the only horizon possible, the only thing to look forward to, the measure of all things. 
Anti-uchronia takes a (first) stab at capitalocentric time. It may not (yet) propose 
alternative temporalities, but it shows the non-inevitability of uchronia, which, being 
teleological, presents itself as inevitable by definition. In exposing tension where things 
were previously taken for granted, anti-uchronia opens up a breach for alternative 
temporalities to potentially emerge or be noticed. 
This chapter’s goal is to take a moment to think what anti-uchronia means, how to 
foster this eye, these occasions for pauses. One of anti-uchronia’s effect is to suspend the 
race of compressed, uchronian temporality, or at least to disrupt its pace. It is not an elan 
to stop time itself: rather, it intends to make time, suspending or disrupting or shaking the 
frenetic march of consumption and production, asking whether it is all really necessary 
after all, and if necessity doesn’t in fact demand that we take completely different 
directions. Is there only one possible direction to time? Is this temporality the one one 
should want, the one one “cannot not want” (Spivak, 1996, p. 26) play with, create, 
simply because it claims to be, or assumes it is, the only possible horizon? Is this 
temporality even possible, let alone the only possible one, granted that it assumes 
illimited growth in a world with limited resources? Should we take neo-liberal capitalist 
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logics at their word when they call for present sacrifices on the grand altar of growth, 
because growth sets the arrow of time, because one day there will be abundance for all? 
Should we bow to that future today, even when we are seeing everywhere, today, that the 
present sacrifices are tremendously destructive of both human and nonhuman life? These 
questions, all anti-uchronian questions, inevitably take the form of a pause. A pause that 
is much needed in a time when the paces, speeds and rhythms of capitalocentric, growth-
driven progress – uchronia– along with its effects – the approach of limits, and an urgent, 
pressing need for change – are at such odds with possibilities to make the time to think 
through necessary, vast and rapid changes. So anti-uchronia invests the tension between 
the urgency of change in a rapidly changing world, and the need for time to think through 
such change. 
 This chapter meanders through a variety of texts and genres, in the hope of 
instillingmy conceptualization of anti-uchronia with further precision and substantial 
meaning, and because percepts and affects found in a variety of discourses are capable of 
shedding light on, even informing, a concept like anti-uchronia. I find what I call “anti-
uchronian” critique in a number of sites and discourses, both artistic and scientific 
(though also assuming there is more than mere resonance between these: art draws from 
the sciences and these are meaning-creating).The examples developed here are thus 
substantiating the concept of uchronia, not only because or in the sense that they illustrate 
it as perceptual or affective forms resonating with it, but also in the sense that they 
effectively support, ground and fuel the following conceptual work: part of the stakes in 
what follows is to show that anti-uchronian moments are in fact proliferating at each 
instant, all around and with us. Breaches opening up space for doubt and challenge of 
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hegemonic uchronia are erupting with the eruption of Gaia, with our context of ecological 
crisis, showing that uchronia was, in fact, never really entirely sustained or sustainable – 
never will be, even if it suffers adjectival modifications of the sort. It becomes especially, 
visibly, fragilized and fragmented now. I read anti-uchronian moments into Blu’s graffiti, 
then in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s climatological reports. As it 
caricatures the paces and speeds of hypermodernity to depict visions of horror, Serge 
Brussolo’s science fiction is yet another example of anti-uchronian vision. Finally, Yoann 
Bourgeois’ contemporary circus piece Cavale suspends acrobats jumping and spiraling 
on a trampoline and stairs built in white rectangular forms with the curvy Alps as their 
background. From street art, to climatology, to circus, anti-uchronia becomes more full. 
The first section weaves anti-uchronia to further considerations of Nietzsche’s eternal 
return, qua Blu (I). The second draws from Hans Jonas’ concept of futurology to read 
climatology, along Isabelle Stengers’ concept of idiocy, addressing multiple futures, 
uncertainty in the future, as well as the need to pause and consider these (II). Finally, 
Brussolo’s terrifying self-sustaining yet cannibal houses show anti-uchronia in the form 
of caricature, and I spiral to close all these considerations back to the eternal return, qua a 
series of cairological trampoline jumps (III). The goal of this peregrinating would be to 
gather elements for answering more general questions about anti-uchronia and its 
conditions of emergence, such as: what does anti-uchronia look like, mean, entail, 
require? What do anti-uchronian moments comprise? What are anti-uchronian moments 
and events, and what do they look and feel like when they take the form of percepts, 
affects, concepts? What forms do they take? How may we foster conditions for anti-
uchronia to emerge more often?  
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Environmental Street Art: 
Fleeting, Quotidian Glimpses into Anti-Uchronia 
 
 
This first section considers the relation between Nietzsche’s eternal return, his 
exhortation to engage in the transvaluation of values, and anti-uchronia. I draw from the 
ways in which graffiti artist Blu stages anti-uchronian visions and moments in the 
quotidian of urban spaces to give further form to anti-uchronia.  
Nietzsche’s Hammer 
 
In the previous chapter, I advanced Nietzsche’s doctrine of the eternal return as one 
possible path to start contesting the teleological form of capitalocentric temporalities, 
uchronia. Nietzsche taught us that envisioning time as teleology is no less than nihilistic. 
If time had an origin that contained its own end, if time had actually “started” to unfold 
and could be reduced to an unfolding from a supposed origin point toward an end, there 
would be nothing rather than something. The world, if it could “reach” an “end,” or be 
moved by “reason,” aiming linearly toward an ineluctable end-point would already have 
reached such a state. If the present forces could reach an optimal or balanced or maximal 
or harmonious state, they would already have attained it. Because it isn’t the case, we can 
deduce that no such end or origin exist. Time instead is radically exempt of both reason 
and unreason. Any direction or meaning we may see in it is willed, created, and imposed 
rather than (re)presenting an actual, objective teleology or sense the universe would 
simply have. Thus, claims to realism dictating one course as a given cannot be believed 
to be given so easily. More precisely put, they may (perhaps should) be doubted insofar 
as they attempt to reduce our presents and futures to one single direction that we 
allegedly could not but accept as the only possible meaning or direction. Certainly, 
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meaning, sense and direction may be willfully created and imposed on the eternal 
succession of chaotic moments owing nothing to reason or unreason (and thus the 
adjective “chaotic” isn’t satisfactory either: “creative” would be more accurate). Claims 
that one single course with a specific end exists – a course which originated at a point 
causally coherent with it and that explains it – are simply attempts to assert one particular 
specific and contingent meaning: no matter the claim to know what is ahead and what 
should be done according to linear, teleological discourses, by no means are there 
absolute meanings or self-evident, predictable directions, beyond those created 
contingently (this does not by any means deny, either, the force of such contingency: it 
rather highlights it, such that we may re-direct resistance, or anti-uchronia, accordingly). 
In later chapters I will return to the ethical implications of the eternal return and to 
its ontological implications (Deleuze, 1962) – the eternity of the instant situating us 
necessarily in a world of becoming as opposed to one that “develops” or “grows” (see 
especially my concept of synchrony in chapter 6). For the moment, I would like to focus 
on specifically “anti-uchronian” implications of the eternal return as a critique of 
teleological time. If we accept the radical contingency resulting from this, the implication 
is that we rule out reductions of our futures to one single direction dictated by economic 
growth as the ultimate measure of progress, the imperative to even create or subscribe to 
ideals and desires of “progress,” and to the sole possibility of capitalist futures. Not only 
is “another world possible,” as alter-globalization contesters have claimed, but many are 
(or, rather, become). This excludes granting growth the status of unavoidable value. We 
can start to laugh back, when capitalocentric detractors of radical environmental justice 
or cooperative practices and worlds laugh at these, when they claim that these modes of 
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living and these practices are “not realistic,” “… remember, be reasonable, you know we 
need growth!” We can then laugh back and simply ask: “do you? What makes this value 
so self-evidently valuable? What makes you so certain this is ‘the way to go’”?  
The Nietzschean project aimed precisely to the “transvaluation of all values,”41 
and this is linked to the critique offered by Nietzsche’s central doctrine of the eternal 
return.42 If there is no single meaning, sense or direction to the unfolding of time, all 
values should be suspected and examine, potentially rejected, rather than accepted as fact. 
“Progress,” and “growth” as the instrument or value for its measurement, are no 
exceptions to this need to sound each idol with a careful hammer (Nietzsche, 2005). 
Nietzsche’s philosophical hammer has at times been imagined as the doctor’s, but it can 
also be likened to the sculptor’s, who sounds the matter she is working so as to carve and 
                                                        
41 In Death of the Posthuman Essays on the Brink of Extinction vol. 1, Claire Colebrook (2014) argues: “the 
humanism and anthropocentrism that have marked Western thought need to give way to a new relation to 
the environment. (…) We would require what Nietzsche referred to as a transvaluation of values. Rather 
than generating values on the basis of instrumental reason or utility – rather, that is, than assuming that the 
worth of an object or action is gauged by how much it furthers our own purposes – we would criticize 
means/ends rationality. We would not assume that all valid means are justified if they serve to maintain 
humanity in its current mode. We would, at the very least, consider values as if from a point of view 
different than that of ‘man.’” Though I whole-heartedly agree that a Nietzschean transvaluation of all 
values is necessary in times of ecological crisis, we must go further than formulate this transvaluation in the 
terms above, in my view: if we simply stop treating nonhumans as means to ends, are we really resorting to 
a Nietzschean “transvaluation of values,” or are we merely extending to the nonhuman world Kantian 
moral imperatives inviting us to treat alterity as an end and not as means, (which would assume that this 
imperative has already been met with regards to humans, and this isn’t even the case – Bruno Latour has 
provocatively underscored this when he advanced an exhortation to “start treating humans as well as we 
treat animals”)? Nietzsche’s transvaluation of all values goes further than a criticism of the means/ends 
rationality resulting in the extension/inclusion of the treatment as ends to all living beings. Seeing the 
connection between his radical problematization of morality and his concept of eternal return, that is 
examining the need to rework temporality for such a transvaluation to be possible, goes beyond such 
extension/inclusion. It certainly requires “a point of view different than that of ‘man’,” as Colebrook puts it, 
but it does more than “criticize means/ends rationality,” as it abolishes this dualism, and underscores that at 
no moment of our lived experience or histories, is reason and unreason actually pertinent.  
42 Here I’m intentionally opting for a specific reading of Nietzsche. Some may argue that the transvaluation 
of values does not so easily cohere with the concept of eternal return, or at least be skeptical of the 
correlation. However, many commentators of Nietzsche have read his radical attacks on morality as more 
systematically linked with the eternal return than this seemingly unsystematic or anti-systematic thinker 
may have us suspect, from Lou Von Salome’s interpretation (2001), to Heidegger (who, erasing Salome’s 
essay, claimed to be the first thinker to read Nietzsche’s doctrine of eternal return as central to his whole 
thought), and of course Gilles Deleuze (2012; 2013).  
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create something new and get rid of hollow parts. Eternal return’s radical attacks against 
teleological time and against claims to knowledge regarding “where we are headed,” 
against claims to a reason guiding the world toward one goal or end, all act like the 
hammer sounding the unquestioned value of capitalist growth as hollow. The hollow 
resonance signals growth as merely one possible meaning created in a contingent time 
period and which we may proceed to smash. All meaning is created contingently, as the 
symptoms of specific living conditions and configurations of power, specific 
arrangements in the forces of the universe which keep re-assembling in new ways yet 
remain the same at every moment (the infinity of the past and that of the future being 
contained in each instant). All profoundly rooted beliefs that claim to provide a general 
orientation to life and determine it as fact (which is the sense in which Nietzsche uses the 
term “value” in his denunciations), must be subjectedto questioning, problematizing. For 
our purposes here, we can then see that history wasn’t always going in a capitalist 
direction, doesn’t have to, and ultimately isn’t. There is no such thing as an “end of 
history,” let alone one that would be characterized by the triumph of capitalism. Instead 
of such linear temporality of progress measured by growth as the indicator of value 
erected on a pedestal masking any other possible value, anti-uchronian moments let the 
possibility for other temporal orders of things glitter (Foucault, 2014, p. xvii). Here I am 
playing on the multiple sense of the term “value”: Nietzsche intended it as those 
assertions which impose a general orientation to life and were taken as facts: he famously 
was referring to morality, which may not seem so self-evidently the case when one refers 
to growth as value in the sense of measurement, quantitative indicator of economic 
wealth. Yet this is precisely part of my point: growth may seem to belong a different, 
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morally neutral realm of economy, where morality is put aside and profit reigns instead. 
However the fetishized nature of a compulsory imperative to growth is not value-neutral 
in the moral sense any more than it is neutral in an economic, quantitative sense, and 
growth is indeed celebrated as the object of a desire that set a general orientation to life 
though taken as fact. This morally-charged sense of growth is especially visible in 
moments of crisis, when growth becomes actually absent but virtually omnipresent due to 
claims of being missed, and all the more desired, all the more crucial in setting the stage 
and direction of teleological progress: then discourses explicitly tied to morality 
proliferate, as with the current discourse of “austerity.” Nietzsche called for the 
transvaluation of all values, and as a crucial one informing what counts as the real, 
growth must be subjected to such a critique if we are to take his exhortation seriously. 
Anti-uchronia thus corresponds to events, moments, visions, artistic, scientific, 
philosophical and other percepts, affects, and concepts (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994) which 
open up the possibility for such alternative temporal orders erupting, and force uchronia 
to shake and crack, as they allow to shed the veil off something that up until now was 
cloaking itself as the only possible reality. The doctrine of eternal return admits no self-
evident value to growth, and cannot concede to pseudo (and/or completely) Hegelians 
claim that capitalism is “the end of history” (Fukuyama and the likes) or even an 
inevitable “stage” of it (capitalocentric visions of history in general). Anti-uchronia refers 
to the percepts, affects, concepts, and events which shed light on uchronia as uchronian, 
as an impossibility under the guise of the only possible or desirable course. If capitalist 
economies’ hegemony constitute a moment or a “stage,” it is not in the teleological sense, 
but rather in the theatrical sense, or in the sense of it being part of teleological theatrics: 
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not that they don’t exist, not that the play isn’t indeed taking place, being enacted and 
performed, but rather, if the world is a stage and men and women (as well as nonhumans 
and hybrids) merely players, then several scripts, interpretations, performances can be 
written: actors are also playwrights, improvisers who ascribe meanings to what they do as 
they go, for a multitude, a quasi-infinity of reasons. Granted some of the improvising 
troop and direction is willing, the plot may twist in unpredictable ways, in surprising 
ways. Of course, twisting a plot that has so far been written and performed as predictacle 
and coherent, as going without saying, is far from easy. But difficult writing has not 
always prohibited new meanings from being created. The present and the future are open, 
and meanings, ascribed values are just that: ascribed. This makes them contestable: 
concurrent, equally convincing scripts are possible. Anti-uchronia doesn’t (yet) propose 
an alternative script, but sheds light on the one script that presented itself as “reality,” 
showing the ropes of its show, and it envisions the possibility for other possibilities.We 
can start to contest the reign of growth, the inevitable extraction of surplus value by those 
who own the means of production (and may now be dispossessed), from Earth and hitting 
the metabolic rift (Foster, 2000; Foster, York & Clark, 2011), and from working human 
bodies. The eternal return offers an anti-uchronian moment to reject the evaluation of a 
place based on its “GDP”’s increase, and to question the preference of such increases as 
value indicators to the detriment of, say, the increases in CO2 emissions which growth 
depends upon – whether it be decoratively qualified as “sustainable” or not: I return to 
this critique of sustainable growth in chapter 3.This latter fact can start being granted as 
much meaning, being taken just as seriously, as the way growth is taken to be 
synonymous of wealth, as the way wealth is equated to progress and progress to the good, 
 
 177 
to what must and should be. Anti-uchronia, helped by the anti-teleological moment of the 
doctrine of eternal return, sheds light on the ways wealth can happen to the detriment of 
concrete, hybrid, present life. 
Blu’s Spraypaint 
 
It is precisely such a contestatory, anti-uchronian staging I want to turn to now, giving 
further flesh to anti-uchronian visions. The goal is not only or simply to provide an 
example that would act as an analogy, or an allegory, or a representation of anti-uchronia, 
i.e affording me a parallel to the concept of anti-uchronia, only in artistic form. Rather, 
my point is that anti-uchronian moments and visions already coexist with claims of 
monopoly over reality and over value performed by capitalocentric times and 
temporalities, i.e anti-uchronia always already is at war with uchronia. In other words, I 
am not intending to draw a parallel between my concept of anti-uchronia and the 
affective effect or the percepts produced by the art work I am discussing, so much as I am 
trying to argue that this art work itself is indeed anti-uchronian, it offers anti-uchronian 
moments and glimpses. The frescos I describe below are instances, eruptions of anti-
uchronian art work, through which values are provocatively re-examined and dislodged 
from their pedestals, through a new eye, where and when time may pass in an 
unpredictable direction that suspends capitalocentric temporality, where for a moment 
one sees or feels that things do not have to be so growth-oriented or growth-desiring after 
all.  
The artist has a creative position to the real: armed with a hammer or spraypaint, 
s/he may recognize, suggest, evoke or bring to life several possibilities for the real: 
possibilities of sculpting it, of carving several lives, life paths, modes of living,into 
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possibility. In these anti-uchronian cases art makes the contingency of a naturalized, self-
naturalizing temporality visible… before potentially making other orders of things, other 
temporalities glitter. Two moments or dimensions constitute the make-up of anti-
uchronia: one, anti-uchronian art shakes uchronia and in shaking it, suggests that we were 
always already dealing with a fragile strawman (of the kind, so real yet disembodied, that 
could be burned in some festival of the Arizonan desert). It takes down the emperor’s 
clothes and shows he was always naked underneath: anti-uchronian art suggests that what 
is taken for a necessity – accumulating capital, extracting surplus-value in exploitative 
ways, growing capitalist economies – may be an impossibility, or, at least, suicidal, 
nihilist. Second, anti-uchronia glimpses at what could be, instead. In exposing uchronia 
for what it is, it makes it possible to think and say that other worlds are possible.  
Anti-uchronia is thus the possibility that there may be other possibilities. It is not 
yet an alternative temporality, but rather the pointing to uchronia as such, as what it is, as 
timeless temporality (again, naming uchronia is anti-uchronian already), and the 
suggestion which follows from this pointing. It is the invitation, the exhortation:“let’s 
claim the time to imagine something else.” It is not yet, not necessarily, the imagining 
itself: simply the suggestion or provocation to imagine. Anti-uchronia is the start of 
another temporality, “only” in the sense of an interruption so as to make possible another 
durable temporality, “only” insofar as it sees uchronia for what it is (“only” is in 
quotation marks here, because this is already a lot, and quite difficult). Anti-uchronia 
steps out, jumps and sees uchronia in relief… in this gasping for air, this moment of 
suspension in (but not of) time, we see that growth’s value is questionable, and that 
posing the question may be invaluable. As we will see from the following instances, it 
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also interrupts paces and speeds that make it both necessary and seemingly impossible to 
stop and think, to stop and contemplate. Where the Nietzschean hammer allows to sound 
the idols and shake those which turn out to be hollow out of their pedestals, where the 
value of growth and the direction of progress are questioned by the doctrine of the eternal 
return’s anti-teleological moment, so graffiti artist Blu’s spraypaint offers city corners 
and walls a moment to hail pedestrians and drivers’ frenetic march, making time for 
questioning whether this march and its surrounding makes any sense, and what sense 
making this is, what value it claims and whether this claim shatters when shaken, in spite 
or maybe because of an urgency already omnipresent yet backgrounded. 
 One of Blu’s frescos (see picture 1 below, page x) portrays a train made of cars, 
trucks, small grocery store carts-shaped wagons carrying commodities all rotten and piled 
as in a landfill, while other wagons transport oil barrels. Additional wagons are stuffed 
with dollar bills. The driver of the factory-shaped locomotive fills theses bills to burn 
them in the engine. The factory-locomotive is ornated with long chimneys evoking a coal 
plant. The resulting smoke above the locomotive traverses the dark green background. 
The train dangerously approaches an abyss, the railtracks hanging in the air, distorted, left 
free of a collapsed ground which opens into a threatening cliff. The progression seems 
slow, but the fall inevitable, though the stillness of the fresco suspends the movement as 
the spectator gasps. But the train worker who feeds the engine cannot see what the train is 
facing through the entrance of the engine – which looks like a bank and bears the dollar 
and the euro signs. The front of the locomotive, with its external plumbing and triangular 
roofs adding to the dollar and euro, bars the view. Scales are all out of proportion, as the 
train is not much taller than the human being who bends over to burn the banknotes. The 
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grocery carts are the size of wagons – are indeed wagons. Four of the last wagons one can 
make out in the horizon,at the tail of the train, are military tanks yet appear to be of equal 
size as the grocery carts. This could be a small freight train carrying open wagons during 
the gold rush, yet the truck is shorter than two barrels piled on top of each other, which 
are the same height as the factory.  
This fresco contains myriad signs, symbols and symptoms that remind the viewer 
of the quotidian which capitalist lives praise and value: consumer items, dollar and euro 
signs, cars, fuel, banknotes, tanks, etc. Yet in this image, these are not heading toward 
beautiful horizons of peace and material comfort for all those consumers and producers 
who worked hard enough. In fact, the character embodying human hard work – the only 
discernable human presence in the fresco – has no clue where he is headed, however 
determined his frenetic bill-burning and the subsequent march of the train is: he is about 
to collapse in an abyss which he can’t see, yet he inexorably focuses intense efforts so as 
to move forward. He is a uchronian protagonist, and this fresco stages uchronia, 
caricaturing it just enough for viewers to start seeing it as such and to quit thinking of it 
as a coherent or sensible reality, to quit thinking of it as that which needs to be. Anti-
uchronia, in this case, thus takes the form of caricature. But caricature is not so much an 
exaggeration meant to make one laugh or to mock. Though there is a cynically mocking 
dimension here, if the caricature were merely an “exaggeration,” the effect would be 
much less disturbing, one could dismiss it as simply untrue, or reduce the disturbing 
aspects of the image as those parts in the exaggeration that inflate and misrepresent 
“reality.” Rather, here caricature performs a different vision of our surrounding, a 
competing narrative. The fresco contains just enough traits in common with what we take 
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to be reality (and take for granted as something we have very limited capacity to 
influence or change), so as to be intelligible to the viewer as a sort of mirror offered to 
her. Yet the reflection is reflective in both the mirror and the critical sense, i.e it distorts 
these intelligible traits of reality to underscore a different reading of reality, one that aims 
to be just as convincing. That is, in spite of the scales of the train worker’s body, the 
grocery-carts and military tank wagons, the factory-shaped locomotives all being out of 
proportion, the troubling thing is that we can recognize these images, we can identify the 
closeness of these key objects in the consumerist and productivist, hegemonic capitalist 
economies we are part of, and this proximity is uncanny, because in the reflection, the 
locomotive driver will end up smashing the train and himself into pieces, down in the 
abyss. The fresco thus interpellates the viewer, who may wish to hail: jump off! Stop! Hit 
the breaks! In the grocery-cart wagons, one recognizes objects onehas bought and the 
very omnipresent dollar bills of one’s quotidian lives, perhaps identifying with the 
locomotive driver, toiling for such destructive labor without having a clue of the direction 
he’s taking. Or, one may feel repulsion and contempt at this stubborn character pushing a 
train inexorably to its own destruction, while leaving a barren background of ecological 
destruction around the tracks. One may feel a need for insubordination against the 
locomotive driver and wish to abandon the train, or to stop watching it pass passively, 
and stage its derailing. Or one may look forward to its falling into the abyss, remaining in 
the barren desert left in its tracks in the hope of restoring some life there, perhaps stealing 
a couple of actually useful items from the wagons as they pass by, so as to use and 
recycle them to support survival once the fall takes place. Anotherpossibility, of course, 
is onewhere despair prevails. The viewer may recognize the reflection as such, and feel 
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immense pain knowing that this image is indeed accurately reflecting the situation. The 
principal effect, then, corresponds to the first moments of the two dimensions in anti-
uchronia which I outlined above: here anti-uchronia denounces uchronia and sees it for 
what it is, but the second moment is lacking (or not yet there), and the implication of anti-
uchronian critique, that other worlds are possible, is painfully absent, or at best, left as 
bare as the landscape, in the form of a question mark: and if the train does fall, what will 
we have left, what will remain, what will its remains be like? However, even in this latter 
case, the fresco then provides an occasion for catharsis: Blu’s train evokes the pain of 
being unable to be carbon-neutral on a moving train, the feeling of inability to stop its 
march, and the current human, all too human condition as one so caught up in said march 
that it makes us stubbornly incapable of seeing the direction capitalist ecological 
destruction is having us take.  
 Even in this solely catharsistic latter effect the fresco may have, the anti-
uchronian moment is carving a crack into uchronia, insofar as it endents, perhaps shatters, 
its credibility as the direction we allegedly cannot but take. A viewer standing in front of 
this graffiti may venture a claim like: “but we need to keep burning these to move 
forward, don’t you see we won’t keep making money otherwise?” Yet such claim is 
made uneasy and the burden of proof is reversed: in this graffiti’s vicinity 
environmentalist world-making may not have to justify its feasibility as much as 
capitalist futures do. The prioritization of capital accumulation even in the face of an 
abyss where all capital collapses into pieces sounds hollow, like an idol sounded by the 
attentive sculptor or Nietzschean transvaluation’s hammer. As mentioned before, anti-
uchronian concepts, affects and perceptsreverse the charges and the burden of proof: one 
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cannot dismiss those who demand that we slow down or stop, with a shrug of the 
shoulder and a “yes but let’s be realistic: we need to keep burning.” Anti-uchronian 
vision makes it possible to laugh, pause, and perhaps (hopefully), respond: “there won’t 
be anything much to burn among the scattered parts of this whole train of yours after 
you’ve crashed it into the abyss: that makes your imperative to ever more capital 
accumulation, to furthering capitalist growth, absurd at best, off-topic at most, and 
delusional, if we’re being serious.” This can be followed by an elan to stop to look and 
notice the destroyed and barren landscape on one’s way, around the linear tracks one has 
obsessively and blindly focused on. Instead of keeping on burning these bills frenetically, 
it becomes clear that looking ahead and around is needed: “you may be burning bills and 
we understand it’s your passion, but you are destoying the landscape around you, along 
with your own back, and you are riding into a void.” As Latour has put it, moderns have 
long been “running to the future, with their backs turned” (2009). Blu’s train fresco 
provokes a desperate and urgent sense of need for jumping off the train or hitting the 
breaks, or for pushing it into the cliff to make it disappear and start caring for the 
damaged landscape. This fresco depicts uchronia as such, and causes viewers to desire 
slowing down, it poses interpellating questions about whether they may identify with the 
locomotive driver with his bent back who blindly follows the tracks.  
 As a caricature staged on an urban wall in the graffiti genre, Blu’s anti-uchronian 
form interestingly points to the shape anti-uchronian moments may take. This graffiti 
proposes ephemeral glimpses into the absurd promises made by capitalist economies 
where accumulation and growth are prioritized over possibilities for life. The nature of 
this art is ephemeral: this is not only because graffiti art consists of intervention on urban 
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walls that often, regularly get painted over, covered either by the next graffiti or by 
municipal intervention “cleaning” the walls which artists may have “vandalized.” In fact, 
Blu’s renown now allows him to practice his art in the legal rather than the “vandal” form 
(note that graffiti artists’ language reappropriates this pejorative term, so the adjective I 
am using here is not a negative value judgment by any means, but rather an attempt to 
espouse this genre’s vocabulary). The fact that Blu can legally paint city walls now that 
he is a world-recognized artist does not take the spirit of graffiti art away from his works, 
as one that used to occur in a hurry to paint before the police arrests or chases the artist, 
thus happening by night, in hidden, quick, urgent manners. The tradition of fast execution 
remains, beyond the relative institutionalization or tolerance benefiting artists like Blu. 
But in addition, urban viewers of graffiti also experience Blu’s anti-uchronian artwork in 
the paradoxical form of a quick glimpse, as they go about their quotidian itineraries in the 
city’s business and “productive” pace, while also inviting to pause in front of the frescos 
and contemplate for a longer moment what the artist portrays. Graffiti is a form of 
interruption of fast-pace city living, while also espousing it (with the above-mentioned 
speed of execution), insofar as it offers some of the rare still images in city-scapes which 
aren’t for commercial or profit purposes. Thus the specific artistic genre of graffiti aptly 
lends itself to an anti-uchronian moment: anti-uchronia contains two dimensions, one 
showing uchronia for what it is, the other an opener of possibilities, and it often does this 
in investing the tension between urgency and need to pause, in the form of an 
interruption, and invitation to take the time to think and imagine. It is thus a (critical) 
intervention on temporalities, and at the same time its temporal form is specifically 
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interruptive (I will further elaborate on this point in section 3 of this chapter, which 
discusses the cairological character of anti-uchronia).   
 So anti-uchronia, in these cases, proposes two moments: a critical one that shows 
uchronia as such, and a positive one that opens the possibility for other possibilities. It 
does so in the form of a pause, either long or short, an eruption into the quotidian and its 
assumptions, its normalcy. As exemplified in the case of the train fresco described and 
analyzed above, anti-uchronian art may take the form of caricature, and such caricature 
may provoke a desperate desire to hit the breaks, showing uchronia as delusional, and 
darkly mocking it. Yet, because anti-uchronia also encompasses the subsequent 
implication of possibilities’ opening, caricature may transform into fantasy. This second 
moment of anti-uchronian critique is anti-uchronia’s imaginative dimension, or its call for 
an expansion of imagination. Here another fresco painted by Blu constitutes a useful 
additional instance of anti-uchronia, one taking the form of fantasy rather than caricature 
this time (see second picture below). On a large wall bordering a sidewalk and a bus stop, 
Blu plays with scales and disproportion once more, painting four giant bikes riding on 
and crushing thousands of cars. It is unclear whether the countless cars are simply all 
parked statically very near each other, abandoned on a dense yet immense plane, or 
whether this is to represent an incredible mass of traffic stuck on an endlessly large 
highway. Have these subsequently been abandoned, their numbers forbidding them to 
make any progress? Have the drivers simply deserted the vehicles as they couldn’t move 
anymore, or have people intentionally stored these cars there, and if so is it so as to 
abandon them, or is this, perhaps, a parking lot for cars just freshly out of the factory 
ready to be sold? Either way, the cars form a dense carpet soil extending to the horizon. 
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The giant bikers’ heads aren’t in the frame of the mural, which further confirms their 
giant scale to the viewer’s eye. All that’s visible is the bikers relaxed, leisurely, slowly 
yet inexorably and perhaps terrifyingly pushing legs, dressed with skirts, pants and shoes. 
The most visible one wears a T-shirt and is slightly bent over in a determined yet cautious 
pose leaving a trail of crushed car parts behind her or his bike’s wheels, which sinkinto 
the car-carpet, down like war trenches, or like the trail of a demolition machine. The play 
on scale, in spite or maybe because of the stillness of the large graffiti, evokes slow 
motion, and the slow, sadically pleasuring sound of creeking metal being folded and 
flattened by the giant bike wheels. Just like with the train graffiti, and with the 
businessman wearing golden watches who opened this chapter, the human element of the 
painting is but an evocation, an elliptic suggestion: the time-bound businessman was 
headless, the train was moved into space with only one human worker and no human 
passenger being visible, he occupied little space in the whole wall: he was bent over, 
almost crippled by his blind effort to burn dollar bills. With these giant bikes and car-
carpet graffiti, Blu suggests human presence in an elliptic manner again, as the frame 
only includes the enormous bikers’ legs, their torso at most. Mostly, Blu’s graffiti insists 
on the material world produced and/or destroyed by humans who are much smaller or 
much bigger than it. The play on disproportionate scales ricochets into the way the 
viewer can imagine the movement’s pace, as both the train and the bikes seem to move 
inexorably, perhaps slowly, surely with great strain, while paradoxically unstoppable. 
Life, worlds, seen in slow motion, as in a magnifying glass, look contestable, as though 
slowness acted like a quesiton mark imposed on a normally assertive, affirmative 
necessity. In addition, here the scales evoke a reversal of quotidian city life’s power 
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structure: this graffiti covers a large and long wall in an urban space, and even the most 
bike-friendly cities are almost always dominated by cars, to the point even that car 
circulation is one of the most striking characteristics of big agglomerations. They 
dominate in terms of threat to life (cyclists’ lives more acutely than drivers’), cars usually 
crushing bikes and bikers rather than the other way round. Cars also dominate as invasion 
of air and noise, numbers, and, in appearance, speed (in lives where speed tends to be 
valued more than slowness).  
 Many environmentalists have pointed out that, were bike lanes and public 
transportation more broadly available to city dwellers, the speed of their commute on 
bike would be significantly higher than that of a car. Andre Gorz and Ivan Illich were 
among the first prominentecosophers to make this argument. Andre Gorz argued that cars 
had not been invented as a democratically accessible good, but rather a luxury item, and 
they immediately lost their value when the perception that every person or at least every 
family should own at least one car came to prevail. The generalization of car ownership 
also resulted in the congestion of cities. Bottlenecks and traffic jams continue to be 
“addressed” by enlarging roads and streets, adding more ramps and highways or bridges, 
which “solutions” never do anything but engorge cities with ever more cars. This, in turn, 
also resulted in urban sprawl. Andre Gorz sums up some of the consequences of this 
situation: “The spread of the private car has displaced mass transportation and altered city 
planning and housing in such a way that it transfers to the car functions which its own 
spread has made necessary” (1980). Cars allow the masses to live outside and away from 
the cities, making for urban sprawl, and then become all the more needed, etc. Before 
Gorz, Ivan Ilich also had underscored automobile paradoxes: 
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The typical American devotes more than 1500 hours a year (which is 30 hours a 
week, or 4 hours a day, including Sundays) to his [or her] car. This includes the 
time spent behind the wheel, both in motion and stopped, the hours of work to pay 
for it and to pay for gas, tires, tolls, insurance, tickets, and taxes. Thus it takes this 
American 1500 hours to go 6000 miles (in the course of a year). Three and a half 
miles take him (or her) one hour. In countries that do not have a transportation 
industry, people travel at exactly this speed on foot, with the added advantage that 
they can go wherever they want and aren't restricted to asphalt roads (quoted by 
Gorz, 1980). 
 
And, we could argue, the ever adding advantage of increased health due to lesser air and 
noise pollution, accidents, and the superior amount of exercise. In other words, bikes are 
already more powerful than cars in many ways. Yet they are outnumbered, dominated, 
excluded by them in countless other ways, violent ones. This is what Blu’s cyclist fantasy 
reverses. 
 The fantasy effect is especially salient as the fresco offers no context for these 
car-crushing bikes: as mentioned above, we do not know what happened to these 
hundreds of minuscule cars (whether they were parked or abandoned, stored, stuck in 
traffic and abandoned…), we have no explanation, just two symbols, erupted as in dream, 
in black and white, the bikes and the cars respectively blown or shrunk out of proportion. 
The cars are indeed shrunk to the point of being annihilated, crushed by magnified, all 
powerful bikes. The image is surrealist, invites spectators to pause and gaze not only at 
this reversal of forces and power, but also at “reality,” or the hegemonic order of things, 
as if in an inverted mirror. This surrealism could go so far as a complete disconnect from 
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lived experience, from what counts as the real. Yet, just like in the train fresco caricature 
required recognizable elements of quotidian consumerist and productivist life to be mixed 
with emphases and exaggerations of scale and shape, dramatizing the sense of 
destruction, so does the cycling fantasy require enough concreteness and the recognition 
of quotidian figures, i.e connections to both what could be and what is, to function as an 
intelligible fantasy. The effect is thus to invite a desire, perhaps partly perverse and 
sadistic, for a different world where bikes would take their slow revenge against cars, 
where cars don’t dictate the speeds and paces and spaces or scales, where relationship to 
space is not mediated by engines but by feet and pedals, where bikes do not get crushed 
by automobile traffic, but reverse the roles, and are recognized as more powerful 
solutions to commuting needs. By presenting a seemingly absurd image where bikes’ 
force is inflated to be presented as overpowering cars, the fresco thus offers a vision at 
the absurdity of the reign of cars, and opens up the question: what if we granted more 
value to a world that would not celebrate these destructive machines, and rather destroyed 
them to impose a biking, non-polluting world? What if we considered the possibility that 
there may be other possibilities? This seemingly naïve question resonates with force 
thanks to the scale of the mural and its situation on a city wall right by a street where cars 
pass by every minute. Anti-uchronia thus points to the absurdity, the impossibility of 
uchronia, caricaturing it to propose that it may be more fragile than it may be, an 
impossibility that claims to be the only possible world. Blu’s graffiti art, positioned as it 
is in the midst of city daily life, evocatively portrays uchronia under a light that critically 
exposes it, inviting pauses to stop and think in spite of the fast pace of city movements.  
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Figure 2: Blu, untitled. 
 
Figure 3: Blu, untitled.  
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Climate Science’s Anti-Uchronian Moments: Futurological Productions 
 
Anti-uchronia thus comprises at least two moments: one consisting of critical 
engagement with uchronia in which the latter temporality is shaken, fragilized, in which a 
crack is open in the hegemonic teleology of capitalist growth showing its contingency, in 
spite of uchronia’s overwhelming self-naturalizing pretension. Another anti-uchronian 
moment gestures at the desire, the possibility, to imagine other possible temporalities, to 
invent different worlds. Note that these two aspects or moments of anti-uchronia aren’t 
necessarily simply distinct, and may be simultaneous. Anti-uchronia takes the form of 
pause, of interruption, of suspension of time and in time, so as to make the time to think 
in a fast-paced world, and a world where ecological crisis urgently calls for change. It is 
both in spite and precisely because of this urgency and this fast pace, that anti-uchronia is 
interruptive, a gasp for air, a making of time allowing new temporalities to perhaps be 
considered. I have argued above that graffiti art is particularly well equipped to create 
such anti-uchronian moments. Yet anti-uchronia may also erupt in very different 
discursive realms than art, and in the following section of this chapter, I turn to scientific 
reports on the climate crisis to underscore this.  
Indeed, the sciences have played and continue to play a crucial role in grounding 
certain environmentalist claims. Though in chapter V, I will interrogate the limits of these 
grounds, for now I would like to underscore the ways in which the evidence generated by 
climatology both has taken an anti-uchronian form and has anti-uchronian lessons to 
teach us. Just like Blu’s artwork was more than a simple illustration or a parallel to my 
concept of anti-uchronia, and rather constituted instances where anti-uchronia erupts, the 
scientific reports I examine here are more than an instance of scientific knowledge 
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containing similarities with my own concept of anti-uchronia. Neither is it simply 
providing an analogy. As I will show, the anti-uchronian moment in the scientific reports 
I focus on here productively offer additional layers to anti-uchronia: where Blu’s art 
produced, evoked and provoked anti-uchronian percepts and affects, climatology presents 
evidence and concepts that add to the very substance of my concept of anti-uchronia (I 
will emphasize the multiplicity of climatologically produced futurity, as well as 
uncertainty). Furthermore, the form in which these are advanced tells more about how 
anti-uchronia may manifest itself or erupt (as we will see, anti-uchronia may take the 
form of “idiotic” questions triggered by the conclusions of climatological reports).  
The IPCC Reports as Futurology 
 
In a famous passage from his famous Imperative of Responsibility which I already quoted 
in chapter I, Hans Jonas underscored a historical shift from economic growth and 
technological development as progress to their problematization as threats. Today, this 
problematization continues to resonate with the eruptions of new ecological crises that 
have gradually added to the specter of nuclear catastrophes: this shattering of the 
teleology of progress is precisely what anti-uchronia points to. What could have been 
taken for a certain pessimism on Jonas’ part turns out to be quite visionary instead, when 
one considers even the most moderate or optimistic projections into the future the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has produced. This conglomeration 
of world-renowned climate scientists within the United Nations synthesizes current 
climatological knowledge every few years so as to produce diagnoses regarding climate 
change, draft possible future scenarios, and offer prescriptive insights to policy makers. 
The IPPC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5)’s first part just came out last fall (focused on 
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the physcial science basis) only to confirm “anthropogenic” global warming’s severity, 
while the second and third Working Groups published their results (focused on 
adaptation, vulnerability and mitigation) at the end of March 2014. As philosopher Emilie 
Hache has also remarked (2010), the IPCC can be described as producing the 
“futurology” which Hans Jonas was calling for. Jonas critiqued Kantian ethics as 
incapable to face the new scale of human actions’ consequences which technological 
“progress” had so drastically inflated. A new “ethics for the future” was needed: its 
implementation would include multiple temporal changes. While technological 
innovations and their commercialization would have to be slowed down, a “futurology”’s 
development would accelerate. This futurology would inform political leaders about the 
possible consequences of technological innovations and production, ideally 
contributingto sound, ethical decisions. The IPCC reports are quite close to fitting exactly 
this description: the reports synthesize worldwide climatological knowledge periodically 
and with each of their reports, they include a synthesis for policy makers, thus directly 
attempting to fullfill this role of advisors informing the ethics which will itself guide 
policy, in the hope of present and future generations’ lives’ liveability being enhanced, or 
at least rendered possible. The IPCC is quite clearly an attempt at futurological 
knowledge production, with its elaborate computerized scenarios analyzing millenia of 
data, weighing these against the modern period of CO2 production, and projecting them 
into decades and even centuries of hypothetical futures. The scope of the research, as well 
as the level of worldwide scientific unanimity, are both unprecedented. The IPCC has a 
clear vocation in terms of informing what could indeed be called an “ethics for the 
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future,” to the point that it was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, an award that had never 
been given to a large panel of “hard” scientists, or any group of this kind.  
While providing an exegesis of the IPCC reports in what follows, I read these as 
denouncing uchronia.I then argue that the IPCC reports can be read as anti-uchronianalso 
to the extent that they rely upon multiple possible futures. Further, the uncertainty 
regarding “equally plausible” futures is made visible in the very form of the texts. The 
reports constitute themselves as a “futurology” of multiplicity, while posing questions 
that interrupt certainties about growth and capitalist development, showing these alleged 
certainties as they are: uchonian.  
 
Impossibility and Futurology’s Diagnosis: 
You Can’t Be Carbon-Neutral on a Growth-Activated Train 
 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) “was established by the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization 
(WMO) in 1988 to provide the world with a clear scientific view on the current state of 
knowledge in climate change and its potential environmental and socio-economic 
impacts” (IPCC, 2015). Since then, it has famously produced reports explicitly targeted 
to government officialsand international organizations (more so than the general public). 
In its very latest report on the Physical Science Basis of its diagnoses, published last fall, 
the IPCC further confirms and demonstrates its findings that:  
Warming of the climate system is unequivocal, and since the 1950s, many of the 
observed changes are unprecedented over decades to millenia. The atmosphere 
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and ocean have warmed, the amounts of snow and ice have diminished, sea level 
has risen, and the concentration of greenhouse gases have increased. (2014, p. 2) 
 
These phenomena, described it the opening section of the Physical Science Basis report, 
are then explained by a myriad of causes, for the most part “anthropogenic,” or human-
induced (I will further problematize the undifferentiated character of this causal 
demonstration in chapter 3, where I will stress the “counter-uchronian” dimension of this 
humanist scientific discourse). In other words, the report details the now famous 
Greenhouse effect: carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases emitted by a vast array of 
human activity trap heat in the atmosphere that would otherwise be sent outside of it. As 
we know, a greenhouse replicates the same mechanism on a smaller scale. The IPCC’s 
2013 Physical Basis report assertively qualifies “human” influence among the drivers of 
climate change, calling it “clear.” 
Natural and anthropogenic substances and processes that alter the Earth’s energy 
budget are drivers or climate change. Radiative Forcing (RF) quantifies the 
change in energy fluxes caused by changes in these drivers for 2011 relative to 
1750 (…) Total radiative forcing is positive, and has led to an uptake of energy by 
the climate system. (…) Human influence on the climate system is clear. This is 
evident from the increasing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere, 
positive radiative forcing, observed warming, and understanding of the climate 
system. (2013, p. 13) 
Having established the phenonenon – greenhouse effect’s rising of average temperature 
level in the Earth’s atmosphere – and its causes – “human” activities emitting greenhouse 
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gases emissions and bringing temperatures to an unprecedented level, the IPCC reiterates 
and further develops evidence regarding their physical science-based diagnosis:  
Each of the last three decades has been successively warmer at the Earth’s surface 
than any preceding decade since 1850. In the Northern Hemisphere, 1983-2012 
was likely the warmest 30-year period of the last 1400 years (medium 
confidence). (2013, p. 3) 
I will return in the section below to the language of likelihood and degrees of confidence 
used by the climate sciences. The IPCC’s language of uncertainty sadly makes for 
breaches which climate negationists happily penetrate (these are also known as climate 
“skeptics,” although they hardly deserve this title). For the time being, suffice is to note 
that the accelerated and unprecedented warming experienced in the Earth’s atmosphere 
has drastic consequences on human and nonhuman livelihoods, health, losses of coastal 
land due to sea level rise, mass extinctions and destruction of myriads of ecosystems, 
extreme weather events and the subsequent destruction of human and nonhuman habitat, 
lives, living conditions, water supplies, etc. This diagnosis regarding the manifold effects 
of “anthropogenic” climate change on human and nonhuman environments is the focus of 
the IPCC Working Group II’s report.  
 The second report indeed observes environmental and human, present and 
(projected) future changes resulting from climate change, explaining among other things 
that “water supplies stored in glaciers and snow cover are projected to decline, reducing 
water availability in regions supplied by meltwater from major moutain ranges, where 
more than one-sixth of the world population lives” (2014a, p.11). Still according to the 
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report, global warming will cause droughts to increase in extent in regions already prone 
to these, while flood risk will augment in other regions due to heavy precipitation events.  
The resilience of many ecosystems is likely to be exceeded this century by an 
unprecedented combination of climate change, associated disturbances (e.g., 
flooding, drought, wildfire, insects, ocean acidification), and other change drivers 
(e.g., land-use change, pollution, over-exploitation of resources. (2014a, p. 10) 
This means that: “Approximately 20-30% of plant and animal species assessed so far are 
likely to be at increased risk of extinction if increases in global average temperature 
exceed 1.5-2.5° C” (p. 11) These mass extinctions are without precedents in the 
Holocene. So are hunger risks increases for human populations, which are projected to 
occur “for even small local temperature increases (1-2° C)” (p.11). Some may welcome 
some changes, and reep the benefits of localized temperature increases. The IPCC, taking 
this in consideration, nonetheless alerts its readers: “Costs and benefits of climate change 
for industry, settlement and society will vary widely by location and scale. In the 
aggregate, however, net effects will tend to be more negative the larger the change in 
climate” (p. 12). The report is quite alarming regarding global warming’s consequences 
on human health:  
Projected climate change-related exposures are likely to affect the health status of 
millions of people, particularly those with low adaptive capacity, through:  
- increases in malnutrition and consequent disorders, with implications for child 
growth and development; 
- increased deaths, disease and injury due to heatwaves, floods, storms, fires 
and droughts;  
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- the increased burden of diarrhoeal disease; 
- the increased frequency of ground-level ozone related to climate change; and, 
- the altered spatial distribution of some infectious disease vectors. (p. 12) 
The report specifies that some health benefits may be found in temperate areas, including 
reduced rates of deaths from cold exposure, yet these would be outweighed by the 
negative health effects of worldwide temperature rise, “especially in developing 
countries” (p. 12). I will return to the question of unequal impacts and contributions to 
climate change and the way the IPCC addresses disparities among “humanity” (or, to 
some extent, fails to address them) in chapter 3. For the moment, what I wish to 
underscore is the anti-uchronian dimension and consequences of these conclusions. 
 The picture of the present and future worlds painted in these texts is certainly not 
an attractive or optimistic one. Yet here, the IPCC allows us to see the uchronian 
character of capitalocentric temporality, the limits of the current economic systems being 
underscored by myriad environmental and health effects arising today. The temporality at 
work within the text is important in doing so, as animated as it is by a linear causality I 
will further critique below (chapter V). The first working group diagnoses past and 
present causes and effects of global warming: the “Physical Science basis” of the reports 
concludes the influence of greenhouse gas emissions produced by “human” activity is 
“unequivocal.” Then, the report written by Working Group II transitions to a second 
moment, as it dives more closely into the projections of current temperature trends into 
the short and long term futures, to focus on the ecological effects and their consequences 
on human health, food production, livelihoods in general. Finally, Working Group III, 
focused on mitigation of the climate crisis, projects possible measures’ ability to address 
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global warming into the short and long-term future. My use of the plural for the second 
diagnostic, or most descriptive moment, contrasting with my use of the singular in 
reference to “the future” in the third, most prescriptive or programmatic moment of the 
reports, is of course purposeful.  
What is interesting for now, is the way in which this articulation has the IPCC 
shed vast doubts upon past and current models of development, and does so explicitly. It 
allows environmentalist claims to be made, including mine: infinite, capitalocentric 
growth-driven development in a world with a finite tolerance for it, is indeed uchronian, 
and one can affirm that “we have scientific facts to back it up.” Such statements are 
powerful in a world which, as Bruno Latour has shown, authorizes scientists to cross the 
human/nature separation and bring “truths” from the latter that are often capable of 
forbidding politics, imposing themselves with more authority even in the human realm. 
And they are powerful also, of course, because such truth making powers can cause 
controversies. When the IPCC compares millenia of temperature data during the 
Holocene to the last two centuries and a half, concluding that high-carbon economies 
have caused and will cause unprecendented destruction, progress takes on an explicitly 
life-threatening form, and capitalocentric temporalities’ promises of abundance are 
challenged, crumbling even to a status of impossibility. It becomes clear that uchronia 
disregards the Earth’s limited ability to suddenly receive carbon dioxide sequestered over 
millenia into its atmosphere without it heating and without such heat resulting in mass 
destruction. The scientific reports produced by the IPCC are clear. They compare 
millenia of the Earth’s average atmospheric temperature prior to industrialization, in 
1750. These dates correspond to the rise of a predominantly carbon-based political and 
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economic world. Timothy Mitchell has compellingly demonstrated the profoundly 
mutually constitutive relation between oil exploitation, which is responsible for most of 
greenhouse emissions, and capitalist democracies (2011). Today the IPCC is insisting 
that future vulnerability depends not only on climate change but also on “development 
pathway” (2014, p. 11). In other words, the extent of the destruction resulting from global 
warming is deeply contingent upon the horizon in sight taking into account the effects of 
past and current greenhouse gas-emitting modes of production. Or, in contrast, this 
horizon could continue to exist in a nebulous cloud obscuring its consequences on the 
Earth surface to paint an impossible and dangerous, illusory oasis of endless growth, 
relentless abundance, with greenhouse gas somehow magically disappearing into thin, 
self-purifying air. This oasis-like horizon, which recedes as “we” approach it while 
leaving destruction on “our” path, is uchronia. To an extent, the IPCC reports clear the 
nebulous cloudlike horizon and rid us of the oasis projected by capitalist modes of 
production, to reveal a different horizon. They allow us to see the capitalist horizon as 
uchronia, underscoring what is known about the present and future consequences of 
capitalist consumption and production, along with the unknown dimensions of “our” 
futures: “A wide array of adaptation options is available, but more extensive adaptation 
than is currently occurring is required to reduce vulnerability to future climate change” 
(2014, p. 19). The IPCC thus attempts to demonstrate that “sustainable development” is 
able to reduce climate change vulnerability. In this respect, the Panel has so far relied 
upon the Bruntland Comission definition of “sustainable development,” i.e as 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability for 
future generations to meet their own needs” (2014, p. 20). The “diagnostic” reports on 
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Physical Science, adaptation and vulnerability at least gesture at opening the future to 
possibilities of change, and takes temporality into account in a new way, where future 
generations’ needs would be recognized and incorporated into present decisions. In so 
doing, they include grounds for anti-uchronian visions. 
 
Multiplicity and Futurological Projections: Several Futures Are Possible! 
 
In addition to the above-described diagnosis and feeding into it, the IPCC produces a 
form of futurology now better known to the greater public (in part thanks to the IPCC’s 
Nobel Prize): it entertains “storylines” and “scenario families” imagining various modes 
of global socio-economic development and demographic changes. Each of the families of 
scenarios branch into several modifications, with a result of more than 40 scenarios in 
total, all syntheses of thousands of scenarios invented by worldwide climatological 
research. The IPCC’s scenarios are called SRES scenarios. Their description is the object 
of a Special Report: SRES stands for Special Report on Emission Scenarios (2000). This 
technique is directly inherited from climatological literature, although the IPCC is the 
only organization in the world capable of compiling this much data and scenarios into 
such efficient models. On this basis of many “equally plausible” scenarios and based on 
the collection of palaeoclimatic data, the panel projects itself in the future via as many 
models, practicing a form of science-fictional thought experiment.  
For instance, the “A1” family of scenarios is characterized as follows: 
The A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid 
economic growth, global population that peaks in mid-century and declines 
thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies. 
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Major underlying themes are convergence among regions, capacity building, and 
increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional 
differences in per capita income. The A1 scenario family develops into three 
groups that describe alternative directions of technological change in the energy 
system. The three A1 groups are distinguished by their technological emphasis: 
fossil intensive (A1FI), non-fossil energy sources (A1T), or a balance across all 
sources (A1B). (p. 4) 
In contrast, the “B1” scenario family is described as  
a convergent world with the same global population that peaks in mid-century and 
declines thereafter, as in the A1 storyline, but with rapid changes in economic 
structures toward a service and information economy, with reductions in material 
intensity, and the introduction of clean and resource-efficient technologies. The 
emphasis is on global solutions to economic, social and environmental 
sustainability, including improved equity, but without additional climate 
initiatives. (p. 5) 
Let’s pause to contemplate the last phrase here, which specifies that the scenario does not 
include “additional climate initiatives.” It is quite telling of one of the epistemological 
and political choices made by the IPCC. In an attempt to craft what Hans Jonas would 
have called a “futurology,” and one that still satisfies criteria of “scientific objectivity” as 
opposed to seeming altogether programmatic, the IPCC has designed scenarios that do 
not implement the Kyoto agreements, or specifically climate-targeted policy. The idea is 
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to pose a programmatically neutral question:43 if the planet was to keep going in various 
possible, or “equally plausible” directions, all with no specific regard to climate change, 
what directions would have us experience what results? Then, from observed results 
produced by the climate models and purporting to nibble at policy changes in a number 
of possible futures, the IPCC’s Third Working Group – which is specifically assigned to 
the task of thinking through climate mitigation solutions – considers various measures 
addressing global warming and evaluates their respective effectivity levels. Working 
Group III’s futurity is thus dancing precariously on the thin line separating the 
programmatic and the moderately prescriptive, the whole of the scenarios’ production 
being premised upon a claim to remain soley descriptive and analytical. 
The IPCC’s futurological epistemology (inspired by climatology at large) is as 
unprecedented as the crisis it studies. By proposing so many scenarios, it sheds light on 
the multiplicity of the future and the – at least relative – open “developmental paths” 
available to the planet. It thus suggests a possible departure from a teleological necessity 
that imagines one end only as possible for the future of “our” current capitalocentric 
world, evoking this world’s contingency, or at least the presence of contingency in the 
future. Indeed, the scenarios are explicitly ascribed equivalent plausibility, for reasons 
linked to the avoidance of a programmatic tone in the Special Report on Emission 
Scenario (SRES). Yet this undeniably questions current developmental paths’ desirability 
and can point to the necessity to rethink their inevitable character. Though as we will see 
(chapter V), none of the scenarios go so far as imagining a future world dominated by 
                                                        
43 “No judgment is offered in [the SRES] as to the preference for any of the scenarios and they are no 
assigned probabilities of occurrence, neither must they be interpreted as policy recommendations” (p.3). 
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non-capitalist economies, or even consider non-capitalist economies at all for that matter, 
IPCC futurology is a futurology of multiplicity. 
Multidirectionality and Futurological Anticipations 
 
Finally, the reports’ relation to temporality at least partly secedes from uchronia insofar 
as it proposes a new form of anticipation where humans and nonhumans are taken into 
account together. Here, scientific imagination and mathematical models indeed project us 
onto multiple possible futures, and it is by throwing oneself into present and future 
implications of climate change, andsimultaneously making our way back from the 
comparison between these futures to the present that recommendations are made. 
Futurology here suggests futures’ multiplicity as well as a multidirectional relationship to 
time and to change. In this sense also, the IPCC’s futurology is anti-uchronian, and anti-
uchronia implies attempting to grasp infinite pasts and infinite futures in the present (this 
is where anti-uchronia tends toward synchrony: see chapter VI). In the latest IPCC 
reports of 2013-14, the panel further innovated, pushed by climatologists’ criticisms, and 
complicated its futurity. New scenarios have been designed that added more 
multidirectionality to multiplicity. Indeed, the panel does not limit itself anymore to 
project current trends into multiple possibilites, and then make its way back to the present 
for recommendations, which movement so far, was the only multidirectionality involved 
in relatively linear model. The last reports have corrected a crucial limit in previous ones: 
these used to project current economic, social, demographic and other human trends, to 
assess the climate impacts, including some feedback effects internal to the climate 
system, but with limited to inexistent attempts at including the ways in which these 
changes in climates would reciprocally then proceed to affect demographics, economic 
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behavior, and how the latter would then continue to affect climate, etc. The 2014 impacts 
and adaptation reports have created increasingly dynamic models which include these 
reciprocities between factors of change. This further complicated the futurity at play to 
render it more multidirectional, in addition to multiple. As I’ve underscored above, anti-
uchronia includes two moments (granted these overlap, interconnect, and can be 
simultaneous, almost acting as dimensions as much as moments), whereby uchronia is 
critically shown or portrayed as the timeless, teleological temporality which naturalizes 
itself yet is contingent, while at the same time, by implication, the possibility to consider 
other possible temporalities emerges. The IPCC’s conclusions, along with its multiple 
future scenarios’ methodology, correspond quite exactly to these two moments of anti-
uchronia. They allow to further explore what anti-uchronia may entail: interrupting 
uchronia to think of the possibility for other possibilities may require to open up onto a 
futurity of multiplicity and rejecting a futurism which subjects presents to an abstract 
singular and reified future (of endless accumulation). It may require readiness to nourish 
a relation to temporality that makes room (or time) for multidirectional moments of 
anticipation. It may require accepting and even assuming, asserting uncertainty regarding 
both the present, and the infinite past informing it, the infinite future flowing from it. 
Uncertainty and Futurological Epistemology 
 
Indeed, another dimension of the texts produced by the IPCC further suggests the radical 
contingency of “the future,” in addition to the multiplicity of “futures” which the Panel 
presents. Consistent with climatological knowledge and epistemology, the reports indeed 
insist on carefully underscoring, assessing and distinguishing between likelihood, 
evidence and confidence levels. This shows the limits of certainties regarding future 
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projections of past and current trends in the Earth’s temperature, greenhouse gas 
emissions, and “human” activities causing these. For instance, “very high confidence” 
represents “at least a 9 out of 10 chance of being correct”, whereas a “high confidence” 
stands for “about an 8 out of 10 chance of being correct.” Similarly, 
the following terms have been used to indicate the assessed likelihood, using 
expert judgement, of an outcome or a result: Virtually certain > 99% probability 
of occurrence, Extremely likely > 95%, Very likely > 90%, Likely > 66%, More 
likely than not > 50%, Unlikely < 33%, Very unlikely < 10%, Extremely unlikely 
< 5% (2013 & 2014). 
Finally, in Working Group III’s report on mitigation, yet another classification system is 
used to evaluate the levels of agreement among IPCC scientists, and the evidence 
available to substantiate each claim. Most paragraphs in the reports are thus followed by 
the parenthetical mention of levels of confidence and evidence (e.g., high agreement, 
medium evidence; high agreement, much evidence, etc).  
The unknown and the known are thus emphasized, in relation to one another and to 
time or futurity. While this rhetorically creates breaches into which climate negationists 
love diving as deep as their absymal lack of responsibility and the depths of their oil-
pockets for propaganda funding allow them to, this underscores both the contingency of 
the future in addition to its multiplicity, and the specific extent of certainties regarding 
“human” emissions of greenhouse gas fueling global warming. In admitting to the vast 
extent of the unknown and attempting to evaluate so carefully the portion of uncertainty 
in each claim they make, the IPCC reports are anti-uchronian as they evoke contingency– 
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one of uchronia’s characteristic, even in spite of its self-representation as the only 
possible end in sight, and the future’s unpredictability. The paradox here is that the 
measurement of uncertainty with likelihood, evidence and confidence level 
corresponding to numerically expressed probabilities (usully numbers of chances of 
occurence out of 10), and in percentage points, indicates a will to truth, a desire for 
exactitude regarding the limits of climatological knowledge, i.e it betrays a desire for 
certain, exact assessments of uncertainty. But precisely in this tension, anti-uchronian 
tensions are allowed to glitter: all that science is capable of asserting is that we may be 
hitting this or that tipping points, threshold (400ppm), and so on. So anti-uchronia here 
takes the form of a question mark, a doubt shed on current “developmental paths.” If we 
further extend this anti-uchronian moment in climatological futurology, if we invest this 
breach, this crack, anti-uchronian critique ricochets to make any fast and certain 




Pausing to Think on Time in a Time of Urgency 
 
 
Reading the IPCC reports as futurological knowledge offering anti-uchronian moments 
thus allows to see additional layers in anti-uchronia: impossibility, multiplicity, 
uncertainty and multidirectionality inform the past, present and future portrayed and 
analyzed by climatologists in the panel to suggest grounds for anti-uchronian questions 
about the dangers and limits of capitalist growth. Anti-uchronia comprises seeing 
uchronia for what it is, as an impossible horizon that recedes as we approach it and 
which, because it is teleological, positions itself as the only possible end in spite of its 
contingency. As we have seen both in turning to Blu’s graffiti art and to the IPCC, it also 
implies the possibility to consider that there may be other, multiple possible presents and 
futures in sight. Finally, I have mentioned that such anti-uchronian percepts, affects and 
concepts, such anti-uchronian moments invest the tension between simultaneous needs to 
take the time to pause and think, and to act fast in a fast-changing world, a tension 
emerging out of a context of urgency. The last section of this chapter focuses on this third 
aspect of anti-uchronia. In what follows I will argue that anti-uchronia cairologically 
intervenes in and because of this tension. Anti-uchronian moments are moments which 
allow barely intelligible questions which slow everyone else down, struggling against the 
rapid contamination of our oikos to erupt clearly before all life in it is made unlivable, 
and suspending time to make time to think other possible lives. It refers to moments 





The Idiot: Pausing to Pose Anti-Uchronian Questions 
 
“Questioning growth is deemed to be the act of lunatics, idealists 
and revolutionaries. But question it we must.”  




Anti-uchronia takes the form of a pause imposed upon a uchronian rush, where the future 
is considered as the teleological result of inevitable patterns, made of abstract endless 
accumulation, and subjecting the present and concrete possible futures to destruction. As 
produced by the anti-uchronian moment in the IPCC texts (among others), such a pause is 
evocative of a conceptual figure which philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers (2010) 
mobilizes to think critically about the state of emergency the climate crisis creates. This 
figure is none other than the Deleuzian “conceptual character” of the idiot.44 In what 
follows I describe this conceptual character to juxtapose it to my concept of anti-
uchronia. Through this juxtaposition, I am simultaneously showing the idiot’s 
fundamentally temporal dimension and continuing to specify the meanings, forms and 
                                                        
44 I was told, in a conference presentation context, that “disability studies may have issues with my use of 
the concept of stupidity” to denounce geoengineering, among other things (the criticism was mobilizing 
“disability studies” at large: such remarks, in bringing on an entire, vast field of literature as vaguely as 
possible, are always fascinating, and their vagueness justifies responding to them solely in footnotes). I 
hope this time it will be clear, in case it was not in the first place, that both here and when I discuss 
geoengineering and the IPCC’s concept of “anthropogenic” climate change more critically (chapter V) – as 
these involve stupidity, that I propose the character of the idiot as an inspiring conceptual figure, and that 
when I use the concept of stupidity, it is to denounce experts and decision-making (corporate and state) 
elites seriously considering geoengineering as our way out of the climate crisis. In other words, the idiot is 
by no means stupid, but in fact engaged in a confrontation against stupidity. I read these deciding and 
decidedly delusional elites (chapter V) as traversed by stupidity (they themselves are not even characterized 
as “stupid,” though their comportment surely makes such generalization quite tempting). Any reader who 
would read quickly enough to feel offended by my denunciation of stupidity as a process and confuse this 
with an “attack against mentally disabled people” (the terms that were used in the above-mentioned 
criticism) might want to interrogate their own rush to the association made by such objectors, between 
stupidity and mental disability – an association I do not make by any means. If any parallels between 
mental disability and the concepts I deploy here absolutely needed to be made, one could perhaps look to 
the inspiring figure of the idiot. But this would probably require an idiotic (i.e slow, careful) reading, which 
the critic in question was unable to do, given how incompatible academic life and a certain static and 




effects of my own concept of anti-uchronia, my reading of the IPCC reports as in part 
anti-uchronian. The IPCC stands as the much needed “idiot” who poses necessary and 
pertinent yet disturbing, interruptive, pause-causing, barely intelligible questions with 
respect to uchronia. In other words, my purpose is to entangle the idiot to the concept of 
anti-uchronia, to show the idiotic dimension of anti-uchronian questions and give 
examples of such questions. To this end, my reading of Stengers’ concept emphasizes the 
idiot’s temporal dimension.  
 Stengers describes the idiot as being defined by her45 resistance to both the 
consensual way and urgency: 
in the ancient Greek sense, … a semi-private language that excludes from a form 
of communication characterized by an ideal of transparency and anonymity … 
Deleuze’s conceptual character is the one who always slows the others down, who 
resists the consensual way in which the situation is presented and in which 
emergencies mobilize thought and action. (2005, p. 994).  
Thus idiotic interventions disrupt the rush to a “mise en equivalence,” causing a pause, in 
the face of emergency. While those stressing emergency rush to an “…and so…,” the 
idiot demands that we slow down, a deceleration inseparable from the conditions of 
emergence of thought. In the case of climate change, I would add that such pause and 
resulting novel questions being posed are in fact all the more necessary that urgency 
results from the approach of the specter of ecological catastrophe. In other words, it is 
precisely because the situation is so urgent that one needs to pause and think. The very 
urgency invoked to justify rushing to conclusions without taking the time for idiotic 
                                                        
45 Here I am using feminine pronouns regarding the figure of the idiot, following Stengers. Yet one should 
note that the IPCC reports writers include very few women. 
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questions creates the need for the kind of pause generated by idiotic questions. Thus the 
requirement to slow down actually takes place within states of emergency.  
 To an extent, the IPCC reports allow to see the past and present predominant 
developmental paths – made of carbon emission, intensive agriculture and industry, 
relentless growth on a planet with limited tolerance for such paces and with a growing a 
fever – as uchronian. The anti-uchronian moment in these texts is an idiotic one, one that 
deploys itself with all its temporal effects: it interrupts, disturbs, arrests, causes pause. It 
suggestively casts doubt upon fundamental assumptions of capitalocentric temporality, on 
uchronia: are “anthropogenic” global warming patterns of production and consumption a 
necessity, or isn’t it necessary instead to at least slow down, if not disrupt, growth and 
even the desire for growth?  
The idiot’s questions are hardly intelligible in the midst of a rush to conclusion, to 
emergency measures brushing off the surface of anti-uchronian moments to quickly 
return in the seemingly reassuring and familiar spheres of uchronia. Indeed, the 
implications of the above analyzed futurology that growth may not be desirable at all 
though it advertises itself as that which we cannot not want, are quite discernable in the 
reports, but also entangled in myriad uchronian and counter-uchronian assumptions (we 
will see in chapter 3 how the IPCC falls back on counter-uchronian “sustainable growth,” 
in spite of the breach it opens to doubt the imperative to growth). The risk of an idiotic 
question lies in the possibility that it may not be seen or heard. At the same time, the 
IPCC has indeed shaken growth-oriented assumptions enough to cause outrage and 
incomprehension on the part of so-called “skeptics.” The idiot’s strength and weakness 
(her pharmacological character, in the sense of Plato’s famous pharmakon as both a 
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remedy and poison) is that she reaches for the limits of knowledge, and poses disturbing 
questions which barely can be deciphered or grasped, let alone accepted. Reading 
climatological data and drawing conclusions from observations that post-industrialization 
levels of CO2 are on their way to making life unbearable, requires a moment of retreat to 
barely intelligible but now growingly pressing questions regarding how things could 
possibly be and/or become otherwise, and questions about whether growth-oriented 
temporalities would be included in these other order of things. 
“Playing the idiot” or “acting the idiot’s part” thus comprises a dimension of time 
spent at the limits of knowledge, asking unlikely, unexpected, perhaps naïve sounding 
questions, and turning what seems self-evident into problems, to create concepts 
responding to such problems. The figure of Dostoyevski’s idiot certainly is one source of 
inspiration for this conceptual figure, but the idiotic play also evokes the character of 
Socrates. Not that the idiot would perform his role and slow others down by asking his 
disturbing and disrupting questions in an insincere or ironic way (as Socrates was 
sometimes accused, and at times guilty, of doing): the idiocy may very well be genuine 
and sincere, an attention to what most, in common language and caught up in the pace of 
“normal” daily life, may pass over too fast. The idiot, in addition to and because she 
confronts the limits of knowledge, remaining with the problem instead of rushing to a 
solution and/or simply not seeing the problem, ignoring it, is producing idiomatic 
formulations regarding what usually goes without saying. It goes without saying that we 
all need and want growth, and the question of whether it is the case or not will not be 
address, as this would be a waste of time, as this question is indeed not even granted 
existence as a question. Thus the idiot is barely intelligible to others, imagined as a 
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stargazer (Socrates’ figure erupts again), disconnected from the ground’s reality. She may 
be called lazy or superfluous: “you wonder why we should have growth? Perhaps it’s 
because you don’t wish to work hard to have it:” already the question of whether growth 
is beneficial, desirable, feasible, sensible has been erased as it is assumed to be an 
obvious end and the idiot is accused to want to escape solely from the mean deployed. 
The escape and the laziness of the interlocutor who makes such an accusation being, of 
course, left unquestioned: he, after all, is willing, to “work hard.” Proof being, he very 
reasonably wants growth and can see this is the only sensible route. The idiot, 
meanwhile, also wastes others’ time by refusing to hurry and propose a program once her 
questions are being posed. The idiotic part is not one that attempts to arrive at a definitive 
answer, turning idiomatic questions into an axiomatic (“idiomatic” should not be 
confused with “idiotic,” but if the two share a root it is precisely because of the barely 
intelligible dimension of idiotic questions, such that not all idiomatic questions are 
idiotic, but certainly idiotic moments are bound to take on a partly idiomatic form). One 
of the strengths of the idiot is precisely that she does not offer a solution, forcing 
interlocutors to postpone normative or prescriptive leaps – whether the idiot will in fact 
have interlocutors is not guaranteed however: unintelligibility is also one of the idiot’s 
problems, though it allows for the conditions of thought. In sum, the idiot’s flirting with 
the limits of intelligibility is indeed a pharmacological dimension, both remedy and 
poison, both strength and weakness. The idiot forces us to stay with the problem, to grant 
it more duration. She stretches out the pause, because it is there that thought can emerge: 
this is why she slows all other players down. But thought may be more necessary in a 
circumstance of ecological urgency than at any other time. 
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I have explained above (section I and II) that anti-uchronia contains two 
dimensions, one denouncing uchronia for what it is, the other opening up the possibility 
for possibilities. It does so in the form of idiotic pause. Though anti-uchronia does not 
claim to definitively offer a temporality to substitute to uchronia, it has a temporality of 
its own, one that triggers pause. But under what kind of circumstances can anti-uchronia 
erupt in this way, and in what context may it gain resonance, what effects may erupt 
when? In what follows, I will linger with the “when” question, along with the question of 
anti-uchronia’s form. 
Oikos Contaminated: Missing the Right Time to Sustain the Livability of Life 
      
       Truth is a matter of imagination. 
         Ursula Le Guin 
 
In his Cauchemards paralleles: vue en coupe d’une ville malade, Science Fiction writer 
Serge Brussolo (2006) describes a city where inhabitants are fleeing and fighting a 
strange disease affecting their houses. The oikos has indeed gone mad, and the 
protagonist engages every inch of her body in a struggle against the mysterious 
“contamination” of houses, which become inhabitable as they (the houses, that is) carve 
galleries underneath themselves. Gradually, the reader gathers that the computer-
managed houses of the “sick city” use the components of their own surface layers for this 
digging and for their meanderous underground constructions. The houses’ “advanced” 
technology absorbs old materials, furnitures, curtains, paint, bricks above, and somehow 
recycle these to form endless tunnels which turn out more scary and less habitable each 
time. Through the eyes of the main character, the horrified reader witnesses the spectacle 
of a world controlled by computers once programmed to anticipate every need and new 
development of future human societies. This was done through intricate ethnographic and 
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algorithmic information aimed at automatically renewing the houses above so as to keep 
on carving the house of the next generation with the old one. Yet the anticipation 
resulting from the artificially intelligent, self-designing houses has turned into wreckless 
machinic speculation incapable of actually fitting human needs. The human world is 
being destroyed by this hyper-rationality. The speed of the renewal has accelerated to the 
point that human inhabitants could not possibly follow and adapt. In fact, the machines 
go so far as to (hyper rationally) perceive and treat human bodies, from skin to hair, flesh, 
blood, organs and bones, as part of the houses: they now use human skin, body parts, 
hairs, to compose the insane walls, furniture and objects of the most recent galleries. The 
computerized, renewable oikos has swallowed the human beings still attempting to live in 
it. As a result, computerized renewability, engineered speculative recycling’s fast pace 
frenzy has turned comfort-providing houses into anthropophagous ones.  
Each bit of progress made by this computerized oikos becomes more inhuman.A 
lifeless and destructive hybridization process is at play. Though cyborgs may be 
attractive in some understandings (Haraway, 1987), Brussolo’s hybrid forms, in the 
poisonous oikos he describes, are terrifying. Instead of sheltering it, the oikos threatens 
the fabric of life with computerized and technological colonization, to the point of 
reaching death. Technologically-driven recycling results in the absorption of life (I will 
return to this when I critique “sustainable growth” as “counter-uchronian” in chapter V). 
The protagonist in fact feels this draining out of her life force as she evolves through the 
galleries.  
Of course this is not necessarily contradictory to Donna Haraway’s critique 
(1987) of boundaries between the animal, the human and the artificial and her exhortation 
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to embrace our hybridity and foster affinity rather than prefer illusory self-coherent and 
bounded identity. That is, one simplistic reading of Brussolo’s horror story could fall on a 
flat rejection of technology as necessarily and intrinsically sick, and on a need for 
humans to somehow separate themselves from it. Yet the sickness here is everywhere and 
knows no boundaries, starting with the fact that the houses’ computers were originally 
engineered by humans to manage the oikos. Rather than reading this in a luddite vein, I 
read Brussolo’s fables as offering a world where, precisely because the absence of 
boundaries between these is made especially obvious, sickness in computer systems and 
algorithmic prediction, poisonous directions in paces at which the entanglement between 
human bodies and artificial intelligence, pour over all of life so as to void it. More than 
hybridization, or rather, inherently linked with a sick form of hybridization, are the paces, 
rhythm and speed at which some aspects of such hyridization morph and internally clash 
with others. Temporality is crucial in shaping the form of sickness and pushing it to the 
boundaries of horror, to anthropophagous ways. The contaminated oikos shows how 
much one must make hybridization a fundamental and urgent matter of concern (Latour, 
2009). 
The first chapter in Parallel Nightmares: Sectional Views of a Sick City (my title 
translation) simply describes the protagonist’s desperate and impossible struggle against 
the houses (she is inevitably as sick as the technology she is attacking and which is 
attacking her, as she moves about the houses constantly to attempt curing them – and 
herself). Each “parallel nightmare” in the “sick city” can be read independently as well. 
In other words, Brussolo describes a premise, the computerized oikos gone mad, and 
from then on the reader may start to interpret the following short as an exploration into 
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some the various tentacles or galleries created by the houses. This second storystages 
mere automated, lifeless reproduction, perhaps further exemplifying the nihilism of high-
tech house-building computer(ized) architects (if indeed we are dealing with another 
gallery dug by the houses). Here Brussolo describes a long hallway with no end or 
beginning in sight, and female human beings attached to beds, confined in rooms as bare 
as solitary confinement cells, where voices from some kind of speaker are the only mode 
of unilateral communication. Males and females are born in these rooms. The latter are 
sent to “grow” in their own confined cells and reproduce there, while the former then 
creep their way out slowly, yet never shed their umbilical chords, eventually reaching a 
new room where another female prisoner is confined, and where they couple. The 
prisoners continue on to produce new humans who replicate the patterns of emprisonment 
and rape. The story portrays bare reproduction with unlivable life, and the beings 
produced know no escape as the chain constrains their atrophied muscles. Both this 
gallery and what one imagines (based on the first story) as the surface, contaminated 
world constitute an environment of mechanical, alienated lifeless life, an atrocious 
caricature of meaningless uchronia, with a dark surrealist dimension evoking the worst 
fantasies imaginable. We have seen (section 1) that graffiti artist Blu resorted to both 
fantasy and caricature to propose anti-uchronian visions (though his fantasy was one 
where bikes crushed cars, in a flash of environmentalist dream world rather than a 
dystopian vision of further ecological destruction). Brussolo’s horror stories critically 
stage a different moment of uchronia: a moment situated after the train of progress would 
have passed a nihilist tipping point, and fallen down into the cliff. The book certainly 
deserves its title: “parallel nightmares,” that is, visions of horror in a world where living 
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beings do not cross paths, a world envisioned by the gaze of a mysteriousimpossible 
narrator: in the latter story, no one could possibly leave a written account or narrate 
anything of this strictly reproductive, alienated and raw human flesh-making 
technological apparatus. If they did, would such narrator take on a human form, one that 
could write? If not, would the narration be intelligible to us, and if so how? 
At first, only the title (“Parallel Nightmares: Sectional Views of a Sick City”), the 
opening chapter, and some common themes running through the two stories suggest the 
possibility of a whole world containing the various galleries. The stories don’t explicitly 
refer to one another, neither are they tied by a single plot or protagonist. Who may be 
capable of doing the narration thus remains a mystery for most of the second story 
(wait… suspense…), though the title evokes “sectional views.” Each story peeks at each 
bit of gallery as such a “sectional view.” Are we witnessing flashes, as in a premonitory 
nightmare, of the city’s architects’ viewpoint? If the architects are in fact artificially 
intelligent computers, do(es) such narrator(s) feel sympathy, terror, or indifference with 
respect to these flashes into inhuman galleries? Indifference seems excluded, as the title 
also calls these sectional views “nightmares,” yet if the narrator’s viewpoint is the 
computers’, does artificial intelligence render capable of affects, like terror and empathy, 
let alone narration? Brussolo’s text is relatively neutral in tone, almost strictly descriptive 
(except for moments when narration happens, still in the third person, but qua the 
viewpoint of the protagonist in the first story). It remains for the reader to be horrified, 
especially as the last element of the title to be mentioned is the adjective “parallel,” that 
both may refer to the ways in which galleries meander, one alongside another and never 
crossing, and might also signal, in a typically science fictional/fantasy language, this 
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desolate and cannibalistic environment as parallel to the readers’ worlds – in the sense 
that it may never meet, that it coexists with ours in another reality, i.e that it may play the 
role of a metaphor, be compared to our worlds.  
In the second story, the plot takes an actual cannibalistic turn that adds to the 
evocation of anthropophagous computerized houses from the first story. The character 
from whose point of view the narration occurs has found, somehow, a razor blade with 
which he cuts his umbilical chord. He then wanders in the hallway in search of the first 
female body, the origin point of this unbearable yet absurdly and meaninglessly eternal 
network. In his path, his search doubles with the necessity for sustenance: he is now 
disconnected from the apparently infinite umbilical chord, and finds no other means of 
subsistence than… human flesh. Devouring his helpless victims, his reasoning is just as 
inhuman and terrifying as the world he move around in: his victims being immobile for 
eternity, are condemned to either powerlessness, or to resistance by way of extraction 
from the network, annihilation of the cannibal. In the latter case, they would subsequently 
have only two choices: suicide, or reproducing the cannibalism practiced by the man they 
just killed:  
Que pouvait-on contre lui? Pour lui donner la chasse, pour le combattre et 
l’anéantir, il aurait fallu qu’un autre homme acceptât lui aussi de se libérer de son 
cordon et le poursuivre de palier en palier, rasoir en main jusqu’à l’affrontement 
final. Mais après ? Il y aurait la faim du survivant à combler, la faim du 




Interestingly, the network of umbilical chords is eternal, yet the protagonist assumes that 
it has an origin point, which he feels so enraged against he orients his whole wandering to 
the search of the first female, that without which none can be nourished in this 
meaningless, solely reproductive world. Life is eternal, because the umbilical chords will 
never stop connecting all to all. It is also fragile, given that if one disconnects, all will die 
– which makes the purpose of the protagonist’s hunting even more absurd, but the 
hunting itself revealing of even more anger against this meaningless bare life. Women are 
reducing to complete passivity and imprisoned with a restriction of their mobility even 
more drastic than that of men, the originary point of the chain is assumed to be a woman, 
and all that remains is eternal expansion of the chain. « Pourquoi l’éternité ? » wonders 
the wanderer. 
With every step of progress the computerized oikos makes in subterranean 
galleries imprisoning any hope for life in nothingness, we watch the unwatchable, lacking 
a viewer that could ever become narrator, such that the reality described is a nightmare 
not only in the horrific sense of the term, but also insofar as it is impossible to tell as 
anything else. Colebrook’s discussion of extinction and her critique of the concept of 
anthropocene discusses this paradox (2014): who is the geologist reading the marking of 
the Earth’s lithosphere when geologists today argue that our age will be readable as that 
when human activity was prevalent over any other factor of geological change (the 
definition of “anthropocene”), given that the concept of anthropocene also inaugurates 
the idea that “we” humans will not be there by then, given how destructive the 
anthropocene would be? Brussolo’s horror dystopia describes a world passed a 
technologically, cyborg or hybrid nihilist tipping point, and this horror, just like Blu’s 
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caricature of uchronia discussed above, has us interrogate uchronia more critically. But if 
similar traits are present in Brussolo’s anti-uchronian science fiction as were in Blu’s 
train mural, the former stories emphasize yet another aspect of anti-uchronia, which I will 
call the cairological aspect. They tell the story of a world where it is too late for livable 
lives to be lived, where no one screamed to the driver of the train of progress that he 
should hit the breaks before the machine and all wagons fall into an abyss and leave a 
barren landscape behind (above the galleries’ surface). This is a story where “kairos,” the 
right moment for action and thought, for speaking out, has been missed, where resistance 
did not erupt on time. The problem isn’t that one has missed the train of progress, but that 
one has missed the occasion, the moment to derail or stop it. Hans Jonas announced that 
progress’ promises had turned into threats,  yet both promises and threats were always 
situated in an abstract future, in the à-venir. Brussolo’s fantasy novel (if it may be called 
this) passes the moment of realization of the threats and realizes them, to impossibly 
describes the “afterwards.” This poses the question of “when,” the question of the 
opportune moment for anti-uchronian pause to be taken and for critical thought to emerge 
while we slow down, and to further slow us down. This last aspect of anti-uchronia, its 
cairological dimension, is fundamental. Anti-uchronia caricatures and/or fantasizes, so as 
to emphasize the uchronian dimension of our presents, the impossibility of abstract, 
futurist, capitalist promises that justify present destructions. By estranging usually reified 
and naturalized, teleological capitalocentric temporality from the viewer, anti-uchronian 
images expose and discredit claims that desire for growth goes without saying. A second 
moment, as we have seen, includes the possibility that there may be other possibilities, 
other possible temporalities. In Brussolo’s story, we stay a bit longer with impossibility 
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to read, through the impossible eyes of a viewer that will not come to be, the possible 
outcome of destruction which fast uchronian paces may breed, if pushed beyond their 
limits. This, by implication, powerfully forces to wonder when we may (if at all) 
cairologically intervene: for anti-uchronia to matter at all, it needs to occur in the right 
interstices left open by uchronia and widen these cracks, making the most of “the right 
moments” (if those exist, or can be created). 
Brussolo’s fiction stages bare bodies fulfilling their supposedly most “natural” 
function, most minimally reduced, a form of vitalism46 which pro-life advocates defend: 
life for life’s sake, certainly, but not in the sense of the affirmation of life as creation of 
one beyond oneself, rather the horrifying picture is one of life below oneself, below 
humanness, below more-than-human lifeforms. The inhuman humanness of this fable is 
telling of what may be one of the distinct traits of the human: its capacity for loss, for 
extinction of what makes it human. This dystopia is but the horrific caricature of nihilist 
forms of pseudo vitalism and naturalism, coupled with the hyper-technological. In the 
first story, the artificially intelligent computers building self-perpetuating galleries for 
human housing have drunk the coolaid: life, nature is fundamentally about reproduction. 
In the second story, the female bodies are reduced to their most inhuman, natural-
technological passivity: lying down on beds they are confined to, they breed, expanding 
the numbers of human bodies, while the males barely exercise any mobility yet 
monopolize all the mobility there remains, one attached to alienating umbilical chords. In 
this gallery, contrary to the gallery mentioned above, body parts like hair or skin do not 
                                                        
46 Here again, we are reminded of the distinct forms of vitalism within Western thought and politics, which 
I have mentioned above: we may remember that Jane Bennett (2009) briefly mentions the distinct nature of 
her material vitalism from the right-wing vitalism of pro-lifers, while Claire Colebrook (2014) has 
identified a queer vitalism uniting Spinoza, Nietzsche, Deleuze, etc as a counter current of actual vitalism 
(including Plato, Kant…). 
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make for the material used for furniture which sits still and will absurdly never be sat, 
lied on, or used in any way. In fact it is more rational and more natural than the hair and 
organs-made lamps and couches, as there the computers may have fulfilled their mission 
of ensuring that human life sustain itself along with human habitat. Yet, the 
objectification is perhaps more total than in the first nightmare, as the full bodies reified 
in this case (as opposed to body parts) may (or may not) still be able to think and 
experience the atrocious reality surrounding and constituting them in a somewhat 
conscious way (though these beings’ cognitive capacity are likely highly damaged). The 
confinement of female bodies on their beds, where they do nothing but breathe, receive 
some kind of nutrients for their atrophied muscles through the never-ending umbilical 
chords, get raped and give birth in series, as on a chain in a human flesh factory: the 
women are chained to the beds, both males and females receive instructions from 
speakers to breed, and, for males, to leave and enter the rooms. These two coercive and 
disciplinary (the speaker voice is called “civic educator”) measures assume a need to 
respectively stifle potential resistance, give orders, invests bodies in life labor. This 
implies at least some residual agency on the part of the inhumanly computer-managed 
humans. The thought may be at least as unbearable as the thought of a reduction of body 
parts to raw material for lifeless objects, however non-humanly vibrant these may be.  
Something about the wholeness of the bodies and their parts still functioning somewhat 
dynamically together, added to the coherence of this hyper-rationalism (again, in the case 
of body parts fueling furniture elements, there remained the absurdity of the uselessness 
of habitat), creates added horror. The kind of imprisonment depicted here replays the 
most extreme disciplinary mode of exercise of power: individualizing and totalizing at 
 
 224 
once, solitary confinement is systematized to the point of suppressing any possible sense 
of collective, such that the little agency humans in this situation may have, the little 
resistance they may exercise serves only to aggravate their suffering. This caricature 
offers a glance into what the reduction of life as reproduction entails if pushed to its 
furthest implications: if Nature’s aim is reproduction, then high technology gone mad is 
capable of fulfilling this mission in the most rational implications. Rationality, hyper-
rationality, meet madness, loss of all cognitive abilities. The genius of Brussolo’s fable is 
to grasp precisely so many of the essential(ist) themes of the anthropocene: human 
technology is capable of sacrificing the human on the great altar of reproductive Nature’s 
grand goals. In placing the mirror this way to encapsulate the most extreme consequences 
of efficiency, rationalism, technology and Nature, Brussolo unveils the dystopian 
character of utopian dreams screaming, produce, reproduce, you are designed for it, you 
designed your computers for it, and your computers reciprocate in the great natural elan 
that you defined as such.  
Suspending the horror for a moment, relieving the unbearable suspense, Brussolo 
abruptly ends the second short story with a change of voice: the protagonist has dreamed 
most of this world, while sedated by powerful experimental drugs during a military 
mission which transport included hours chained through tubes. He did, however, sleep 
walk and killed (some say he ate) many of his co-soldiers.  
Kairos, Suspension, Slow Motion 
 
Suspense and suspension are crucial to anti-uchronian moments, moments when uchronia 
is caricatured for instance, creating a critical distance and pause that allows thought. In 
the case of non-caricatural forms, as we will see below when I examine the jumps of 
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circus acrobats, suspension can also be the physical, embodied creation of space and time 
for breath and thought. But these anti-uchronian pauses require a complex understanding 
of time, in cairological and chronological terms. Kairos, one of the two ancient Greek 
words for time (along with chronos), refers to “the time of opportunity of ‘occasion’ 
come and gone which marks the significant moments of historical action” (Smith, 1969; 
Honkanen, 2007). Thus “chronos” would correspond to the measurement of duration, the 
quantity corresponding to a duration, in other words it is the quantitative dimension of 
time. Questions associated with it include ‘how old? How fast? How long?’ Kairos, in 
contrast, refers to qualitative time, the time of opportunity or “right time.” A season 
offering the opportunity for a certain event, or a missed opportunity, is referred to in 
cairological terms. Questions associated with kairos include ‘when?’ ‘at what time?’ ‘at 
what point?’ The last one is interesting, as it shows that kairos, like chronos, relies on 
spatial terms to make sense (see introduction to this dissertation). Kairos allows us to 
emphasize constellations of events, events themselves, and stresses the ways in which 
these would not have been possible at another time and in other circumstances. It thus 
stresses contingency, as the meeting point between necessity and randomness, that which 
could have been otherwise but occurred in a certain way at a certain time because of 
myriad reasons specific to the moment, context or period. It is, to simplify, time as the 
relationship between moment and context, opportunity (missed or taken) and 
circumstances. 
For anti-uchronia to be capable of seeing uchronia as contingent in spite of the 
latter’s teleological character and subsequent self-naturalizing claims, anti-uchronia 
positions itself cairologically (which doesn’t exclude, in that cairologically-erupting 
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occasion, asking questions having to do with chronos). Global climate change would not 
have been possible under circumstances less reliant on capitalist modes of production: 
this anti-uchronian claim makes it clear that the critical dimension of anti-uchronia adopts 
a cairological perspective. Further, the second moment of anti-uchronia, that which 
strives to open up the possibility for other possible temporalities, is also a cairological 
intervention. As I have pointed out above, anti-uchronia invests the tension produced by 
circumstances of urgency, whereby the need arises to pause and take the time to think 
through vast and rapid changes while the need to act fast is also salient, and while both of 
these seemingly contradictory needs erupt from the same movement. The kairos of anti-
uchronia is thus full with tension.  
Consequently, it becomes crucial (urgent?) to linger on the cairological dimension 
of anti-uchronia. If anti-uchronia is about creating breaches, cracks opening up the 
possibility for other possibilities, its questions, its condition of existence (of eruption) 
have to do with ‘when? ‘In what circumstances? ‘In what occasion?’ If opportunity refers 
to the relationship between time and possibility, and if Kairos refers to the opportune 
time (or absence or passing thereof), then anti-uchronia is more a cairological than a 
chronological matter, but may also (cairologically) ask chronos-related questions. Of 
course these are connected: some questions entail taking both of these dimensions of time 
into account: a certain quantity of time may be needed for the right moment to emerge. 
Questions posed by Brussolo’s fiction or Blu’s graffiti art or the IPCC’s futurological 
climatology concern how much time needs to pass for a “tipping point” to occur, after 
which certain actions regarding the climate crisis will not be possible anymore. Kronos 
thus refers to a before and after (Aristotle defined it as the number of motion with respect 
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to the before and after, thus stressing the materiality of time, which is also crucial here – 
Aristotle, 1984). The relationship of anti-uchronia to these two dimensions is thus more 
complex than it simply cairologically saying something about chronos or failing at 
finding kairos, the right moment to carve a thought-provoked and provoking pause. 
Seeing the cairological dimension of anti-uchronia would have more to do with its 
context of urgency, the tension I have been mentioning between a need to pause and think 
and a need to act fast in a fast-changing world, which are but two facets of the same coin.  
This also leads to questions of how anti-uchronian visions can be fostered, what 
the opportune perspective at the opportune moment looks like. Art is again a rich venue 
for such interrogation. The performing arts, the arts in movement, depend upon the 
passing of moments with repeating and differing phrases, scuplting into speed, pace, 
rhythms as their matter. They thus work the fabric of cairological time, and maybe highly 
suited for fostering anti-uchronian foresight. A couple of years ago, French contemporary 
circus artist Yoann Bourgeois created a piece titled “Cavales.” This word could be 
translated very unsatisfactorily as “run” (“cavaler,” “to rush about”) or “escape” (“etre en 
cavale,” “to be on the run”). It is often associated with a panicked run, whether it 
connotes horses galloping away from a source of danger, or children driven by 
excitement and haste. Yoann Bourgeois’ circus piece was staged on a high point 
overlooking the city of Grenoble, with a majestic view of the Alps, which surround the 
city and together serve as the background. The ground décor was made up of a white 
rectangular elevated plane, with a set of equally immaculate stairs in the back of the 
rectangle on the right. The scenography thus played with a contrast between the green 
curvy Alps, in whose creases the city is nested (urbanized areas being visible in the 
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background of the stage and horizon), and white geometrical, cold planes, though these 
could also curiously evoke curveless clouds. On the stage, the light and muscular bodies 
of two acrobats walk, move, lean, jump into each others’ arms, and eventually make their 
way to the half of the rectangle that is in front of the stairs, which turns out to have 
cloudlike rebound: a trampoline is dissimulated in what could have first seemed like a 
solid and strictly horizontal structure throughout, and the acrobats’ jumps amplify, slow 
down, spiral, accelerate, also using the stairs. Moving on a melancholic music (a track by 
experimental rock band Silver Mount Zion), the softly bouncing bodies interchange 
position at various stairs, letting themselves fall down on the trampoline while in an 
upright but loose position, barely touching the surface underneath to land, back like 
feathers on stairs higher or lower after their bodies have crossed in a scissor-like pattern 
until their feet meet the stairs. The stairs quickly feel like they erupted from a dream, and 
suggest that they may lead to the sky. In the sound background, at moments when the two 
acrobats are slowing down, the voices of Roland Barthes and then Gaston Bachelard 
emerge, and excerpts of their lectures shed light on some of the many meanings, effects 
and affects evoked by the jumps, rebounds, suspensions and movements in the 
choreography.  
The piece by Barthes is an excerpt from his work on the category of the neutral, 
where he cites Pasolini claiming that all we have left is a “desperate vitality.” I will return 
to this Pasolinian idea for different purposes later (chapter VI on synchrony), but already 
the phrase, along with the choreography and scenography are suggestive of many of anti-
uchronia’s conditions of emergence. The suspension in the air of light bodies rebounding 
regularly on the rectangular, cloudlike stage often lasts long, as the artists have incredible 
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control over the speed of their motion, and these suspensions go from the rational looking 
geometrically shaped rectangle to the sky and the Alpine background, beautifully 
entangling images of nonhuman and human things and living beings. In watching this 
elevation and return to the soft ground, also landing softly to the harder stairs, spectators’ 
breathing may rhythmically follow the movements, gasping in admiration while also 
lengthening their breath as the image is impeccably timed and the pace is slow. The 
exchanges of positions and places between the two bodies, their turns and spirals are 
movingly soothing as well. Yet a tension remains throughout, against which the phrase 
“desperate vitality” resonates and echoes. The surfaces on which the artists are moving, 
the ground which they rebound against, are geometrical and made of straight white lines, 
rational, rigid, yet transform to cloud and dreamlike under the artists’ feet. The Alps are 
irregular, full of abrupt cuts and tall long curves, and the city sinuously couches in its 
valley.  
As I pointed out already, anti-uchronia may take the form of a pause, yet like 
these performing artists, suspending time or pausing does not equate stopping it, but 
rather makes time, opens possibilities of evocation of despair as well as vitality. Anti-
uchronia isn’t, either, not yet, an alternative temporality that would purport to replace 
uchronia, but rather questions it and lets other temporal orders of things glitter. The term 
glitter is useful here, as again, it is the possibility of other possible temporalities that 
emerges, rather than these temporalities themselves. Yet this possibility itself “makes the 
time” to think, so it does have its own temporality, just like the suspensions created by 
trampoline jumps happen in space, have their own duration, yet also make space and 
time. In the repetition of movements as well as in the seemingly more static motion of 
 
 230 
this circus piece, the eery association of white and geometry is advanced in soft tension 
with the background and the bodies wearing black though their movements evoke a form 
of unattainable purity as well. It is through tension, pauses, suspension, rebounds, 
repetition, difference and interruption, that anti-uchronia may take a cairological form.  
High Stakes 
 
My searching for anti-uchronian affects, percepts and concepts in micro-literatures like 
eco-science fiction, or in climatological reports to policy makers worldwide, in graffiti 
art, in contemporary circus shows the political dimensions and powerful stakes these 
discourses and genres engage in, and is symptomatic of an age where even conversations 
on the weather, once a shelter for easy consensus and seemingly apolitical 
(intergenerational) ‘small’ talk, no longer can afford consensual small talking, taking on 
scales that widen beyond understanding: these conversations will not be any more 
protected from the storm than any place else, and they in fact resolutely question what 
this storm is, says, does. The shelter is shaken, and the oikos needs kairos, in order to 
become habitable. If the arts and sciences have never occupied a realm outside of politics 
(considering them as such in fact may serve highly conservative purposes obscuring 
powerful sites for change), they have special political salience with the eco-crises, now 
more than ever: the stakes are about the livability of human, nonhuman, and hybrid lives.  
 Meandering through these artistic, scientific and literary genres and forms, we 
have seen that anti-uchronia cairologically invests the tension characteristic of a context 
of urgency, with its contradictory needs for rapid change in a fast world, and for time to 
think. If anti-uchronia suspends time, it is not in the sense of stopping it, but rather in the 
sense of a gasp for air, a gasp for thought, idiotically slowing down everything else to 
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claim that perhaps something more important is at stake. It contains two moments, one 
whereby uchronia is shown for what it is, stripped down of its credibility when making 
naturalizing teleological claims ruled out by the eternal return. In doing so anti-uchronia 
insinuates into uchronia’s interstices to creates larger cracks, where we may carve the 
time to allow other possible temporalities’ emergence. The task is tall and the stakes are 
high, however. The next chapter will engage temporalities that present themselves as 
alternatives or substitutes to uchronia, yet still take the teleological form of timeless 
temporalities, and make promises linearly abstracted from concrete presents, failing to 
confront the question of limits. These “counter-uchronias,” I will argue, are not up to the 
task. Again, the stakes are high: if we have killed God, who was replaced by all too 
human humans without getting us rid of the place.47 Now some may have been trying to 
celebrate homo economicus and his capitalist market in the same way, de-humanizing 
man, and developing a teleology of endless accumulation. But the world is limited, and at 
this point we might as well also kill capital, and, perhaps more importantly, its insatiable 
desire for growth. Note that it is interesting that cowboy capitalism would form 
assemblages and resonance machines with fundamental Christians (Connolly, 2008) 
precisely while God has been sacrificed on the altar of growth, yet growth and life are 
now engaged in a fight to death. But if growth can only survive as lifeless – indeed, so 
many are already filling the ranks of the living dead compulsive digitalized consumers 
                                                        
47 Deleuze explains very clearly, synthesizing so many passages in Nietzsche’s work in simple terms, that 
“the thought of Nietzsche, is that the death of God is a great noisy event, but insufficient” … “in 
Nietzsche’s works, the versions of the death of God are multiple, at least 15, all of great beauty. But 
precisely, according to one of the most beautiful, the murderer of God is “the ugliest of men.” … 
“Nietzsche is the first one to teach us that killing God does not suffice to operate a transmutation of values” 
(Deleuze, 2013, p. 30). The “ugliest of all men” depiction is of course a reference to Zarathustra.  
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and producers watching zombie movies in their ‘free’ time – then the struggle opposes 










Finally Contemplating What We’re Facing… By Running Backwards? 
 
If uchronia is the timeless (ever-postponed) and idealized temporality, which subjects the 
present to an abstract and impossible future of relentless, never satisfied or satiated 
growth on a limited planet, it is also often resisted (enters anti-uchronia), questioned, 
critiqued. Anti-uchronia may show uchronia to be contingent rather than natural, 
impossible rather than the only plausible way, radically outside any desirable reality 
rather than the reality. It opens the possibility for other possibilities, yet not all 
alternatives to uchronia take a form radically different than uchronia, and many mimic 
both its (often unfortunate) appeal and its problematic nature (enters counter-uchronia) 
and/or relationship to human/Nature.  
In the previous chapter we meandered through the (performing and street) arts, 
the sciences, science fiction. Through some instances of these, I argued, the idealized 
temporality I have called “uchronia” may be shown or at least suspected as contingent 
rather than “natural” or self-evident, as an impossible and undesirable horizon, rather 
than the (only) probable and desirable one. Certain artistic representations or practices, 
scientific reports and observations, stories and narratives, proliferate cracks in the 
uchronian narrative, with the anti-uchronian effect of slowing us down, perhaps even 
making us pause, so as to allow critical thinking to emerge. This slowing down evokes 
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the figure of the idiot, making pause to ask the disturbing questions which uchronia (its 
paces) normally rejects as unintelligible. Thus in chapter 3, the helpful character of the 
idiot was incarnated among others by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
reports’ diagnostic moment. In what follows, I wish to further complicate this landscape, 
suggesting that, often entangled with uchronia and anti-uchronia’s resistance to it, we 
find what I call “counter-uchronian” moments. These replicate or mimic the teleological, 
linear, idealized and abstracted form of uchronia, and they make claims to substitute to it. 
If uchronia was about moderns “running to the future with their backs turned to it” 
(Latour, 2009), “counter-uchronia” may be about jumping, leaping, running or simply 
going, either back, forward or ahead on the same (highly problematic) line. For instance, 
when I return in the next chapter (V) to the IPCC reports, it will not be so as to 
underscore the helpful, welcome (in an eco-crisis context), idiotic anti-uchronian moment 
I first read in these texts (chapter III). This time, I will emphasize the counter-uchronian 
dimension of the reports, which, leaving idiocy behind too hastily, leap to conclusions 
incompatible with their very own diagnosis: this time, the not-so-idiotic IPCC reports 
will be read as traversed by stupidity. After its anti-uchronian moment has queered 
uchronian temporalities, the IPCC straightens time again. 
Counter-uchronias offer either to merely amend or to symmetrically oppose 
uchronia, and remain trapped in similar paces, speeds, rhythms, pasts, presents, futures, 
linearity, teleology, futurism, and/or passéisme. I will examine below various contrasting 
examples of this, in “primitivist” or reactionary dimensions of some environmentalist 
thought and art, on the one hand (this chapter), and on the other, in the oxymoronic, 
futurist “sustainable growth” advocated – for instance – by the IPCC and some of the 
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climate sciences (chapter V). In the former examples, counter-uchronia has moderns start 
running backward, finally facing where they are running to... now rushing back after an 
equally illusory time to replace uchronian futurism (seeking a glorified past of harmony 
between “Man” and “Nature” which has never existed). In other words these examples 
are past-oriented (let us “return” to “Nature”) and they constitute themselves as reactions 
against, attempts to counter, uchronia, in symmetrically oppositional forms. In the latter 
examples meanwhile (in the case of sustainable growth), the same running forward with 
one’s back turned to the future is occurring as does with uchronian temporality, only the 
adjectival modification of growth by way of the term “sustainable” makes the running 
take the form of a series of sinuous steps or leaps, of uneasy and awkward contorsions, 
creating a choreography substantially similar to uchronia, perhaps more absurd and 
farcical. First as tragedy, then as farce. Part of the farce, I will argue, has to do with what 
I see as the truly problematic nature of a certain version of “Nature,” namely its 
temporality: when Nature is conceptualized as a teleological end, congealing a stable 
harmonious state, whether this Nature needs to be restored, conserved or returned to, 
naturalizing politics are damaging nature as becoming, nature as surprising, 
unpredictable, uncertain, unstable, the ungrounded Earth under our moving (perhaps 
dancing) feet. Consequently the problem with “Nature” is not nature: the issue lies in the 
counter-uchronian and uchronian temporalities at play to constitute this concept.  
In this chapter, I examine some instances that would have us suspect some 
environmentalisms of being merely counter-uchronian, of the sort that would risk to fall 
into or be tempted by a “backwards” movement toward an idealized past, a symmetrically 
oppositional response to progressive uchronia. I will end on the distinction between anti- 
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as antidote and counter- as reactive, as mirror. I begin this reflection with the example of 
de-growth, which privative prefix “de” raises the question of whether what is advocated 
by political ecologists and tenets of this movement is a gesture backwards, or a “return.” 
As we will see, a number of counter-uchronian dimensions may be encountered in de-
growth thought, but I will argue that they do not necessarily reside in the initially 
suspected “backwardness” (I).  
How may we then explain impressions of ecologism as potentially coterminous 
with “backwardness,” of “returns” to nature, the candle (as a symbolic tool or technology 
from an era where “Man” would allegedly have lived in harmony with “Nature”), or 
“caveman” lifestyles? Are such suspicions evidence that ecology indeed mimics 
uchronia’s linearity and teleology, only to reverse it, giving it a declentionist and 
reactionary form (counter-uchronia) that would oppose progressive and modernist 
capitalist growth qua an alleged “primitivism”? I will try to respond in part to this vast 
question, examining some of the problems involved in the very term “primitivism,” 
loaded as it is, just like progressivism, with colonial assumptions about linearity and non 
co-evalness between various cultures and modes of living. I will look into anarcho-
primitivism and deep ecology’s respective versions of the theme of a “return” to Nature 
(II). Finally, I will read Viennese artist Hundertwasser’s works (III) as symptomatic of 
temptations to “retreat” to counter-uchronia (for the time being – see chapter VI for an 
alternative reading). These various examples will hopefully show how reactionary 
counter-uchronian dimensions are sometimes present in specific currents of 
environmentalism. In concluding this chapter, returning to Nietzsche once again, I will 
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recapitulate the anti-uchronian critiques I propose with respect to “regressive” 
environmentalist counter-uchronias.  
De-growing Uchronia: Growth Objectors, Progress and Backwardness 
 




Is de-growth a form of counter-uchronia? The following will not provide a clear-cut 
answer to this question and will rather lean toward a non-conclusive negative answer. 
Instead, the goal of critically examining the “de” of “de-growth” and the objection 
practiced by those calling themselves “growth objectors”48 will be to show (or at least 
wonder) how anti-uchronian critiques can be entangled with counter-uchronian 
dimensions. This should not be surprising to anyone (self-critically) aware of the fact that 
any critique is bound to mimick and perhaps even risk reproducing its own target, 
especially when it slides toward merely oppositional perspectives, or tries to fight off 
such temptation. But if this is the case, then the distinctions that anti- and counter-
uchronia offer may seem vain, pointless, a mere play on words. However, the critique of 
critique, so as to more finely tune the latter, is rarely vain,49 especially in times of such 
high stakes as those present, when uchronia claims hegemonic status in the face of mass 
                                                        
48The phrase “growth objection” was first coined by the French constituency within the transnational de-
growth movement, to add nuance and even sometimes as a critique of the term “de-growth,” as internal to 
the movements debates emerged about how de-growth unsatisfactorily centered growth and risked 
confusing people, precisely about impressions that not wanting growth meant “going backwards.” 
Objection to growth is obviously a pun on “consciousness objection” (in French consciousness – 
conscience – and growth – croissance – rime), but it is also a way to signify that the point is not so much to 
back-track the “advance” of growth, but rather to distance ourselves from the imperative to growth, to ask 
whether it is necessary.  
49 This is where I part ways with JK Gibson-Graham (2006): abandoning critique is unhelpful at best, 
dangerous at worst. I would rather side with Gilles Deleuze’s understanding of the left as (partly) defined 
by its refusal to ever abandon critique (see also chapter VI below on this point).  
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inequalities, ecological destruction of scales capable of threatening life, or at least the 
liveability of human and nonhuman lives today and tomorrow.  
(De-growth = Backward only if Growth = Forward) 
(We Have Never Moved Forward) 
 
What hides behind the prefix “de” of “de-growth,” and the objection “objecteurs de 
croissance” strive to practice? We may recall, from chapter 1, how one of the leading 
figures of this movement, economist Serge Latouche, defended this political position 
against potential accusations to retrograde and reactionary tendencies. Yet he and other 
theorists advocating for de-growth are quite aware of the limitations of the term, which as 
they regularly remind readers, is more provocative than literal. The term “de-growth” has 
been gathering a diverse array of European (especially French, Italian, Spanish), South 
and North American groups and movements,50 often coming from or overlapping with 
the alter-globalization movement, these regions’ respective leftist movements, social 
movements such as Occupy and Indignados, political ecologists (in the lineage of Illich 
and Gorz – see chapter I). It intervenes in a uchronian sea of assumptions according to 
which growth is deemed the inevitable goal one cannot not want, raising the question of 
how to de-center this desire: the objective is consequently quite clearly anti-uchronian. 
However, de-growth economist Paul Aries himself has referred to the term “de-growth” 
as a rather “obtuse” (quoted by Latouche, 2009) one, meant to help “decolonize the Left 
from progressive imaginaries” (Latouche, 2009) rather than being a literal signifier: the 
prefix “de” should not be interpreted as implying a return, a move “backwards.” The 
                                                        
50 We may note the recent publication of a glossary of degrowth vocabulary with contributions by theorists 
from all these regions, which speaks to the diversity and vibrancy of the movement today (D’Alisa, 
Demaria, Kallis et. al., 2014).  
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question then becomes more complicated: does de-growth indeed perform such de-
colonizing, or, in attempting to do so, does it partly reproduce progressive teleological 
visions (countering uchronia yet ultimately running on the same path and in the same 
direction), or, finally, does it regress to run backward toward an also dangerously illusory 
past (reproducing uchronia insofar as it tries to take its opposite direction again on the 
same path)? 
 One is first tempted to answer unequivocally that de-growth does in fact strive to 
perform the first of these three, and there is indeed plenty of evidence within de-growth 
and growth objection discourses to attest for what I have called an “anti-uchronian” 
moment. First of all, if the “de” in “de-growth” were to be suspected of signifying a 
backward movement, it would only be in relation to the assumption that “growth” is 
indeed a movement forward, and that there is such a thing as a line threading the past, 
present and future so as to give only two possible directions to the passing of time, while 
the orientation would either be ascending or descending, and while the ascent and descent 
would be measured by growth. If on the other hand, the anti-uchronian moment of de-
growth critique were to be capacious enough to challenge this assumption, what is being 
undone by the “de” in “de-growth” would not necessarily result in it running backwards. 
Thus we need to examine de-growth’s anti-uchronian moment first, to then turn to its 
programmatic moment and how or whether it may be assimilated to a backward 
movement. De-growth anti-uchronia offers many layers, at mundane, minute and also 
larger scales, and focused on consumption as well as production. Here de-growth critique 
does not simply imply a return, or a reversal of ongoing trends. In a text titled Manifeste 
Utopia signed collectively by members of this movement and recently re-published after 
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participatory democratic re-drafting (2012), the authors call for a radical 
reconceptualization of our “relationship to time” (rapport au temps). This critique 
operates simultaneously at the quotidian and the larger scales, taking on the notion of 
progress along with daily activities, both being equally in need of rethinking with respect 
urgencies and priorities.  
Anti-Uchronian De-growth From Quotidian to Historic Time 
 
Quotidian temporalities are critiqued from the perspective of work and productivism, as 
well as consumerism. The Manifeste Utopia denounces capitalist economies’ equation of 
personal fulfillment with consumption and work. Yet the fluctuations of consumers’ 
buying power and the constant creation of more needs by a society that’s also one of 
spectacle creates the impossibility to satiate the imperative to consume. The only good 
consumer becomes the frustrated, never satisfied consumer, compulsively and 
impulsively quenching part of her thirst in quick moments, brief durations of time, when 
buying, partly and never completely soothes the pain. From the perspective of my 
conceptualization of anti-uchronia, we may see in this critique an insightful denunciation 
of the forever postponed, self-feeding promises of capitalist economies, along with fast 
paces and high speeds (all defining traits of uchronia). Consumers run after a future 
satisfaction that is always postponed, a time with no time.  
The same goes with the productivism characteristic of capitalist economies: 
Manifeste Utopia calls for questioning “the value of work,” which tends to monopolize 
quotidian time: I’ll work until exhaustion and sleep when I die, because working always 
more hours is both the key to and the sign of success, virtue, fulfillment, etc. Here our 
growth objectors underscore the ethical stakes, pointing out that the quantity of time 
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spent working is taken, in capitalist contexts, to be an indicator of individual virtue, 
morality, etc. Thus quotidian temporalities and the critique both of the relentless paces 
and speeds of consumerism, along with rhythms, durations and hours generated by 
productivism, are an essential part of the objection to growth critique, even when it does 
not make temporality as central as I make it here, and even when the elements described 
above are sometimes scattered in the text rather than thematized under the rubric of 
temporality. One is not hard-pressed to find numerous excerpts in the text that stress the 
question of time in a manner that I would describe as anti-uchronian.51 For instance, 
bringing together the critique of productivist and of consumerist times, we find 
statements such as: 
We wish to promote a management of time that, throughout life, would allow 
everyone to articulate daily both their professional life and other times of their 
life, or to interrupt their work so as to dedicate themselves to personal and 
collective projects. (2013, p. 42)52 
The proposal is to change priorities, rhythms, and paces so as to slow down and live more 
liveable lives, and this resolution is visibly tied to an anti-uchronian resolution to reinvent 
temporality, as here the emphasis is on the possibility for other possible temporal orders. 
Manifeste Utopia also examines another anti-uchronian aspect of objection to 
growth critiques of temporalities: the authors raise the larger-scale temporal question of 
what they call “the ideology of progress.” In their view, progress is “erected as value,” to 
the point of “subjecting man instead of serving him” (p. 43). Along with growth 
                                                        
51 We must note here that the more than 200-page manifesto does include one short section in a chapter 
which focuses solely on the question of time, while the claims I am synthesizing and commenting on here 
are also spread across the text. One may thus read this as at least one of the many threads that run across the 
overall argument. Here I choose to provide a reading from the perspective of temporality.  
52 NB: this and all the following translations of this text are my own. 
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objectors’ self-proclamation as “utopians,” the humanist and gendered language 
mobilized in this critique contributes, as I will discuss below, to the counter-uchronian 
moment in the text. Yet the denunciation of progress offered testifies of this manifesto’s 
anti-uchronian character as well, pointing to how both facets may indeed cohabit in one 
single text.On the anti-uchronian front still, Manifeste Utopia goes on to claim that: 
Since the industrial revolution, our cultural history has had us believe that our 
civilization inexorably follows an ascending slope, a temporal linearity which has no 
more limits than growth does. The critique of a certain relationship to temporality and 
to “meaning” seems central to us. The renewal of modern political thought indeed 
relies upon taking finitude into account as well as plurality in relationships to the 
world. (2013, p. 46) 
After showing the relation between temporalities of work and morality, here we see an 
attention to temporalities and meaning. Both of these insights, as we have seen and will 
examine again with regards to the Nietzschean notion of eternal return’s pertinence to 
anti-uchronia, seem to be at odds with the idea that this manifesto may risk to reproduce a 
linear, teleological and progressive form of uchronia. This critique of progressivism is 
two-fold: it targets both a futurism (the subjection of the present to an abstract future), as 
well as a “relationship to time [that is] turned to immediacy and ephemerality.” Building 
on Illich’s work, the text underscores thresholds beyond which “medicine is a nuisance to 
health, speed has us waste time, school makes us ignorant, communication is so invasive 
that one does not understand anything anymore” (Mouvement Utopia, 2013; see also 





Counter-Uchronian Moments: Between Progression and Regression 
 
In spite of these anti-uchronian elements though, at times the Manifeste Utopia seems to 
merely inverse the linearity and teleology of growth denounced, keeping it intact in this 
linear and teleological form by glorifying a past that would allegedly be (or have been) 
both more natural and more humanist, resulting to an extent in a counter-uchronian 
declentionist narrative as well as a call for “returns.” At other times, the Manifeste Utopia 
also reproduces the form of uchronia, to propose a counter-uchronian progressive 
alternative. In addition, the explicit claim of objection to growth politics as “utopian” all 
the way to the title of the text indicates the concession to a certain abstraction and the fact 
that a program situated outside or beyond necessity and reality remains present.  
 Some passages in the text may indeed incite to confirm the suspicions to a 
declentionist or backward-oriented perspective which de-growth’s prefix first created. 
Indeed, growth objection as reflected in the Manifeste Utopia resorts to teleological 
origin points reminiscent of a quasi-Rousseauist narrative. When denouncing 
consumerism, we find the claim that “the logic of needs, originally natural, has expanded 
itself to the totality of human desires…” (p. 32) or the critique of the Left as succumbing 
to progressive perspectives and to productivism, but insofar as it “claims a lineage 
whereby the meaning of the history of man would be to humanize the natural, to model it, 
to push aside the world’s animality” (p. 38). Of course this last statement may be read as 
encouraging a challenge against the human/nature dualism, denouncing both it and its 
association with a future/past dualism, and/or a dualism opposing archaism to modernity. 
Yet this challenge tends to be formulated as though the implication was one of return, 
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reversal, with little to no further deconstruction of the dualisms under discussion. The 
possibility that the world may be (re)composed of hybrids, a mesh of strange strangers 
(Morton, 2010) neither human nor natural, or perhaps too much of both, or perhaps never 
having been either even when claims were made to the contrary, is nowhere to be found 
in the text.  
 Yet these slippages to a form of declentionist narrative and a temptation to merely 
reverse the path, reverse the human/nonhuman relation associated with modernity, are 
also complicated by the opposite but equally counter-uchronian impulse: in a both 
humanist and naturalist tone, Manifeste Utopia wishes for “tools and technologies” to 
“serve people rather than the reverse.” But again, what if we had always been hybrids, 
never been modern, never been quite so human? What if “Nature” was a form of 
technology (Haraway, 1989), and of recent invention at that? These questions are left 
unaddressed. The text also claims its utopian nature even though it opens with the incipit 
quote (stolen above here, to open this section) by surrealist poet Paul Eluard: “there is 
undeniably another world, but it is inside this one” (Eluard, 1968, p. 986).53 Interestingly, 
the growth-objecting authors admit to the risk of mimicking the very target of their 
critique and struggles: “the mimetic temptation mustn’t lead de-growth activists toward 
the detrimental logic of a new ‘de-growth ideology’” (Mouvement Utopia, 2013, p. 27). 
Also interestingly, the text presumes that capitalist economies are founded upon a form of 
utopianism as well: “the capitalist utopia of illimited material growth is leading us right 
into a wall” (p. 23). If there is mimickry then, the imitation is partly conscious and even 
                                                        
53 The Manifeste Utopia quotes Eluard, but the famous poet himself was quoting French writer Albert 
Beguin, quoting the scientist, writer and philosopher Ignaz-Vitalis Troxler: “There is undeniably another 
world, but it is within this one, and to attain its perfection it must be recognized and one must engage in its 




intentional. And if capitalist economies make claims to reality, de-growth advocates 
know better. Then why still resort to utopia to describe their own project?  
 Ultimately, the counter-uchronian dimension of de-growth arguments defended in 
this manifesto does not simply reside in a form of alleged backwardness, a desire to start 
running back, inverting the direction or running backwards in a race initially moving 
toward the future with our backs turned to it, as moderns tend to do according to Latour. 
The goal is not to start running to a glorious and idealized past, although to an extent that 
is not entirely excluded either. Again, some parts of the text call for restoring a lost 
“naturalness” in human interactions and modes of living, as well as a lost humanity, a 
humaneness, a humanism. Though no simplistic “return to nature” is praised, one senses 
a partly declentionist account of history, when attacks are made against “the ideology of 
progress” as betraying and subjecting both “man” and an originary  “nature” to a 
dangerously abstracted future, hopelessly defying material limits. In contrast, some other 
parts in the text claim a certain artificialism drawing complicatedly from both old and 
new, asserting the impossibility and improbability of running back, of simply turning 
back the clocks of progress. Yet this artificialism is indeed imbued with a humanism and 
a concept of “Nature” reminiscent of… moderns’ justifications of progress. Thus both 
futurist and retrograde moments and movements, both forms of counter-uchronias, are 
present in the text, along with helpful critical gestures that may be described as anti-
uchronian, and anti-utopian assertions that the “other world” is “within this one,” that 
linearity and temporality do not sit well together, that the world is plural, and that 




Reversing and Deepening Uchronia: 
Anarcho-Primitivism and Deep Ecology’s Counter-Uchronitis 
 
The best thing we can do with environmentalists is 
shoot them… They are Luddites marching us back 
to the 18th century. 
Michael O’Leary, chief executive officer at Ryanair  
 
 
De-growth, as discussed above, illustrates that reducing critiques of progress formulated 
by various currents of environmental thought to declentionist, decadentist, backward calls 
to rush away from modernity would be simplistic at best. Yet, greens have been 
caricatured as “primitivists” calling for a return to caveman life and ‘the candle,’ 
arguably much beyond any claims they themselves have been making. The image of 
backwardness of dark green agendas is surely amplified by the sensitivity of the critiques 
made, with respect to questions of (sacro-sanct) consumerist lifestyles, for instance. The 
violent, defensive and paranoid tone of the above quote by Michael O’Leary illustrates 
this. In addition, in contexts of capitalist economies, contexts where temporality takes a 
uchronian form, the reflex of casting any critics of modernity as “backward” is, to an 
extent, expectable. In other words, in worlds that conceive, idealize and experience 
temporality as linear, teleological, progressive, futurist (in the sense that it is subjected to 
an abstract, impossible, ou-chronian, future), imagining any objection to progress as 
being strictly oppositional and thus operating on the same track only backwards, is a most 
logical assumption. Many environmental activists, beyond eclectic currents within the 
movement, would probably agree that they have encountered multiple times this type of 
fearful and angry response to their arguments regarding limits to growth (something in 
the aggressively derisive vein of: “at this rate, do you want me to give up all my comfort 
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and go back to prehistory?”). Thus the stereotyping of environmentalists as solely 
declentionist and regressive advocates of an illusory golden past of harmony with nature, 
desirous of returning to the cave and/or candle (depending on when that harmonious past 
may be situated) often performs the role of a discrediting strawman mobilized by 
detractors of certain radical green politics who cannot but imagine an alternative to 
uchronia as taking on the same teleological form, only in reverse (a counter-uchronian 
form). This may distort or exaggerate the extent to which past-oriented counter-uchronias 
are present in environmentalist imaginaries, and quite conveniently portrays 
environmentalist times as belonging to a remote, utopian past. If we can disentangle 
aspects of environmentalist claims that risk being easily dismissed with accusations of 
being retrograde and naively praising a return to a past that has never existed (counter-
uchronia), from powerful, compelling and needed (anti-uchronian) critiques of progress, 
and if we can distinguish between the extent to which detractors of environmentalism 
portray it as a counter-uchronian regression, and the actual (or virtual) ways in which 
some currents or dimensions of environmentalist discourses do indeed fall into this trap, 
then anti-uchronian critique may be more finely tuned.  
Some currents within the recent history of ecosophy didin fact evoke themes of 
“return” more unambiguously and unapologetically than others, and among these 
nature/return lovers, various figures and schools of thought ventured more or less far into 
the past on a cursor of how much “going back” to “Nature” is allegedly necessary.Some 
of these decadentist or declentionist narratives were indeed just as caricatural as, almost 
reversed mirror-images of, uchronian progress narratives and their assumptions that 
capitalist growth measures the good life. They too, took the form of a desire for a 
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timeless time, a time outside of time. In what follows I will examine two examples of 
this, first turning to the anarcho-primitivism of John Zerzan, who continues to write well 
after the boom (and decline) of this movement – a movement whose most famous figure 
may have been the Unabomber (boom indeed). I will then turn to a movement that also 
has its roots in the 1980s though it too is still influential among dark greens, and which I 
have already discussed in chapter 1: namely, deep ecology indeed slips toward themes of 
“return” to “Nature” quite often – in fact deep ecology and anarcho-primitivism have 
sometimes overlapped, in the sense that, for instance, eco-terrorism draws from both 
currents. Reciprocally, deep ecologist Arne Naess has occasionally praised monkey-
wrenchers’ ‘propaganda by the deed’ type of methods,54 and anarcho-primitivism 
sometimes draws from a deep ecology ontology and ethics. Deep ecology’s counter-
uchronitis is arguably more subtle than anarcho-primitivism’s, yet both can be versions of 
a reply to, and a reversed replica of, uchronia, i.e here I read them as instances of 
counter-uchronias.  
Anarcho-Primitivism: After Language All Went Awry 
 
In Primitivism: An Illusion with No Future, Stephen Booth vehemently attacks anarcho-
primitivism with tirades only a fellow green anarchist could address to his comrades, yet 
in so doing, he also provocatively encapsulates what I would call the“counter-uchronian” 
issues with the anarcho-primitivism of a John Zerzan or Unabomber Ted Kaczynski. In 
Booth’s view, anarcho-primitivism was a “complete failure” because it busied itself:  
                                                        
54 An exhaustive, and much more precise description of the lineages would not be feasible here. But it is 
worth noting that not all monkey-wrenchers would identify as anarcho-greens. The relation I am pointing to 
specifically here, is that qua a repertoire of action and discourse partly inherited from left-libertarian 
propaganda by the deed, direct action, illegalism, and though they cannot be reduced to this influence, 
monkey wrenchers who also often turn to deep ecology for philosophical influences are one instance which 
link the two currents of ecosophy together.  
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proclaiming etiological myths about the palaeolithic origins of our present 
problems in agriculture or in symbolization, and an eschatology of collapsing 
civilization, empty supermarket shelves and failing electricity supplies; leading on 
to the language-less bliss of non-hierarchical oneness with each other and our 
eventual merger with the primal wilderness. (Booth, 2015, p. 2)55 
Further clarification of this angry tirade is of course needed, but the essential traits of the 
anarcho-primitivism defended by someone like John Zerzan are indeed well captured: in 
Zerzan’s view, humanity started to err and create the conditions for our current ecological 
crisis and unequal, violent society, when sedentary agriculture replaced nomadic hunter-
gatherer lifestyles, when language emerged (and the reign of the symbolic severed 
humans’ relations to their own bodies, corporeality, sensuality, nature, etc), when gender 
emerged to inaugurate millenia of division among humans, a decay into difference, 
hierarchy and inequality. Late capitalist societies are thus doomed to catastrophically fail 
in ensuring survival, and they worsen even more the grasp of the symbolic over human 
beings, with the “tired communication” via emails and such digital technologies 
ceaselessly cutting us off further even from the immediacy of material experience.  
 Zerzan denounces in one fell swoop everything that came after sedentarization, 
agriculture and language, depicting language and any representation, i.e “the symbolic” at 
large, as nothing but a form of emprisonment and alienation from the real, from the 
immediacy of sensory experience. He equates language to a form of disembodiement, as 
an “all-defining imprisonment, rather than liberatory triumph.” The invention and 
dissemination of language is guilty for “subordinating natural systems that humankind 
                                                        
55 For more on anarcho-primitivism see for instance Gagliano, 2010; Zerzan, 2002; 2005; 1994; Kaczynski, 
2005. More pacifist versions of this eclectic movement include Jacques Ellul (1964), who was quite close 
in many respects to Ivan Illich and influences the political ecology movement in France to this day.  
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was once attuned to,” and it is coterminous with the loss of the world. This decay 
culminates with the modes of communication now commonly used at least among the 
most privileged segments of a globalized world’s populations, namely the internet, digital 
communications in general: “human connectedness and corporeal immediacy have been 
traded for a faded sense of reality.”  
At no point does Zerzan consider the possibility that language, along with other 
technologies and modes of communication and representation, may perform empowering 
or emancipatory functions as well, or connect humans among themselves, or to some 
extent, play a part (positive or negative) in new kinds of “transcorporeality.” The latter 
concept, which belongs to environmentalist feminist Stacy Alaimo, is an interesting 
contrast to Zerzan’s hypothetical “corporeality”’s and its alleged purity from any 
linguistic dimension. Alaimo’s “transcorporeality” (2010) includes performativity, in its 
discursive and material dimensions, instead of falling in the trap Zerzan leaps into, where 
the realm of the linguistic is so neatly separated from bodily natures. In his account, 
anything “symbolic” is inevitably and profoundly flawed, alienating. Thus Zerzan blames 
every evil on language, leaping from the invention of language to nation-states and 
nationalism for instance. Though he certainly has a point that nationalism has relied on a 
certain language, vocabulary or discourse and the imposition of certain “national” 
languages being imposed to create specific national subjects, this example (among others) 
reveals the shortcomings in Zerzan’s decadentist vision of human history: no mention is 
made of languages that were violently erased to make nation-states and their 
monolingualism possible. The distinction underscored by Ivan Illich (2013), between 
vernacular languages and knowledges on the one hand, and standardized, commodified 
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language is silenced to enable a smooth causality, an equation going from the original sin 
of inventing language and the symbolic, directly to violent and alienating ends.  
Thus the account proposed is a teleological one, the exact inverse of the most 
caricatural progress narratives: where uchronian temporalities reduce all of time passing 
to a march of progress, flattening bumps, contradictions and contingencies on the way, 
Zerzan reduces all events in human history to a downwards fall away from nature. Here 
Zerzan also reveals a reactionary, reifying and caricatural idealization of indigenous 
modes of living as closer than Western modernity allegedly is to this originary and pure 
nature of the past, citing for instance how some indigenous people (the mention is often 
vague) recognize the existence of reality beyond language. These, he claims, have the 
merit of acknowledging that language is inadequate to account for all of reality and what 
Western conceptions would call “nature” (the quotation marks are mine though, as 
Zerzan is blind to the fact that many of the indigenous people he refers to do not have a 
term for “nature”). Yet, an important detail is missing from this claim as well: namely the 
distinction between rejecting language at large, as though it were fundamentally flawed 
and always already synonymous of corruption or “denaturing,” and simply (humbly) 
acknowledging that human language has limits as to what it may represent or express. 
This point is exemplary of a number of twists in Zerzan’s regressive counter-uchronian 
argument which are founded on a caricatural depiction of “indigenous people” at large, 
“hunter-gatherer tribes” in general, supposed to represent a time passed and 
extinguishing, that we moderns should long for nostalgically as it was so much closer to a 
perfect, pristine and harmonious relationship with the natural. Thus indigenous and non-
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Western ways of life are lumped together with nature, the whole being in turn thrown to a 
remote past.  
 In Zerzan’s declentionist narrative, language, sedentarization and agriculture also 
inaugurated or coincided with the apparition of gender. This to the anarcho-primitivist is 
also a marker for what we may ironically call the “original sin” that allegedly caused our 
decay and lead to the modern ecologically destructive world we now live in (the indeed 
ironic parallels between Zerzan’s declentionism and some forms of religious 
eschatological narratives are numerous). The beginnings of the Paleolithic and 
sedentarization inaugurate a “shift from the non-separated, non hierarchized life” 
(Zerzan, 2008, p. 16) to modes of living reliant upon hierarchy and domination, with the 
originary form of such domination being founded in gender. To Zerzan, “the general 
crisis of modernity has its roots in the imposition of gender” (p. 18). Interestingly, to an 
anti-feminist writer he quotes as praising cranes as (allegedly) male-invented 
technologies and claiming that "if civilization had been left in female hands, we would 
still be living in huts" (p. 18). Zerzan responds that "to some of us 'grass huts' represents 
‘not taking the wrong path’” (ibid.) The objection is not about denouncing a hasty 
assimilation of a certain mode of living with femininity and another modern one with 
masculinity, with each term in this strange equation, and the interdependent dualisms 
constituting these terms, placed under critical scrutiny. Instead, Zerzan affirms and 
celebrates a supposed (essentialist) anti-technological femininity. Nature or language-less 
oneness, femininity or genderlessness, are deemed to all belong to a past Zerzan longs for 
us to run back to. “The symbolic” (language, science, the arts…) is seen as having 
emerged with gender which itself emerged with agriculture which altogether created a 
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world of destruction and domination, and Zerzan calls for our running back to a 
genderless, a-symbolic oneness: for instance, according to him "there is no evidence of 
symbolic activity (e.g cave paintings) until the gender system" (p. 12). Apparently the 
only way to get out of a world based on domination and violence and return to blissful 
primitive ways is to give up on both gender and art, in one fell swoop: let’s throw the 
creative baby with the gendered bath water.    
 Zerzan’s eschatology and his denunciation of “dis-embodied high-tech futures” 
suggests apocalyptic ends, as Stephen Booth’s summary above graphically describes 
(“collapsing civilization, empty supermarket shelves and failing electric supplies”). 
Though he is most vague about such apocalypse, the decay seems to eventually bring 
humans full circle, to a redeeming a-linguistic oneness supplanting the separated dis-
embodied denatured humans: “the wholeness of original genderlessness may be a 
prescription for our redemption” (p. 18). Ultimately, we have oneness, non-hierarchical 
and sensory, a-linguistic, a-symbolic hunter-gatherer simple modes of living in perfect 
union with nature and bodily reality, which belong to a remote past, being destroyed and 
separated, hierarchized, alienated the minute agriculture, gender and language came 
about, then a long downhill evolution where humans are increasingly de-humanized and 
de-natured, and finally a grand collapse closing the cycle to bring us back to a form of 
second state of nature and oneness. This narrative is of course highly reminiscent of 
Rousseau’s Discourse on Inequalities (1984), where the good savage of the ideal state of 
nature was corrupted by the invention of property and civil society (and we may 
remember that Rousseau also includes language, knowledge, the arts in this downward 
slope), the emergence of social inequalities, to then decay into an increasingly violent 
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state, where one hopes for a second state of nature to come.56 At least one major 
difference is striking however: besides the fact that Rousseau’s historical context was 
immensely different, the XVIIIth century contractualist also famously recognized how 
little was known about the origins of civil society, and that his discourse was to a great 
extent speculative. Proposing to “begin by laying facts aside,” Rousseau specified that 
“the investigations [he] may enter into … must not be considered as historical truths, but 
only as mere conditional and hypothetical reasonings, rather calculated to explain the 
nature of things” (p.109). Zerzan’s account reifies and idealizes hunter-gatherers as good 
savages united to nature in a different way, as he allegedly grounds this depiction on 
anthropological and archeological research, and yet importantly, he intervenes after so 
much has been discussed and contested to shake any uncritical mobilization of terms like 
“primitive” and “civilization.” Of course Rousseau is not merely excused his colonial 
assumptions due to his context, and the fact that he raised an appraisive voice with 
respect to non-Western modes of living in a context where non-Western people were 
barely considered human is not either an excuse for his ‘kind’ racism. Yet Zerzan’s 
caricatures and equations lumping non-Western/genderlessness/past/Nature all in one 
basket seem quite naïve and dangerous in a new way. His declentionist, reactionary 
counter-uchronia incites the reader to desire apocalyptic destruction of all that is present 
and/or recent to “return” to hypothetical better times, constructed on the basis of 
dangerous assumptions regarding “the primitive” and “civilization.” Zerzan’s example of 
counter-uchronia reveals some aspects of the problematic nature of “primitivism,” the 
colonial legacy of this adjective, whether it is used appraisively or negatively. This point 
                                                        
56Rousseau does suggest though, that democracy would be the closest civil societal state to a harmonious 
second state of nature.  
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illustrates how progressivism and primitivism, uchronia and regressive counter-uchronia, 
in fact converge to “deny co-evalness” (Fabian, 2014) to non-Western traditions and 
ways of life. Zerzan’s anarcho-primitivism is therefore exemplary of what I would call 
regressive counter-uchronia. Zerzan sees progress and capitalist growth as untenable (in 
this respect his premise is anti-uchronian), yet resorts to a mere symmetrical opposite to 
fight progressivism with: primitivism is key to him because it simply reverses the 
supposed march of progress, it turns that teleology upside down, yet replicates the 
linearity. Ultimately, his “primitivist” counter-uchronia uncritically transforms the 
“tomorrow everything will be fine and abundant” into a “yesterday everything was happy 
and simple.”  
Deep Ecology Back to the Future Primitive 
 
Another instance of current within ecosophy that contains counter-uchronian dimensions 
would be deep ecology. To some extent this movement overlaps with anarcho-
primitivism, though we will see that deep ecology does not propose quite the same kind 
of clearly reactionary reading of human history. Neither does it deploy themes of “return” 
to “nature” in quite the same manner. But the first striking difference between the two 
movements probably has to do with the fact that, though anarcho-primitivism has 
occasionally enjoyed a certain notoriety partly thanks to eco-terrorist actions and such 
spectaculars (e.g Ted Kaczynski), within dark green activist groups the ranks of those 
influenced by, or identifying to deep ecology are significantly more important. For these 
different reasons, both movements’ counter-uchronian dimensions deserve examination.  
Timothy Luke (2002) has situated deep ecology as follows: 
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The deep ecology movement grew during the 1970s as a reaction against 
reformist environmentalism. …The most well-know figures in deep ecology – 
such as Warwick Fox, Arne Naess, Bill Devall, George Sessions – aggressively 
staked out difficult conceptual positions in their own complex philosophical 
approaches to nature protection that have only proven to have other severe ethical, 
political and social limits. Yet the influence of deep ecology now plainly extends 
beyond the philosophical analysis of nature… Deep ecology principles sustain 
innumerable local, regional, national, and even transnational political action 
groups all around the world. 
Luke then goes on to cite Friends of the Earth!, Greenpeace, the monkey wrenchers, 
various green political parties in North America, Australia, Western Europe and Japan, 
Earth First!, and many others as having been significantly impacted by deep ecology 
ideas and ideals, this influence being still palpable today.  
I have already evoked the works of Arne Naess, the author who coined the phrase 
“deep ecology,” in chapter 1. I then noted how this current insists that all natural things 
have “intrinsic value” rather than merely instrumental value in serving human needs. We 
may remember that it is on this basis that deep ecology justifies calls to “protect,” 
“conserve,” “preserve,” “restore” nature – a past-oriented paternalism close to that of the 
conservation movement (there is a lot of overlap between the two traditions as well). 
Further, we have seen that deep ecology, like a number of other ecosophical schools of 
thought, emphasizes urgency, sustainability and future generations: the temporal is 
consequently an important dimension of deep ecologist thought. 
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To an extent, deep ecology differs from the vague apocalyptic visions anarcho-
primitivism offers with respect to the future: it imagines what I would call non-uchronian 
futures. In this respect, deep ecology is quite far from regressive or reactionary counter-
uchronias. For instance, Arne Naess stresses the urgency of projecting ecological 
imagination into “the twenty-second century,” which he envisions by way of multiple 
future scenarios he situates “in 2101.” To conjure pessimistic “doomsday prophets,” 
Naess claims that deep ecology “has a mission, however modest, in shaping a future that 
is not remote. Just a couple of hundred years” (Naess, 2008, p. 312). Naess thus 
multiplies broadly described possibilities for the future, a multitude I’ve called anti-
uchronian in the previous chapter (when discussing the multiple scenarios imagined by 
the IPCC):  
1. No major change in ecological policies or the extent of poverty. An ecological 
catastrophe occurs because of the slowly accumulating effects of a century of 
ecological folly. The dramatic situation forces new ecologically strict policies, 
perhaps through undemocratic, even brutal dictatorial military means used by rich 
countries. 
2. The same development except for a major change in the poor countries: 
considerable economic growth of the Western kind. Five times as many people 
live unsustainably. A breakdown follows very soon, and harsh measures are 
applied to fight chaos and to start a decrease of unsustainability. 
3. A couple of similar developments, ending in catastrophic and chaotic 
conditions and subsequent harsh, brutal policies implemented by the most 
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powerful states. There is a turn toward sustainability, but only after enormous 
devastation.  
4. Ecological enlightenment, a realistic appreciation of the drastic reduction in 
life quality, an increased influence of deep ecological attitude, a slow decrease of 
the sum total of unsustainability.  The planet follows a trend of decreasing 
unsustainability discernible in the year 2101. (Naess, 2008, p. 310) 
Of course these future scenarios are not devoid of doomsday dimensions: in all first three, 
Naess imagines catastrophe, brutality, chaos and anti-democratic measures dictated by 
the increased gravity of the crisis. These descriptions certainly have the (anti-uchronian) 
merit of underscoring the multiplicity of possible futures ahead, and of ending with the 
envisioning of a possible deep ecological future. This at least depicts the future as open to 
several routes, a much needed multiplicity that at least partly parts ways from a single 
linear vision. Furthermore, Naess insists that for this deep ecological future to come into 
being, “every week counts,” this emphasis on relating present urgency to possibilities for 
more sustainable futures qualifying to an extent as what I will call (see chapter VI) 
“synchrony.” However, what would this future then entail, and what does Naess (along 
with other deep ecology thinkers) picture the deep ecological future to look like? What 
does Naess have in mind when he refers to the “deep ecological attitude” that may 
permeate his fourth scenario, and does such attitude entail a counter-uchronian “return” 
to “nature”?  
I want to suggest that the deep ecological notions of “intrinsic value” and 
“ecological self” rely upon images of a “return” to “purer” subjectivities. Thus at the 
ontological level, deep ecology’s essentialist tendencies position this movement closer to 
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what I call counter-uchronia. In addition, this comes with the notion and praise of a 
counter-uchronian “future primitive” just as problematic as the primitivism of anarchist 
John Zerzan discussed above.  
In deep ecologists’ accounts, one trait of deep ecological thought distinguishes it 
clearly from other branches of ecosophy (though some, often deep ecologists themselves, 
also claim or assume that deep ecology is the only philosophical foundation of ecology 
and environmentalism). Arne Naess and others are careful to repeat regularly that deep 
ecology is difficult to define in rigid terms, and advance that it cannot be reduced to a 
fixed set of principles, let alone one principle. However, one notion, in the last analysis, 
is reiterated and returned to over and over, deep ecologists ultimately granting it the 
status of principal distinction: namely, deep ecology advocates that nature and all natural 
things have intrinsic value beyond instrumental use serving human needs. As Reed and 
Rosenthal have summarized, for instance, “some lands might be preserved for their own 
sake, giving nature value in itself, independent of human need” (Reed and Rosenthal, 
1993, p. 1). 
The first consequence of this is that it often results in a portrayal of nature as 
relatively stable, as coming into equilibrium if only humans were to interfere in it 
significantly less or not at all. As William Connolly sums up, deep ecology “emphasizes 
the gradual self-maintaining character of nonhuman processes if and when the human 
footprint is light” (Connolly, forthcoming). In other words, nature somehow changes little 
when left untouched by bipeds’ prehensible hands and their tools. Nature supposedly 
tends toward harmony, stability, and to do so privileges biodiversity (all these claims 
being amply contradicted by lots of ecosystems and events which rather make a case for 
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what Connolly calls “bumpy temporalities”). This alleged equilibrium in circumstances 
of human non-intervention, grants deep ecological “Nature” a sort of originary status, or 
at least a relative stability and staticity that most (scientific) ecologists would likely agree 
does not exist. Queer ecology has also taught us about the surprisingly unstable, ever-
changing, unpredictable and queer ways of nonhumans, which shed doubt to this deep 
ecological portrayal (Hird, 2010). Thus we see how deep ecology assumes a nonhuman 
temporality that is somehow coterminous with stability, longevity, reliability and 
predictability. In addition, the biocentric, mere reversal of the human/nonhuman dualism 
(as opposed to a deconstruction of the two terms and their relation advocated for instance 
by ecofeminist Val Plumwood, 2002) strengthens the depiction of “Nature” as originary. 
Natural things, be they living beings, landscapes, rocks, etc, come before human ones, in 
both sense of this conjunction: nature before man, chronologically, and also in terms of 
importance. Of course the point of a critique of this counter-uchronian account is not to 
contest or deny that nonhumans existed long before humans in history. But the moral 
grounding and the organization of value according to this chronological order and this 
alleged state of stability and equilibrium are reminiscent of a certain uchronia, only 
turned upside-down, or “forward-back,”i.e a counter-uchronia. We humans – the exact 
meaning, complexity and contestability of this category is barely touched by deep 
ecologists – allegedly are situated on a line which has an origin in a past stable and 
harmonious moment, just like narratives of growth-driven progress may present us with a 
line going toward a fictitious end of abundance and satisfaction never attained, yet always 
justifying a certain organization of values in the present.  
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 What then is to be done, according to this counter-uchronian ontology? Devall 
and Sessions preach for privileging “basic intuitions and experiencing ourselves and 
Nature” (in Clowney, Mosto et al., 2009, p. 213) which allegedly should result in what 
Arne Naess has called “self-realization and biocentric equality” (Naess, 2008). It is when 
this nurturing of an “ecological self” breaking away from “materialist egos” is evoked 
that we find the most striking rhetoric of return being deployed. Naess for instance claims 
enthusiastically that “[going] to a cabin for a weekend is to return to a less complicated 
way of life more in touch with nature” (Naess, 2008, p. 22) Such “retreats” into “Nature” 
are of course evocative of Thoreau’s utopia of one and his Walden Pond cabin, as well as 
a long tradition of outdoor recreation and conservation ethics where the wilderness is 
taken to foster a certain sense of manly self at one with his environment (Haraway, 
1989). Nature (for leisure rather than labor) provides eternal truths and its pristine images 
experienced on one’s own in isolated hiking trips offer opportunities for “materialist 
egos” to be replaced by the ecological self, at one with the nonhuman world. This kind of 
sense of self is interpreted as the only one capable of intuiting the intrinsic value of all 
living beings’ vital needs now perennially secured. Going “back” to nature and finding 
inner essence so as to “sustain” vital needs for future generations to come all the way to 
the 22nd century produces a temporality shaped so as to counter uchronia, where what is 
imagined as the eternal laws of a mythical past project individuals to a “future primitive,” 
to use deep ecologist Warwick Fox’s formulation. Individual spiritual growth supplants 
capitalist growth, and the forward thinking of deep ecologists requires a turning back to 
nature, envisioned as relatively static.  
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 What then, does this “future primitive” look like? The oxymoronic phrase of 
course underscores the tension in this counter-uchronia, and just like anarcho-primitivist 
Zerzan’s grandiloquent narrative of decay and eventual collapse came full circle to evoke 
a dramatic return to age-old ways, deep ecology’s prescriptive moment is not only 
suggestive of a return at the level of individual subjectivities, as we just saw. It is also 
accompanied with occasional mentions of a supposed “return” to ways of living broadly 
depicted as pertaining to what some deep ecologists call “the minority tradition” (Devall 
& Sessions,1985). This refers to so-called “primal” human traditions that have been 
minoritized as a result of productivist societies’ hegemony, which entails a re-
enchantment of the world and a re-sacralization of ancient ties to natural beings and 
things, the possibility for personal growth in small communities living in “simple” ways, 
cultivating ecological consciousness and attachments to place. What indeed defines the 
ecological self is that the place in which one lives, along with its ecology, becomes part 
of oneself, an integrated whole. The problem is, according to deep ecology some aspects 
of German romanticism, Native American cultures, indigenous cultures in myriad places 
not always specified, cultures that pre-date capitalism’s emergence, Buddhism and 
various “oriental” traditions, etc, are all lumped together to constitute “the minority 
tradition.” The long list assembled by deep ecology would be quite rich and highly 
helpful if it wasn’t for the fact of homogenizing, orientalizing so-called minority 
traditions – note that Devall and Sessions in fact use the singular – and associating them 
to the past, to non-Western, non- or anti- modernity, without further ado regarding the 
possibility that “we” may never have been modern, and with little attention to what “the 
West” may mean. As was the case with Zerzan’s counter-uchronia, the colonial 
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undertones of this sweeping collection of influences come from an implicit and assumed 
denial of co-evalness (Fabian, 2014) between various cultures that are in fact 
contemporaries (e.g. some Native American cultures with “Western” ones), along with an 
assumption of coevalness where there may have been violent extinctions for some, 
persistence for others, etc. This move is interestingly shared by deep ecology’s 
temporalities and those it denounces, driven by growth, which makes the former earn the 
qualification as counter-uchronian, merely attempting to “reverse” the course of uchronia 
yet leaving intact the assumption that such a course exists as well as the linear and 
teleological form of this course. A mythical past is homogenized, reifying and fetishized, 
to aspire to re-instate just like uchronian temporalities may aspire to abstract futures. One 
interesting anti-uchronian point here is evaded, namely the possibility (likelihood?) that 
there may not be anything to “reverse,” as, to paraphrase Latour once more, we have 
never indeed been modern.  
Tim Luke has called Deep Ecology  
dangerous. Because of its qualities, deep ecology tends to ring up politically as a 
form of utopian ecologism.  As a utopia, the imagination [thus] articulated 
presents some alluring moral prospects for what might be. At the same time, they 
fail to outline practicable means for realizing these moral visions. Deep ecologists 
are trapped by endorsing new images for new “ecotopias,” but they do not have a 
very practical program for anything their visions of future primitive reinhabitation 
or bioregional community building. Political action is pushed off into the realm of 
ethical ideals, making it every individual’s moral duty to change himself …. —
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this individual moral regeneration might be, at best, a green quietism. (2002, p. 
180) 
But deep ecology does not only posit a form of utopia or ecotopia lacking practicality, as 
Luke underscores here. More specifically, it also does so at the temporal level, and in a 
reactive form aiming to counter yet symmetrically oppose and consequently reproduce 
myths attached to progress. Deep ecology does, to an extent, advocate a form of 
regression to an illusory past. But more specifically and problematically, it fails to 
question whether there may be any such thing as a line of time on which to regress on, 
and instead reasserts this line, in the hope of reversing its direction. An anti-uchronian 
perspective teaches us that growth-driven progress never had a direction, never took 
place, and neither will it take place. Rather than reverse, perhaps we may begin to rethink 
temporalities, at the quotidian and the larger scale, parting from their linear and 
teleological form, as well as their predictability and single or binary directions.  
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Building Substitutes to Uchronia: Quintuple Skins and Tree Tenants 
 
Anything linear should be met with distrust.  




Friedensreich Hundertwasser was an artist who claimed that “[he] want[ed] to show how 
simple it is basically, to find paradise on earth” (cited in Restany, 2001). He also 
happened to design numerous, famous posters for Greenpeace throughout the 1970s and 
1980s, and numerous stamps attempting to spread environmental messages. He proposed 
an alternative flag for New Zealand on behalf of the Maori people. He modified his name 
so as to signify “Peaceful HundredWaters.” He sailed around the Mediterranean for most 
of his later life on board of a ship he had called Regentag, or “rainy day.” Earlier when he 
first taught at the Fine Arts school in Vienna, which he promptly left, he would tell his 
students to go study their own creativity outside and dismiss class, only to paint irregular 
lines all over the walls without anyone’s permission. Because he didn’t believe in straight 
lines, he never ironed his self-made striped clothes. The multi-disciplinary artist preferred 
what he called “fluidoid” lines and spirals to straight ones (I will discuss this matter in 
more depth in chapter 5). But most importantly for our immediate purposes, 
Hundertwasser may help us envision what forms some of the “regressive” counter-
uchronia may take aesthetically: as Greenpeace activists were reading and citing deep 
ecology, he elaborated a theory of the five skins and built houses were trees lived as 
tenants at a time, which I will argue may be read as counter-uchronian art, though I will 
also show in chapter 5 that we may read this as heterochronian and heterotopian art. 
 The five skins’ representation, a naïve drawing under Hundertwasser’s pencil 




Figure 4: Hundertwasser’s Five Skins. 
The drawing divides existence into five various “skins,” which depicts a whole 
reminiscent of some deep ecologist account of the “ecological self” I have discussed 
above: first the epidermis (1), then clothes (2), the house (3), identity (4), Nature (5). In 
what follows I will describe and critique what Hundertwasser’s diverse array of forms 
and genres (poems, paintings, sculptures, happenings, architecture, declarations, 
manifestoes, etc) attached to each of these skins, with the corresponding prescriptions for 
each of these aspects of a self supposed to live in harmony with the whole. Or rather, if 
Hundertwasser granted the status of “skins” to each aspect depicted above, it was because 
each was to be considered literally part of the body and mind of each unique individual. 
As we will see, many issues in the “vegetative painter’s” representation are shared with 




First Skin: the Epidermis 
 
The first circle, a human body’s shape, refers to the epidermis. In Hundertwasser’s view, 
his first skin should be exposed to the most external ones, as often as climate and weather 
deem it possible. In 1967, Hundertwasser gave a conference in the nude, to indicate that 
the epidermis’ exhibition in public offered great potentialities for the assertion of the 
uniqueness of individual bodies, from shape to texture to color. If the experience of 
nudity as a spontaneous practice may seem appealing, the normative injunction seems 
more problematic. Nudist movements and groups have a long history tied to a form of 
social control, de-sexualizing bodies to standardize them, and have often deployed a 
rhetoric of authenticity along with the longing for a past, golden age of infantile, 
primitive and pure nudity. Arnaud Bauberot’s study of nudist practices (2004) from 
antiquity to Nazi Germany on to contemporary nudist movements, shows that these have 
shared imperatives of exposing the bodies so as to cultivate desire and control of athletic, 
muscular, potent and able bodies, along with a rhetoric of return to a lost state of nature. 
If Hundertwasser’s advocacy of nudism belongs to the specific context of an 
environmentalist activism now including events like the annual world naked bike ride, 
quite far removed from fascist uses of nudism, the myth of a return to authentic selves 
qua nude bodies nonetheless sheds doubt on the bodily diversity argument presented by 
the artist. In addition, the fact that Hundertwasser held a press conference in the nude to 
make such claims to authenticity, accompanied by two attractive and young women 
standing naked alongside him and who as far as I was able to ascertain did not peep a 
word while he talked (their presence is left unexplained in all the accounts I have 
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encountered), also points to the danger of rendering (female) bodies more immediately 
available for objectification. 
Second Skin: Clothes 
 
The second skin is made of clothes, which Hundertwasser grew into the habit of creating 
himself early in his life (Restany, 2001). Like the nude body, the normative invitation for 
making one’s own clothes was intended to guarantee the display of individual 
uniqueness, against fashion prêt-a-porter’s dictates. In addition, individual creation of 
one’s clothes was held to be less likely to result in the production of straight lines, which 
Hundertwasser’s anti-rationalism considered a way for modern life to annihilate any 
“natural” sense of creativity in human beings. As I mentioned above, ironing was also 
looked down upon as it risked straightening the “natural” striations and undulations of the 
material. Hundertwasser wore striped pants, striped shirts, ornated his sailboat with a 
striped sail, and the curves and irregularities caused by wrinkles and wind respectively 
allowed for the non-straight striated motifs to manifest fully. Ironically, any sailor knows 
that a wrinkled sail indicates poor orientation of the sail and inefficient use of the wind, 
but Hundertwasser probably did not care about these details. Another “detail” left 
unexamined by these prescriptions has to do with a lack of critique at the level of 
quotidian temporalities and gender roles: as Ivan Illich has put it, most of the “ghost 
work” (Illich, 2013) allowing for commodities (such as, in this instance, materials to 
make clothes) to be consumed is performed by women, and in a society where salaried 
work predominates to dictate the value of time, the enforcement of Hundertwasser’s 
hand-making of clothes would be quite problematic were it to come without a more 
general attention to such temporalities. The lack of this kind of critical lens also risked 
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obscuring the fact that many “still” in fact make their clothes by hand today, further 
reducing this work to “ghost work.” In addition, the principal reason advanced by 
Hundertwasser in banning straight lines resided in his association of such lines with non-
natural, rationalism. The artist claimed (wrongly) that straight lines were nowhere to be 
found in nature. The assumption that “Nature” is the opposite of “rationalism” and 
“modernity” is of course left implicit and unsubstantiated, and the ascription of normative 
value to Nature resonates with deep ecology’s originary Nature supposed to guide ethics. 
Third Skin: the Oikos 
 
 
Figure 5: Hundertwasser’s Tree Tenant House 
The oikos is the third skin. In the very heart of Hundertwasser’s ecology, it also allowed 
for the artist to intertwine the various skins: his most famous architecture is covered with 
trees and green, and includes what he called “tree tenants,” who inhabited floors and 
rooms here and there and would “pay their rent” by providing oxygen and trapping urban 
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noises to the surroundings. Hundertwasser’s five skins theory is thus highly holistic: all 
skins must be integrated harmoniously, as part of one single coherent irrationalist project. 
The houses themselves were supposed to function and breathe as a closed circuit, as 
human excrements, celebrated in Hundertwasser “Sacred Shit Manifesto” (ibid., n.d.) was 
supposed to be re-used internally, in each house, to nourish the trees as fertilizer – 
granted human excrements are actually highly toxic unless treated for a number of years, 
before which they cannot serve as compost, revealing a temporal dissonance in the 
strange immediacy depicted here and clashing with the necessary slowness of this closed 
system. The above, naïve picture represents a tree-tenant house which was never built 
quite in this way, as the constantly open windows turned out to be quite inefficient for 
heat. The drawing is thus very much a utopian depiction of what a tree-tenant house 
would look like in a place devoid of weather, climate, and fluctuation.  
Fourth Skin: Identity 
 
The fourth skin, namely that which Hundertwasser referred to as “identity,” includes “the 
family, the home country.” These words are written in the five skins’ drawing with no 
further precision as to whether this list should be punctuated to signal an ellipsis, i.e 
whether the reader or viewer should see the rest of the inside of this skin as an “et 
cetera,” or whether the list is closed and exhausted by these two categories. Nonetheless, 
the choice of the categories seems problematic and counter-uchronian in a number of 
aspects. If familial and patriotic values ring quite reactionary, and certain understanding 
of identity as fixed or made of sameness among members of a particular groups, the 
inscription of “other people” along with “nature” and both perched in a tree in the midst 
of the fourth skin reveals similar problems as those discussed above with respect to what 
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deep ecology called the “minority tradition.” The adjective “other” of course raises 
question regarding who these people are other to, and no explanation is provided as to 
their proximity with a “Nature” which also constitutes the fifth skin. From various 
writings of Hundertwasser’s, the other relates to “Western modern man,” in a gesture 
reminiscent of the counter-uchronian “primitivisms” already examined above.  
Fifth Skin: Nature 
 
Finally, Hundertwasser offers “Nature” as the fifth skin’s fabric, though it is also present, 
as we just saw, in the fourth. We have seen that Hundertwasser opposed reason and 
Nature, straight lines being associated with the former and “fluidoid” ones with the latter. 
The Nature the artist describes in a number of poems and texts is quite close to the stable, 
reliable, predictable and originary one dear to ecology’s intrinsic value. Here in the 
drawing, it circles all other skins to unite what deep ecologists have called the “ecological 
self,” so that the self is not only inclusive of mind but also an embodied relation thanks to 
the skin metaphor. Gaia is the organism that brings the whole together, the background 
upon which the supposedly unique individuals must evolve, in the nude and with their 
fluidoid clothing, equipped with national and familial identities. The whole thus looks 
like a counter-uchronian and counter-utopian union of spheres supposedly separated by 
modernity. As we will see in chapter VI however, if this drawing were to be read as a 
spiral, a motif of predilection for Hundertwasser, it may take a heterotopian and 




Human, All Too Human and Natural, All Too Natural Teleologies? 
 
An age of happiness is quite impossible, because men want 
only to desire it but not to have it. … The destiny of man is 
designed for happy moments - every life has them - but not 
for happy ages. Nonetheless they will remain fixed in the 
imagination of man as 'the other side of the hill' because 
they have been inherited from ages past. 
Nietzsche, Human All Too Human. 
From a de-growth manifesto to an anarcho-primitivist’s declentionist vision of history, 
from a deep ecological future primitive to an environmentalist artist’s five skins, 
contemporary ecosophy and ecologist art offer a number of examples of responses to 
uchronia which counter it sometimes by replicating some of its traits. In these cases, 
rather than challenges to the uchronian myth of a timeless time, to a simplistic yet 
contradictory linearity and teleology, reversals of direction emerged out of the ecological 
crises from the late twentieth century on. The placement or situation of the myth of a 
timeless time on a chronological line switches from an abstract future to an abstract past, 
yet it remains, in these examples, that the time in question is timeless, that it has no time. 
Although initiated from an anti-uchronian impulse, these counter-uchronias reproduce 
uchronia as much as they oppose it, or, to put it more precisely, as they oppose it, in 
opposing it, precisely because they merely oppose it.  
Regressive, Reactionary, Backward Counter-Uchronias 
 
This is probably due to the very nature of oppositional stances, to an extent. But these 
also prompt further need for anti-uchronian critique. The above examples mostly include 
what we may call “regressive” counter-uchronia, or past-oriented ones rather than future-
oriented, progressive ones. However, the very term “regressive” is perhaps inadequate, or 
only partially adequate, and so would be terms like “primitivist” or “reactionary” or 
 
 273 
“backward.” Each have some specific reasons for their respective inadequacy and for 
their partially helpful, partially unhelpful ways, and at the same time they share some of 
these reasons in common.  
One shared reason is that, quite simply, “we have never been modern,” or 
progressive, or future(s)-oriented. Uchronia was always a timeless temporality, a time out 
of time, the elan forward onto a line that did not exist but in fictitious form. Yet as such, 
in its contingent fictitious ways and unconvincing or contradictory claims to a natural, 
self-evident, inevitable, non-contingent or universal singular future, uchronia exercises 
such attraction and power as to constrain attempts at countering it or opposing it to 
espouse inverted mirror forms. There was never any forward movement involved in 
growth-oriented progress, the progress was never to, toward any actual time when 
capitalocentric temporality would fulfill its promise, but based on a futurist vision lacking 
a concrete future and subjecting the present. Yet, to various extents, some 
environmentalist discourses, exemplified above, have called for running the clocks 
“backwards.” There is no more backward to run back to than there was ever a forward to 
run to. The past, harmonious, idealized time of “regressive” counter-uchronia is nowhere 
to be found in these simple or idealized forms, yet some have felt compelled to call for 
such illusory regressions in response to illusory progressions, even though these efforts 
had stemmed from a realization that the forward movement was impossible.  
“Backward” counter-uchronia cannot run backward without tripping, yet the 
phrase refers to a desire for a mythical past. The adjective “reactionary” also partially 
helps describing what is at work – a mere reaction or re-action –  but is vastly tied to 
ideological traditions and histories distinct from the particular, partly idiosyncratic 
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movements, groups and discourses under scrutiny here. “Regression” in the form of 
counter-uchronia cannot occur in actuality, as progression never did. Yet neither uchronia 
nor counter-uchronia are about actuality: both are appeals, rallying cries and ideals that 
claim (and fail) to justify certain concrete strategies, practices. They have effective 
consequences, but rely on myths of a time to-come or a time past which lacks a time 
coming, passing or passed. Among the major effects of uchronia are depletion of present 
resources, aggravation of inequalities, attachments and desires that generate compulsive 
work and consumption on scales and at paces, rhythms and speeds unsustainable to the 
planet and the concrete material livabilities of human and nonhuman lives. As for 
“regressive” counter-uchronias, they not only rely upon, keep intact, but also perpetuate 
assumptions entrenched by uchronia, including interdependent dualisms: past/future, non-
Western/modern, primitivism/progressivism, Nature/human.  
Teleological, All Too Teleological Humans and Nature 
 
One amendment to these dualisms often emerges, however. In the instances above, 
because humanism is not problematized and “the human” is still postulated as indicative 
of something valuable, as a value in the sense Nietzsche denounced (a claim taken as fact 
so that it provides a general orientation to life), and because “the natural” is likewise 
granted normative value (as is the case, to some degrees, with uchronia: “it is quite 
natural to want growth,” capitalism is the “natural” end of history, etc), going back to a 
mythical “more natural” past also is associated, at times, with a re-humanizing process, 
with a return to more human and humane ways allegedly lost by hyper-modernity. In 
other words, when themes of return emerged above, they were about parting ways from 
the supposedly in-human consequences of uchronia, to “go back to” simultaneously more 
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human and more natural ways of living. The human, as well as “Nature,” are erected once 
again as values, granted normative status, qua their serving as ends to be achieved.  
 Where in uchronian times, the “natural” end of homo economicus is economic 
growth, accumulation, and situated in the (singular, naturalized) future, the end of 
regressive counter-uchronian times is to retrieve the once lost human and natural ways. 
For instance, we have seen that anarcho-primitivist Zerzan claims that modernity has 
“subordinated natural systems that humankind was once attuned to.” Of note here is the 
fact that the reference to humans is not in plural form, but takes instead the form of a 
pompous “humankind” or “humanity” as a whole species. The struggle is against an 
allegedly de-humanizing modernity and progress that has supposedly separated “Nature” 
from the human. As such, it lacks a contextualization and critical engagement with “the 
human” and “Nature” as Western, recent, contingent categories (Foucault, 1971; 1979) 
that guide and distribute value within a contingent economy of power, although these 
categories’ value may, perhaps should, be questioned. Surely there is a form of critical 
engagement in the “de-humanization” argument, but the target is partly missed as it fails 
to wonder whether the (temporal) order of things valuing the natural and the human as 
teleological ends could possibly be otherwise. Counter-uchronia errs by assuming that 
what is being questioned by the eruption of Gaia is the direction taken on a teleological 
line supposed to aim toward humanity and naturalness. 
 The example of the Manifeste Utopia critiques the human as a teleological goal to 
attain, not insofar as it is teleological, but because and when this teleology is supposed to 
lead to humans’ separation from nature. De-growth advocates denounced a modern 
narrative where “the meaning of the history of Man would be to humanize the natural … 
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to push it aside the world’s animality.” Here the denunciation critically targets a 
temporality where the development of the human is equated to a gradual distancing from 
nature, a work of separation modern uchronia purports to advance. The critique of 
modern understandings of human evolution as the achievement of a gradual de-
naturalization is certainly appealing in times of ecological crisis. However, here it is the 
separation, not the teleology that the manifesto’s authors denounce. Though this 
separation is indeed problematic, re-assembling the various forces at play cannot occur 
without addressing how the teleological dimension of this separation supports it, or how 
it informs the shapes espoused by these conceptions of Nature and by the human. 
Therefore, ultimately the Manifeste Utopia falls short of interrogating the categories of 
the human and Nature, along with, and insofar as they are partly constituted by, their 
temporal dimensions. Instead, it responds to uchronia by way of a desire to “return” to 
uniting the two categories, as though their existence preceded the claim to separate them, 
or the teleological vision that informs these categories. 
In other words, this reactionary move purports to re-naturalize the human so as to 
finally make it human(e) again. The initial move in this critique is quite needed, but the 
prescriptive implication is mislead by desiring a mere reversal of the human/Nature 
dualism, and a mere reversal of the direction taken, which do not go so far as to question 
the lines (or separation, of direction). This de-growth counter-uchronian moment solely 
problematizes the human/nature separation, and the direction of their teleological 
movement, rather than their teleological character. This fails to draw the fullness of the 
critique’s implication and to keep pursuing more critical work: “Nature” is now taken as 
a value which value is not questioned. This move, instead of transvaluating values, in fact 
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replaces a value with another rather equivalent one, celebrating Nature as a normative 
model. Similarly, Hundertwasser praises fluidoid and spiral lines by opposition to straight 
ones, deeming the latter as foreign to Nature, and does so claiming to an “anti-
rationalism” which would be more aptly named “counter-rationalism,” a merely 
oppositional stance whereby natural (un)reason is supposed to guide the course of ethical 
action. Yet as we have seen (see chapter II & III), Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return 
teaches us that neither reason nor unreason pertain to the course of the world. We cannot 
find guidance in Nature’s alleged “laws,” or its allegedly stability, permanence, reliability 
or stillness, as it is no stable background, and is made up instead of becoming, of agentic 
and dynamic change always partially unexplained and unexplainable. While 
Hundertwasser sought in Nature a way to justify his fluidoid lines, which were in turn 
meant to open up possibilities for uniqueness and creativity, his (re)turn to Nature as 
value, and as guidance, as unreason, ultimately may stifle creation and change. If there is 
any such thing as a justification for fluidoid rather than straight lines, it cannot and will 
not be found in “Nature,” or in Man, or in both of these finally re-united. This implies a 
re-conceptualization of both, in fact, and a de-centering of the dualism in favor of 
hybridity (a mere reversal will not do), which is only possible if one interrogates the 
temporal dimensions of these teleological ends (wherever they land on the line of time – 
past for regressive counter-uchronia, or future for progressive counter-uchronia and 
uchronia).  
The problem with “naturalizing” a mythical time, i.e with making the end of 
capitalist teleology natural, making teleology natural, making capitalist economies and 
their growth natural, is only a problem if and insofar as “Nature” has been erected as 
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stable law, or crystallized as background, congealed as static (though none of these 
metaphors completely work as ice, crystals, and erections are all made up of movement, 
change and becoming, once one looks closer). It is because “Nature” has been 
conceptualized as a teleological end, and/or as moved by a teleological movement, that it 
becomes counter-uchronian or uchronian. “Nature” and “naturalizing” (capitalism, 
growth, past ages, etc) are only problematic, not because of nature, not by nature, not 
because of the claim or even the assumption that a particular movement would have 
natural attributes or be natural, but because of a temporally flawed (untenable, 
unsustainable) version of “Nature.” In other words, teleological Nature is at issue, not the 
nonhuman per se. Temporality remains the problem, that which requires rethinking, and 
if the emphasis were placed on a natural and constant becoming of all (natural and human 
and hybrid) things as different, if nature was to be read for difference (Gibson-Graham, 
2006), if nature was to be read from the perspective of the eternal return, “naturalizing” 
time, pasts, presents, futures, paces, rhythms, speeds, assemblages would not be 
problematic. On the contrary, in our current “anthropocene” context of extinction, this 
would be quite desirable instead. If the only constant is change, if the only being there is, 
is the being of becoming, as in the Nietzschean eternal return, then conceptualizations of 
the human and nature must radically be reworked and cannot suffer a counter-uchronian 
or uchronian status. Put differently, I could say that the above title of this last part of this 
chapter (IV) is (playfully) misleading. The problem is not that teleologies involved in 
uchronias and regressive or progressive counter-uchronias would be made up of too much 
“Nature” or be too “human.” Rather, what is at issue is that both the nonhuman and the 
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human have been conceived as teleological, all too teleological. Thus the question mark, 
in this title. Thus the reversal, in this section’s title.  
Myths of Happiness from Ages Past: 
Counter-Uchronian Happiness and Anti-Uchronian Joy 
 
Regressive counter-uchronian movements also fall short of critical anti-uchronian 
moments, in their resorting to myths of happy good savages and an appraisive racism one 
would think (hope) could have been left to certain eighteenth century Western male 
thinkers. The gesture is interestingly very similar to that just described regarding a 
“return” to “Nature.” Here reactionary counter-uchronia joins hands with uchronia in 
colonial reifications and homogenizations involving a denial of coevalness between 
various naturecultures. Though making “archaic” peoples exemplary, counter-uchronias 
portray these as remote (note however one distinction: in regressive counter-uchronian 
discourses the term “archaic” is rarely used, as it rather belongs to progressivism. 
“Primitivism” is used appraisively instead). In the case of anarcho-primitivist Zerzan, this 
myth of the good happy savage is accompanied with the myth of genderless or 
alternatively (and contradictorily) feminized societies.  
 The question of happiness is important to each of these counter-uchronian 
examples. Each portrays the good (eu) and remote (ou) time (chronos) as happy, 
describing leisurely paces and quotidian life, the fulfilment of reduced needs, satisfaction. 
The terms happy and happiness keep resonating to make this remote time a form of “age 
of happiness.” Here Nietzsche is helpful again, as the quote opening this section shows. 
To Nietzsche an age of happiness is “quite impossible, because men want to desire it but 
not to have it.” He thus evokes “happy moments” in lives, but rejects the possibility of 
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“happy ages.” He also claims that the latter “will remain fixed in the imagination of man 
as ‘the other side of the hill’ because they have been inherited from ages past.” Indeed, 
just like the eternal return entails that there can be no state of equilibrium, no maximal or 
minimal state, but a finite set of forces constantly shifting, re-assembling and re-
distributing in unpredictable ways to form new arrangements at each moment (long or 
short), and there cannot be either reason or unreason guiding the course of events, there 
cannot, either, be ages of happiness or ages of sadness. Instead, all we are left with is – 
neither chaotic nor rational – joyful and sad moments, joy and sadness being (constantly) 
unevenly (re)distributed from moment to moment (long or short). What is the distinction 
however, between long moments and “ages”? If we understand long moments as 
extended durations of time with uneven and unpredictable ways, whereas “ages” would 
refer to societal states,57 then we start seeing the pertinence of this idea to my critique of 
uchronia. But be it at the level of a life, or of societies and epochs, the “happiness” taken 
to be coterminous with mythical times of counter-uchronian longings, understood as a 
stable state, a being, is a form of time paralysis or freeze.   
Here Nietzsche is not rejecting happiness per se, but rather emphasizing moments 
as opposed to ages, movement rather than states. I would even suggest that joy (in the 
Spinozan sense of the increase of what a thing can do) would resonate better with these 
moments, while happiness indeed projects imagination to still times, timeless times, ever-
postponed ones, and abstraction. The difference does not lie so much in the duration of 
moments or ages, but their quality as respectively made of movement and becoming, as 
                                                        
57Joy, in a Spinozist sense (Spinoza, 1992; Deleuze, 1988), refers to the increase of what a thing can do, 
whereas sadness is its decrease, and even in common language it connotes a moment, a cairological 
dimension or duration rather than a chronological dimension, whether short-lived or long term, a point of 
an oscillation rather than a stable, still or permanent state.  
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opposed to being. For instance, consumer satisfaction, an always postponed state 
belonging to a future that will not be reached, otherwise the consumerism this never 
satiated state contributes to render possible would collapse. Are you happy with what you 
have? Sure but I’d be happier with more. Simone de Beauvoir wrote about happiness in 
the Second Sex:  
It is not quite clear just what the word happy really means and still less what true 
values it may mask. There is no possibility of measuring the happiness of others, 
and it is always easy to describe as happy the situation in which one wishes to 
place them. In particular those who are condemned to stagnation are often 
pronounced happy on the pretext that happiness consists in being at rest. 
(Beauvoir, 2014). 
The fact that a stable state of happiness will never come to be in a full, stable, indefinite 
form yet the desire for such stillness is perpetuated makes consumerist desires possible. 
In fact, as we might recall the anti-uchronian moment of the Manifeste Utopia includes 
this very critique: the good consumer is a never-satiated consumer. Even at the level of 
the quotidian, happiness is something one wants to desire but not to have, it operates in 
uchronian terms: the appeal is in the endless postponement. Counter-uchronias similarly 
propose a state of harmony, stillness, a stability nowhere to be found. And again, 
Nietzsche writes about ages of happiness that “they will remain fixed in the imagination 
of man as ‘the other side of the hill’ because they have been inherited from ages past.” 
Ages of happiness are these ages or states where we are not, rather than these actual or 
virtual joys we may encounter and foster in a present re-thought. If these ages evoked 
may be inherited from ages past, it is not because they have existed, as a state of maximal 
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(or minimal), perfect stillness is only attainable in a timeless time: if time can indeed 
pass, it is because it is inhabited, moved and changed constantly, neither by reason or by 
unreason, made of unpredictability, surprise and contingency.  
Moving Forward or Spiraling Autopoietically 
 
At the same time, it may seem to some degree that the very same condition allows for all 
kinds of change and resistance, including anti-consumerist ones: it is often because 
dissatisfaction rises, or because promises are not met yet still hoped for, that some of us 
mobilize, think critically, question. The problem is thus to keep identifying, deciding, 
creating distinctions between uchronian states of happiness, thus coterminous with 
temporal stillness, and joyful moments where the possibility for other possibilities arises 
(anti-uchroinan critique). I have tried to suggest here, and will continue to do so in 
considering yet other temporalities, that (counter) utopia and (counter) uchronia are 
incompatible with a philosophy of becoming. If anti-uchronia incites a pause, a 
suspension of a certain time to create time for critical thought and practice, or their 
possibility, counter-uchronia traps us right back to paralysis, stasis, stillness, 
timelessness. Anti-uchronia can be read as an antidote, that which disrupts a certain logic 
or phenomenon and inoculates it with new possibilities, whereas a certain form of 
strictly, symmetrically oppositional critique is drawn to “counter” a logic or phenomenon 
with a mirror-image of itself. But if counter-uchronian longings for stillness in fact stifle 
change under the guise of inspiring it, how may surprising becomings erupt without being 
contained by a projection of imaginaries to a “good” and “non” place or time, an outside, 
an earlier/back in the day or a later/tomorrow? May these becomings emerge 
autopoietically, to borrow Felix Guattari’s borrowing of Francisco Varela’s notion (1989) 
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of self-creating change? How may we account for, espouse, embrace and nurture 
unpredictability, becomings, the new, emerging out of both the present actual and 
virtual,58 and imaginaries connected to the here and now and multiple futures and pasts?  
 While I will try to partly address these inexhaustible questions in chapter VI, for 
the time being I will turn to some examples of what I call progressive counter-uchronias. 
As I have discussed above, some dimensions and moments in de-growth discourse does 
not escape the progressivism it purports to question, thus hybridizing regressive and 
progressive counter-uchronia. To move forward with our going back to Nature, could 
indeed sum up a number of the positions discussed above. We may add that, in a way, in 
more than one way in fact, there are myriads of counter-uchronian, uchronian, anti-
uchronian and synchronic moments or dimensions in eco-temporalities and temporalities 
which make up our daily lives, imaginaries and desires. Thus the distinctions are not 
stable attributes or natures for the discourses examined here, but rather they aim to 
underscore and disentangle what enables the new, and a kind of new that may enable 
more of itself. For instance, while in the previous chapter I had read the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports as offering a welcome and needed 
anti-uchronian perspective, they may also be read, as in the next chapter, as presenting a 
dangerous form of progressive counter-uchronia just as capitalocentric as unqualified 
growth-driven progress, i.e uchronia. Similarly, I will return in the last chapter (6) to 
                                                        
58 Though as I have mentioned Claire Colebrook (2014) has proposed that two traditions exist among 
vitalist ones, some being anchored in the actual and some, queer vitalisms investing the virtual, I do not 
think that synchronic change does or has to solely emerge from the virtual, her criterion for this distinction: 
there are, here and now, actual practices and politics which to various degrees are capacious enough to 




Hundertwasser’s art, arguing for a heterochronian reading of his spiraling through five of 







PROGRESSIVE COUNTER-UCHRONIA  
OR HYPER-UCHRONIA 
 
Rushing to Gaia’s Deathbed… to Save Her Growth 
 
Counter-uchronias refers to emerging eco-temporalities that attempt to counter existing 
uchronian temporalities yet retain most of their form. Merely reversing linear progressive 
understandings of time that make impossible promises postponed to an abstract futurism, 
we have seen in the previous chapter that regressive counter-uchronias idealize a golden 
age of Nature, an age of happiness when the human/Nature dualism was supposedly 
reversed, with Nature on top. Futurism is then supposed to be countered by a sort of 
“past-ism,” progression by a regression (the French language has a word for this, 
“passeisme”: we may need to invent a word for the English language). In this chapter, 
what I will read as “progressive” counter-uchronias also reactively responds to the 
shattering of uchronian temporalities performed by the eco-crises. However, contrary to 
regressive counter-uchronias, they continue on to a new form of amended futurism. They 
rely upon the same teleological and linear direction as uchronia’s. The progressive 
counter-uchronias examined here repeat, to an extent, the (linear, progressive, 
teleological, futurist) forms constitutive of uchronias, but they perform contorsionist 
gestures trying to adjust the linear progression of time postulated by growth-oriented 
capitalist economies to some awareness of limits, the goal being to overcome limits. Let 
us bend the arrow of time a bit, … so that it can keep it pointing “forward” (to an 




forms: in the examples I draw from below, one of these is the “techno-fix” contorsion: we 
shall tweek, adjust the Earth temperatures and climate with vast-scale technological 
devices, do not worry, Gaia is feverish but engineers are on it, ready to shoot massive 
needles into her massive veins, or, as Gaia theorist James Lovelock’s metaphor goes, 
ready to “put her on dyalisis” (Lovelock, 2009) Another form of contorsion progressive 
counter-uchronia performs so as to amend and bend the trajectory of uchronia while 
failing to contest it, consists of “internalizing” global warming in capitalist world 
economies’ accounting: capitalist production has indeed played a tremendous, crucial 
role in feeding climate change, because it failed to exhaustively and rationally calculate 
the cost of environmental devastation. Thus we shall proceed to fix one of capitalism’s 
limits by expanding it: capitalist production and consumption are running us into a wall, 
let’s swallow (capitalize, speculate on) that wall and keep running. Global warming 
becomes, under this kind progressive counter-uchronia, an opportunity to create new 
markets where carbon emissions shall be traded – and, therefore, speculated upon, etc. As 
we will see, technofixing manifestations of progressive counter-uchronias and carbon-
marketing ones can ally and overlap: the creation of carbon-markets called for, among 
others, by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change associates with techno-fixes 
like so-called renewable energies, themselves the objects of new markets. Meanwhile, 
would-be (or, as we will see, actual) geoengineers trying to tweek temperatures on earth 
do so with some conservationist concerns mixed with hopes that their brand new, grand-
scale engineering techniques become lucrative sources of carbon credits, providing them 
with a head-start in the emerging, brand new carbon markets. These changes may be 




amended so as to allow it to keep following its course (into a wall), but they may also be 
called “hyper-uchronias.” A form of uchronia on steroids, these hyper-uchronian 
temporalities imagine the future as potentially extending capitalist markets to integrate its 
own devastation and speculate on it, and they invent quick and easy technofixes assuming 
a confidence in technology even more relentless than prior to the eco-crises, as it scales 
up to fantasies of intentionally tweeking the planet’s temperature like one would their AC 
in one’s apartment.  
Why would it matter to name deep ecology’s image of Nature as something to 
“return” to “regressive” counter-uchronias, or to name carbon market fantasies of 
speculation and geoengineering hubris “progressive” counter-uchronia? It should be 
apparent by now that my concepts of uchronia, anti-uchronia, and counter-uchronia (and, 
finally, heterochronia, synchrony in the next chapter) refer to temporalities embedded in, 
informed by and informing world views, responses to ecological disaster, ways of living, 
ways of imagining and experiencing the (past, present, future) living that profoundly 
differ, sometimes even diverge, and that these divergences have tremendous effects on 
what is being done in the midst of Gaia’s fever. Yet these are sometimes difficult to tell 
apart. Given the centrality of temporality to the problems and questions posed in times of 
eco-crises, looking at all these competing discourses from the vantage point of their 
temporalities helps distinctions to be made and reflected upon critically, and it helps 
seeing how these elements may also be (sometimes ambiguously) entangled. Thus this 
fourth concept of “progressive counter-uchronia” may add another layer of possible 
criteria for distinguishing temporalities erupting with and within ecological discourses 




For example, when I initially discussed the IPCC reports in chapter 3, I read these 
as helpfully providing a needed critique of uchronia, which I called anti-uchronia. The 
questions posed by the IPCC, I argued, were “idiotic” questions in the sense that, as any 
good science and/or philosophy hopefully does, they may provoke readers to slow down 
and wonder: these were questions previously barely intelligible (do we really need 
growth? Can we really want it?) that cause us to pause. Yet, in this chapter, I return to the 
IPCC reports to examine another aspect in these texts, namely their counter-uchronian 
dimension. From this perspective, the IPCC does not stop at asking helpful, sorely needed 
idiotic questions: it instead commits leaps that I will characterize, after Stengers, as 
animated by “stupidity.” Consequently the reports provide an apt illustration for how 
anti-uchronia cohabits with counter-uchronia, how in a historic moment when the 
contestation and fragility, the contingency and fallacy of temporalities of progress are 
coming under attack, alternative temporalities erupting in response oscillate between 
merely reactive forms and more disruptive, radical challenges. The distinctions I am 
laboring throughout this dissertation strive to provide ways to disentangle the former 
from the latter, and see how complex these differences are, prompting a need for never 
abandoning anti-uchronian critique.  
  While as we may remember from chapter III, the IPCC reports offer a futurology 
which anti-uchronian moment depicts the future (futures) as multiple, uncertain, 
multidirectional, and suggesting the impossibility of sustaining growth, we will see in 
what follows that these texts also contain a counter-uchronian moment when “business as 
usual” takes over. Though the diagnostic and prognostic moment is one offering 




Gaia’s deathbed… supposedly to “save” her, and yet the creation of carbon markets 
ultimately proposes to save growth (though of course there will hardly be any capitalist 
growth, or “business as usual,” if the Earth becomes inhospitable to human life as a result 
of unsustainable growth). I will locate one of the points of distinction between the IPCC’s 
anti-uchronian and counter-uchronian moments in the difference between its “idiotic” 
gestures, which slow us down, and “stupidity,” which fast-forwards and leaps to make 
impossible demands on a situation, demands that are radically at odds with the situation’s 
own demands (Stengers, 2005).  
 But let me return for a second to the distinction between regressive and 
progressive counter-uchronia I have made here, to address one possible source of 
confusion. It may seem as though in the distinction I am making here, the sciences tend 
toward espousing progressive forms of counter-uchronias, while the arts, various 
manifestos, ecosophy, eco-literatures, would turn mostly to regressive counter-uchronia. 
However I wish to underscore that one could select a number of examples that would 
nuance this impression: the regressive or progressive nature of various counter-uchronias 
encountered here are not generalizable by discipline. In fact, my own examples 
themselves do not fit such easy and reductive dualism: as we saw, de-growth as discussed 
with regards to the Manifeste Utopia is partly a forward form of counter-uchronia, while 
as we will see the conservationism of rogue geoengineer Russ George or the praise of 
geoengineering by Gaia theorist James Lovelock include mixtures of regressive and 
progressive counter-uchronia. While the previous chapter focuses on regressive counter-
uchronia and draws mostly from political and artistic examples, and this one focuses on 




this focus follows a goal of carving conceptual tools enabling complex distinctions. 
Perhaps this suggests that the ecological crises afford us no simple replacing of uchronia 
with inversions of its direction, and how equally problematic various forms of counter-
uchronias are, in their imperfectly successful claims to challenge, supplant or amend 
uchronia. All these stem from an anti-uchronian impulse, but bump into difficulties in 
reshaping imaginaries in non-uchronian ways. These troubles to go from a critical anti-
uchronian moment to a more normative and/or prescriptive moment, as they fall back on 
counter-uchronia, are shared across regressive and progressive counter-uchronias and 
across genres, be these scientific, literary, artistic. In other words, regressive counter-
uchronias do not necessarily emerge from one genre while progressive ones would be the 
monopoly of the sciences. First of all, the following discussion of the IPCC reports and 
geoengineering should shed light on some of the political and economic dimensions of 
the sciences’ insight into the eco-crises and their temporalities. Secondly, much art and 
literature (accelerationist aesthetics, certain futurist science fiction) could be read as 
progressive counter-uchronias, which I do not discuss here for lack of space and so as to 
prioritize analyzing a diverse array of genres: the organizing distinctions made here stress 
the temporalities involved but the nature of the examples in terms of disciplinary 
boundaries and sorts of discourses are only secondary. If they are important, it is in the 
sense of demonstrating a thread through a variety of eco-discourses, and indirectly, one 
lesson to take away would be that the analysis of eco-temporality adds one more reason 
to challenge disciplinary boundaries, genres and forms’ limits, as well as limits between 
various domains of what Latour has called the modern constitution (Latour, 1993; 2004):  




traversing ecological and environmentalist discourses through and through shows that the 
traps of counter-uchronias, acting like limits onto anti-uchronian critique, threaten the 
humanities and the so-called “hard” sciences alike. In fact both the future of humanities59 
(centering on the human in a period when the nonhuman overwhelmingly erupts), and the 
future of “pure” “apolitical” or “politically neutral” “hard” sciences, i.e the problematic 
nature of disciplinary boundaries and of the contours of spheres like science and politics 
which have long been affirmed as separate while always already porous (Latour, 1993), 
are in question with the way the eco-crises have fragilized uchronia.  
 
 
                                                        
59 Regarding this question of humanities’ futures, see among others Braidotti, 2013; Colebrook, 2014; 
Grusin, 2015: the discussion of humanities’ futures is vast and varied, yet recurrent in recent decades in 
Science and Technology Studies and New Materialist Theory, and these are not exhaustive examples in an 




Several Futures Are Possible… 
… Only If They Are Capitalist: IPCC Stupidity 
 
It is not in the least assured that the sciences, at 
least as we know them, are equipped to respond to 
the menaces of the future. 
Isabelle Stengers  
 
 
Normative and Prescriptive IPCC: 
All Futures Will Be Capitalist, so Let’s Trade Carbon Emissions! 
 
In chapter III, when I discussed the anti-uchronian dimension of the IPCC reports, I 
focused mostly on the first two parts of the reports, crafted by Working Groups I and II of 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. These, as I mentioned, concentrate their 
research on the “physical science basis” of climate change (working group I), and its 
“impacts, [as well as questions of] adaptation and vulnerability” (working group II). 
Working group III specializes in questions of mitigation. To simplify, we could say that 
the three working groups correspond more or less to three moments we may call 
diagnostic, prognostic and prescriptive. While the reports compiled by working groups I 
and II are written mostly by climatologists, the various scenarios used in all three reports 
to make projections regarding various carbon-emitting trends and the report composed by 
working group III regarding possible measures for mitigation of climate change are 
informed not only by “hard” scientists but also by economists’ input.  Interestingly, 
counter-uchronian dimensions of the IPCC reports emerge in the latter two, and 
especially the prescriptive moments of the texts, whereas the diagnosis would be where, 
as I argued in chapter III, we find anti-uchronian, critical questions. In what follows I 




provocatively encourages anti-uchronian questions to be posed, and a counter-uchronian 
prescriptive moment. This gap, characteristic of what I call progressive counter-uchronia, 
is a rush from scientific conclusions which provoke questions of whether we should even 
want growth, to hasty programmatic impulses endeavoring to continue on with growth, or 
“business as usual.”   
The IPCC is explicit in its diagnosis:  
globally, economic and population growth continue to be the most important 
drivers of increases in CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. The 
contribution of population growth between 2000 and 2010 remained roughly 
identical to the previous decades, while the contribution of economic growth has 
risen sharply. (IPCC, 2014b, p. 8) 
Yet all scenario storylines which the IPCC deploys for its modeling assume economic 
growth and the predominance of capitalist economies, even though many scenarios 
include a decline in global population growth after the middle of the 21st century, and 
even though some include a more equal distribution of per-capita income growth across 
the world. We may remember, for instance, the descriptions provided by the panel for the 
A1 storyline, which I commented on in chapter III, then insisting on how these enable to 
imagine multiple rather than one single future:  
The A1 storyline and scenario family describes a future world of very rapid 
economic growth, global population that peaks in mid-century and declines 
thereafter, and the rapid introduction of new and more efficient technologies. 




increased cultural and social interactions, with a substantial reduction in regional 
differences in per capita income. The A1 scenario family develops into three 
groups that describe alternative directions of technological change in the energy 
system. The three A1 groups are distinguished by their technological emphasis: 
fossil intensive (A1FI), non-fossil energy sources (A1T), or a balance across all 
sources (A1B). (IPCC, 2000, p. 4) 
Though this scenario family portrays a world that goes against some of the current trends 
toward aggravation of inequalities, toward “convergence” and “reduction in regional 
differences in per capita income,” the description opens with the mention of rapid 
growth, implicitly assuming a globalized world dominated by capitalist economies: the 
various groups within the A1 family differ among themselves in the kinds of resources 
mostly used (more or less fossil intensive, “technological emphasis”), “efficiency” of 
technologies, but no mention is made of a reduction of consumption or production per 
capita: the only reduction of consumption and production that may be implied would 
result to the decline in the world population. Even the B1 scenario family, which is the 
one that tends toward “equity” the most, fails to even consider the possibility of de-
growth and/or of a proliferation of capitalist economies resulting in the disappearance 
(whether it be gradual or rapid) of capitalism. Dramatic reductions in consumption levels 
worldwide are not included either among the futures considered, however multiple these 
are: across the more than 900 scenarios collected, the IPCC privileges imagining instead 
the increased use of so-called “renewable energies,” with little decline in energy 
consumption. Thus every storyline deployed for modeling purposes assumes capitalist 




crisis without interruptions of the desire for growth, as capitalism has long experienced). 
Not only do the scenarios collected by the IPCC assume capitalism: they take this 
assumption to go without saying, and the assuming is always done implicitly rather than 
as a clear postulate. As we can see above, no explicit mention of capitalist economies or 
capitalism is made in scenarios’ descriptions. The term is not even necessary as it is taken 
to be the only possibility, merely taking on various forms or modifications. Each scenario 
family stresses “technologies,” “resource efficiency,” convergence or divergence, some 
reductions in “material intensity” in scenarios where the service and information 
industries predominate (as though the information industry was less energy-intensive, 
which remains to be proven), and throughout the text, though capitalism is rarely named, 
its presence is always already assumed: imperatives of profit, commodity exchange, 
growth, and markets are omnipresent. Green capitalism, less green capitalism, grey 
industrial capitalism, make for the various shades of future capitalist paths envisioned. I 
will return in the next chapter to a playful re-writing of these descriptions imagining what 
they would look like were we to invent non-capitalist futures. For now I wish to 
underscore the capitalocentrism inherent and implicit to these various possibilities, in 
spite of the multiplicity I stressed earlier, when reading the reports from the perspective 
of their anti-uchronian dimension. Through the constant mention of the creation of 
carbon markets, the neoliberal language deployed, the instruments “measuring” “the 
economy” (this phrase is always used in a singular form erasing any possible or existing 
diverse economies), the “developmental” paths considered, the IPCC remains attached to 
a capitalocentric futurism. The developmentalist assumptions so omnipresent especially 




continuous growth. In other words, according to the IPCC several futures are possible, if 
and only if they are capitalist.  
At best, the IPCC looks at growth qualified or amended rather than ever 
questioning it or its desirability: it advocates for “less carbon-emitting growth” (IPCC, 
2014b, e.g. p. 4, 10). More precisely, in the most recent, fifth assessment mitigation 
report, published in November 2014, the IPCC specifies that baseline scenarios 
(“scenarios without explicit additional efforts to constrain emissions”) would “result in 
global mean surface temperature increases in 2100 from 3.7% to 4.8% compared to pre-
industrial levels” (p. 8). Looking at scenarios which include efforts to constrain 
emissions, the IPCC still assumes growth, and merely imagines less growth than in the 
baseline scenarios: “mitigation scenarios that reach atmospheric concentrations of about 
450 ppm CO2 eq by 2100 entail losses in global consumption … in 2100 relative to 
consumption in baseline scenarios anywhere from 300% to more than 900% over the 
century” (2000, p.12). The losses in consumption levels are only relative to baseline 
scenarios’ rampant growth, which skyrock with at least 300% over the century. 
Furthermore, note that here the relatively less intensive consumption levels are described 
as losses: the section I extracted this quote from focuses on “costs” of mitigation. Even 
declines in growth (as opposed to de-growth) are framed as “losses” and “costs,” in other 
words not as desirable paths but as unfortunate concessions or amendments to an 
orientation that remains growth-driven, though with lesser rates. The IPCC then fails to 
entertain scenarios where de-growth is valued and a radical change of the future’s 




The IPCC reports painfully attempt to present themselves in a not-so-explicitly 
programmatic form, thus preferring to enumerate seemingly disparate measures rather 
than a general outline of what policies would best enable facing the climate crisis. The 
reports repeatedly assert that no particularly scenario among those considered (all 
capitalist) is deemed most probable, though some are described as more desirable than 
others in terms of mitigating, adapting to climate threats (those scenarios that go beyond 
baseline ones). Thus the third working group’s report, offering recommendations for 
mitigation, purports to offer no recommended paths but rather compilations of 
recommendations. Prescriptive claims are presented in this way for reasons of diplomatic 
prudence as well as epistemological credibility, yet the result is an underlying assumption 
that all recommended measures intervene in a predominantly capitalist context taken for 
granted, as a naturalized background or unchanging law, to the point that again, 
capitalism is not or rarely named in the texts. Ultimately, if no program is laid out, and 
though no scenario among these capitalist ones is deemed more plausible or probable 
than another, the lack of any non-capitalist scenario normatively excludes non-capitalist 
modes of living. There is no arbitering among equally probable or plausible scenario, but 
the field of what is possible is limited to a capitalocentric horizon.  
In addition, and perhaps most importantly, among the array of measures it 
recommends, one thread runs across the IPCC’s Working Group III’s report, which 
further confirms the capitalocentrism at play: the creation of future global carbon 
markets. The shared dimension of most prescriptions made is thus highly capitalocentric: 
it consists of commodifying green gas emissions. If so far, neoliberal economy has 




integrating the formerly “external” in calculations of costs and benefits by calculating 
carbon emission levels and taxing these, allocating and trading (and presumably opening 
the way to speculate on) carbon credits, at the international and national levels. In spite of 
the multiple futures presented by the IPCC, in spite of its dramatic and breath-taking 
diagnosis, in spite of the uncertainty of the futurity at play suggesting that our presents 
and futures may after all be relatively diverse, at no point does the IPCC entertain the 
possibility of the end of capitalism, or of the prevalence of non-capitalist futures. Neither 
does it read the present projected in the reports as constituted of diverse economies that 
cohabit with hegemonic capitalist ones. The picture proposed for mitigation is one of 
amended uchronia, or “counter-uchronia.” The temporal horizon remains tied to a drive 
toward always already capitalist modes of production, consumption and living. Instead of 
taking on the implications of its own diagnosis more fully so as to ask whether growth is 
even desirable, or what carbon emissions and temperature levels would look like in a de-
growth scenario, the IPCC asks how we may continue on with growth, protect growth in 
spite of, against, and beyond the eruption of Gaia it describes. In addition, by imagining 
carbon markets as the main, recurrent set of measures recommended, the IPCC’s third 
working group goes beyond simply reproducing counter-uchronian futurities and indeed 
further expands the reach of capitalocentric visions: capitalist economies pollute? Let’s 
add pollution in capitalist accounting methods and proceed to commodify it, to integrate 
it into capitalist trade! The defense of the creation of carbon markets entails that what has 
been more and more astutely recognized as a destructive side-effect of capitalist 
production, what used to be seen as an external waste product of commodity production 




uchronia amends uchronia only to strengthen it, to reinvent capitalocentric futures. 
Ultimately, the IPCC’s progressive counter-uchronia is a form of uchronia on steroids, a 
hyper-uchronia. 
The IPCC’s Embrace of Geoengineering: 
Pollute Now, Clean Up Later, On to Hyper-Uchronia! 
 
In the IPCC’s November 2014 Mitigation report and in its 2015 Synthesis report, a new 
turn unfolded in the history of the first scientific panel to have won a Nobel Peace Prize. 
The IPCC then embraced, for the first time since its creation, the idea of Carbon Dioxide 
Removal (CDR) technologies as an allegedly compelling technique that even justifies a 
certain permissiveness of this new report with regards to carbon emissions levels. The 
AR5 (i.e the 2015 fifth assessment report) developed the notion of “overshoot,” 
accompanied with subsequent development and deployment of carbon trapping 
technologies, as one possible path to mitigation. More simply put: international 
conferences on climate have gradually and (in)famously generated, the threshold of a 2 
centigrades’ increase in global mean surface temperature as the maximum “acceptable” 
limit or goal (note that many environmentalist movements, small islands states and global 
South countries have long protested this limit, which would reep devastating effects for 
many populations, posing the question of whom it was acceptable to). While the IPCC, 
an outgrowth of the United Nations, had always taken the two degrees goal to be 
consensual (even though it had provided evidence that small island states and others 
would suffer drastically even from such increase), with its AR5 the panel opened up to 
possibilities of “temporarily” going beyond carbon emissions that would cause a rise of 




way of CDR technologies to-come. In fact, this “pollute now, clean up later” strategy, 
which counts on hypothetical geoengineering technologies that have yet to be proven 
effective, feasible, or without risk of worsening the situation, is an emerging theme 
throughout this most recent, 2015 report. In short, the hypothesis is that CDR 
technologies to be invented, perfected, and/or generalized mid-way through the 21st 
century, would justify more flexibility with respect to the two degrees’ objective.  
Among CDR techniques, the IPCC most seriously considered Bioenergy with 
Carbon-Capture and Storage, or BECCS (2014b, p. 12). These would consist in growing 
trees and other carbon-absorbing biomass to subsequently burn that in power plants 
designed to capture carbon emissions before they would reach the atmosphere, 
supposedly generating energy with “net zero” emissions and even removing carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases out of the atmosphere. Many questions are 
unanswered regarding BECCS, including where such captures would then be stored, 
where the immense necessary biomass could possibly be planted, how such massive land 
use would not further aggravate climate change (land use contributes 24% of direct 
emissions according to the IPCC itself), how leaks would be avoided from carbon 
storage, etc.  
The IPCC itself concedes that such scenarios count on the hypothetical use of 
future (mid-century) technologies not yet perfected (and, we may add, not at all certain to 
ever be reliable enough): “overshoot scenarios typically rely on the availability and wide-
spread of BECCS and afforestation in the second-half of the century” (p. 12). Thus the 




levels of 450 ppm CO2 eq (associated with the two degrees threshold), as long as mass-
scale technologies trapping the carbon succeed, in 40 years. Time will tell whether 
hubristic confidence may pay off this time around. Let us remain caught up in the same 
growth-oriented logic, and postpone to a hypothetical future the solution for the problem 
wrought by such logic, granted the “solution” itself is one that assumes more 
technological progress, on a vaster scale, more exhaustive knowledge and mastery of 
nature, this time at the planetary level. Furthermore, and quite importantly, the possibility 
that further, more exhaustive knowledge concerning the technologies imagined could 
result in conclusions that such technologies be too risky and uncertain, i.e the conclusion 
that we do not and will not ever know enough to tinker with the global climate, does not 
fall under the IPCC’s scrutiny: the specific kind of scientific-technological knowledge at 
play here refuses to entertain its own limits. Welcome to uchronia on steroids, a.k.a 
hyper-uchronia. Uchronia finally appears for what it is, in its impossible form, thanks to 
anti-uchronian conclusions the IPCC itself advances, … so now let us continue on to 
invent new, boosted forms of uchronias that would counter what is deemed to be mere 
side-effects of growth, somehow with further trust in the very technological age that has 
produced the crisis: the IPCC’s counter-uchronian rush to fall back on more growth even 
after slowing down to take a bit of time imagining its devastating effects, espouses and 
scales up the futurism of uchronia. This leap, similarly to the regressive counter-
uchronias I examined in the previous chapter, rebounds on similar temporal forms as 
those it opposes or amends, even after an anti-uchronian moment. Hyper-uchronia offers 
to boost uchronia with a shot of geoengineering and carbon markets after bumping into 





Leaping From Anti-Uchronian Diagnoses to Counter-Uchronian Prescriptions 
 
In Aux temps des catastrophes: Résister à la barbarie qui vient, Isabelle Stengers (2009) 
points to the urgent need to name “la bêtise” (which translates as “stupidity”). Stengers 
explains that our need to make ourselves think becomes dangerously incapacitated in the 
current ecological crisis. She distinguishes stupidity from dumbness (the French false 
cognate “stupidité”). Stupidity (bêtise) consists in an active force rather than a stable 
attribute defining specific individuals. It traverses, seizes people and assemblages. Being 
dumb when confronted to a terrible situation would manifest itself as a form of paralysis 
(in fact the French word for dumb shares its root with “stupor”), curtailing any possible 
action in the face of a larger force. Dumbness’ effect is numbness. In contrast, stupidity 
actively engages forces into actions that do not match, and even worsen, the conditions 
and exigencies of a particular situation. Worse, stupidity engages us on a path that 
consists of making demands on a situation that are in fact incompatible with the 
situation’s own demands, and it is this tension that causes the situation to further worsen. 
I argue that the IPCC’s prescriptions correspond to the absurdity described by Stengers, 
even in spite of its anti-uchronian diagnoses. The situation indicates that growth is the 
primary driver of climate change? Let’s imagine technofixes and new market expansions 
so as to continue demanding (assuming) growth in this, out of, this situation.  
In Stengers’ view, stupidity currently inhabits those “(ir)responsible” for making 
decisions. In the IPCC reports, I would contend that stupidity manifests itself in the form 
of the discrepancy between the highly helpful and necessary diagnosis of the situation of 
climate crisis as one requiring rapid, drastic change, and the incapability to think beyond 




and experiments, top-down policy-making, expert-led environmentalism rather than 
climate justice, de-growth and diverse and slow economies. As we saw in chapter II, 
Greenpeace, among other examples of organizations, has based some claims, arguments 
and positions of its campaigns on the body of scientific knowledge produced by the 
IPCC: it was in the aftermath of the 2007 IPCC fourth assessment report that the famous 
environmentalist organization crafted the “It’s Not Too Late!” campaign I’ve discussed at 
length above. If the IPCC diagnosis have not only allowed for many to see uchronia for 
what it is, a temporality assuming illimited growth on a limited planet, and if the 
climatological knowledge presented by the panel offers food for thought and critique, if it 
constitutes part of the grounding evidence environmentalists often seize to advance anti-
uchronian mobilizations, the reports part ways from such activism when they invoke 
carbon markets, “development,” “sustainable growth,” BECCS, as ways to address the 
climate crisis. The anti-uchronian moment, where the IPCC’s description and 
documentation of climate change challenge notions of progress and disrupt assumptions 
in favor of growth, are followed by a resolute commitment to “overcome” global heating 
insofar as it is an obstacle to growth, rather than take in the consequences of knowledge 
and uncertainties regarding global warming so as to carve more livable ways of living.  
 Stengers provides examples of rhetorical phrases deployed in the context of “our” 
officials’ stupidity. In the face of “the eruption of Gaia” and the subsequent need to put 
growth in doubt, they retort: “mais ce serait la porte ouverte à…” which could be literally 
translated as “but this would open the door to…” (and in a more idiomatic English 
expression, would likely be conveyed with images of slippery slopes). The suggestion 




to growth, for instance. The stupidity at play in recommendations to create carbon 
markets and resort to certain kinds of geoengineering strategies takes the counter-
uchronian form of a rush to close doors to radical changes in production and 
consumption, and to solve a problem with the very tools that created it, only deploying 
them on a larger, planetary scale this time. Capitalist, carbon-emitting growth has given 
the planet a fever, … so let’s expand capitalist commodification to the emission of CO2! 
The technological age has spinned out of control, so let’s hurry and invent new 
technologies, … like air conditioning for the Earth! Stupidity, a moment where the 
demands made upon the situation do not match the situation’s own exigencies, arises 
from the persistence of uchronia’s appeal and even its strengthening: once again, 
technology and market expansion are expected to act as a fix to continue to ensure 
growth (to reproduce themselves), feeding its own self toward hypothetical all-masterful 
futures. This generates a form of hyper-uchronia. 
The temporal dimension of stupidity, and the stupid dimension of counter-
uchronia or hyper-uchronia are important here. With the term counter-uchronia, I refer to 
the leap, the rush to assumptions that growth will and should persist even when it has just 
been acknowledged as the primary cause of a world-historic eco-crisis, whereby obstacles 
to uchronia are countered and its logic prolonged. This also underscores the common 
reactive character of regressive counter-uchronias and progressive or futurist ones. By 
hyper-uchronia, I refer to the specific form of boost to uchronian logic performed by the 
futurist turn to carbon market, geoengineering, and such amendments to uchronia. One of 
the crucial constitutive elements of this hyper-uchronian moment has to do with 




aggravate it against its own demands depends upon a skip to hasty conclusions, a re-
active rush to rescue the Earth without taking the time for doubt in a fast-paced, 
disconnected temporality reliant upon a teleology of growth. In spite of its future 
impossibility and its current and future destructivity, growth of capitalist markets is held 
once again as the only imaginable horizon. Only this time, technological tinkering will 
take place directly at the planetary scale. The stupidity at play is especially visible from 
the temporal perspective: there is a gap between diagnosis and prognosis on the one hand, 
and prescription on the other, then a leap to abstract futures echoing and even 
caricaturing uchronia that would subject the present to even more carbon-emitting ways: 
thus the IPCC proposes “temporary overshooting” and eventual deployment of 
hypothetical future technofixes which effects are unknown but deemed knowable in the 
future. 
Stupidity v. Idiocy: IPCC Sustainable Growth as Counter-Uchronia 
 
In the 2014 reports (AR5), the IPCC re-wrote their definition of the notion of 
sustainability, which they previously drew from the Brundtland Commission’s definition: 
“development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability for 
future generations to meet their own needs.” The definition now used in the reports reads 
as follows: “a dynamic process that guarantees the persistence of natural and human 
systems in an equitable manner” (IPCC, 2013; 2014a; 2014b) The new definition is more 
anchored in the present and lets go of a reference to future generations in favor of the 
more vague term “persistence,” a term which, however, has the merit of still underscoring 
a present-future continuum. Indeed, many of the changes projected in the 2007 report 




among the IPCC’s predictions have been proven wrong, not so much in the sense that the 
changes anticipated did not take place, but more often than not, in the sense that the Panel 
had underestimated the extent, speed, pace of the change. Here the IPCC is being caught 
up by its own prognosis, which is becoming a diagnosis in need of updating to more 
dramatic states.  
Both understandings of sustainability share one common trait however: the goal is 
by no means to supplant capitalocentric, growth-driven temporality (uchronia) with a new 
temporality of sustainability, but to create an adjectival modifier to amend uchronia: 
“sustainable growth” is the new, counter-uchronian horizon. The multiple scenarios 
entertained and the measures promoted, normatively obscuring non-capitalist economies 
and prescribing the creation of carbon markets as well as increased confidence in the 
technological age’s capacity to “fix” the problem it created, converge within a 
capitalocentric futurity supposed to be adjusted to a bit of equity and some persistence. 
Namely, in spite of their anti-uchronian moment, the IPCC reports fall short of taking the 
time for sufficiently idiotic questions: do we, after all, need growth at all? The IPCC 
models rush back to the “stupidity” that consists of saying, in the same breath, that 
growth is a fundamental driver of greenhouse gases’ emissions, and that in order to 
continue to have growth happily ever after, we should create carbon markets and trust 
geoengineering expertise. The capitalocentric horizon, uchronia, is merely amended by 
an impoverished concept of sustainability to give rise to a “counter-uchronia,” or 
strengthened even, by a geoengineering boost that may justify calling this futurist vision a 
hyper-uchronia. Isabelle Stengers did not bring her two concepts of idiocy and stupidity 




climatological knowledge or emphasize their temporal stakes (although she clearly has 
the current ecological crises in mind). I now return once again to idiocy for a moment, 
qua the prism of anti-uchronia’s battle against both uchronia and counter-uchronia. 
Indeed, the question French philosopher of science Isabelle Stengers poses in the 
incipit of this section remains: There is “no guarantee whatsoever that the sciences, at 
least as we know them today, are equipped to respond to the menaces of the future” 
(Stengers, 2009, p. 22). Against the declarations of an IPCC which synthesizes, second or 
third-hand and as a result of long negotiation seeking consensus within a community of 
hard and soft scientists accountable to the United Nations, idiocy may compare the 
mitigation “solutions” proposed by the IPCC to a multitude of proposals and direct 
attempts for the concerted and participatory proliferation of a new ethics and new modes 
of living at local and micro-levels, i.e diverse economies in the here and now, with future 
generations as a matter of concern. Yet as Stengers points out, the idiot may easily be 
discarded or excluded as having nothing to propose, no clear program, no single solution, 
or as abusively and ruthlessly denying its power to scientific knowledge and 
technological progress. 
This response to emergency contrasts with and stands against stupidity as a 
temporal leap. Where stupidity leaps away, from a moment of seeing growth as an 
unsustainable temporality, to rushed and dangerous tweeks in conditions supposedly 
aiming at the continuation of growth, anti-uchronia may slow us down to contemplate the 
idea that growth be replaced by experiment with the present, taking the future into 




Idiocy thus slows us down, in part because it poses barely intelligible questions in 
precisely a moment where temptation is so great to just skip over rapidly. If 
idiocy slows us down, if it contests the consensual presentation of our situation, if 
it resists urgency,[it] is not because the presentation would be false or because 
emergencies are believed to be lies, but because ‘there is something more 
important’. Don’t ask him why: the idiot will neither reply nor discuss the issue. 
The idiot … produces an interstice … But his role is not to produce abysmal 
perplexity … the idiot demands that we slow down, that we don’t consider 
ourselves authorized to believe we possess the meaning of what we know. 
(Stengers, 2005, p. 995) 
 
The idiot does not only cause and require us to slow down: she is defined, in Stengers’ 
view, by her status as that who is likely to be excluded, on the basis of assumptions that 
she has nothing to contribute, that she does not know any solutions to the problems she 
herself may pose. This question of distinguishing idiocy and perplexity, and of the 
absence of a program, goes along with a distinction between idiocy and ignorance. Idiocy 
is a form of skepticism, holding on to the possibility that science may not be best 
equipped to make all decisions for us, and while useful as one of many actors involved in 
diagnosing situations, it should not have a monopoly over either such moments or 
prescriptive moments: the idiot does not deny articulated knowledge, does not denounce 
it as lies, is not the hidden source of knowledge that transcends them. The constraints 
proposed are idiotic in the following sense: they refer to no arbitrator capable of judging 
the validity of the urgencies that the experimenters claim to exist. In other words, idiocy 




glitter within an order of things seemingly closed to such possibilities. It is an ethical 
interrogation that does not assume a particular temporal order or teleology to the world 
that we should construct, that is not attached to any preconceived notion of this world. In 
contrast, the stupidity that animates the crafting of diagnoses regarding the 
unsustainability of growth as a driver of global warming, and the articulation, in the same 
breath, of capitalist expansion and technofixes, is a form of reaction embedded in 
urgency: the technological society’s (Ellul, 1964) growth is throwing us into perilous 
shaky grounds, let us keep growing, helped with a dose of technofix. 
 
Who is the “Anthropos” of “Anthropogenic” Climate Change? 
 
Another aspect of the counter-uchronian component in the IPCC reports is made striking 
qua its universalizing claim that climate change is “anthropogenic,” that it has been 
caused by “humans” and will be, is being, experienced by all. In the following section I 
explore some of the problems posed by this sweeping gesture, this “mise en equivalence” 
(as Stengers may put it) that brings humans together as the cause of a natural 
phenomenon they allegedly will all have to suffer from, unless “we” act fast. As we will 
see, not only is this interestingly tied to a narrative of progress with human mastery of 
nature undertones reminiscent of uchronia before it was ever disrupted by the eruption of 
Gaia, i.e, not only does this “anthropos” category point to a persistent attachment to a 
certain temporality, but reciprocally, it is also in the periodization, in the reading of Earth 
and human history supporting the argument of climate change as “anthropogenic,” that 




All Humans Shall Be Affected by Man-Made Climate Change… 
Unevenly and in Different Ways 
 
Civilized man says: I am Self, I am Master, all the rest is 
other – outside, below, underneath, subservient. I own, I 
use, I explore, I exploit, I control. What I do is what 
matters. What I want is what matter is for. I am that I am, 
and the rest is women and wilderness, to used as I see fit.  
Ursula Le Guin 
 
With each new report (every 7 years or so), the IPCC specifies some of the changes made 
from one report to the next. It does so in general terms, mostly limiting itself to indicating 
that more data and a greater number of scientific publications are available with each 
report, that more detail was added. However, one of the qualitative changes that occurs 
with each report often has to do with the IPCC having to go into more depth regarding 
regional variation of the impacts of climate change: though climate change has been 
caused by humans and impacts all of them in one way or another, these causes and effects 
are not evenly distributed. The reports published in 2014 and 2015 include ten new 
chapters. Chapter 13 of Working Group II’s report focuses exclusively on climate 
change’s impacts on poverty, livelihoods, and inequalities among and within world 
regions – though interestingly, a language of “variation” tends to be preferred to terms 
like “inequality,” which is rarely used in the reports. As the following excerpt from the 
2014 report attests, the IPCC itself has thus admitted shortcomings in its pastinvestigation 
of inequalities and poverty: 
Understanding future vulnerability, exposure, and response capacity of interlinked 
human and natural systems is challenging due to the number of interacting social, 




These factors include wealth and its distribution across society. (IPCC, 2014a, p. 
56) 
Yet these differences are not explained by power dynamics or dependency between 
regions, but rather – in a discourse highly symptomatic of the linearity of 
developmentalist approaches – they are framed by a language of “lacks,” insufficient 
“capacity,” “adaptability,” in the most “vulnerable” regions. Focused on Latin America, 
this passage of the report is telling: 
Some countries have made efforts to adapt, particularly through conservation of 
key ecosystems, early warning systems, risk management ... However, the 
effectiveness of these efforts is outweighed by: lack of basic information, 
observation and monitoring systems, lack of capacity building and appropriate 
political, institutional and technological frameworks; low income; and settlements 
in vulnerable areas. (2014a, p. 1048). 
 
Thus Latin America is presented as at best plagued by some mysterious “lacks,” at worst 
responsible (“made efforts to”) for its “vulnerability” due to ill-informed decision-
making. This language of “low adaptive capacity” is deployed with respect to Africa and 
Asia as well, where information on climate change impacts in these areas is admitted to 
be incomplete, with little to no attempt at pointing to the power dynamics, inequalities, 
colonial legacies, and interdependencies (in the sense both of a dependency of the global 
North on global South poverty, and of the global South on global North hegemony) that 
may explain this uneven distribution of climatological knowledge, beyond the complexity 
of climates in areas like the Sahel, for instance. As for Europe and North America, it is 




The interdependencies at work in aggravating inequalities worldwide and within 
regions, countries, areas, among class, race, gender, etc are not mentioned. Poverty and 
inequality are treated as “other stressors” aggravating the impacts of climate change, 
rather than as complexly overdetermining ecological crises. For instance, chapter 13 of 
the new report introduced references to women for the first time in the IPCC’s history, 
which was about time (until then there was no mention of gender in the thousands of 
pages of reports), yet they are constantly reduced to descriptions as “vulnerable,” absent 
of any account of how gendered power dynamics may work to inform and produce such 
“vulnerability.” The “capacity” and “adaptability” language obscures the larger question 
of capitalist power dynamics, notably between regions. However, as environmental 
historian Mike Davis has demonstrated in his work on El Nino famines (Davis, 2002), 
these have often been the result not only of natural disasters but of failure for markets and 
capitalist states to distribute available resources where most needed in emergency 
situations, along with active appropriations of resources by colonial powers. There is no 
reason to believe that global warming-induced famines would now differ, if one persists 
in considering– even an array of – capitalocentric scenarios. Adaptability, capacity-
building, vulnerability, in sum the IPCC’s language when dealing with the unevenness 
and inequality inherent to the climate crisis, is drawing exclusively from 
developmentalist accounts of “the economy,” which assumes “developmental paths” all 
directed toward generalizing the dream of global North “development,” a generalization 
the panel itself proves to be impossible without a limitless planet. This 
developmentalism, reliant upon a vision of history as linear and universally marching 




dynamics and violence.60 This issue is also interestingly tied to the one discussed above: 
in the IPCC’s accounts, the future (futures) is multiple, as long as it is capitalist: all 
scenarios assume “development” as an end-goal, with all the colonial Western 
underpinnings of this linear vision making it impossible for projections to do anything 
but imagine capitalist hegemony as the default, unproblematic state worldwide. But 
however implausible this may seem, what would happen to carbon emission levels, were 
the IPCC to draw from models projecting a worldwide generalization of traditional 
indigenous modes of living, and/or societies, naturecultures, which “still” rely mostly on 
small-scale, subsistence agriculture? 
Furthermore, the IPCC evokes the heightened risks of local and regional conflicts 
over resources, and the increase in migratory flows due to higher number of climate 
refugees. This in fact is part of why the Nobel Peace prize was awarded to the IPCC in 
2007. Yet at no point of the reports does the IPCC offer insight into how global North 
countries who have contributed most of the carbon emissions placing world populations 
of humans and nonhumans in today’s catastrophic situation are also likely to be the least 
violently affected by global warming, and what ethical and political responsibilities this 
may create. The narrowing of income difference explicitly and dubiously assumed in 
many scenarios also runs counter to any evidence considered even by the most superficial 
observation of capitalist history, which the recent disasters resulting from Structural 
Adjustment Programs have only confirmed: growth cannot be assumed to narrow 
inequalities, and neither can the creation of a global carbon market, or the deployment of 
geoengineering techniques like BEECS – which most global South countries would 
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hardly be able to afford contributing to – that the Working Group III calls for. The report 
starts many sentences with formulas such as “assuming that market efficiency is 
improved…,” further confirming its own capitalocentrism. It cites “studies of market 
potential,” advances that “literature identifies taxes as an efficient way of internalizing 
the costs of greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions,” and praises “revenues from carbon 
taxes or auctioned permits under an emission trading system used to promote low-carbon 
technologies or reform of existing taxes.” These are but examples of the many passages 
on regulating carbon emissions by way of taxes and creating a worldwide carbon market 
which the report on mitigation is filled with. Little to no consideration is taken of who in 
the world would be able to afford these “auctioned permits” to pollute, how such 
auctioning may aggravate existing inequalities and thus shed serious doubts on 
speculations that equity in income distribution could possibly come with a continuation 
of growth (e.g. A1 scenarios). The question of what states would be able to enforce 
carbon taxes, what underground markets would develop as a result and their scope 
relative to what economies, are also unaddressed. Yet the answers to these questions can 
be suspected, and they would most likely not benefit the Global South, or women, 
minorities, the poor, etc. The “anthropogenic” character of climate change has been 
demonstrated by the IPCC reports. Yet who is the “anthropos,” and the “we” in its 




Remember Back When We Became Human, All Too Human, in 1750? 
 
Man is neither the oldest nor the most constant 
problem that has been posed for human knowledge 
… It was the effect of a change in the fundamental 
arrangements of knowledge … Man is an invention 
of a recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. If 
those arrangements were to disappear as they 
appeared … then one can certainly wager that man 
would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the 
edge of the sea. 
Michel Foucault 
 
As a vast, worldwide conglomeration of hundreds of scientists and economists who 
synthesize findings from peer-reviewed climatological literature under the auspices yet 
autonomously from the United Nations, the IPCC is well known for having constituted 
itself as a legitimate voice confirming a quasi-unanimous diagnosis that current global 
warming was “anthropogenic.” Its issuing “synthetic reports for policy-makers,” it has 
served a function of vulgarization and translation of climatology to international politics, 
and the resulting texts have informed international environmental summits from Cancun 
to Rio, Kyoto and Copenhagen. This is in part why it received the Nobel Peace Prize: at 
the intersection of international science and politics, the IPCC has given tremendous 
weight to the claim that climate change was caused “by us humans” and consequently has 
offered fuel for thought and action to myriad mobilizations. Its most striking contribution 
to worldwide debates on global warming is arguably that the climate crisis is 
“unequivocally” (the vocabulary has become more adamant in the last, 2014 report) 
anthropogenic. The panel supports this claim with a comparison of millennia of climate 
change cycles to the short period of industrial modernity, with the predominant date cited 
in the reports placed at 1750. Throughout the reports, the IPCC refers to “pre-industrial 




levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere before industrialism have been constant, 
and suddenly destabilized starting in 1750. This makes room for objectors to the 
anthropogenic climate change position (who when backed up by far right dollars, have 
been quite vocal, in spite of their ultra-minoritarian situation, and have even succeeded in 
usurping the name of “skeptics”) to point out that Earth history has experienced 
tremendous amounts of variation throughout. What climatologists mean by “pre-
industrial levels,” is the relative stability of greenhouse gas throughout the Holocene, 
though even this stability is indeed relative: many of us now know about the ice age (for 
instance) that took over Europe during the middle ages. This variation does not discredit 
the argument that from 1750 on, industrialism caused CO2 levels to rise dramatically.  
 However, did we indeed become human in 1750? Are economies not reliant upon 
the predominance of industrial growth not animated by humans? May we syllogistically 
deduce that the rise of capitalism was a process of humanization, before which medieval 
populations were less-than-human? Are today’s non-industrial economies producing 
inhuman modes of living? These anti-uchronian questions point to how the timeline, the 
periodization advanced by the IPCC, the vision of history underpinning its language and 
arguments, are profoundly capitalocentric. Yet the equation humanism = industrialism 
may have some critical purchase, perhaps against the IPCC’s original intentions in 
crafting the terms of debate. Indeed, simply replacing the adjective “anthropogenic” with 
a seemingly more specific “capitalogenic” may obscure that, precisely, the economy of 
power-knowledge that was born around 1750 did inaugurate a certain figure, man, who 
proved to be quite carbon-emitting.  




coining the term “anthropocene” to designate the geological epoch “we” may allegedly 
have inaugurated by modifying the lithosphere, including allegations that such an epoch 
may more aptly be called “capitalocene.” In a recent article titled “Anthropocene, 
Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin,” Donna Haraway has written 
that  
A big new name, actually more than one name, is warranted. Thus, Anthropocene, 
Plantationocene, and Capitalocene (Andreas Malm’s and Jason Moore’s term 
before it was mine). I also insist that we need a name for the dynamic ongoing 
sym-chthonic forces and powers of which people are a part, within which 
ongoingness is at stake. Maybe, but only maybe, and only with intense 
commitment and collaborative work and play with other terrans, flourishing for 
rich multispecies assemblages that include people will be possible. I am calling all 
this the Chthulucene. (2015, p. 160)  
Similarly, the adjective “anthropogenic” that the IPCC mobilizes invites the proliferation 
of qualifiers to name global warming: the warming would thus not only be global and 
anthropogenic, but also capitalogenic, plantationogenic, and the cooling down hoped for 
may prompt the adjective chthulugenic. I will return to Haraway’s Chtulucene in the next 
chapter, but for the time being, we may simply say that here Haraway refers to an ethical 
call to join forces with 
the diverse earth-wide tentacular powers and forces and collected things with 
names like Naga, Gaia, Tangaroa (burst from water-full Papa), Terra, Haniyasu-




many more. (p. 159) 
As Haraway puts it, “the issues about naming relevant to the Anthropocene, 
Plantationocene, or Capitalocene have to do with scale, rate/speed, synchronicity, and 
complexity” (p. 159). We may say the same about anthropogenic, capitalogenic, etc 
global warming. What the IPCC’s use of the adjective “anthropogenic” indicates and 
calls for problematization is the apparition of “man” as coinciding with the 
“development” (one may rather say contingent eruption) of a certain economy that 
generated enough carbon emissions to threaten most species on the planet of extinction. 
The IPCC suggests this coincidence without problematizing its contingency, however: it 
uncritically equates capitalism with the anthropos, in a sweeping, universalizing gesture 
that extends industrialism’s legacy to a human legacy, both in terms of cause and in terms 
of those impacted: “we” humans have caused the planet to over-heat, which claim may be 
as empowering as it is overwhelming (in the sense that, from a hubristic viewpoint it may 
provoke feelings that only humans can fix the damage they have reeped). Though the 
IPCC’s own marker for when excessively carbon-emitting ways began is 1750, the panel 
fails to further qualify anthropogenic climate change, which results in a blind 
capitalocentric reading of progress, history, the anthropos. This hyper-uchronian 
blindness makes for the ontological grounds upon which the IPCC then proceeds to a 
series of hyper-uchronian positions, from the prescription to create carbon markets to the 
leniency regarding overshooting two degrees’ increase targets while counting on 
hypothetical future technofixes, and from the qualification of growth as “sustainable” to 





Hubristic Leaps “Forward”: Geoengineering Stupidity 
 
These technological fixes should not be condemned 
without considering their value as an extender of 
the time we have to act. In a longer run they are 
probably no more a cure than is dialysis for kidney 
failure but who would refuse dialysis if death was 
the alternative.  
James Lovelock 
 
The IPCC has so far espoused only one kind of geoengineering method: it has imagined 
the BECCS (carbon-dioxide removal and storage techniques) that I described and 
critiqued above to be perfected in about 30 to 40 years, so much so that overshooting is 
also made imaginable and acceptable in the near future. Some have gone further and 
imagined other geoengineering schemes, and even gone ahead to implement them. 
Geoengineering, or large-scale, deliberate interventions in planetary climate systems 
aiming to counter the effects of carbon emissions, hypothetically includes myriad 
experiments which the U.S Congress has amply discussed and considered serious options 
in various hearings. These techniques would include, for instance, spraying large amounts 
of sulfate aerosols in the atmosphere to cause drops of temperature similar to those that 
occur as a result of volcanic eruptions. Other techniques take the form of massive satellite 
shields blocking some of the sunlight from entering the atmosphere. Others yet entail 
planting forests of genetically-modified trees that would be more carbon-absorbing than 
natural trees, thus offsetting some of the current and future carbon-emissions. Yet another 
example would consist in changing the reflectivity of clouds so as to modify the albedo 
of the Earth. In its fourth report (2007), the IPCC wrote with skepticism about the 




Geo-engineering options, such as ocean fertilization to remove CO2 directly from 
the atmosphere, or blocking sunlight by bringing material into the upper 
atmosphere, remain largely speculative and unproven, and with the risk of 
unknown side-effects. Reliable cost estimates for these options have not been 
published. (IPCC, 2007, p. 79) 
The IPCC’s subsequent shift, in the fifth assessment report (2015), to open up to carbon 
removal procedures as more credible alternative is certainly evidence of leaps from 
diagnosing a situation of urgency to considering actions that reproduce and dramatize a 
futurist technofix and renew further desire to continue with growth, overcoming the 
climate crisis (as opposed, perhaps, to facing it). But some scientists, engineers and 
millionaires outside of the IPCC have gone further in this hyper-uchronian direction.  
The Earth Has a Fever? Put Her on Dialysis! 
Millionaire Russ George and Gaia Theorist James Lovelock to the Rescue 
 
On October 15th, 2012, the Guardian reported that in July of that year, “an American 
businessman [whose name is Russ George] [had] dumped around 100 tons of iron 
sulphate into the Pacific Ocean as part of a geoengineering scheme off the west coast of 
Canada” (Lukacs, 2012). The article explained that “the iron has spawned an artificial 
plankton bloom as large as 10, 000 square kilometers. The intention is for the plankton to 
absorb carbon dioxide and then sink to the ocean bed – a geoengineering technique 
known as ocean fertilization that [Russ George] hopes will net lucrative carbon credits.” 
The Guardian also specified that “scientists [were] debating whether iron fertilization 
[could] lock carbon into the deep ocean over the long term, and [had] raised concerns that 




worsen ocean acidification and global warming” (ibid.). A list of side-effects at least as 
scary and consequent as those on the banner for certain drugs’ ads on TV, except on quite 
a different, to a great extent unknown, temporal and spatial scale.  
George violated the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency’s orders who had 
warned him that he could not fly the U.S. flag near the Galapagos and Canary Islands 
after his boats had been banned from ports from the Spanish and Ecuadorean 
governments because he had already made attempts to conduct his little experiment near 
these islands. The millionaire nonetheless claimed that some of the equipment used to 
monitor effects and results following his initiative off the coast of British Columbia had 
been loaned by U.S. agencies like NASA and the National Ocean and Atmospheric 
Administration. In order to conduct his Pacific Ocean experiment Russ George had 
convinced an indigenous village on the nearby Haida Gwaii islands to not only grant 
approval for his project, but also to establish the Haida Salmon Restoration Corporation, 
which would raise and contribute one million dollars to fund it. George had assured the 
indigenous village council that the experiment was about restoring the salmon population 
in the area. His geoengineering initiative was subsequently accused of violating two U.N. 
Conventions (on biological diversity, and the London convention on the dumping of 
wastes at sea) which prohibited for-profit ocean fertilization. As the news of his 
experiment broke while a United Nations environmental summit was being held in 
Hyderabad, India, the governments of Bolivia, the Philippines, several African nations, as 





Russ George has a personal website (called “Bring Back the Fish”) boasting titles 
of blog posts like “A Penny for Our Planet,” “Poof Go the Puffins Unless We Help,” 
“Science Confirms: Dust + Plankton = Ice Ages,” “Sockeye to Return in Historic 
Abundance” (George, n.d. “Bring Back the Fish”) along with arguments about his 
experiment having allegedly been successful both in generating carbon-absorbing 
plankton, and proliferating depleted salmon population. The language in his website is 
dominated by four interestingly entangled semantic fields: that of corporate business and 
profit, that of restoration, that of “miracles,” magic and mermaids, and finally, science. 
Money and Science restore enchantment, an all-in-one formula blending magic dust and 
hubris.  
George’s personal bio (George, n.d., “Me: A Personal Story”), an incredible first-
person narrative and the very first choice of pages on his website’s toolbar, specifies that 
he was taught to swim in Walden Pond. He claims that “if you soak there you can be 
imbued with some of Thoreau’s magic” (ibid.). Before George tells readers about the 
allegedly restorative idea of soaking magical dust in the Pacific in other pages of the 
blog, he takes care to enumerate many of his experiences in the “great outdoors,” 
promptly and inevitably thanking his first car, “a beat-up old 1958 jeep” (later car models 
are also mentioned in narrating various oh so wild anecdotes). Russ George’s mother is 
also thanked, the daughter of a farmer who “didn’t need today’s notions of being 
locavores or organic foodies” to tend the garden and feed him well.  
 Russ George also tells about having lived in a tiny log cabin, working in tree 
logging “to make ends meet,” as according to him that was what “us back-to-the-landers” 




decided to quit logging (but who subsequently does not reappear in the story): this 
decision follows a clumsy personification of trees screaming as he runs his saw through 
them. After logging, George created his own tree planting company having “hired a 
bunch of hippy friends.” The story of course is punctuated with solemn declarations and 
grandiose twists and turns: “thus was born another chapter in my life of fixing the 
damage to Nature that our kind has wrought,” (ibid.) exclaims Russ George. He also 
shares an anecdote illustrating his childlike, creative purity mixed with his virile go-getter 
assertive defiance: George once presented a report to the Canadian prime minister when 
he worked as an ecology consultant, delivering the report in the form of kindergarten-
level flashcards (George had had an epiphany reading his kindergarten attending 
daughter’s report, but the link there is unclear as this excerpt in the story is particularly 
rich in typos and approximative grammar). The Premier allegedly responded to this with 
an “OK smart ass now that you’ve shown we’re remiss in our management you fix it” 
(ibid.).  
“Fixing Nature” has long been Russ George’s vocation. The bio page on his blog 
does not include any written mention of the iron dust dumping, but instead a short video 
of the apparently joyful event, which was conducted from a beautiful sailboat. The low 
voice of a friend filming the large red trace of dust following the ship’s stern and spilling 
in the ocean, half solemn and half laughing proudly, exclaims that “this is Americans 
doing somethin’ about the Earth… trying to make it a more habitable spot… cause, we 
know we do a lot of things that tend to make it uh, not so habitable … so here we’re 
doing our best” (ibid.). Not only humanity but the planet shall now proceed to thank Russ 




bio can hardly be paraphrased without doing violence to the exemplary, virtuous, 
meriting “scientists and managers,” – or should we simply call them heroes? – “working 
on the inside” to “do the right thing,” “walking the walk” that Thoreau’s magic may or 
may not have blessed, had he not bit the dust before the iron-fertilized sea ever came into 
being:  
Jump forward a few more decades and here I am still walking the walk instead of 
talking the talk out there restoring trees and seas with the sweat of my own brow. 
Soon I’ll be posting a television documentary program here that I wrote, 
produced, and directed in the late 80’s. It’s titled, “The New Environmentalists,” 
and tells the story of environmental scientists and managers who work on the 
inside, within industry. They go to work every day and do the right thing. That 
right thing is usually just doing something about the earth, trying to make it a 
better place. Walking the walk is far more important than talking the talk. 
(George, ibid.) 
In addition to producing this kind of rich prose to praise their own merits, new 
environmentalists indeed jump forward sometimes, on interesting imaginary lines. And 
Russ George is not alone in his righteous rescue mission. His own technofixes are 
informed by a version of conservation rhetoric, while someone like James Lovelock, one 
of the inventors of Gaia theory, also advocates for considering geoengineering as a 
serious option. James Lovelock revolutionized the way biology and other sciences view 
the Earth by demonstrating that its systems act very much like those animating a living 




community, but Lovelock, along with Lynn Margulis, was eventually able to make a case 
so that it is now recognized as shedding a new light on the blue planet. This theory has 
tremendously inspired environmentalist positions, and the term Gaia, which he coined to 
describe it, has been seized by many including among radical ranks. When Isabelle 
Stengers refers to “the eruption of Gaia,” though she does not define this event, she is in 
part referring to the sciences’ understanding of Earth systems, which Lovelock greatly 
advanced, and in part to the current, unprecedented ecological crises that have challenged 
anew modernity’s claims to separation between nature and humans.   
However, in his recent book The Vanishing Face of Gaia, Lovelock (2009) offers 
a questionable logic which consists in arguing that if global warming is already a form of 
unintentional geoengineering, we might as well go ahead and reverse the process of 
warming, “curing” the ill we have wrought, only this time “deliberately.” Thus Lovelock 
writes:  
There are signs that we can treat global heating by engineering or other means. 
We have proved that our unscheduled and unintended experiment of adding large 
quantities of carbon dioxide into the air by burning carbon fuel heated the planet, 
and we know that it was a mistake. Does this mean that we can cure global 
heating by adding some other gas or material that does the opposite and cools? 
Scientists, including me, think that we may have little option but to try; but surely 
it is much better to try as a planned experiment than as a panic response. (2009, p. 
137) 
The tense mix of urgency and criticism of panic response is striking: according to 




question “business as usual,” a phrase that comes up regularly in his prose. On the other 
hand, he contrasts geoengineering experiments with “panic responses,” trusting that one 
could “plan” for such “experiments.” However while planning is surely part of what 
makes an experiment more or less rigorous in a laboratory, part of the very planning 
involved has to do with making room for the unexpected. Any experiment starts with 
hypotheses one then tests with a certain openness to surprise, to the unanticipated. Given 
the planetary scale, how one would proceed if such experiment of adding cooling factors 
to Earth systems were to fail or produce detrimental effects is quite unclear. Yet 
Lovelock’s confidence in science is impressive, and so is his capacity, in this case, to 
rhetorically imply that “scientists” in general think we have “little other option but to try” 
(note that he does not write “some” scientists or specify in any way). Somehow, from the 
fact that global heating has been proven to be caused, inadvertently, by human action, 
Lovelock leaps to the conclusion that we may go ahead and continue on the same 
interventionist path, this time “knowingly.” The question of where and how the 
unknown/known border may be delineated does not seem to trouble the Gaia theorist 
enough to call for abstinence from large-scale tinkering, and rhetorically, he situates this 
at the level of cairological temporality: the “unscheduled” experiment is contrasted with a 
“planned” one. First as tragedy, then as farce, first as “unscheduled” then as “planned,” 
humans are entrusted the “management” or “cure” of Earth systems so complex that no 
complete consensus on what exactly we may anticipate is reached – Lovelock is a loud 
voice insightfully contesting the IPCC’s projections and claiming that their modeling is 
excessively linear, that the panel may have underestimated feedback effects, tipping 




interdisciplinary scientific approach. But between “panic response” and “having little 
option but to try,” Lovelock walks with amazing confidence on a very thin line of threat. 
Describing Earth’s history by comparing it to the life of a woman, he explains that Gaia 
can be considered an “old lady,” which fragile state calls for protective intervention on 
the part of humans. He repeatedly claims that a sudden, dramatically catastrophic event 
would be, to an extent, desirable as it would shake the powers that be out of their apathy, 
into action. What we would need, in his view, is a cataclysmic event comparable to a war 
(his last book abounds in belliquose metaphors), which would finally justify a strong 
leader stepping in – here Churchill’s figure is each time invoked to praise “blood, sweat 
and tears” attitudes that would not shy away from circumventing excessively slow and 
impractical democratic imperatives, which to Lovelock impede acting with the necessary 
boldness.  
Thus Lovelock, a former MD, also deploys threatening, anthropomorphizing 
metaphors where the Earth is again staged as a fragile old lady that human scientists 
rescue as her benevolent doctors – deemed knowledgeable enough to help and save her – 
as with the quote in incipit of this section, which is worth re-examining here:  
These technological fixes should not be condemned without considering their 
value as an extender of the time we have to act. In a longer run they are probably 
no more a cure than is dialysis for kidney failure but who would refuse dialysis if 
death was the alternative. (p. 142) 
Western medicine, which indeed has a history of declaring itself capable to act as the 
ultimate life extender,61 is taken to be exemplary of the kind of ethics that shall guide us 
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to the path of geoengineering. Life on dialysis is assumed better than death, in a 
peremptory “who would refuse” turn of phrase, yet one may pose another “who” question 
shaking the accuracy of the metaphor: whose death is being discussed here? The death of 
the planet as we know it, in the Holocene form we are (un)familiar with and have evolved 
in, may be at stake, but leaping from this to the death of the planet in general seems the 
kind of leap only a strong human exceptionalism may be able to perform. Besides, the 
very leap from individual lives and life-saving dialyses in the human medical realm 
(which ethical assumptions are already contestable) to the planetary scale serves an 
impressive yet dubious confidence in our capacity to “cure” ills caused by “us.”  
Lovelock’s trust in technology and his desire to see “business as usual” enabled to 
continue in spite of the climate crisis, his futurist confidence where “experiments” 
inadvertently conducted by heating the planet can be reversed as long as the 
“inadvertent” is turned into “deliberate” and the “unscheduled” in turned into “planned,” 
erasing unpredictability in even stronger a way, his call for a bold anti-democratic blood, 
sweat and tears leader and his desire for a catastrophe of a scale and suddenness 
sufficient to prompt dramatic action, his thin impossible line between claims that 
geoengineering would be “better than a panic response,” and threatening “we have little 
other option,” “dialysis or death” tone, make for an incredible exemplar of uchronia on 
steroids, or hyper-uchronia.  
I will refrain from elaborating on Stengers’ concept of stupidity with respect to 
Lovelock’s rhetoric. It would be just as debasing to apply it to an old man known for 
having invented a not only scientifically revolutionary but also poetically beautiful Earth-
                                                                                                                                                                     
the Truths and righteousness of medicine and jumping to apply these to Gaia, but even the former are 
highly contestable, let alone the fact that the leap from human living beings to the vast systems that 




as-living-organism theory, as his paternalistic gestures to cure old Gaia are preposterous. 
Nonetheless, Lovelock’s demanding of democracy that it concedes “we have little other 
option,” his demanding of the Earth that it lets geoengineers experiment, his demanding 
of geoengineering and science that they “cure” Gaia’s fever, seem to run into a sharp 
dissonance with what the climate crisis situation could be read to demand, and with the 
complexity of his own Gaia hypothesis. Lovelock writes that “we have proved that our 
unscheduled and unintended experiment of adding large quantities of carbon dioxide into 
the air by burning carbon fuel heated the planet” (p. 139) and from this he somehow 
deduces that more experimenting, this time “deliberate,” is in order. One may oppose to 
this an anti-uchronian suggestion that we have “proved” a certain “business as usual” so 
dear to his heart can reek havoc, that some of the sciences have been able to diagnose a 
likely relation between this damage and certain industrialist, technology-dependent 
modes of production, and that we know too little to continue treating the Earth as the 
object of our “experiments.” Lovelock’s recommendations are indicative of the powerful 
appeal of uchronia, to the point that frenetic fixing is at times preferred to phronesis even 
by incredibly inventive scientists. Here the relationship between limitless confidence in 
scientific knowledge’s unstoppable progress and uchronia is made visible. It is based on 
the confidence that discoveries of techno-scientific “solutions” to fix complex Earth 
systems’ disruptions will be found in the future that both the IPCC and Lovelock 
conclude geoengineering may be the right course of action (though the latter is very 
critical of the former they do share this assumption in common). We shall put the Earth 
on dialysis for the time being, and figure out later how to perform a more definitive 




same path of experiments intentionally, to counteract the current inadvertent effects, 
imagines untangible courses and directions to Earth and human history, where the 
technologies and mode of production that brought the crisis shall counteract their own 
effects (counter-uchronia), and where more trust in futurist experiments and technologies 
shall be invested (hyper-uchronia).  
“New Environmentalist” Emergency and Hyper-Uchronian Heroism 
 
Russ George and even James Lovelock’s respective practice and defense of 
geoengineering could easily be reduced to a cynical hope to speculate on carbon credits 
or maintain “business as usual,” and in Russ George’s case there is certainly an explicit 
rhetoric interpellating the climate crisis as a business opportunity. One could certainly 
stop here with sufficiently compelling reasons explaining their positions. However, James 
Lovelock’s views are more conventionally reactionary than this venture capitalist 
explanation would inaccurately account for. Even for George, if the search for 
speculation on carbon credits is reason enough, his self-avowed desire for turning the 
climate crisis into a source of lucrative activities is couched in a peculiar conservationist 
discourse he seems to genuinely adhere to and which deserves noting. Indeed, would 
someone who wishes to profit off of global warming even invest millions of dollars in 
carbon credit speculation endeavors if they didn’t believe that large-scale tweeking of the 
Earth’s temperature at the very least did not risk to result in planetary holocaust or mass 
biocide? What good (profit) will this speculation do when the experiment has failed and 
caused runaway climate change and subsequent mass extinction (including, perhaps, of 
our species)? This latter question is surely one that would-be and actual geoengineering 




consider these risks, albeit hastily. Furthermore, it turns out that beyond a strangely 
cynical and naïve conviction that geoengineering can’t hurt the planet, the two examples 
of pro-geoengineering rhetoric described above are both ones coming from what Russ 
George calls “new environmentalists,” i.e folks who seem to sincerely be attached to a 
version of conservation ethics and a certain scientism, and as such belong to a long 
tradition of virile pseudo-scientific managerial and technocratic environmentalism.  
 Both the characters described mobilize images of heroes acting boldly in a 
moment of urgency, playing on a certain version of masculinity. For Russ George, the 
hero is none other than his ever so humble Earth-servant autobiographical self. His car, 
his swimming in the “wild” magic waters on which shores a great transcendentalist once 
built a utopian-of-one cabin, his self-depiction as an “American doin’ somethin’ right,” 
his being called “smartass” by the Canadian Prime Minister, and his characterization of 
“new environmentalists” as “working from within the industry” to “fix” things, all 
participate in painting the portrait of a conservationist high-tech hyper-modern hero. In 
Lovelock’s case, the desire for virile heroism comes up when he evokes the figure of a 
strong Churchill-like leader daring to sidestep democracy for the greater Gaian 
(understand, human-hospitable Holocene Earth) good. Another heroic figure is that of the 
Gaian doctor, who will protect fragile old feminine Earth. Note, regarding the sick 
patient’s character, that Lovelock scientifically supports his claim about Earth’s old age 
by telling his readers about his rich Gaia hypothesis and living systems, Earth’s life 
expectancy with respect to the sun, etc, but he never explains why the Earth should be 
female, besides a tautological explanation: his having named his theory with the name of 




 These different forms of virile heroisms also mix with a specific scientism, self-
righteousness and human exceptionalism, all informing the hyper-uchronian futurist 
narratives here. This does not imply, by any means, that hyper-uchronia has to take this 
particular gendered form, of necessity. Yet this is the form it takes in both examples, in 
what’s only a caricature of the relative genderblindness of the IPCC’s own counter- and 
hyper-uchronias discussed above.  
Human exceptionalism is another constitutive trait of this hyper-uchronian 
horizon. The repetition of terms and phrases like “fixing,” “doing the right thing,” 
“curing,” sustains Lovelock’s hyper-uchronian reasoning: “we have experimented and 
been mistaken, let’s now experiment and fix our mistake” (p. 139). While this language 
of fixing assumes that humans are in a position of agency, control and deliberateness or 
“planning,” it blatantly underestimates the agentic and unpredictable ways of Gaian 
response, even in the midst of evidence that intervention into so much complexity can be 
disastrously destructive and may not be possible to anticipate. Reciprocally, it arguably 
over-estimates human capacity for deliberation, intentionality, conscious action, the 
unstoppable extension of human scientific knowledge, and human planning, foresight 
abilities, the latter two being a condition for deliberation and intention. What is being 
proved by the climate crisis exactly? According to Lovelock, it is not so much the vast 
extent of the unknown, but rather that we may now proceed on the same route, 
“deliberately” this time. The “deliberate” character ultimately amounts to an act of faith, 
but that does not disturb the confident scientist. The idea of heroic manly figures “fixing 
the damage to Nature that our kind has wrought” taps into the image of a (male) 




against an evil “kind.” Thus human exceptionalism is entangled with exceptionally heroic 
and virile individuals. Again, the gendered aspects here may not be sine qua non 
conditions of existence of human exceptionalism, yet they feed into and support this 
specific contingent hyper-uchronian arrangement.  
The claim to altruistic “saving” of course is fragile, as not only is Russ George 
experimenting to eventually beat competitors to new markets of carbon credits, but the 
goal is also not simply to help the Earth per se: again, the point is to rescue the Holocene, 
i.e human-habitable Earth. Even though Lovelock can hardly be suspected of being avid 
capitalist speculator (after all, he failed to acquire the copyright when he invented the 
micro-wave), he does recurrently repeat the phrase “saving business as usual” to express 
urgency, throughout this Vanishing Face of Gaia (2009). This is another aspect of the 
human exceptionalism at work: humans have damaged Gaia as we (do not entirely) know 
it, humans are the only ones capable of “fixing” the damage, they are assumed to be 
capable of it on an act of faith, and finally, it is for the human species that such saving is 
assumed to have to take place. From conventional, simplistic moral imperatives with 
strong doer-deed understandings of responsibility – fix the damage you have caused – we 
leap to assumptions of exclusive possibility – the doer behind the global heating deed is 
the only one capable of undoing what he has done. Rugged individual conservationist 
figures are, to an extent, a caricature of human exceptionalism, though Russ George self-
righteously denounces the “damage [his] kind has wrought,” and presumes with no 
particular reason but anthropocentrism that because humans have caused the climate to 
warm, they can also reverse the pattern. Urgency (“we have little other options,” 




Hyper-uchronia is made of a futurism where Man shall triumph once more, even in 
correcting his own mistake, even in scaling up those among his actions that are 
“deliberate,” to the level of the planet (that this is possible is of course assumed: only one 
quick step separates, if at all, inadvertent, accidental cause-effects from intentional, 
deliberate ones). Similarly to what I remarked in the case of regressive counter-uchronias, 
this hyper-uchronian vision relies upon understanding the extension of Gaia’s life as a 
goal, her preservation, cure, treatment, control and protection, her restoration, as a 
teleological end which Man must tend to, and the human can become truly human, 
human exceptionalism’s end can be met in this heroic mission. Both Man and Nature are 
once again celebrated in teleological forms, and in this hyper-uchronian futurism 





WHAT IS BEING DONE? 
EMBODIED HETEROCHRONIA,  
SYNCHRONY, ECO-CHRONIA 
 
Present: De-growth Livelihoods Here and Now 
Coming up: Non-Capitalist Futures 
 
What would a non-capitalist, de-growth description of a scenario family used for 
modeling futurological climatological data look like? My own proposition would read as 
something like this:  
The Z00 storyline and scenario family describes a future Chthulucene world of 
rapid de-growth and slow living, global population that peaks in mid-century and 
declines thereafter in favor of queer kinships, and the rapid introduction of 
convivial tools following the abolition of private property (including intellectual) 
as well as the proliferation of DIY. Bicycles generalize as a means of transit, feet 
are also used more and more, distances being covered more slowly. Food 
production diversifies as a result of a global ban on GMOs and the generalization 
of subsistence permaculture as well as indigenous agricultures, decreasing in 
quantity also with the decrease in population and simplification/diversification of 
local diets. Generally production becomes almost exclusively local and organic, 
with commodities’ value being measured (if at all) not by exchange but based on 
the durability of objects. Bartering and the collectivization of both needs and 
goods at local levels become prevalent compared to transport over long distances. 
Major underlying themes are naturecultural bio and economic diversity, 
bioregional cooperative units, community economies building, increased cultural 
and social interactions and leisure time, with a generalization of participatory 
local democracy practices. By 2101 the term “growth” in reference to economies 
is recognized as obsolete and only found in etymology dictionaries, along with 
terms like “capitalist” and “profit.” The Z00 scenario family develops into 
multiple groups that describe alternative directions of economic, social and 
political change toward diverse forms of post-capitalist economies. The multiple 
Z00 groups are distinguished by their convivial emphasis: diversification of 
naturecultures and in renewable energy sources with contraction of material 
production such that liberated time is mostly dedicated to the collective and 
individual creation of vernacular sciences, art, dance, music (e.g Z0068X), 
diversification of naturecultures and in renewable energy sources with contraction 
of material production such that liberated time is mostly dedicated to joyful 
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farniente and queer love (e.g Z0069Y), diversification of naturecultures and in 
renewable energy sources with contraction of material production such that 
liberated time is mostly dedicated to a bit of both and more sustainable activities 
and farniente – mostly unimaginable to 2015 human generations (e.g Z0070Z). 
This is not a program.  
I have already quoted (at more length) Foucault’s claim that “the idea of a program of 
proposals is dangerous. As soon as a program is invented, it becomes law, and there is a 
prohibition against inventing” (Foucault, 1997). In other (my) words, programs entail a 
counter-uchronian futurism. Rather than outlining “what is to be done,” the above play on 
IPCC scenario language is meant to disrupt capitalocentric assumptions, to eco-queer 
temporalities, and perhaps, to imagine other possible temporal orders of things, based 
partly on what is already being done.  
Though the above scenario description may seem science fictionesque, it is by no 
means utopian. If some may judge it unlikely or improbable, it is not outlining a strict 
project to guide pre-drawn lines, and neither should it cave to being cast as impossible. 
My critique of certain (many) greens’ utopianisms is in no way a rejection of desires and 
needs to expand our imaginaries: I have tried to show, on the contrary, that claiming 
utopianism may restrict imagination, crystallizing, immobilizing creative, surprising, 
unlikely and imaginative experiments. This however is not an apt metaphor, as crystals 
are ever so slowly dynamic in minuscule ways reticent to human naked eyes, and neither 
would be the description of utopia as making things and life too “static,” as static energy 
is also made of movement. Utopias and uchronias, armed with their privative “ou,” have 
represented an urge to make time stand still, to abolish time, to get out of time, to escape 
time (and how could this be done without ending life: “realized” utopia and uchronia 
would be death). Change is contingent upon time (not necessarily long durations, but 
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necessarily passing), and it is all there is, all that becomes, all we have (only we arguably 
don’t “have” it in any simple sense). Though they exercize an understandable appeal (the 
appraisive “eu”), utopian projects connote a longing for immobility incompatible with the 
espousal of unpredictability and becoming I call for here (change, which requires time to 
pass, happens within, inside, rather than from an illusory pristine outside: the problem is 
in the association of “eu” with “ou”). Imagination (also within us) does not need, and 
must do without utopia and uchronia. But, as Ursula Le Guin puts it, “truth (note the lack 
of capital “t”) is a matter of imagination.” (Le Guin, p. xi, 2012). This is why what 
preceded and what follows is far from rejecting science fiction as an art form: the above 
scenario is not a utopia, but it may be read as science fiction, and to a great extent science 
fiction already feeds life. As Dorion Sagan suggests, “perhaps the greatest science fiction 
story would be a literal description of our present reality, but couched in terms that made 
it unrecognizable until near the story’s end” (Sagan, 2013, p. 48). Similarly, the border is 
quite thin between, on the one hand, ethnographic work by Chris Carlsson (2008) on 
“Now-Topian” DIY, hackers, cyclists, urban homesteaders, and on the other, a narrative 
like Ernest Callenbach’s Ecotopia (1973). This novel portrayed a relatively close future 
in which the U.S. West Coast had seceded from the rest of the country to create a 
confederation of small cooperative, mostly direct democratic spaces where sustainable 
“steady states” were nurtured. The practices described in both of these texts are very 
much alike, only in the latter case, they are generalized to the whole natureculture. Here 
science fictional imagination may tremendously inspire radical green alternatives to 
spread, without requiring that green activists and movements claim utopianism (and in 
fact Callenbach’s novel has caused an ecotopian group to create, that called itself 
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“Survivalists,” just like in the novel: the relationship between reality and science fiction 
is a mutually constitutive one, or better still, because science fiction is always among us, 
an autopoietic one). In other words, we may proceed to turn the table, and claim loud and 
clear that ecotopianism is much more realistic than the capitalist utopianism that is 
currently having us drown. 
 A few precisions on the above scenario description may help make the openness 
of the futures imagined in this perspective even clearer. The term “Chthulucene” was 
recently coined by Donna Haraway as an alternative to the anthropocene, the 
plantationocene, the capitalocene, the age of Dithering.62 This would be a past, present, 
future epoch (note that Haraway emphasizes the anthropocene, not as an epoch but as a 
border event) that would enable the proliferation of more hospitable timespaces for the 
many refugees lacking a refuge who populate the planet in our current context, be they 
human or not. Indeed, the name is a reference to myriad of vibrant human, nonhuman and 
hybrid things, including: 
the diverse earth-wide tentacular powers and forces and collected things with 
names like Naga, Gaia, Tangaroa (burst from water-full Papa), Terra, Haniyasu-
hime, Spider Woman, Pachamama, Oya, Gorgo, Raven, A'akuluujjusi, and many 
many more. “My” Chthulucene, even burdened with its problematic Greek-ish 
tendrils, entangles myriad temporalities and spatialities and myriad intra-active 
entities-in-assemblages—including the more-than-human, other-than-human, 
inhuman, and human-as-humus. Even rendered in an American English-language 
text like this one, Naga, Gaia, Tangaroa, Medusa, Spider Woman, and all their kin 
[can be imagined and embraced within and by] the webs of speculative fabulation, 
                                                        
62 This age name is Haraway’s reference to Kim Stanley Robinson’s science fiction novel, 2312 (2012). 
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speculative feminism, science fiction, and scientific fact. (2015, p. 160) 
If these would make for some of the present and future possibilities, they require re-
imagining temporalities, giving visibility to existing non-uchronian ones, along with 
critiquing existing ones (part of the previous chapters’ goal was to start the latter task). 
As J.K. Gibson-Graham and Gerda Roelvink have put it, this implies shifting the 
questions we ask: 
Rather than pose the time-honored but often paralyzing question of “what is to be 
done” to produce change, we choose to marshal examples of “what is already 
being done”, thereby contributing to the credibility and strengthening of 
alternative economies. (2009, p. 331)  
Here the term economies could be substituted with temporalities. In fact, Gibson-
Graham’s project already implies a different relationship to temporalities: “What is being 
done?” allows an inclusion of the present yet often marginalized economies and, I argue, 
temporalities which would make and that already make the proliferation of alternative 
livelihoods, paces, speeds, futures and presents possible. However, as I mentioned in the 
introduction to this dissertation, this cannot limit itself to a simple presentism, nor to 
solely envisioning myriad alternative futures as if present alternative times didn’t already 
exist. The effort here must encompass the combination of present imaginations and 
experiments, the imagination of futures, and more (slowing down, speeding up, pacing, 
pondering, wandering…): when now-topians (Carlsson, 2008) and interim futures 
(Connolly, 2008) assemble, non-utopian and non-uchronian temporalities are made 
possible. Neither presentist nor futurist, the temporalities I propose to foster and that are 
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already challenging the reign of uchronia are not tied to a program, because they ask what 
is being done, because they are committed to non-commitment, democratic participation 
and direct action, surprise, contingency, the anticipation of the non-anticipated and the 
unknown – thus the playful, parodic yet serious Z00 scenario family description 
concludes with the assertion that most activities envisioned there cannot truly be 
envisioned or imaginable by our 2015 selves. The description above implies a complete 
rethinking of sustainability as not tied anymore to sustaining growth, but rather, 
sustaining anti-uchronian critique, as well as a heightened awareness of present and 
future “queer kinships,” as Donna Haraway has put it. This latter concept echoes the 
concept of “future generations,” in contrast with uchronia’s futurism, but further 
radicalizes it to accommodate for the limitation of mammal populations (mostly humans 
and their lifestock) whose bodies suffice on their own to make carbon emissions a threat 
to life.  
 These efforts are partly informed by my reading of the Nietzschean eternal return. 
As I mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, the eternal return has a history of 
being dismissed as a serious Nietzschean concept, though a renewed interest in this 
notion has been emerging in recent continental philosophy, 63 often in response to 
Heidegger and then Gilles Deleuze’s influence. So far I have drawn mostly from the 
critical implications and dimensions of the eternal return, notably the critique of and 
incompatibility with teleological visions of time. Nietzsche places contingency and 
                                                        
63 Throughout this dissertation I have relied mostly on Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation of the eternal return: 
see Deleuze, 2005; 2013. For more, recent interpretations and (attempts at) critiques of this concept, 
including failed, Badiousiard critiques among the ranks of object-oriented ontologists, see also Ray 
Brassier, 2007; Meillassoux, 2010. 
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randomness at the core of the ontological condition of eternal return (the throw of dice). 
Neither reason nor unreason are pertinent to the course of time, an insight I have brought 
in conversation with my critiques of endism and growth. We have seen, importantly, that 
if many of the temporalities examined above are human all too human, and natural all too 
natural, certain understandings of the human and the natural may also be scrutinized as 
teleological, all too teleological. I have discussed the necessity for the transvaluation of 
all values in relation to these themes, and Nietzsche’s claim that there cannot be any ages 
of happiness, though there may be moments of joy.  
In this chapter I will elaborate on the question of how joy may be possible in a 
time of ecological crisis, a time when the world of becoming and eternal recurrence erupt 
to be experienced all the more intensely, intensifying every moment, long or short. If 
Nietzsche’s thought may richly inspire a reconceptualization of temporalities in a context 
of global warming and mass extinction, it is also because he called for cultivating a 
capacity to cry out “da capo!” (in music, this Italian phrase means “from the beginning!”) 
even in the face of the thought of thoughts, that everything will eternally return, that the 
infinity of the past and the infinity of the future are ever present in the present and in each 
moment, which is the only way time can pass. If all there is, is the ever-repeating 
moment, then what is being done, and will we joyfully welcome its eternal return?  
This chapter turns to the positive ontological and ethical dimensions of the eternal 
return to inform my conceptualization of a couple more notions that could serve as 
needed distinctions in our contemporary condition. “Heterochronia” refers to the 
juxtaposition of otherwise seemingly incompatible moments and temporalities in specific 
times, a needed experience as the planet is warming and as we realize this warming is 
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anthropogenic. To illustrate this, I will propose an alternative reading of Hundertwasser’s 
five skins theory in the light of his spiral motifs and “tree-tenant houses,” a heterotopia 
(to borrow Foucault’s term) that inspires my concept of heterochronia. “Synchrony” also 
refers to the cohabiting of multiple temporalities, yet with this concept I emphasize the 
(sometimes dissonant) simultaneity of this cohabitation. Synchrony does not imply a 
homogenous, coherent, smooth or synchronized temporality in the sense of “everything 
being interconnected” in any simple way: what coexists in synchrony here would be 
pasts, presents and futures, virtual and actual. Though some of that literal synchrony may 
manifest in symbolic choreographies erupting in activist moments, as for instance in the 
case of a Flood Wall Street protest in New York City where all the protesters tapped their 
hearts in silence at the same time so as to evoke an alignment with Gaia’s heartbeat, by 
no means can all the living beings and forces of the Chthulucene be sync-ed as easily as 
an iPhone and a computer, and neither would this necessarily be desirable. Finally, I 
discuss eco-chronia as the temporalities of the Chthulucene, multiple, unpredictable, 
surprising, contingent and creative, human, nonhuman and hybrid. This hybridity 
resonates in bodies, must be embodied, thus I turn to Pina Bausch’s contemporary dance 
and its metaphors bringing heterotopias or transcorporealities (Alaimo, 2010) of human 
and nonhuman bodies out on stage. I examine these in conversation with Foucault’s 
discussion of the utopian nature of the body, to eventually return to a (not-so) different 
kind of dance, where Nietzschean character Zarathustra’s moves join those of life in 
unison.  
 




ma allora cos’ha 
lei all’attivo?…” 
“Io? – [un balbettio ... mi trema la 
voce] – 
Io? Una disperata vitalità. 
Pier Pasolini 
 
When Nietzsche Traveled to Messina 
 
When Nietzsche sent his “Messinese Idylls” (which now close the Gay Science) to the 
newspaper Internationale Monatschrifft, he told the publisher that he thought “even the 
most serious writings, once in a while, need[ed] something cheerful.” Yet as he was 
writing joyfully about “an albatross who felt sorry for envy,” and a woodpecker who told 
him that he, Nietzsche, was a poet, which made the philosopher-poet laugh, the thinker of 
the eternal return was staying just a couple hundreds of kilometers from one of the 
world’s most active volcanoes, the Etna. This mountain of lava regularly threatens to 
erase the whole area as we know it (as a 2014 eruption which caused ashes to rain all 
over Messina attests), in spite of the persistence of traces marking the hills at this point of 
Sicily all the way from antiquity, produced by Greek enslaved labor to terrace the slopes 
and prevent the potentially rapid erosion of the volcanic soil – we may note that the mafia 
and capitalist economies are now much less efficient in maintaining these. In 1908, just a 
few years after Nietzsche visited and stayed in Messina, a massive earthquake devastated 
the town, leaving it looking very different from the landscapes and architecture his 
woodpecker friend had flown once over. Today new threats are emerging here, including 
a mega-project to build a bridge across the straight of Messina that would connect 
Calabria to Sicily, making the town even more unrecognizable to a XIXth century 
Nietzschean eye. Swordfish are disappearing rapidly from the straight, as the latter’s 
current helps intensive fishing, another threat which graffiti artist Blu, whose work I have 
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already discussed alongside Nietzsche’s (chapter III), has beautifully depicted in a fresco 
decorating the wall of a Messinese squat/cultural and social center downtown (see 
below). The artist has represented swordfish perhaps taking a revenge against humans, 
perhaps saving them from their consumerist, urban, crowded and frenetic drowning, as 
they too are an endangered, all too endangered species.  
 The long and the short term, the imminence of destruction and the persistence of 
antiquity’s history, the latter history’s minuscule weight in the vicinity of Gaia’s core 
lava, seem to highlight tension and fragility here by the straight, and must have been 
palpable also in the Messina that Nietzsche knew. In spite of this, he affirmed the 
necessity to write “something cheerful.” However, Nietzsche often oscillated between 
joyful and crushing, unbearable affective responses in facing the eternal return. Or, 
rather, as I will try to suggest, he oscillated between exhilarating yet also crushing, 
unbearable joy, desires for lightness and joyful dance, and crushing sadness or perhaps 
despair. Thus he also wrote: “my most profound objection again the eternal return, my 
properly abysmal thought, is always that of my mother and my sister.” The thought of the 
eternal return weighed an unbearable weight on Nietzsche and his dancing and laughing 
Zarathustra, and yet they desired a state where they could watch the whole orchestra and 
cry out: “da capo!” Would we cry out “da capo!” while contemplating Blu’s fresco and 
the crying naked bodies of humans, drowning in a sea of commodities, caught in nets 
with swordfish’s bills breaking them open? Surely some joy can be found today in 
Messina: two years ago, Renato Accorinti, a Messinese gym teacher and anti-bridge 
activist was elected mayor of this city against all odds, and in a recent protest to protect 
convivial plazas in the city, he carried a sign with Mark Twain’s quote: “they did not 
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Figure 6: Blu, untitled. 
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The Eternal Return as Condition of a “Real Philosophy of Becoming” 
 
The eternal return, like the constant, age-old imminence of an earthquake, like the 
cohabitation of deep and quotidian time and the eruption of Gaia and/or the Etna, 
questions what is possible and probable, and heightens both joy and sadness, under the 
crushing weight of a certainty that if all will pass, all has to return infinitely. Contrary to 
dismissals of this notions that deem it a “half-mad idea,” as Milan Kundera claimed in his 
lucky unbearable lightness of being, I continue to argue that this notion is especially 
welcome, needed and inspiring in a context of eco-crisis. William Connolly, who has 
abundantly drawn from Nietzsche in his recent works and also extensively addressed 
temporality and environmental matters in relation to the German “philosopher of the 
future,” has nonetheless brushed off the concept in his recent book, The Fragility of 
Things. Connolly’s work on Nietzsche and ecology is rightly recognized as key to 
contemporary Environmental Theory and to contemporary political thought at large, and 
his insistence on temporality among other threads offer important references and 
differences that will help situate the reading I ultimately defend. I will then turn from this 
difference with Connolly to Deleuze’s interpretation.  
In the Fragility of Things, Connolly footnoted a Nietzschean quote affirming 
becoming with the following remark:  
How, it is surely to be asked, does this formulation and innumerable others like it 
in several Nietzschean texts, square with the idea of eternal return as the return of 
long cycles, in which everything that becomes during one cosmic cycle returns in 
exactly that mode in future cycles? There is no tension if this idea is merely posed 
as an existential test: ‘would you choose life again if everything in it repeats?’ But 
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Nietzsche, besides treating it as only a test sometimes, also experiments with long 
cycles as a metaphysical theme. To me that theme is incompatible with a real 
philosophy of becoming. (2013, p. 217) 
Besides the fact that I struggle to understand Connolly’s “would you choose life again,” 
which questionably seems to assume that we “chose” it at all, this remark differs from my 
reading of the eternal return on a number of counts. Firstly, the eternal return implies that 
there be no simple free will, the condition necessary for “choice”: our freedom is 
constrained by a contingent and constant rearrangement of forces, including ours, which 
will is beyond us as individuals or any kind of simplistic choice an “existential test” 
would include. It would be to greatly misunderstand both the will to power and the 
eternal return, to think that we “choose” life. Instead, the ethical challenge that results 
from our ontological condition of eternal return has to do with espousing fate – amor fati 
– or being crushed by the demon that reminds us everything will return. Secondly, the 
eternal return is not necessarily the return of long cycles, but may be seen at multiple 
scales. It is the return of the moment that returns, all forces of a closed universe being 
constantly re-distributed anew, through the play of relations of force: thus the metaphor 
Nietzsche often deploys of a throw of dice: all faces and dimensions of the dice are 
always present with each new throw, yet each combination is unpredictable and differs 
form the previous one, and at one point each will return. If this is the case, we may 
understand the eternal return as concerning infinitely short as well as infinitely long 
moments. Furthermore, Nietzsche repeatedly rejected the image of “cycles” as adequately 
describing the eternal return, especially in his notes that were published posthumously – 
many have not been translated in English, and are only available in this language, in their 
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distorted version in the Will to Power, a book assembled by Elizabeth Nietzsche, a sister 
who as we have seen is one of the figures whose eternal return Nietzsche has the hardest 
time with. Connolly’s reading understands the object of the return, what is returning, as 
long cycles, and as matter. Thus he evokes “the assumption Nietzsche makes about the 
finitude of matter and the infinity of time is the key problem here” (2013, p. 217). Yet 
here too there is a different possible reading, one that has been stressed, among others, by 
Gilles Deleuze: Connolly takes matter to be finite for Nietzsche, where Nietzsche in fact 
sees the universe as closed and insists on forces, not matter. In the Deleuzian, force-
focused interpretation, Nietzsche is not claiming that matter returns, after long cycles, but 
that the return of forces returns. It is the return that returns in Deleuze’s reading, the 
diverse, the lack of goals, contingency (which contrary to what Connolly also asserts 
does imply necessity, only a complex kind), becoming that keeps on returning, making it 
possible for time to pass. 
Thus, to William Connolly’s statement, “to me that theme is incompatible with a 
real philosophy of becoming,” I would answer that a real philosophy of becoming 
requires the eternal return, which, as Deleuze has put it, is the being of becoming (the 
only being there can be). Here Connolly seems to imply a non-ergodic64 kind of 
becoming, similar to Milan Kundera’s complaint that, because everything passes and 
allegedly will never come back, every moment is fleeting and light as a feather. Thus 
Kundera’s lament about the unbearable lightness of being. To Nietzsche things are not as 
                                                        
64 The term “ergodic” refers to “a process in which every sequence or sizable sample is equally 
representative of the whole (as in regard to a statistical parameter),” and in its second acception, it refers to 
a process which “involves or relates to the probability that any state will recur; especially :  having zero 
probability that any state will never recur” (Merriam-Webster). Thermodynamics, which Nietzsche was 
familiar with, hypothesizes this state. See also Dorion Sagan and Eric Schneider, 2005, p.56, for a 
commentary on the eternal return from the perspective of thermodynamics.  
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simple: it is precisely the awareness of the eternity of the instant that crushes the 
philosopher-poet-Messinese woodpecker friend, whether this weight may weigh joyfully 
or desperately. Furthermore, we will see when discussing the dance of life and thought, 
that the return is not always so heavy: Nietzsche’s struggle for amor fati was in fact about 
seeking a way to face the return in a joyful and light manner, a joy and a lightness staged 
in Zarathustra and his dance with life. For this reason in part, I will draw from examples 
in contemporary dance to think about our current condition of extinction and whether 
light, joyful affects and percepts may emerge in its midst.  
What follows is my translation of a posthumous fragment Nietzsche wrote in the 
fall of 1881:  
The world of forces has suffered no diminution: for otherwise it would always 
have been emptied of its power and would have succumbed in the night of infinite 
time. The world of forces has suffered no interruption in its movement: for 
otherwise its end would be reached and the clock of life would be still. The world 
of forces thus never comes into equilibrium, never has a moment of calm, and its 
strength, its agitation are equal at all time. Whatever the state this world may 
reach, it must have reached it already not only once, but countless times. Thus this 
instant: it has already existed once and many times and will also come back, all 
the forces distributed exactly as now: and thus with the instant that gave birth to it 
and so as well of that which is the child of the present instant. Man! Your entire 
life will be turned again and again and again like an hourglass always spilling – 
meanwhile, a great minute of time for until all conditions from which you have 
become to come together again in a circle over the world. And then you'll see 
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again every pain and every joy and every friend and foe and every hope and every 
mistake and every bit of grass, every sunshine, the integral series of all things. 
This ring, on which you are nothing but a grain, shines again and again. And on 
each ring of human existence, taken in its absolute meaning, comes the hour 
when, to one, then many, then all, the most powerful thought arises, that of the 
eternal return of all things – for humanity it is each time noontime. (Nietzsche, 
1881b, my translation) 
 
As I have pointed out already in chapters II and III, to Nietzsche time cannot have either 
end or beginning, an original or ultimate moment of culmination where all forces would 
cohere and organize rationally, it cannot “suffer any diminution,” “interruption,” 
otherwise it would cease to exist. A teleological vision of time is excluded by this 
account, given that if forces were to unfold from a beginning to a goal, this goal would 
have been achieved already. The very condition of becoming we are caught in is evidence 
that there was always already nothing but becoming, and will always be becoming, 
otherwise there would be nothing rather than something. Thus this idea that the eternal 
return is the being of becoming: nothing is ever lost, no force ceases to exist, but is re-
absorbed, mobilized and transformed, to form and assemble anew, at each moment. Thus 
also, the ergodic quality of difference and becoming. Nietzsche then asserts: “whatever 
the state of the world may reach, it must have reached it already not only once, but 
countless times.” In the above passage, it is clear that Nietzsche does not merely conceive 
the eternal return as an “existential test” or ethical challenge, though it is very much the 
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latter as well, but also as our ontological condition.65 And if every grass, every bit of 
sunshine, every friend and every foe, every joy and sadness will eternally return, the 
metaphor deployed is not that of a cycle, but that of a ring. Nietzsche does qualify the 
ring metaphor where grains of sand would constantly be animated and in motion, 
eventually coming back to exactly the same point where they have been an infinite 
number of times, and keep on in this motion within a closed universe, cautioning that the 
image is imperfect (Nietzsche, 2003). The ring of sand and the throw of dice, though 
imperfect as metaphors would necessarily be, should not be confused with cycles, where 
loops may advance and not get us completely rid of straight linearity. Just like drops or 
grains of water or sand constantly flowing in a closed loop, the only way time can pass is 
for all forces to return, and this movement of repetition is one that may be sliced at 
infinitely small and infinitely large scales.  
The above quoted excerpt also poses a question I wish to discuss here through 
dance: Nietzsche enigmatically refers to “the hour when, to one, then many, then all, the 
most powerful thought arises.” This is an occasion to ask what the proliferation of 
heterochronias and temporalities of synchrony would look like, and more specifically, 
what these may look like not only in the form of the philosopher’s solitary ruminations, 
but also in experiential, collective forms? May such eruptions be joyful and light? In 
what follows I will try to reflect on the embodied practices (architecture, sex and dance 
provide some examples) that may generate, create or make visible alternate temporal 
                                                        
65 Though I am situating my reading in contrast with William Connolly’s here, as his works are important 
to respond to in the context of a discussion of temporality, ecology and Nietzsche, and offer an occasion to 
clarify what I am not saying so that what I argue becomes (hopefully) clearer, perhaps it is helpful to 
underscore here that this argument according to which the eternal return is an ontological concept rather 
than only ethical (though it has ethical implications) is not uncommon in Nietzschean scholarship or in 
contemporary political philosophy. Thus from Lou Salomé (2001) and Heidegger (1961) to Deleuze (2005; 
2013) and on to recent discussions of the eternal return by Brassier (2007) or Meillassoux (2010) I have 
already mentioned in a footnote above.   
 
 353 
orders of things, as well as how these have to take a transcorporeal form which par 
excellence goes beyond the strict boundaries of separated, individuated subjects, to 
anchor themselves instead, in selves co-constituted by and for myriad human and 
nonhuman alterities.  
Ethical Implications of an Ontological Condition 
 
Nietzsche’s ontological views certainly do have ethical consequences. Zarathustra 
oscillates between praising and hating the throw of dice, who he at times calls his lover. 
In the excerpt below, it is ardent love that prevails, and is even presented as inevitably 
attractive – “how then could I not…” :  
If ever a breath come to me of creative breath and of that heavenly necessity that 
forces even accidents to dance astral rounds:  
If ever I laughed with the laugh of creative lightning that follows rumbling but 
obediently the long thunder of the deed: 
If ever I rolled the dice with gods at the gods' table of the earth, so that the earth 
quaked and ruptured and snorted up rivers of fire –  
– because the earth is a gods' table, and it trembles with creative new words and  
gods' throws –  
Oh how then could I not lust for eternity and for the nuptial ring of rings - the ring 
of recurrence!  Never yet have I found the woman from whom I wanted children, 
unless if were this woman whom I love: for I love you, oh eternity! For I love 




Zarathustra exclaims: “I have liberated them of goals!” in a triumphant outcry directed 
against teleology. But if Zarathustra takes for self-evident, here, that this fate be 
irresistible not only as inevitable but also as desirable, we may just as well ask a question 
opposite to his: how could such a crushing thought, whereby “even accidents dance astral 
rounds” (even the most seemingly unexpected is ever so fateful and will repeat ad 
infinitum), and the earth spectacularly “quakes, ruptures, snorts out rivers of fire,” prompt 
dancing, love of fate, joy? How could the great randomness of the throw of dice recurrent 
in Thus Spoke Zarathustra and Nietzsche’s reflections on the eternal return be 
accompanied with images of lovers, the affirmation of the Earth and its eruptions, the 
joyful affirmation of life? To Deleuze, Nietzsche’s entire works seek to affirm life, to 
transvalue all values, and reject philosophy and Christianity’s tradition of asking life to 
redeem itself, redeem the suffering it contains, and further, read all suffering as a 
redemption of life. The critical problem becomes the value of values, and in the famous 
aphorism of the Genealogy of Morals, which proclaims the death of the subject, the 
relations between the transvaluation of all values, Nietzsche’s critique of morality, and 
the eternal return are glaring:  
A quantum of force is … a quantum of drive, will, action, in fact it is nothing but 
this driving, willing and acting, and only the seduction of language (and the 
fundamental errors of reason petrified within it), which construes and 
misconstrues all actions as conditional upon an agency, a ‘subject’, can make it 
appear otherwise. And just as the common people separates lightning from its 
flash and takes the latter to be a deed, something performed by a subject, which is 
called lightning, popular morality separates strength from the manifestations of 
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strength, as though there were an indifferent substratum behind the strong person 
which had the freedom to manifest strength or not. But there is no such 
substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind the deed, its effect and what becomes of it; 
‘the doer’ is invented as an afterthought, – the doing is everything. Basically, the 
common people double a deed; when they see lightning, they make a doing-a-
deed out of it: they posit the same event, first as cause and then as its effect. The 
scientists do no better when they say ‘force moves, force causes’ and such like, – 
all our science, in spite of its coolness and freedom from emotion, still stands 
exposed to the seduction of language and has not rid itself of the changelings 
foisted upon it, the ‘subjects’ (the atom is, for example, just such a changeling, 
likewise the Kantian ‘thing-in-itself ’). (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 26)  
There is no doer behind the deed, indeed, just as there is no separation between lightning 
and flash, an image cherished and recurrent in Nietzsche’s thought.66 If the flash is not 
caused by lightning but rather is the lightning, or simultaneous to it, or a doubling, 
language’s doing, a doing-doing, similarly our actions are not caused by us, but belong to 
the unpredictable and contingent ever-becoming continuum that we reduce to a self. Thus 
the “existential test” could not be about whether we would “choose” life again, as 
Connolly puts it, but has to do with an oscillation between love or joy, and despair, an 
oscillation that may be well known to those of us and those moments within us to whom 
and when the thought of extinction, of global warming, of the destructive character of 
carbon-emitting ways comes crushing. But if we have no choice, in the free will, liberal 
                                                        
66 Nietzsche did, after all, experience the crushing weight of the thought of thoughts by the shores of lake 
Sils Maria, in Switzerland, among mountains which make thunder quite spectacular, and one could 
speculate that some of his visions of the eternal return were “caused,” or rather, erupted in the context of, 
epileptic shocks perhaps in response to lightning (Salome, 2001). 
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sense of the term, and if all we may have is amor fati, then how could this possibly be 
helpful at all in a context of ecological crisis, and not result in a paralysis? The point is 
evidently not to be subdued by fate, to become fatalist and passive, but rather to actively 
embrace fate: we are engaged in the forces that Nietzsche describes and in the will, 
action, deeds that move about, in creative ways that go much beyond us and extend ad 
infinitum to the pasts and futures that are present in our present, beyond the human. The 
embrace of the earth and life, as they deploy active forces and as the eternal return is the 
animating principle of a life-affirmation beyond nihilism, seems particularly pertinent in 
our current context of extinction, though at the same time this amor fati is made more 
complicated and challenging by it – as we will see however, the point is not to simply 
affirm the real, which has been sculpted into hollow idols and has damaged life, as 
nihilist forces have required of life a redemption, compensation, justification. What 
Nietzsche calls for, as visible in the penultimate excerpt quoted above (“If ever I rolled 
the dice with gods at the gods' table of the earth”), is that we actively throw ourselves in 
the divine throw of dice. If it is not the case that “force moves, force causes,” etc, then 
responsibilities shift and the question of what makes life worth living, in a context of 
facing species death, is disrupted by questions about the worth of worth, the value of 
values.  
One last long quote regarding the oscillation between a desire to reject the thought 
of thoughts as unbearable, despicable, and desire for the return may illustrate the 
difficulty here. Its length will hopefully be forgiven as the reader (you) enjoys the beauty 
of this famous Nietzschean aphorism, from the Gay Science, an aphorism that is usually 
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referred to even by commentators who dismiss the ontological aspect of the eternal return 
yet grant it the quality of an ethical challenge: 
The greatest weight —What, if some day or night a demon were to steal after you 
into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: "This life as you now live it and 
have lived it, you will have to live once more and innumerable times more; and 
there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every thought 
and sigh and everything unutterably small or great in your life will have to return 
to you, all in the same succession and sequence—even this spider and this 
moonlight between the trees, and even this moment and I myself. The eternal 
hourglass of existence is turned upside down again and again, and you with it, 
speck of dust!" Would you not throw yourself down and gnash your teeth and 
curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you once experienced a tremendous 
moment when you would have answered him: "You are a god and never have I 
heard anything more divine." If this thought gained possession of you, it would 
change you as you are or perhaps crush you. The question in each and every 
thing, "Do you desire this once more and innumerable times more?" would lie 
upon your actions as the greatest weight. Or how well disposed would you have to 
become to yourself and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate 
eternal confirmation and seal? (Nietzsche, 1974, p. 273) 
 
This aphorism emphasizes the return at the scale of a life, and poses the challenge of 
saying ‘yes’ to it even when a demon asserts it will recur eternally. This may be part of 
the confusion in Connolly’s analysis, where the affirmation of life is taken to be a matter 
of choice: life-affirming Nietzsche should not be confused with life choosing Nietzsche, 
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as choice, reason, unreason are irrelevant to the thought of thoughts. The metaphor 
deployed here is obviously even more of a playful image than the imperfect description 
of the ring of sand, but the aggressivity of the thought, incarnated in a demon, who calls 
his interlocutor not a grain of sand but a similar, apparently more insignificant and 
disposable, wasted or useless “speck of dust” is revealing of the weight of this experience 
of eternal return, of the intensity at play in facing the crushing thought: the alternatives 
are extreme, dramatic: either to “throw [oneself] down and gnash [one’s] teeth and curse 
the demon,” or to “crave nothing more fervently.” The former is what philosophy has 
often been so busy doing, asking life to redeem all the suffering it contained, blaming it 
for the suffering, reading suffering as a redeemer of life’s indecent liveliness. The latter, 
the “craving,” is Nietzsche’s call to cry out “da capo!,” to desire the eternal repetition 
from its beginning as if we specks of dust were the conductors of the orchestra of life, 
which indeed, we would join, dance with, play within.  
The ethical implications of the eternal return are indeed a tall order that refuses 
any petty pleasure, justified in utilitarian manners by something else they are not, means 
subjected to ends postponed to a later moment, especially when the same forces will be 
present in that future moment. Thus Deleuze insisted, in his reading of the ethical 
dimensions of the eternal return, that small pleasures, petty compensatory acts, actions 
performed “one last time,” as a temporary exception redeemed elsewhere or some other 
times, are systematically excluded by this principle of selection. In a sense, all actions 
should be performed for their own sake, or both for no reason or purpose, and with all the 
reason and purpose in the world. Reason and unreason, purpose and aimlessness, are 
irrelevant to the course of the universe. We specks of dust are put before a high-stakes 
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test: would I be prepared to live this instant an infinite number of times, can this action be 
both self-justified, performed for its own sake, and completely gratuitous, can means and 
ends collapse into one in each moment, radically opposing any form of utilitarianism? 
Can I embrace this moment and the forces engaged in it asking no further justification, 
with no bad conscience or resentment, granting no moral status to suffering as either 
redeeming life or asking of life to redeem itself, knowing that all of it is eternal and 
repeats? By this logic we cannot be asked to sacrifice Gaia on the altar of growth, an 
ever-postponed satisfaction of abundance, or one last carbon emission out of our exhaust 
pipes so as to continue on with growth just a bit longer, to accumulate now for later 
postponing our confrontation with present and future planetary limits. 
Affirming Life and the Earth 
 
Nietzsche’s demonic eruption asks, “how well disposed [we would] have to become to 
[ourselves] and to life to crave nothing more fervently than this ultimate eternal 
confirmation and seal.” What, here, may be affirmed so fervently? How could the eternal 
return be a joyful thought, and not a paralyzing one? In Deleuze’s reading the eternal 
return is a selective principle that reactive and active forces go through. As Deleuze 
summarizes, the slave mentality, which triumphs with common morality, separates 
strength from what it can do, and causes “a becoming-reactive of all forces.” It 
“triumphs, not by the composition of its power, but by the power of contagion” (Deleuze, 
2013, p. 27). To Nietzsche, European man, domesticated man, is the embodiement of this 
sickly triumph of resentment and nihilism, where the will to power “ceases to mean 
‘creating’ and instead means to desire power (puissance), to desire domination” (p. 32). 
Nietzsche’s philosophy, with the eternal return at its core, is one that calls for a change in 
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the valuation principle, one that dares question the value of values. Deleuze writes: “the 
transmutation of all values is defined as follows: a becoming-active of the forces, a 
triumph of affirmation in the will to power” (here the will to power can again be 
understood as synonymous to creating, in contrast with the reign of nihilism). What is 
affirmed then? Again according to Deleuze’s reading: “affirmation is the highest power 
of the will. But what is being affirmed? Earth, life” (p. 33).  
If it is high time for a Nietzschean ecology, or, as Claire Colebrook has called it, a 
queer vitalism, it would be one that affirms life and its eternal return, with “every pain 
and every joy and every friend and foe and every hope and every mistake and every bit of 
grass, every sunshine, the integral series of all things,” knowing that each of us are 
“nothing but a grain” or a “speck of dust” on the ring. This could also be called, after Pier 
Pasolini’s phrase, “desperate vitality” – quoted in the circus piece I read above as anti-
uchronian, because, as the Italian poet-intellectual-filmmaker-ecc put it, “every act in life 
is a segment already signed in a line which is life itself, clear only in dream” (Pasolini, 
1964, p. 118). Pasolini’s line metaphor is problematic if imagined as a straight line, but if 
queered in the form of a dancing spiral, it could offer another image in addition to 
Nietzsche’s ring of sand. In Pasolini’s poem “una disperata vitalità,” rather than linear in 
this straight sense, life is depicted as “magmatic.” Magma, volcanoes, the eruption of 
Gaia, Nietzschean lightnings shedding doubt on linear causality, prompt us to understand 
every moment as containing all pasts, presents and futures, such that a walk around 
Messina, a conversation with woodpeckers and albatross, the threats posed against 
swordfish nearby, the deep time of volcanic life, all cohabit at once, in a heterochronian 
movement that makes faith in the Truth of progress or growth impossible. The examples I 
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discuss below of architecture and dance share the motif of the spiral in common: away 
from straight time (Halberstam, 2005), the queer movement of the spiral brings spaces 
and times together in surprising and otherwise unlikely ways, and may indeed make 
another possible – temporal – order of things glitter to the surface of times of extinction.  
Heterochronia and Synchrony: Changing Perception in a Heartbeat 
 
I have a bicycle. Paris is big. I want to say that the 
lines I draw with my bicycle through this great city 
are extraordinary. … 
And it pleases me enormously to see that the line I 
trace is never straight, never confused, but has a 
reason to be like this in every tiny part. 
Beware of the straight line and the drunken line.  
 
The straight line leads to the downfall of humanity. 
Friedensreich Hundertwasser 
In chapter IV, I read Friedensreich Hundertwasser’s theory of the five skins as a form of 
counter-uchronia celebrating a long-lost Nature that we should return to, loaded with 
assumptions about “primitivism” and essentialism. However, in what follows I propose a 
counter-reading of this counter-uchronian dimension, which illustrates my concept of 
heterochronia. To do so, I will take a detour through space and the Foucauldian concept 
of heterotopia, and then attempt to read the theory of the five skins as represented in 
Hundertwasser’s drawing, this time in relief, qua his favored motif of the spiral and the 
agency he grants to trees the artist planted in the tree-tenant houses he designed and built 
in Vienna and elsewhere.  
From Heterotopia to Heterochronia 
 
Michel Foucault opens the Order of Things with a quote by Jorge Luis Borges that, the 
French philosopher claimed, prompted him to write his book  
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out of a laughter that shattered, as [he] read the passage, all the familiar landmarks 
of [his] thought – our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our 
geography, breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we 
are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long 
afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between 
the Same and the Other. This passage quotes ‘a certain Chinese encyclopedia’ in 
which it is written that ‘animals are divided into: (a) belonging to the emperor, (b) 
embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) 
included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with 
a very fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, 
(n) that from a long way off look like flies. (1994, p. i) 
Foucault goes on to explain that this uncanny taxonomy, unthinkable to “us,” but 
thinkable for “exotic systems of thought” (the Orientalism is laughable too here, though 
the main point is still helpful) encourages questions about what is possible to think, and 
what kind of impossibility is faced in the encounter with what he calls a “heterotopia.” 
The oddity of this classification, Foucault argues, does not so much come from the 
inclusion of imaginary and real animals, monstrosities or fabulous creatures, but from the 
fact that they are linked together by way of the alphabet (one wonders what the supposed 
original Chinese text looked like with ideograms, though here Foucault implies that the 
robbing of a common ground has been accomplished by Borges). According to Foucault, 
it is in the interstitial spaces of the text, in its relations, that the oddity resides. He adds 
that the mere propinquity of these unlikely elements, the juxtaposition of otherwise 
remote things, is not sufficient either in making for the strangeness here. Rather, “what is 
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impossible is the very site on which [the animals’] propinquity would be possible.” Let us 
note here that, when the eternal return and all its ontological, critical and ethical 
implications erupt in Nietzsche’s thought, it is also an entirely different (temporal) 
principle from which to create values, a bit like this uncanny site Foucault gets puzzled 
at. The French philosopher goes on: “where would they ever meet, except in the 
immaterial sound of the voice pronouncing their enumeration? … Where else could they 
be juxtaposed except in the non-place of language?” (1994, p. iii) 
 The laughter and unease experienced in this reading is what causes Foucault to 
resort to the concept of “heterotopia,” in reference to the “heteroclite,” a kind of disorder 
“in which fragments of a large number of possible orders glitter separately in the 
dimension, without law or geometry, of the heteroclite” (p. xvii). Foucault then 
introduces heterotopia, a word he borrowed from medical science where it refers to the 
presence of an organ or limb in an anomalous location of the body. He opposes 
heterotopias to utopias, as these “afford consolation,” imagining a site that may be no-
where but where improbable things all belong and share in common. In contrast, Foucault 
argues, heterotopias allow for “another possible order of things” to “glitter,” another 
order that is not no-where. Could heterochronias similarly suggest other possible 
temporal orders of things? Foucault asks about where, besides “the non-place of 
language” this kind of juxtaposition could occur, what site could act as its common 
ground. We may ask what common time, moment or moments could bring together 
things and times otherwise incompatible.  
 In a 1967 essay published in Dits et Ecrits only in 1984, where Foucault further 
discusses this concept of heterotopia, he does mention the term “heterochronia,” though 
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here again space eclipses time. Foucault even claims that “we are in the epoch of 
simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and far, of the 
side-by-side, of the dispersed.” To Foucault, this means that the current period may be 
opposed to the previous one as that of space in contrast to periods of time. Where he 
takes spatial juxtapositions for the proof of the importance of topos, and the need to stress 
heterotopias as heteroclite sites disrupting the (spatial) order of things, Foucault pushes 
simultaneity aside and does not similarly conclude that an important, similar disruption of 
(temporal) orders may emerge from heteroclite times and temporalities juxtaposed in one 
moment. However, I have mentioned before that Foucault’s later analysis of discipline 
includes an emphasis on temporalities of the disciplinary societies. If we may agree that 
the contemporary period could be read as one of simultaneity, it would be because 
various temporalities – uchronia, counter-uchronia, the deep time of the Earth and its 
possibly anti-uchronian consequences, may cohabit at one and the same time. And 
perhaps some non-uchronian nurturing of other possible temporal orders requires unlikely 
juxtapositions that seemingly have no common time.  
 In his essay on heterotopias or “other spaces,” Foucault explains that heterotopias 
have “the curious property of being in relation with all other sites,” and these “contradict 
all the other sites,” as they challenge the separations otherwise omnipresent in modernity. 
To Foucault, utopias also belong to this category, yet they do not have an actual location. 
If heterotopias can be defined as spaces which further desacralize oppositions modernity 
has generally upheld by operating in relation to all other spaces while being effectively 
localizable, Foucault also proceeds to further describe them by listing a number of 
principles which he speculates could organize the “heterotopology” he calls for. I will not 
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add further detail to the definition I have already paraphrased, but one of the principles 
suggested in this speculative heterotopology is pertinent to our purposes here: 
heterotopias are connected to a “découpage” of time corresponding to the juxtaposition of 
spaces, which Foucault calls “hétérochronies.” Two heterotopias could thus be 
distinguished based on their respective temporalities, namely the eternitarian 
(éternitaires) ones, accumulating time ad infinitum (which corresponds to the modern 
project pursued for instance by libraries or museums), and the chronic ones, passing but 
reoccurring times (festivals would be an example of the latter ones). We can see here that 
eternitarian and chronic heterotopias may converge: their heterochronian dimension 
shows that all the pasts and all the futures are present in the presents, and that this is the 
condition for the passing of time. I would suggest that they may have the effect of 
providing a glimpse into the eternal return. Foucault privileges space in his essay, to the 
detriment of time, seeing heterochronia as merely the temporal dimension of heterotopia 
among many other principles animating the latter ones, and he does not mention the 
reciprocal, that heterotopia may be the spatial dimension of, and among the principles 
animating, heterochronia. He claims in the beginning of his essay that time is the problem 
of the XIXth century, while space is that of our contemporary period. Space takes 
precedence in Foucault’s argument to the point of preventing thinking the temporality of 
simultaneity which heterochronia may offer. This is ironic because if time and 
temporality must often be described and conceptualized qua spatial metaphors, here 
Foucault resorts to temporal terms to describe heterotopia, without making note that he is 
doing this. For instance, he describes heterotopias as juxtaposing in one single space, 
simultaneously, otherwise incompatible and separate spaces. Furthermore, if it were true 
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that our times are times of simultaneity, this does not deprive time of importance but 
rather does the opposite, increasing its salience, having us experience at each moment, 
the plurality, multitude, non-linearity of time, the condition of time passing. Foucault’s 
otherwise capacious concept of heterotopia is accompanied by his underestimation of the 
importance of time (an importance which, again, he will grant later on in Discipline and 
Punish and on) in the sense that he claims: “space has not yet been entirely desanctified, 
unlike time.” In his view, time was “detached from the sacred in the XIXth century.” Yet 
when considering uchronia, we see that a pseudo-secularized teleology replaced the deist 
one, substituting Gods’ ends with the market’s and consumerism’s insatiability, as well as 
teleological notions of the human and the natural.  
Tree-Tenant Houses, Fluidoid Lines and Spirals: Hundertwasser’s Heterotopias 
 
However, Foucault’s sketch of a notion of heterotopia can be helpful for a detour through 
space reconsidering what I first read as a regressive counter-uchronia in Friedensreich 
Hundertwasser’s art and architecture, from a different, multi-dimensional perspective. 
From this we may gather some food and trees for thought regarding my conceptualization 
of heterochronia.  
 Hundertwasser’s five skins theory undeniably contains counter-uchronian 
dimensions, especially if it is to be read alongside some of his poetry, or his praising 
nature as a prescriptive model understood in a teleological form. Yet, if Hundertwasser’s 
five skins’ drawing were read in relief, and perhaps distorted a bit based on the 
omnipresence of spirals in his architectural work, and if the tree-tenant houses 
Hundertwasser built are brought into the conversation, one may also make out, 
challenging the counter-uchronia at play, the possibility of a heterotopia, for “other orders 
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of things” to “glitter.” The tree-tenant houses Hundertwasser imagined (see the 
reproduction of that drawing above – page 275) as entangling the five skins were never 
built quite in the way of the drawing he created for it. However some were granted a real 
location, in Vienna and other places. They usually took the form of larger buildings and 
were often used for low-income housing projects, and they included communal and some 
small commercial spaces. There, trees would be planted on roofs and within the floors, 
and would “pay their rent” by providing oxygen and absorbing some of the noise 
pollution in the surrounding urban streets, in sort of hybrid, more-than-human bartering 
spirit. This granting the status of active tenants to trees challenges how agency is 
distributed among humans and nonhumans, making for a vibrant more-than-human 
heterotopia. These locations are heterotopian, in the sense that, hybridizing both nature 
and humans, they bring together spaces and realms modernity otherwise claims to 
separate. It is also worth noting that Hundertwasser did not intend the concept of ‘tenant’ 
to connote a restriction on usage in favor of landlords, based on property rights. A tenant 
is a user, and the artist wrote a manifesto on tenants’ rights, including the right human 
tenants would have to paint their windows and the surrounding facades, based on how far 
their arms + their paintbrush may reach. The extension of the status of tenant to trees is 
all the more significant that the tenant herself is extended more abilities and rights than 
usually accepted in common, private property-centered arrangements.  
 Spirals and “fluidoid” lines dominate Hundertwasser’s architecture. Buildings 
sinuously spiral up, often devoid of stairs. His clothes, the sail on his ship (where he lived 
most of his later, nomadic life) were striped on purpose and never ironed, to underscore 
the anti-rationalist lack of straight lines. Thus the stripes were meant to underscore the 
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anti-straight aesthetics, queering the lines. These are present yet meant to be meandrous, 
wrinkled, animated by wind (the ship’s sails) and by bodily movement (the clothes, or 
second skin). If we are to propose a generous reading of this art work, we may push aside 
Hundertwasser’s claims to erect Nature as a prescriptive and static model, and simply 
point out that if we live in naturecultures, it is in the sense that nature is a technology 
emanating from culture which itself is within nature, etc. Or put differently, as Dorion 
Sagan writes, “we dwell circumscribed by culture inside nature. Whether that second 
nature is also inside culture I’ll leave for you to decide” (Sagan, p. 35). I would not be so 
presumptuous as to “decide,” but would suggest that the answer can be yes, and again ad 
infinitum. And if Hundertwasser’s insistence that the nonhuman world’s “fluidoid lines” 
should be mimicked by human architecture, art and life, then the question arises of the 
effect of such mimesis and such meanders, arguably a heterotopian effect. A spiral or 
fluidoid not only moves in irregular and perhaps unpredictable patterns, it also ascends 
and descends, thus offering no stable hierarchies, and it may move with time, connecting 
the otherwise seemingly unconnectable, creating dynamic entanglements. If we were to 
look at the five skins’ drawing (reproduced here back on page 272) in this dynamic 
manner, then the various schematically described spaces are juxtaposed where they are so 
often kept separate, hybridizing various aspects and dimensions of humans and 
nonhumans’ lives. Agency to trees, hybridization of otherwise incompatible spaces qua 
unlikely lines, make for a provocative ecological heterotopia.  
What kinds of heterochronias may consequently come into view and what 
simultaneities may we nonhuman humans and human nonhumans be able to experience? 
Heterochronias refer to the quotidian paces, speeds, rhythms, and the relationships 
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between pasts, presents and futures, that emerge in the context of heterotopias and 
elsewhere. If we inhabit a nature that is within culture within nature, etc, then nature 
cannot be cast to an idealized past any longer, and neither culture nor nature may be 
experienced as static or as abstract futurist futures, but instead as contingent and 
dynamically co-evolving. Time cannot take the form of a straight line connecting the 
past, the present and the future, but entangles, in interlaced spiral forms, multiple pasts, 
presents and futures. As we will soon see when turning to contemporary dance, these 
heterochronias must spiral through bodies as well as the oikos (the spiral is also a 
privileged motif in Pina Bausch’s choreographies). Each moment, as with the eternal 
return, contains all these, virtual and actual, unpredictable and surprising, multi-scale – 
the deep time of nature and its volcanoes, for instance, cohabits, perhaps at odds with, not 
always harmoniously, the mundane times of the quotidian and historical times irreducible 
to solely human experience(s). The difficulty of heterochronia is that, like heterotopia as 
described in the preface to the Order of Things, which site is most confounding, 
heterochronia seems at first to be missing a cairological moment: what is the temporality 
of temporalities, the time of times, how could the juxtaposition of all these temporalities 
in one moment not be a form of end-on or outside of time perspective, which the eternal 
return rules out (there is no end from which to experience time, as time has neither end 
nor beginning, nor, therefore or either, an outside). At first, therefore, heterochronia 
seems to lack a time, or at best, to refer to a “time out of joint,” as Shakespeare’s Hamlet 
put it in the face of the collapse of succession. Note, however, that Hamlet did not say 
“time out of time” – ou-chronia – but “out of joint.” In his essay on heterotopia Foucault 
amended the puzzlement expressed in the Order of Things’ preface with respect to an 
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apparent lack of site, and relegated such site-less topos to utopia. If utopia was a placeless 
place that juxtaposed all locations, heterotopias had a real location. Similarly, 
heterochronia is in fact present at all moments, and is a matter of perspective: the eternal 
return has and is a temporality, it is, indeed, the being of becoming, the experience and 
conceptualization that at each moment, all times and temporalities are present. 
Heterochronia juxtaposes, in time, on time, all times.  
More-than-Human Synchrony in a Heartbeat 
 
In October 2014, in the midst of protests responding to an international gathering on the 
climate crisis taking place at the United Nations in New York that was meant to prepare 
the December 2015 Paris meeting, a couple thousand activists gathered at Battery Park 
and marched to Wall Street, with the intention of “flooding” it. This protest took place 
the day after one of the biggest climate justice marches in history, which mobilized 
400,000 people. Though there were overlaps, the Flood Wall Street protest distinguished 
itself from the larger climate justice march in a couple of ways. One was the rejection of, 
say, Al Gore’s claim that the climate crisis was a business opportunity for a new, green 
capitalism. Gore has called for and praised the emergence of “Earth Inc.” along with a 
“global mind” – both of which he defends in his last book, The Future (2013). To Flood 
Wall Street protesters, if global warming is largely what I have called above 
“capitalogenic,” it will not be faced properly and sustainably with more capitalism, but 
with the latter system’s end. Another difference had to do with the protesters’ repertoire 
of action. While many had also marched the day before in the Climate Justice March’s 
ranks, the march and sit-in organized on Wall Street were not legal, and many protesters 
were prepared to get arrested. The sit-in was mostly peaceful and lasted a number of 
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hours, blocking traffic for the afternoon. About one hundred protesters were eventually 
arrested that evening. But the moment in this protest that seems most pertinent to my 
argument here is not directly linked to the civil disobedience at play. At one point of the 
sit-in, in its very beginning, protesters, all wearing blue to symbolize a time when Wall 
Street will be under water due to ocean levels’ change, became silent. Or almost. They 
started tapping quietly on their heart, two beats, a pause, etc, in unison, to symbolize 
Gaia’s heartbeat in front of the symbol of capitalist markets. Collectively, the gentle and 
rhythmic tapping of protesters’ hands on their own hearts resounded strongly enough to 
be perceivable in spite of Manhattan traffic in the background.  
This heterochronian choreography symbolically brought together a number of 
rhythms at once: from farthest to closest, traffic, police sirens, the hearts tapping, the 
image of the Earth’s breathing, the rhythmic, emotional human breathing of protesters. 
Gilles Deleuze has claimed that the left, in his view, was not a matter of morality, not 
about a “beautiful soul,” but could be characterized as two things (Deleuze & Parnet, 
1987): on the one hand, the resolution we may call epistemological, to never give up 
critique. On the other, a matter of perception: this would mean perceiving the contours, 
the outskirts of one’s world first: the universe perhaps, then the planet, then the Global 
South when one is speaking, as was the case with most Flood Wall Street protesters, from 
the privileged West, then one’s area perhaps, city, street, one’s immediate loved ones, 
then oneself. If we were to return to Hundertwasser’s five skins’ drawing again, this 
would mean that the chronological order in which the various spaces are read, fluidoid as 
it becomes with the motif of the spiral granting relief to it, also can change everything 
about the reading: starting with the fifth skin, and working one’s way back, 5, 4, 3… go, 
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may be closer to what Deleuze called the left, as again, not a matter of morality but as 
one of perception – note that making it a matter of perception does not only evince 
common morality from the concept and movement, but also common, strict senses of 
politics, and qualifies art, as a realm of creation of percepts, as much more political than 
some may have us believe... thus the theatricality of certain protest becomes especially 
important.  
The Flood Wall Street protest’s collective heartbeat embodied a heterochronian 
redistribution in perception: first the rhythms and breaths of the Earth, enacted 
collectively by a crowd of human bodies, then the city’s traffic and authorities’ siren. The 
order of things (temporal and otherwise) is challenged, not only because traffic is blocked 
in front of a building supposed to set the pace for the rest of the world, erected so as to 
host the frenetic, now algorithmic rhythms of the markets, which made no sound in this 
case, but also because the goal is to symbolically have Gaia as we know it, be heard. 
Furthermore, the blue attire in which protesters swarmed Wall Street that day was to 
prefigure a possible future where the algorithmic paces of trades will not be able to 
continue operating there unless they are absurdly equipped with submarine infrastructure: 
these were made into dislocated, anomalous presences. At one point of the protest, one 
humorous yet angry activist screamed: “why don’t you come out you cowards? Don’t 
you see we’re trying to save you from drowning too?” What was this cowardice’s object, 
but one where Wall Street speculation and carbon-addicted capitalist globalization fails to 
face the possibility, or the opportunity of affirming life? Here the heterochronia at play is 
double: in a collective heartbeat, in a choreographed instant, Flood Wall Street staged the 
juxtaposition of otherwise dissonant temporalities and the redistribution of chronological 
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order, of priorities in perception. Synchrony is one aspect of heterochronia: it underscores 
the simultaneity in the juxtaposition of various temporalities, where heterochronia 
stresses their heteroclite character. However synchrony is not quite an alignment: in a 
way, it is an asynchronic and dissonant simultaneity, rather than a sync-ing into depths of 
hasty and linear stupidity (see chapter V) and their hyper-uchronian narratives of 
unstoppable progress. It brings together dissonant temporalities in one moment: 
synchrony is the temporality of heterochronia, the cairological time through which, or 
when, of all these tempos are juxtaposed, just like the eternal return is the thought of 
thoughts, just like in the eternal return, it is the return that returns.  
Similarly to heterochronia, synchrony refers to the cohabiting of multiple 
temporalities. However in this case, my point is to stress the – sometimes dissonant, 
conflicted, always contested, ripe with friction – simultaneity of this cohabitation rather 
than the cohabitation itself. Synchrony answers the question of: what paces, rhythms and 
speeds does it take, what forms, times and moments may juxtapose incompatible times, 
or in other words, what is the temporality of heteroclite juxtapositions of temporalities? If 
Foucault’s discussion of heterotopias obscured time and temporality, we may remember 
that it was because Foucault asserted that the temporality at play in heterotopias is one of 
simultaneity. Yet rather than relegating time to the background, simultaneity brings 
various times, moments and temporalities to the foreground, at once. Synchrony does not 
imply a homogenous, coherent, smooth or synchronized time when “everything is 
interconnected” in a simple and easy way. It is quite different than sync-ing one’s various 
electronic devices. The deep time of Gaia, and cairological moments in its history, are 
often at odds with the paces of traffic, and these may clash with needs to slow down and 
 
 374 
breathe, urgent needs called upon in a heartbeat. But what I mean by proposing 
synchrony as a term is to highlight precisely this: that these conflicts, these 
incompatibilities and tensions between various paces, speeds, rhythms, pasts, presents, 
futures, possibilities, probabilities, may all cohabit at each moment: synchrony could be 
described as the experience of eternal return. All forces being present at once, in each 
moment, what can be played? Some events highlight this more intensely, and this was 
partly the point with Foucault’s heterotopia: that they shed a different light on all spaces, 
as they refer to all of them in one. The synchrony at play in heterochronias has a similar, 
only temporal, effect. 
 
Dancing with Zarathustra: Ecochronian Bodies in Movement 
 
Only in dance do I know how to speak the 
parables of the highest things.  
F.W. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
 
      Le corps, c’est le monde. 
      Chopinot. 
The contemporary dance of choreographer Pina Bausch offers examples of what I would 
call eco-chronias, the kinds of heterochronias that, as such, juxtapose otherwise 
incompatible temporalities in uncanny ways that make other possible temporal orders of 
things glitter, using synchrony, and specifically stage such heterochronias that confound 
human and nonhuman temporalities – it is in doing so that these may be called “eco-
chronian.” These choreographies share the motif of the spiral with Hundertwasser’s 
architecture. Where Hundertwasser’s five skins theory offered a way to spatially think of 
embodiement of heterotopia within the oikos, confounding what is taken to be boundaries 
between humans and nonhumans, Pina Bausch’s dance does so temporally, deploying 
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moving spirals animated by the dancers’ spine, limbs and heads and by the curves and 
shapes in Bausch’s scenographies on stage or outdoors. The lightness and weight of 
dancers, contrary to the old norms of classical ballet, do not defy gravity but espouses it 
instead. The break between classical and contemporary dance, usually attributed to early 
twentieth-century choreographer Martha Graham, indeed theorized the spine as put in 
motion in spiral movements of relief and extension, as Graham started to explore the 
ground beyond the mere feather weight and contact of the feet (and traditional pointe 
shoes which surface of contact was minuscule). Contemporary dance spent much more 
time than ballet on the earth, rolling, crawling, at low levels.  
Pina Bausch’s more recent works continued these explorations but also included 
humor, joyfulness, re-introducing lightness, along with unlikely juxtapositions with trees 
being carried on dancers’ backs, rocks, rain and flooding the stage. It is through 
surprising accelerations and slow motions, spirals created with arms, legs, spines, heads 
and with the sand covering the stage or rocks’ meandering lines, that in my reading, Pina 
Bausch challenged straight lines and straight time. This example of eco-chronia is 
especially interesting in that Bausch’s dance created percepts for two dimensions perhaps 
specific to eco-chronia, as one sort of heterochronia dealing with humans and 
nonhumans. Namely, it underscores the necessary embodiement of these new 
temporalities, and it poses the question of how myriad times may simultaneously be 
experienced in common, collectively. As Regine Chopinot, another great popularizer of 
contemporary dance, has claimed, “the body is the world.” In what follows I will further 
develop my concept of heterochronia, synchrony and ecochronia, emphasizing 
embodiement and intersubjectivity. 
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Pina: “Dance, dance, otherwise we’re lost” 
 
In Pina Bausch’s Vollmond, “Full Moon,” (2006) dancers on a predominantly black and 
grey stage seem to be entering in an uncontrollable yet extremely precise trance while 
rain is pouring on the stage. They throw their feet, for a few steps, on a large rock about 
two and a half meters tall… Then they land back on the ground. The piece starts on a 
music by Rene Aubry, throbbingly joyful jazz, quiet rhythms into the movements of long 
dresses and long hair undone, flying with the spiral at the basis of any contemporary 
dance, spirals which once upon a time Martha Graham invented as reconciling a formerly 
ethereal ballerina defying gravity, to the ground, the spine, the core. There is gravity, 
sometimes heaviness, but also lightness, in Bausch’s choreographies, and here, always 
the seemingly static rough surface of the massive piece of mineral in the back. The rock 
too seems to dance, its immobile but curved shapes contrasting and helping the spirals 
and movement in the human bodies in the front stage. The sand on the stage marks the 
itinerary traced by the dancers’ feet. If Zarathustra claimed that “dancers have their ears 
in their toes” (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 181), what do Bausch’s dancers’ toes hear when they 
trace fluidoid lines in the sand?  Eventually the rain fills the stage, and dancers crawl in 
water, imitating breaststroke yet tied and slowed by the ground. What is being heard 
when water covers dancers’ bodies and offers the points of contact with the ground, when 
they playfully slide on the puddles but also seem like the border between play and 
drowning is near? 
There is lots of joy in the heaviness of soaking wet movements and clothes. The 
water invading the second skins of dancers, in Hundertwasser’s sense, has them drag 
themselves down on the ground and slow down each gesture. When lightness takes over 
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the upper parts of bodies – very few jumps take place here, the stage lighting amplify 
drops and splashes radiating around the spirals. Nonhuman water exaggerates each 
human gesture, either accelerating or slowing down the movement at each moment. At 
one point, about half-way through the show, a dancer crawls on the meteorite-like rock, 
embraces it and cries out: “it’s mine!,” only to slowly crawl away. The exuberant and 
sudden declaration of affection but also desire for appropriation with respect to an 
inanimate rock seems absurd, and this absurdity estranges us also from property and ideas 
of property whose object would be the Earth, or pieces thereof: a piece of nature or of the 
cosmos has been placed on stage (again the rock could look like a meteorite), one that is 
motionless, and the slow climbing of the dancer before his sudden, unexpected outcry 
makes us laugh, just like Foucault recalled laughing at Borges’ heterotopia, because the 
associations there made very little sense, or at least were unintelligible to the reader, yet 
their very unintelligibility offered a window into the possibility for other orders of things. 
These instances are instances where heterochronia is primarily deployed in the sense of a 
dimension of heterotopian stagings: the rhythms, movements, accelerations and 
decelerations accentuate, highlight and provide the necessary (sometimes comic) relief to 
reconsider our order of things, where pieces of Earth can be claimed as someone’s 
property. But the heterotopian dimensions of the piece reciprocally informs the 
heterochronian one: waters rising slow down movements while splashes and drops 
exaggerate the velocity of certain gestures.  
After the “it’s mine!” sudden outburst upon embracing the rock, the rock-hugging 
and/or property-hungry dancer exits and Pina Bausch enters the stage. She first walks in 
back to the audience, helped by a dancer to gracefully step on the rock in her long black 
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dress, and the audience bursts into applause when she turns and is recognized, after the 
dancer that helped her gently lifts her chin so that her hair separates and lets her face 
show. He then places a small paper cup on her head. The cup keeps falling off, the dancer 
climbs back and replaces it, until it falls again, before the dancer has time to step off, take 
a camera out of his jacket’s pocket, walk a few meters back. Each time, the cup slides off 
the rock in a different direction before the dancer can take the picture. Pina leaves. Here 
fragility, weight, lightness, water, stability and instability all cohabit in one short scene: 
the rock and Bausch’s standing upright may evoke both stability and instability (one has 
to climb to stand awkwardly on its slope), and Bausch’s thin figure seems so light, and 
the water cup above it so precarious. The contrast between her silent, feminine figure and 
the masculine appropriation that preceded, with its absurd sudden scream, “it’s mine,” 
humorously caricatures gendered human-nonhuman tensions without affirming that 
things are as simple. Similarly, the above case of the exuberant “it’s mine!” embrace of 
the rock, captured the tension between an impulse to embrace the Earth, or at least rocks 
and grounds, and a desire to appropriate these. By deploying metaphors, Bausch’s 
heterochronian dance was evocative of unresolved questions, frictions, tensions, joy, 
lightness and gravity, without imposing rigid grids to simply impose on the complex 
realities staged. In the scene staging the repeated falls of a water cup, Bausch resorts to a 
technique now very common in postmodern dance: durational performance relies directly 
on temporality to advance images. The repetition of the same gesture, especially in this 
case, with the failure to secure a relationship with gravity and balance that would procure 
stability repeated each time, is what provokes the uncanny. Many almost identical 
moments and movements repeat and succeed one another until spectators wonder 
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whether there will be an end and begin to meditate on each detail, or the whole, or the 
myriad possible interpretations, connections and references in what is repeated. Without 
extended duration, this form of repetition would not be able to loop and take on as many 
meanings, producing the uncanny feeling of heterochronia. The loops in time, the 
duration within which repetition happens, gives the choreographic time a spiral form 
which proliferates meanings, in this case conveying the gravity, fragility, lightness and 
precarity of human and nonhuman things and (im)balance. 
After the cup scene ends and Pina exits, another dancer enters, in a long red dress, 
and walks through the stage by fastidiously lifting her feet and pompously bending her 
knees high, as if she were enormous. At each step, she pauses, immobilizing her feet, and 
draws lines in the sand around them: she circles the advanced foot with a large monstrous 
or animal paw’s footprint. If, in the famous closing sentences of the Order of Things, 
Foucault described man as a contingent invention that, “like a face drawn in the sand at 
the edge of the sea” (1970, p. 387) may disappear with the next wave, here animality is 
slowly enacted as the disproportionate, monstrous contours of enlarged footprints drawn 
in the sand by a human dancer. Again a sense of uncanniness and laughter are created 
from the petite female dancer’s pace of movements and gestures themselves, juxtaposing 
otherwise incompatible images. It is the pace that provides the time of laughter, the 
weight and size of the animal and her pompous, aberrant character. The legs are raised 
slowly, which seems like so much effort because of the slow motion, and they stomp in 
the sand suddenly, after which the back slowly bends over and fastidiously draws. Later 
on, a dancer will lie down, casually, his side resting on the ground’s dark sand to face the 
audience, wearing a suit. He then waves his lion tail with a mischievous smile at the 
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audience. Human/nonhuman monstrosity emerges through movement. This is possible 
only because of the slow motions juxtaposed with accelerated gestures. A still 
photograph could not portray the uncanny normalcy of wagging a lion’s tail: here 
nonchalance is signified with a quick wink of the human eye and after a long, relaxed 
pause. The tail jumps up suddenly from behind the casually, still relaxed and immobile 
body lying down on its side with one elbow supporting the head. The rhythm is so 
realistically close to that of felines wagging their tails on a hot day, chasing flies while 
letting their heavy bodies soak in the heat lazily. Similarly, the enormity (both the literal 
size, and the aberrant nature) of large animal footprints left by a small human dancer’s 
feet could not be staged by an immobile statue. These heterochronias stage questions 
about the boundaries between human and nonhuman, inert and animate, living and 
nonliving beings and things.  
If we moved away from Vollmond for a bit, we would encounter in a number of 
Bausch’s choreography other similarly heterotopian and heterochronian metaphors 
posing such questions, invoking among other things the fragility of life. The back of a 
dancer cautiously, gently carries a small tree, walking slowly, around the edges of a 
shallow pool, under a bright sun. The slow pace evokes the immense fragility of the tree 
but perhaps also of the dancer’s feet, and both are tied closely. At the same time, the very 
slow motions can be read as paradoxically suggesting the immense weight of this living 
being tied to the dancer’s back, a paradoxical suggestion indeed, as the tree is small and 
seems so light. In the duration of the walk, the question arises of whether the tree is being 
carried and supported by the dancer, or whether the dancer is arched over on the ground 
because of his own weight and gravity, yet helped up and forward in his steps by the tree 
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tied on his back. Furthermore, is the tree just one tree, or all trees? Are these bodies (all) 
the world, (all) worlds? Wherever the spectator may take the significance and scope of 
the metaphor, it is the slow movements that enact the fragility of things in this case. 
Bausch did not always play with slowness or stillness, however. As we have seen in the 
previously described scenes, it is often the alternating and quick juxtaposition of slow, 
sudden, fast motions that together bring about a sense that several temporalities cohabit, 
including in tension, humor, lightness and heaviness. These heterochronias, because they 
invoke humans and nonhumans together, sometimes in one body, sometimes juxtaposed 
on stage, can be considered, more specifically, ecochronias. They also show how 
juxtapositions of multiple times and spaces can take embodied forms meant for 
performance, thus partly answering the question I posed above about the eternal return 
and its bringing out the infinity of the past and the future in each moment, beyond the 
solitary thought of a philosopher. If Pina Bausch famously called for us to “dance, dance, 
otherwise we’re lost,” this call may also be read as an antidote against uchronia, where 
collective, embodied evocations of the eternal return not as conceptual thought but as 
perceptual experience and as its own temporality – a synchronic one – may glitter and be 
discerned. In what follows I will further elaborate on these two aspects, namely the 
necessary embodiement of synchrony and heterochronia, and the intersubjective or 
collective possibility of these ecochronian temporalities. 
Utopian Bodies and Transcorporeality: Lovers, Dancers, Others and Selves 
 
In a text titled “Utopian Body,” Michel Foucault claims that our bodies are inaccessible, 
the ultimate utopia, a place where we can never truly be, not without it being mediated by 
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myriad utopias (the mirror, tattoos, …). However, one possibility for overcoming the 
utopian nature of the body is entertained at the very end of the essay:  
To make love is to feel one’s body close in on oneself. It is finally to exist outside 
of any utopia, with all of one’s density, between the hands of the other. Under the 
other’s fingers running over you, all the invisible parts of your body begin to 
exist. Against the lips of the other, yours become sensitive. In front of his half-
closed eyes, your face acquires a certitude. There is a gaze, finally to see your 
closed eyelids. … If we love so much to make love, it is because, in love, the 
body is here. (Foucault, 2009) 
To arrive at this final suggestion where Foucault makes lovemaking the way in which we 
may finally exist, not in utopia, but “here,” the French philosopher has gone through 
waves of unveiling utopias as such throughout the essay. Opening by claiming that the 
body is a heavy, alienating materiality that we cannot simply leave for a moment to go 
elsewhere, Foucault first postulates that utopias conjure this imprisoning materiality. The 
soul, in this light, would be the ultimate utopia, representing the body as smooth, 
weightless and perfect, immortal, the essence. Yet we know that Foucault will claim, a 
few years later (“Utopian Body” was first released in 1966) in Discipline and Punish, that 
the soul is the prison of the body (1971, p. 30). Indeed, in “Utopian Body,” he promptly 
refutes his initial postulate, objecting that the body, this materiality one has to drag with 
oneself, is in fact mysterious, unreachable: I have two eyes but know this only from 
mirrors, where I am not, and I see through them only one vision; I cannot see the back of 
my neck (besides through several mirrors, again where I am not). There are all kinds of 
holes, cavernous curves, inaccessible things about my body. Thus Foucault ends up 
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considering the possibility that this estrangement from a body where we are not, a 
utopian body, be overcome through alterity, in the act of love. The self, an embodied 
reality, may come to be, or become, only through (coming with) the other. Though this 
insight, the idea according to which we might only be able to be here and now qua 
alterity, is helpful for my purposes here, contrary to what Foucault seems to reductively 
imply I would suggest that the sex act is not the only way into the intersubjective 
condition of embodied selfhood, of finally getting out of utopia. In addition, a nonhuman 
dimension to this question of embodied intersubjectivity must be added. My goal in what 
follows it to arrive at the conclusion that the body is indeed a hybrid (human and 
nonhuman) heterotopia, one that dance may help us experience, while science can help us 
grasp it.  
 Our bodies are made of myriad earth others. Stacy Alaimo has coined the concept 
of transcorporeality to describe the queerness of bodies that never are only human. In 
Bodily Natures, she proposes a trans-corporeal understanding of the relationships 
between bodies and places. Because our bodies are animated by the “traffic in toxins,” 
because the outside, environments and natures are also inside, because these are not 
static, inert or deprived of agency, but entangled in a dance which confounds boundaries 
and questions the notion of a self-coherent, homogenous and bound subject, 
transcorporeality entails that what we do to natures, we do to ourselves, and vice versa. 
Science, like art, offers insight into this transcorporeality, though it grants us no definite 
foundation: “Science offers no steady ground, as the information may be biased, 
incomplete, or opaque and the ostensible object of scientific inquiry - the material world -
is extremely complex, overwrought with agencies, and ever emergent” (Alaimo, 2010, p. 
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20). Matter is active, and actively undoing any assumption that there may be a stable 
subject to be found at the end (and neither is there such a thing as end) of our 
investigations. Furthermore, the relationships at play are not without destructive aspects 
and conflicts, tensions, violence: as Alaimo points out, in landscapes of risk, contingent 
upon particular historical contexts, bodies may be hurt, damaged or destroyed. Myra 
Hird’s work has shown that these entanglements are no less than queer. In “Naturally 
Queer” (in: Mortimer-Sandilands & Erickson, 2010) Hird multiplies examples to 
illustrate this. For instance, and directly pertinent to Alaimo’s concept of 
transcorporeality, she points out that most of the cells of our bodies are unisex. These 
insights challenge easy separations between nonhumans and humans, queer and normal, 
nature as static and stable truths and culture as changing and contested. As Dorion Sagan 
puts it:  
ten per cent of our dry weight is bacteria, but there are ten of ‘their’ cells in our 
body for every one of ours, and we cannot make vitamin K or B12 without them. 
The maverick Russian geochemist Vladimir Vernadsky thought of life as an 
impure, colloidal form of water. What we call ‘human’ is also impure, laced with 
germs. We have met the frenemy, and it is us. (2013, p. 19) 
Not only, then, is our body full of mysteries and not as easily accessible as a simplistic 
account of materiality would have us believe, to the point of being aptly characterized as 
‘utopian’ in Foucault’s view, but it is also constantly mixing spaces and realms which we 
deem separate. The juxtaposition of these realms, the realization that they constantly 
mingle and that we depend upon these, through scientific (always provisional) knowledge 
or through percepts and affects created by performing and other forms of art, may enable 
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to distance ourselves from utopian relations to bodies and attain forms of heterotopian 
embodiment.  
Thus I would add to Foucault’s assertions according to which, if “we love to 
make love so much,” it is because embodiment can thus be realized: the love act enables 
our body to finally be “here” through the other, her gaze, touch, smell, her own body, but 
if we may finally experience a not-so-utopian form of embodiement by having sex, we 
also always already are mingling with myriad others, without and outside our bodies. The 
heterotopian and heterochronian nature of the sex act allows, as do all heterotopias and 
heterochronias, to refer to all other sites, to relate to all kinds of realms that constitute us 
and juxtapose what seemed incompatible spaces and temporalities. Besides the non-
utopian insight here, what would a non-uchronian or ecochronian experience of the body 
and self look or feel like, one that would emphasize not only spaces mingling, but times, 
or what would the temporal, heterochronian or synchronic dimension of this heterotopian 
body be? If bodies are profoundly transcorporeal, they are also this over time, qua 
movement. This is why dance, a time-based performing art par excellence, as it relies on 
rhythm, pace, speed, movement, contrasts between stillness and immobility, active 
staticity, and fast gestures, is particularly apt at illustrating the temporal dimension of a 
potential intersubjective, human and nonhuman, experience of embodiement, a truly 
heterochronian experience. When, as was the case in the Pina Bausch scenes described 
and analyzed above, this art form stages various human and nonhuman components of 
intersubjective embodiement, it becomes not only heterotopian but also heterochronian. 
Love-making may seem to have us loose ourselves to become more ourselves, with and 
in the other, and enable us to finally be here, but both love and dance, and probably many 
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other useless, unproductive (non-teleological) things allow us to be now, in a now that 
integrates the infinity of the pasts and infinity of the futures – note that I call love-making 
unproductive, weighing my words: most coital experiences are non-reproductive: any 
heteronormative reproductive-centered objections denied here. They are, however, 
creative: of pleasures, amorous sentiments, moments, etc. Thus if dance and its spiraling 
heterochronian movements is non-teleological, it is because it does not have an end to 
which the here and now would be subjected, as uchronia does: abstract, reifying, ever-
postponed (uchronian) goals that movements in the instant would be subservient to are 
irrelevant here. However one interesting thing to note here is that dance does have myriad 
directions: it eliminates goals in a strict teleological sense – in other words it eliminates 
telos in the sense of goal, though it uses and deploys direction – but it does perform the 
complex heterotopian and heterochronian fabric of life, over time, through time, in each 
moment of the choreography.  
 The dances Pina Bausch created highlight this point. This is not only, though it 
plays a tremendously important role, because stages are highly heterotopian and 
heterochronian, bringing together otherwise incompatible spaces in one effective location 
(in his essay on heterotopia, Foucault suggests that theaters are indeed a striking form of 
heterotopia). The soaked bodies and clothes of dancers who move in apparent trance 
inhabited both by heaviness and lightness, with rhythms, decelerations and accelerations, 
quick emphases and slow motion, through rain and puddles over rocks, the bodies 
carefully carrying trees, human bodies nonchalantly wagging their lion tails, underscore, 
in movement, with rhythm, pulsations, speeds, slowness, paces, accelerations, 
decelerations, stillness, agitation, that life cannot but contain all past, present and future 
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forces at each moment redistributed, including conflict, friction, love, humans and 
nonhumans. Here synchrony is clearly not a matter of matter synchronizing gestures, but 
one of forces constantly re-distributed: Bausch’s dancers, in the pieces I described above, 
rarely give their bodies identical movements at identical moments. Contrary to more 
conventional forms of dance like classical ballet, these dances rarely have dancers all 
execute the same movement at the same time. As Deleuze has pointed out, the eternal 
return, evoked through these synchronic temporalities, is not the return of the identical or 
some kind of simple sameness, but instead it is the return of all differences, the return of 
return, of what differs, which is why it is also the condition for time to pass, for becoming 
to continuously come into being. In dance, synchrony is not about identity of movement 
but about simultaneous, spiral-shaped struggles in many directions of many times at any 
given moment. The motif of the spiral is important, as it may provide a more capacious 
metaphor than Nietzsche’s “ring of sand” for the dance of life: the ring is imperfect in 
expressing the eternal return in part because it is strictly circular. It was useful to 
Nietzsche because it implied a closed universe where all forces continuously flowed and 
eventually traversed the exact same point, repeating their course an infinity of times. But 
this same motion can be envisioned, with the same grains of sand (evocative also, as 
some passages in Nietzsche attest, of the hourglass) flowing and returning eternally yet 
doing so in endless spirals, like a snake biting its tail.  
Bausch proceeded by metaphors: in one dancer ever so carefully carrying (or 
being lifted) by a fragile tree, in rain, water and on rocks shedding droplets that 
underscore movement, we see or experience that “the body is the world.” Heterotopian 
when it dances the metaphors of Pina Bausch, the body is shown to contain, 
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synchronically, simultaneously, all the parts. And again, heterotopian and heterochronian 
bodies, like heterotopias and heterochronias at large, have this property that enables them 
to reveal all spaces and all times as containing all others: they proliferate and shed a 
heterotopian/heterochronian light on all things. The forces work together in tension and 
support, such that all effects are effects of myriad effects, and so on ad infinitum.  
Dance on, Zarathustra! 
 
This is probably why Nietzsche’s Zarathustra claimed that he considered any day when 
he hadn’t danced, a day wasted, and why he also asserted that “[he] would only believe in 
a god who knew how to dance” (2006, p. 29).67 It is in the “other dance song” of 
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra that we find one of the most striking iterations of 
Dionysos’ prophet staging his affirmation of life, along with the whispered presence of 
the thought of eternal return. Zarathustra then encounters life and dances with her, and, 
proceeding with metaphors, Nietzschean thought affirms the dance of life, and life 
activates the thought of the eternal return. The encounter and dance are both very sensual, 
a seductive game and playful dialog: life and Zarathustra seem both dance partners and 
lovers – after all, as was suggested above love and dance may be among the experiences 
that allow “other orders of things to glitter,” to access the body as heterotopia rather than 
utopia, “in love, the body is here” (Foucault, 2009). The “Other dance song” opens with 
the following amorous lines: “into your eyes I looked recently, oh life,” says Zarathustra. 
“I saw gold gleaming in your night eyes – my heart skipped a beat at this thrill” 
(Nietzsche, 2006, p. 181). Nietzsche evokes his protagonist’s “dance-drunken foot” 
                                                        
67 Maurice Béjart, who not unlike Pina Bausch, did his share in popularizing contemporary dance, once 
created an adaptation of Thus Spoke Zarathustra to the stage. However part of the beautiful temporality of 
this art form includes the fact that without a video recording, dance is lost (and conserved) to (and by) the 




(ibid.) and claims, in a literal heterotopia (the term, we may recall, comes from medical 
language and there it refers to the presence of an organ in an anomalous location of the 
body), that “a dancer has ears in his toes.” Zarathustra exclaims, addressing life: “I dance 
after you, and follow your trail using any clue” (p. 182).  
The “Other dance song” also stages the link between the ethical and ontological 
dimensions of the eternal return, the transvaluation of all values and the affirmation of 
life: both life and Zarathustra, caught in their amorous dance, are beyond good and evil. 
The passionate and tumultuous dance has Zarathustra oscillate between love and hatred: 
“you whose coldness ignites, whose hate is alluring … who would not hate you, you 
great binder, and winder, temptress, attemptress, and finder! Who would not love you, 
you innocent, ardent-one, wind-bride and child-eyed sinner!” (p. 181). Life, herself a 
protagonist in Nietzsche’s parables, engages with the protagonist of Nietzsche’s 
masterpiece in quasi S &M embraces, in what may be an allusion to the love experienced 
with Lou Salome and famously captured in a picture where she threatens Nietzsche and 
Paul Ree with a whip – or would it be the picture that is an allusion to Zarathustra and 
life’s dance? Whatever the case may be, Zarathustra says to life:  
I am truly tired of always playing your sheepish shepherd pal! You witch, if I 
have so far sung for you, now you for me will – yell! To the beat of my whip you 
will dance so and yell so! But did I forget the whip? – oh no! (p. 182)  
To which life replies,  
covering her dainty little ears: Oh Zarathustra! Please do not crack your whip so 
fearfully! Surely you know: noise murders thoughts – and just now the most 
tender thoughts are coming to me (p. 182).   
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Life goes on: “we are both a real do-no-goods and do-no-evils. Beyond good and evil we 
found our island and our green meadow – we too alone” (p. 182). Life, along with the 
figure that will announce the thought of the eternal return, transvalues all values. Shortly 
after Zarathustra whispers something in life’s ear, something which we may deduce is the 
thought of the eternal return. To this, life exclaims: “you know that, Zarathustra? No one 
knows that” (p. 183).     
In the first dance song, Zarathustra had asked dancing girls: “how could I be 
hostile toward godlike dancing, you light ones?” In “the Other Dance Song” however, 
gods are absent, and life, immanent and engaged in its playful, joyful and light dance, 
activates the thought of thoughts, whispered in her ear by Zarathustra. His joining in the 
dance is a parable for how thought affirms life, and for what amor fati would look like: 
an engagement, espousing in and of the creative dance of life. Only in dance does 
Zarathustra “know how to speak the parables of the highest things” (p. 86). Or so he 
claims.  
We may still need an attempt to clarify this parable however: in so doing I turn to 
Gilles Deleuze’s interpretation for support. Deleuze opens an essay on Nietzsche (2013) 
with the three metamorphoses of the spirit staged in Zarathustra, which not only rely on 
human and nonhuman figures, but can enlighten our purposes here: first the camel, who 
carries the heavy weight of established values, to then transform into a lion, who breaks 
all the idols and stomps on the values, and finally the child, who through play, can begin 
again, creating new values with a new, different principle. Nietzsche, in Deleuze’s 
reading, asserts the fundamental unity of thought and life: again, life activates thought 
and thought affirms life. In other words, as Deleuze puts it, “our modes of living inspire 
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our modes of thinking, and our modes of thinking create modes of living” (2013, p. 18). 
However, with the triumph of slave mentality, “a spirit of heaviness that unites reactive 
and depreciated life and negative and depreciating thought” has come to predominate. 
Extracting ourselves from this means creating. As Deleuze and Guattari have claimed in 
What Is Philosophy? (2013), art creates percepts and affects, while philosophy creates 
concepts. For instance, the art form of dance may stage the dance of life, including Pina 
Bausch’s figures of human dancers nonchalantly wagging their nonhuman lion’s tails, 
with a provocative smile and fleeting wink in the eye, a playfulness prefiguring a possible 
transformation into childlike play and creation, from destroying values to creating new 
ones based on new, life-affirming principles. In Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, “creating 
means lightening, liberating life from its load, inventing new possibilities of life. The 
creator is legislator – dancer” (Deleuze, 2013, p. 20). Indeed, Nietzsche regularly 
opposes, on the one hand, the creator and the dancer (two figures or facets also incarnated 
by the child resulting from the three metamorphoses), to the slave mentality, reactive 
forces, nihilism, on the other. Nihilism has required of life that it justifies itself, that it 
compensates for the suffering present in it, and, going even further, it has made suffering 
a justification of life, a way to redeem it. Once we shed the weight of old values, we may 
finally engage fully with the eternal return, espouse the dance of life, lightly and playfully 
creating. Thus the struggle, to unite thought and life again, to engage in it with amor fati, 
should not be confused with a passive fatalism or acceptance, submission to the real as it 
is: “the real, as it is, is precisely what the values have made of reality!,” exclaims Deleuze 
(p. 22). Teleological temporalities of progress (what I have called uchronia) have 
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weighed on life for long enough, and we may not accept the reality it claims any longer, 
if new ecochronian temporalities erupt from and with Gaia’s dance. 
Dance and play are crucial to the Nietzschean project of affirming life. When 
Zarathustra joins life in a sensual dance, the tragic, Dionysian spirit, the thought of the 
eternal return who enters in a conversation with life, at last. Thus he whispers the thought 
in life’s ear. What then, might this dance tell us in terms of temporalities of 
transcorporeality, or ecochronias? As we saw in the previous chapter, geoengineering 
arguments are tied to teleological (conservationist) visions of nature as corresponding to 
Gaia in its Holocene, human-habitable form, understood as a stable, reliable and 
predictable background, in addition to values, like growth, dictated by business as usual, 
are presumed to be equatable to the good, to a healthy economy. Ecochronias, on the 
other hand, do not have a blueprint or program, but affirm the openness, surprise, 
contingency of time, and the simultaneity of all times past, present and future in each 
moment. Queer kinships may proliferate, ones that are not tied to the real as it is, as the 
utopian and uchronian real subjects us to values weighing heavily on creation and 
preventing the affirmation of life. Readiness to face even extinction (and we could also 
re-write yet another IPCC scenario descriptions accordingly), to draw animal footprints in 
the sand around our dancing feet, Chthulucene multiplicity and contingency, would make 
for part of the substance of ecochronias, so we may finally experience the here and now, 
knowing and feeling that it is radically inclusive of all forces of the past and future, ad 
infinitum. Armed with ecochronias, we may ask “what is being done?,” and imagine 
many futures including possible ones that may not seem so probable but offer more 
 
 393 
livable lives than the abstract promises of uchronia do. In the Chthulucene dance, all 







The pages above have sought to displace depictions of certain radical green politics as 
belonging to a placeless and timeless, ideal place and time: characterizing these as 
utopian and uchronian is both a strategic mistake and inaccurate. Reciprocally, I have 
argued that, instead, it is the unsustainable paces and directions of growth-driven, 
capitalocentric progress that belong to uchronia and utopia. The concepts I have 
developed here aim to help rethinking temporalities in a context of extinction, so as to 
turn the tables and accuse capitalist times and spaces of corresponding to idealized, 
placeless and timeless, times and places. The distinctions offered by the conceptual 
framework I have sought to build aim to enable seeing “other possible orders of things” 
(Foucault, 2014) as they have developed, are currently developing, will and could further 
proliferate, not deeming these unrealistic on the basis of their alleged improbability, a 
measure often assessed based on established values inapt in facing ecological limits.  
This turning the tables is both complicated and hopefully simplified, made more 
effective and clearer with the concepts I have deployed and the distinctions they seek to 
render possible. Simply put, hegemonic temporalities of progress, growth, linear and 
futurist teleologies that subject the present and concrete futures to an abstract futurity that 
will not come, are not as inevitable as they may seem, and in fact it is they that belong to 
the non-realistic, the absurd, delusional deliriums. Anti-uchronian critique makes it 
possible to see that the reign of growth is and will continue to be collapsing on itself, 
while taking limits into account would require ecochronian experiences and 
understandings of time to proliferate. 
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Neither Presentism Nor Futurism: What Is Being Done, What Can Be Played 
 
I have proposed an original contribution insofar as my argument draws from queer 
temporalities and from the Nietzschean eternal return to position itself against 
utopianism. The stakes are high, as again, calling a particular political or philosophical 
(or both) project “utopian” determines its situation with respect to the real, and to what is 
deemed realistic or probable. If geoengineers and carbon markets’ true believers continue 
to bow on the altar of growth, continue to hold on to teleological visions of the human 
and the natural, I contend that we may head toward future worlds where lives (be they 
human or nonhuman or hybrid) would hardly be livable, and the air hardly breathable. 
Though a possible, perhaps even (sadly) probable outcome, this does not seem to be the 
only possibility. A Chthulucene, heterochronian and synchronic possibility does not only 
seem more realistic when it comes to livability: in fact, it also may be more appealing. 
This displacing of capitalocentric temporalities as in fact uchronian while green politics 
call for their own new and possible temporal orders of things has a number of important 
consequences.  
We have seen in the last chapter above that synchronic temporalities that stage, at 
the same time, in one moment (long or short), seemingly incompatible times, are rich in 
bringing images of the human and the nonhuman together and underscoring the 
transcorporeality that challenges their delimitations. I have introduced heterochronia and 
synchrony through the performing arts, through my parodic re-writing of another possible 
modeling climatological scenario that may playfully assess climate change and which 
possibility – whether improbable or not – we may face the crisis with, through 
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heterotopian architecture and spiralesque dances and oikos. What would it mean to join 
life in its dance and affirm it, à la Zarathustra, at each moment?  
First it would entail shifting questions, as I have mentioned, from “what is to be 
done?” to “what is being done?” (Gibson-Graham and Roelvink, 2010) or “what can be 
played?” (Foucault, 1996) and also proliferating possibilities by expanding imaginaries 
that would not be subjected to the probable: ecotopian science fiction, now-topian, 
already existing alternative economies, may be sought now and imagined as generalizing 
in the futures, in defiance to what is usually presented as more likely given realities 
which values we – anti-uchronians – may not share. Ecochronia is thus neither presentist 
nor futurist, but brings to light alternatives now and dares imagine what is deemed 
unimaginable for myriad futures. Knowing, thanks to anti-uchronian critique, that the 
total destruction that could possibly result from hubristic geoengineering experiments or 
nihilistic convictions that growth is the only à-venir there is, is no more imaginable than 
more seemingly idealistic life-affirming alternatives: one is unacceptable and unbearable, 
the other is deemed less probable but may be more bearable and give currently 
endangered humans and nonhumans more of a chance.  
Put differently, the conceptual framework I have proposed above seeks to feed 
into a project of transformation where the improbable is not so hastily equated to the 
impossible, where non-capitalist present and future realities and potentialities are not so 
quickly confined to utopia, elsewheres and other times. This transformation would entail 
that the times outside of time towards which (capital) speculative desires orient 
themselves capitulate under reversed accusations of unrealizability, and the suggestive, 
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propositional, improvisational and creative supplants the programmatic, while the 
planet’s limits are taken into account and imaginaries are not assumed to be limited. 
Sustaining Synchrony 
 
The synchrony I have proposed above results from nearing extinction, from a heightened 
experience of becoming, of time passing only because every moment contains all past 
and future forces constantly re-organized. This synchrony, astutely staged by the dances 
of Pina Bausch, implies a radical ethical shift which has important consequences on how 
sustainability may be conceptualized.  
I have explained, in chapter 2, that the environmentalist concept of future 
generations changes our relationship to futurity insofar as the future takes on both a 
different affective charge and a different object: from uchronian futurism to future 
generations’ futurity, abstract and impossible hopes for endless growth are replaced with 
a concern for the concrete livabilities of human and nonhuman future lives. Similarly, if 
we weigh all our actions and all phenomena that affect us against the provocative 
question posed by the Nietzschean demon, asking ourselves whether we would engage in 
each moment were it to repeat ad infinitum, sustainability changes both object and 
means. The sustainability preached by mainstream environmentalisms like that of the 
IPCC or geoengineering advocates would, de facto, have us sustain a specific mode of 
production taken for the end of history, and deploy technofixes to do so (geoengineering, 
more windmills, solar panels to sustain the same or even more unrealistic levels of 
consumption, i.e all sorts of miracle technologies for all sorts of continuations of growth). 
Meanwhile, a synchronic version of sustainability would seek to sustain an ethical 
attitude, and it would do so by collapsing means and ends: if each moment integrates all 
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other past and future moments, if there is no doer behind the deed, if we are to ask the 
value of all values, then no small action (Deleuze, 2013, p. 30) which value may only 
come to be realized as a means to an end encountered in an abstract future, a postponed 
moment, can be justified in this uchronian manner.  
In other words, at the level of each action and moment, this ethical perspective 
may radicalize a concept like sustainability to require that no mediocre or ecologically 
damaging action be exempt of being weighed against the unbearable lightness of 
becoming. What we would then sustain, is a readiness and openness to contingency and 
becoming, to radical difference in each instant. What returns is the diverse, difference, 
becoming, and if that is the case, then each time our forces engage with all others is a 
time of heightened intensity where the livability of future lives is taken into account. 
Fostering this ethical state is about creating diverse, life-affirming presents and futures. 
The eternal return makes the concrete, material infinite connectedness between past, 
present and future inescapable: this implies that present and future generations of humans 
and nonhumans cannot but be virtually present in each step “we” take, radicalizing also 
the concept of responsibility toward future generations, playfully inventing queer 
kinships (Haraway, 2015). 
Future Generations and Queer Kinships 
 
This indeed would be a third implication of the distinctions I have attempted to make by 
deploying the above battery of concepts: firstly, critiquing uchronia for what it is – 
contingent and fragile in spite of its idealization and ever-postponed impossible promises, 
and opening up possibilities for other temporal orders of things, entails a change of 
questions from ‘what is to be done’ to ‘what is being done’ and ‘what can be played,’ and 
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a refusal of both presentism and futurism. Secondly, sustainability changes means and 
object: no more sustaining one single mode of production out of a principle which value 
is taken for granted, no more subjecting actions of today as mere means to a postponed 
impossible promise’s fulfillment. Thirdly, if we have seen in chapter 2 that the 
environmentalist notion of responsibility future generations changed the nature of futurity 
away from uchronia’s abstract desire for growth to more concrete concerns for future 
lives’ livabilities, we may add a particular stress on Haraway’s concept of queer kinships 
(which I also mentioned in chapter 2). This is not in lieu of the more generic and 
commonly mobilized notion of future generations, but rather adding further nuance and 
precision to this concept. Future generations must include nonhumans and humans, and 
concerns for them must take the form of an audacious gaze into difficult problems, 
including the problem of limits (now and later). The notion of queer kinships provides a 
positive formulation to limits in terms of population, and underscores that, when it comes 
to future generations, less is indeed more: endeavoring to make our and their lives livable 
entails less abundance in numbers. As Donna Haraway puts it:  
“Make Kin” and “Not Babies” are both hard; they both demand our best 
emotional, intellectual, artistic, and political creativity, individually and 
collectively, across ideological and regional differences, among other differences. 
… Evidence of many kinds, epistemologically and affectively comparable to the 
varied evidence for rapid climate change, shows that 7-11 billion human beings 
make demands that cannot be borne without immense damage to human and 
nonhuman beings across the earth. …These issues demand difficult, unrelenting 
work; but they also demand joy, play, and response-ability to engage with 
 
 400 
unexpected others. All parts of these issues are much too important for Terra to 
hand them over to the right or to development professionals or to anybody else in 
the business-as-usual camps. Here's to Odd Kin—non-natalist and off-category! 
(Haraway, 2015, p. 164) 
If the ethics described above is so demanding, the example of its implications for kinship 
and future generations is indeed telling of these challenging exigencies: the question of 
future generations cannot take the form of a reproductive futurism where 
(hetero)normative pressures incite to fetishize the Child, because such pressures would 
destroy the conditions of life of future humans and nonhumans. Our current condition 
requires a transformation of values and norms where we would not only learn to care for 
present and future human and nonhuman generations in new ways, but where we would 
also value these concerns qualitatively rather than by equating growing to health – 
distancing ourselves from uchronia toward ecochronias. Continuing to make demands on 
a situation which demands completely otherwise would be ‘stupidity,’ as Stengers has 
helped us grasp. ‘Make kin, not kids!’ and many other seemingly impossible yet 
necessary (at least if humans and myriad currently threatened species are to be given a 
chance) calls, may have to proliferate to envision drastically different futurities than the 
uchronian horizons we have been offered so far. 
Heterotopia and Heterochronia as a Challenge to the Disciplines 
 
One last, formal question remains of note, one that I have not been able to elaborate upon 
it above. In order to deploy my concepts of uchronia, anti-uchronia, regressive and 
progressive counter-uchronia, hyper-uchronia, heterochronia, synchrony and ecochronia, 
I have drawn from existing graffiti art, dance and circus performances, science fiction, 
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climatological reports, activist videos and manifestos. The variety of sources used aimed 
to underscore that questions on temporalities are omnipresent in environmental 
discourses, across disciplines and genres, calling for more critical reflection on the 
subject. In current environmental political theory, more and more attempts are made to 
cross disciplinary boundaries and draw from science studies as well as the humanities, 
while the latter ones are questioned alongside the anthropos who also animates, for 
instance, present geological debates. It it is without doubt in heterotopian reflections 
bringing together myriad discourses usually not expected to cohabit, that we may find 
uchronia is not the only temporal horizon: different than an interdisciplinary endeavor, 
my close readings of these texts could be described as giving a heterotopian form to my 
defense of ecotopias and ecochronias. My argument thus intervenes in a vibrant context 
where art, science, politics meet. In fact we may note that if heterotopias have the unusual 
property of making other orders of things glitter in that they create spaces which 
peculiarity is to connect to all other spaces, recent challenges to the disciplines in 
academic and activist realms (from Rosi Braidotti’s reflection on posthumanities – 2010 
–  to the emergence of whole interdisciplinary fields like science and technology studies) 
tend to show that politics, science, the arts, literature, etc were never so separate as the 
disciplines had purported to make them. The relationship between science, politics, and 
art is not something I could thematize within the argument developed above, but the form 




O man, take care! 
What does the deep midnight declare? 
"I was asleep— 
From a deep dream I woke and swear:— 
The world is deep, 
Deeper than day had been aware. 
Deep is its woe— 
Joy—deeper yet than agony: 
Woe implores: Go! 
But all joy wants eternity— 
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